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Public policy is "what governments do, why they do it, and what
difference it makes."' It also gives rise to the most vague, fragmented,
and inconsistent notions at work in our law today What public policy
means and does can only be described at a sweepingly general level,3
1. T. DYE. POLICY ANALYSIS 1 (1976).
2. Public policy "is a catch phrase elusive of meaning without reference to
the context in which it is used." Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate, 2
Cardozo L. REV. 481, 483 (1981). See A. ETZIONI. SOCIAL PROBLEMS. 25-26 (1976); infra note
3. At the Brookings Institute, the
word "policy" was repeated as often as a blind man swings a cane before
him. Yet, wherever you searched for government policy, you discovered
there was none. In science, education, welfare, nutrition, energy, health,
and social services, the situation was always the same; there was no con-
sistent comprehensive policy, but instead, many inconsistent, spotty policies.
Each arena had its own constituencies, programs, and statutes ....
Orlans, An Anthropologist Without a Tribe, 50 AM. SCHOLAR 465, 474-75 (1981). See G.
SAWER, OMBUDSMEN 18 (2d ed. 1968) ("We have all, Micawber-like, been waiting for
something to turn up"); infra note 28 and accompanying text. The policy arena
reverberates with Saul Bellow's Great Noise: the noise of technology, money, adver-
tising, miseducation, and the "terrible excitement and distraction generated by the
crises of modern life . . . . Contributing to it are real and unreal issues, ideologies,
rationalizations, errors, delusions, nonsituations that look real, nonquestions demand-
ing consideration, opinions, analyses in the press, on the air, expertise, inside dope,
a factional disagreement, official rhetoric .. " Savaging the Schools, NEW REPUBLIC,
May 5, 1982, p. 7, at p. 9 (quoting Bellow). See A. ETZIONI, at 25-26 (quoted infra note 3).
3. Policies are "tentative theories-about the nature of social processes and
the working of social institutions .... " Majone, The Feasibility of Social Policies, 6
POL'Y SCI. 49, 50 (1975). See A. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 60. Some groups and individuals-
particularly those nominally private "persons" that are large corporations-do, of course,
exert considerable influence on public policy. See, e.g., C. LINDBLOM. THE POLICYMAKING
PROCESS 72-89 (2d ed. 1980). Policy is made when a decision is meant to govern recurring
situations, and where a concern with resolving competing values is expressed. Mar-
cus, Synthesis-Contributions of Economics and the Law to Administration, in
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY 336, 338 (P. LeBreton, ed. 1968). All policies "are
regulatory in nature. Whether they are individually described as promotional, facilitative,
restrictive, directive, mandatory, or whatever, their broad purpose is to induce people
to conduct themselves in accord with governmentally prescribed goals and standards."
Anderson, Public Economic Policy and the Problem of Compliance, in LAW AND CHANGE
IN MODERN AMERICA 110 (J. and M. Grossman, eds. 1971).
Inevitably, lawyers have also tried their hand at defining public policy. While
it plays a larger role in French law (as, e.g., bonnes moeurs, ordre public), some find
public policy to be "peculiarly English," the "particular genius" of the common law.
D. LLOYD, PUBLIC POLICY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW 5 (1953)
(citing Gutteridge and Ren6 David). A far less sanguine view is offered by Baron Parke,
in Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H.L. Cas. 1, 123 (1853): "Public policy is a vague and
unsatisfactory term, and calculated to lead to uncertainty and error, when applied
to the decision of legal rights. ... This contrasts sharply with the view of public
policy held by one of its chief American architects, Justice Cardozo: policy is synonymous
with "social welfare," the "good of the collective body" achieved through an expediency
or prudence, and an adherence to the community mores found in religion, ethics, and
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yet almost everyone concludes that particular policies have failed us
miserably since at least World War II. Our policy landscape is "lit-
tered with [such] multi-million dollar wrecks"4 as the Army's new
Abrams battletank and the War on Poverty. In the words of Eugene
Meehan, "the United States has provided . . . an appalling example
of the bankruptcy of human imagination in the presence of great
material prosperity and . . . some of the strongest evidence available
in history for assuming an inability to handle wealth with foresight,
intelligence, and humaneness. ' 5 This is a damning yet fair indictment
of the fallout from New Deal and Great Society reforms. An explo-
sion in statutory reform after World War II prompted a revolution
of rising expectations in governments' ability to solve our problems.
However, a deep disillusion set in during the 1970's, when people
realized that a problem cannot be resolved simply by throwing money
at it and by enacting any old law.' The media give examples 7 daily
of the policy stupidity evident in the state of our schools, prisons,
mental institutions, and many other administrative arms of
government.
society's sense of justice. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CORDOZO 107, 135 (M. Hall, ed. 1947). See also Symmons,
The Function and Effect of Public Policy in Contemporary Common Law, 51 AUSTL.
L.J. 185, 198 (1977) (quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881)): "The very considera-
tions which the courts rarely mention and always with an apology, are the secret
root from which the law draws all the juices of life. . . . Every important principle
which is developed by litigation is . . . the result of more or less definitely understood
views of public policy."
4. A. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 61. But see id. at 25-26 (quoting Ben Wattenberg's
distinctly minority view): The policy correctives needed are more of the same, and
"the major danger today is only that we will be catch-phrased and crisis-mongered
to death before all is done."
5. E. MEEHAN, REASONED ARGUMENT IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 190 (1981). As in Viet-
nam, we "stagger through history like a drunk putting one disjointed incremental foot
after another." A. ETZIONI. supra note 2, at 87-88 (quoting Kenneth Boulding). See A.
WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS 4 (1979)
(quoted infra note 28 and accompanying text); Beer, The Idea of the Nation, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 19 and 26, 1982, 23, at 29 (emphasis supplied): "Considering where we
started from some thirty years ago, our progress has been substantial. Still, few will
assert that our statecraft-from poverty programs to affirmative action to busing-
has been adequate to the objective. This problem still awaits its Alexander Hamilton."
See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
6. See T. DYE, supra note 1, at 95; R. EYESTONE, FROM SOCIAL ISSUES TO PUBLIC
POLICY 30 (1978) (just as there are business cycles, there seem to be cycles of
governmental - including judicial - activism and quietism, or optimism and pessimism,
based on shifting expectations about governments' abilities and shifting perceptions
of social needs); E. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUES 267-68 (1973) (dashing of a "relativistic"
political logic and of hopes raised by Kennedy, and emergence of public perceptions
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The cumulative effects of so many policy blunders are stagna-
tion, paralysis, and a growing public distrust of government and of
its claims to expertise Some lawyers, politicians, and policy analysts
are busy trying to figure out what exactly is going wrong. This arti-
cle is a modest contribution to their efforts, an examination of how
some of these policy blunders have come about. I will argue that
decisionmakers pose policy alternatives in an unnecessarily polariz-
ed, black-and-white fashion. There is far too little clear and hard think-
ing by lawyers, other social scientists, politicians, and political pressure
groups. Much of what passes for their thinking is a rather simple-
of an "evergrowing governmental mendacity"); C. WEISS AND M. BUCUVALAS, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH AND DECISIONMAKING 6 (1980); id. (public disappointment with social
scientists, especially economists, and their policies set in when the economic bubble
bursts); Beckman, Policy Analysis for the Congress, 37 PuB. AD. REV. 237, 243 (1977) ("The
recognition that good intentions have often fallen prey to messy problems of implemen-
tation, and at an enormous cost, has increased the level of skepticism within Con-
gress. ... ); Schick, Beyond Analysis, 37 PUB. AD. REV. 258 (1977). See also Hurst, The
Functions of the Courts in the United States, 15 L. AND SOC. REV. 401, 453 (1980-81): since
the innovative years of 1905-15, statutory law has loomed large "by direct impact and
by providing the base and framework within which executive and administrative agen-
cies added substance to public policy."
7. President Carter's land Nixon's, Ford's and Reagan's] energy "policies"
offer pointed examples of the almost infinite number of things that can go wrong in
the absence of a creative policy leadership, See, e.g., R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at
150-52; Carron, Congress and Energy: A Need for Policy Analysis and More, 2 POL'Y
ANAL. 283 (1976); Light, The Carter Administration's National Energy Plan, 7 POL'Y STUD.
J. 68 (1978). See, e.g., B. CASPER AND P. WELLSTONE, POWERLINE (1981) (decisions about
powerline routes through Minnesota stupidly and cruelly ignored farmer needs and
desires); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 5 (health policies have us doing better and feel-
ing worse, and, being neurotic about health, we insist on making government psychotic);
id. at 112 (quoting cartoon caption) ("Warning: fools in government want you to quit
smoking while they subsidize tobacco."). See also Gaylin, Skinner Redux, HARPER'S, Oct.,
1973, 48, at 54; Hoffman, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 1982, 37 (discussing Jean
Kirkpatrick's Commentary essay on totalitarian versus authoritarian states and the
State Department's White Paper on El Salvador):
What is most depressing is our apparent inability to learn. We went
through it in China in the 1940's, in Vietnam in the 1960's, and yet, like
Orwell's estimable horse in Animal Farm, we act as if previous disasters
resulted not from flawed premises, but from a mere failure to try hard
enough.
8. T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM xii, 71 (1969); Auerbach, The Relation of
Legal Systems to Social Change 1980 WIs. L. REV. 1227, 1333-36. See J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS
AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 262 (1978):
"Public skepticism of administrative expertise is part of a larger loss of faith in many
traditional sources of public and social authority . . . [and] a larger pattern of social
uneasiness over the impact . . . of large organizations, within both the public and
private sectors." This is a common problem in many countries, of course: see J. HABER-
MAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1976). See also infra notes 18, 255, and accompanying text.
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minded classifying-a pigeonholing, really. Faced with a square peg
and a round hole, theorists and decisionmakers alike are too quick
to reach for a penknife and to whittle off the sharp edges, rather
than trouble to ponder the nature of roundness and squareness. This
process usually involves their lazy acceptance of a small number of
legal categories, frequently two categories at a time: contract versus
the total absence of contract, for example, or the "right" to an abor-
tion versus the "right" to life. Such categories unnecessarily and
prematurely limit the search for policy alternatives; the most rele-
vant, realistic policy frequently escapes notice because it occupies a
gray area, an uneasy middle ground in what may be termed a false
dichotomy of black-and-white policy options.'
After an overview of the policy process, I will expand on these
arguments as they concern contract law, the CIA, and abortion. These
sections, II-IV, are lengthy, more or less self-contained studies of
significant policy controversies. Together they illustrate the major
weaknesses and defects in policy processes. These are discussed in
the "Conclusion," along with suggestions for reform.
I. THE POLICY PROCESS
Theorists, decisionmakers, and special interest groups meet, for
what we hope will be the pursuit of the public interest, in the arena
that can be termed the policy process. The arena includes traditional
legal processes, but it is larger, more amorphous,"0 and sometimes less
9. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
10. A policy "system," relatively fixed patterns of interaction in the arena
of government, exists apart from the "environment" and responds to environmental
stimuli. Ripley, et al., Policy Making: A Conceptual Scheme, AM. POL. Q. 3, 6 (1973); id.
at 8 (environment defined). See T. DYE, supra note 1, at 20: "The smoke-filled room where
patronage and pork were dispensed has been replaced with the talk-filled room, where
rhetoric and image are dispensed." See also Hurst, supra note 6; Stedman, Political
Parties, Interest Groups, and Public Policy, in THE POLICY VACUUM 135, 164 (R. Spadaro,
ed. 1975) (a rather extreme view) (what used to be called public law is now policy
politics). But see E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 195: There is no one place where all rele-
vant policy factors can be brought together and analyzed rationally. The first descrip-
tion of this amorphous system seems to be de Tocqueville's (quoted by A. MELONE,
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 3 (1979)): "Scarcely any political
question arises . . . that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question. .
• .The language of the law becomes ... a vulgar tongue... [and] gradually penetrates
... into the bosom of society .. "
Driven by a simple-minded conception of power, the legal realists sought to
transform all of law into policy. This attempt at a "legal nihilism" failed when a New
Deal reformism faded. Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship 1980 WiS. L. REV. 1383,
1384-87, More recent formulations, such as Frederick Beutel's Experimental
Jurisprudence, have similarly registered few successes: see Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis
or Ideology, 2 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 66, 82 (1972) (quoted infra note 25).
1984]
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savory than conventional systems of legal rules. Two analysts" have,
in fact, compared public policy to the lowly hot dog: the contents of
both can be adjusted to suit the tastes and budgets of producers and
consumers, and the acceptability of public policies and hot dogs alike
requires that the consumer remain ignorant of their precise content
and of the ways in which they are made. Policies nevertheless set
the "tone" for our legal system by providing growth points for future
legal development.12 This tone certainly reflects political directions-
even the Supreme Court is said to follow the election returns-but
lawmakers have also looked to scientists and social scientists (rather
than to philosophers or historians) for policy assistance. The hope has
been to "use our [cumulative] societal knowledge to lick our social
problems in the same way we conquered polio, tuberculosis, and
malaria."' 3 Social scientists should be able to identify and measure
social problems and the costs and benefits of alternative solutions,
and then to help society to steer a safe course through conflicting
goals and values, and between skepticism and dogma."
Unfortunately, the reality of social science contributions to
policymaking falls short of this promise. A glut of information yields
little social science knowledge that is reliable and even less of a
capacity to apply this knowledge systematically. Striving to be at the
center of things, policy analysis has no conceptual or political center
of its own. 5 Assertions that social science analyses are scientific-
rigorous, apolitical, and otherwise value-neutral-are seldom borne out
11. See A MELTSNER. POLICY ANALYSTS IN THE BUREAUCRACY 72 (1976); A.
WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 387 (observation tentatively attributed to a famous sausage-
fancier, Chancellor Birmarck).
12. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4 (1967) (quoting Car-
dozo on the judicial system, but comment applicable to policy generally). See Sym-
mons, supra note 3 (quoted supra note 3).
13. A. ETZIONI. supra, note 2, at 49. See, e.g. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); T. DYE, supra note 1, at 3. This hope reflects the fact that the origins of policy
"sciences" are the great successes registered during World War II by British and
American physical scientists acting outside their chosen fields. Tribe, supra note 10,
at 67. People are most reluctant to regard any social task as unmanageable. Institu-
tions are man-made and, seemingly, they can be manipulated to achieve any result.
Majone, supra note 2, at 50. The fact that we are "free to choose" (a phrase arguably
trivialized by the Friedmans) is the essence of policy. Denial of that freedom amounts
to a denial of responsibility, a willingness to allow things simply to happen. E.
SCHUMACHER. SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL 191-93 (1974).
14. T. DYE, supra note 1, at 96 (citing Alice Rivlin); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note
5, at 19. See Dror, Law as a Tool of Directed Social Change, in LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
75, 76-79 (S. Nagel, ed. 1970); infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
15. T. DYE, supra note 1, at 96, 107; A. ETZIONI, supra note 2 at 61; E. MEEHAN,
supra note 5, at 177; id at 178 (most social science "recommendations deserve to be
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in practice." Different and often contradictory rules for defining a
policy problem and its "best" solution are found in law, economics,
diplomacy, environmental planning, civil engineering, etc. Many of
these criteria are about as neutral as voter literacy tests were in the
Old South. For example, violent crime may be viewed as caused by:
a coddling of crooks, the inherently evil predisposition of people, racial
and ethnic discrimination and the impatience of minorities with the
pace of reform, urban disorganization and the disintegration of the
family, poor policing, alienation or anomie, incipient revolution,
lawlessness at the fringe of a "good" society, or almost any combina-
tion of the above. 7 Obviously, the policy prescription chosen for deal-
ing with crime will depend on which diagnosis is adopted. A policy
confusion and drift result when no consensus over diagnosis and treat-
ment is achieved among policymakers.
A. Conflict and Confusion
After the sun set on President Johnson's Great Society, deci-
sionmakers came increasingly to distrust policy "experts" such as those
found in the CIA. Congress, for example, continues to struggle with
its shortcomings almost alone, out of what Representative Mike
McCormack terms a sense of "confusion and frustration."'" In energy
ignored," given the high "survival capacity of pretentious nonsense"); Schick, supra
note 6, at 260.
16. The social scientists' claim to being scientific has been under attack for
many years. Much of their doctrine has been found to rest on reasonably (not con-
clusively) grounded empirical knowledge, plus professional and personal biases. C.
LINDBLOM, supra note 31, at 22. See, e.g., J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE. THE LEGAL SOURCES
OF PUBLIC POLICY 9 (1977); Wolf, Social Science and the Court; The Detroit Schools Case,
42 PUB. INTEREST 102 (1976); infra note 17 and accompanying text. The same can be said
of law and lawyers, of course. See A. MELONE. supra note 10, at 4. Policy analysts and
lawyers use prescientific, Aristotlean notions of causation. The causal variables are
only partly known, and things occur in a sequence of chain reactions with no simple
answer to when and how they end. Nevertheless, the Cartesian dream, extrapolated
from Newton's, is pursued: all is possible by subduing nature. Abelson, Definition,
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 314, 316 (P. Edwards, ed. 1967); E. MEEHAN, supra note
4, at 140; A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION OF CON-
TROL 158 (1981); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 59.
17. See C. LINDBLOM, supra note 3, at 22. It is impossible to define policy prob-
lems in an apolitical fashion. Values are fluid in social science (and in law), they affect
and are affected by policy decisions. A. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 84. Different and often
contradictory rules for identifying a policy problem, its solution, and evaluations of
a solution are to be found in law, economics, diplomacy, environmental planning, civil
engineering, etc. Anderson, The Place of Principles in Policy Analysis, 73 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 711, 714 (1979).
18. Quoted in Davidson, Congressional Committees, 2 POL'Y ANAL. 299, 308
(1976) (McCormack refers to energy policies, but comment applicable generally). The
19841
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legislation, public works projects, and many other areas, Congress
tends to "fly blind," without benefit of rigorous policy analysis, and
to rely on the executive, party leaders, and competing special interest
groups to keep a policy program consistent. Policy goals are often
confused because a program and its aims, if any, are poorly understood
by all of the parties concerned. Knowing not what it wants to do,
Congress frequently passes the buck to an administrative agency such
as the CIA, under broad delegations of power. Many policies wind
up in courts eventually, where vague opinions written to build majority
coalitions frequently ignore the problems of policy and its
implementation. 9
An inter-professional backbiting between lawyers and other social
scientists is much in evidence in attempts to deal with policy prob-
lems. For many social scientists, policy is much too important to be
left to the superabundance of lawyers whose analyses are not
trustworthy. ° Some lawyers respond with the kinds of criticisms of
social scientists I outline. All of this is unfortunate for the policy pro-
cess, which is always the first casualty in what are really fratricidal
wars between lawyers and other social scientists.21 There are many
similarities in the approaches of lawyers and other social scientists,
and the differences are or could be made fruitful for policy.22 It is
distrust of expertise is fueled by the failures of Great Society programs, especially
those concerning space and Vietnam, and, more recently, by defects in energy and
economic recovery programs. See Carron, supra note 6, at 293; Davidson, passim; Frye,
Congressional Politics and Policy Analysis, 2 POL'Y ANALYSIS 265, 266-67, 270-74 (1976);
Light, The Carter Administration's Energy Plan, 7 POL'Y STUD. J. 68 (1978); supra note
5; infra note 254 and accompanying text.
19. See G. EDWARDS, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY 39-40 (1980); Thurber, Con-
gressional Budget Reform and New Demands for Policy Analysis, 1 POL'Y STUD. REV.
AN. 404, 416-417 (S. Nagel, ed. 1977). E.g., the House Public Works Committee is no sim-
ple, porkbarrel operation; a modicum of loose policy analysis is utilized. Army Corps
of Engineers' cost/benefit analyses are adopted automatically, unless these are challenged
by railroads (which oppose river navigation) or utilities (which oppose public power
generation). Decisions are not based on the most favorable of cost/benefit ratios, but
on whether the favored program can be plausibly portrayed as having a 1:1 ratio over
time. Murphy, Political Parties and the Porkbarrel, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 169, 181-83
(1974). See. e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
20. E.g., J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note 16, at 5; Mayo and Jones, Legal-
Policy Decision Process, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 318, 378 (1964). See A. MELTSNER supra
note 11, at 219-20; Beckman, supra note 6 at 243; Carron, supra note 7, at 296; Frye,
supra note 18, at 281; Tribe, supra note 10, at 78.
21. J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note 16, at xv: conflicts between law and
policy studies lead to confusion, frustration and stalemate in devising and implementing
policies.
22. As H.L.A. Hart observed in his Inaugural Lecture:
In law as elsewhere, we can know and yet not understand. Shadows often
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 2
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commonly said, for example, that the social scientists' policy goal is
efficiency while the lawyers' is that of securing rights or justice. The
Chicago School of law and economics, and its critics, have had some
success in bridging this gap (or false dichotomy) of rights and effi-
ciency, but differences clearly remain. Is this so bad? Are rights always
the basis for policy or do we always seek efficient solutions? CIA
activities in the Shah's Iran and in Nicaragua today23 suggest that
neither efficiency nor rights are sought. What (.an be the objection
to a middle ground, a more efficient justice or a more just efficiency,
given that either state of affairs is in the public interest?24
obscure our knowledge which not only vary in intensity but are cast by
different obstacles to light. These cannot all be removed by the same
methods and until the precise character of our perplexity is determined
we cannot tell what tools we shall need.
H. HART, DEFINITION AND THEORY IN JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1953). See Rorty, Philosophy in
America Today, 51 AM. SCHOLAR 183, 192 (1982):
The ability to construct a good brief, or conduct a devastating cross-
examination, or find relevant precedents is similar to the ability that
analytical philosophers think of as distinctively philosophical . .. [the ability]
to see at a glance inferential relationships between all the members of
a bewilderingly large set or propositions.
Policy analysis
tends to downgrade what ought to be in policy for what is, indicates a
concern for the ex post facto explanation . . . . concentrates on specific
policies rather than the overall nature of policy, treats policy as the depen-
dent variable, essentially bypasses the symbolic for tangible or allocative
factors of public policy, and only partially tests feedback linkages.
Spadaro, Public Policy and the Political Scientist, in THE POLICY VACUUM 1, 12 (R.
Spadaro, et al., eds. 1975). Substitute "law" for "policy" in Spadaro's statement and
the characterization remains just as accurate. See E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 178-80;
M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 90 (1968) (courts and
agencies -and, I would add, lawyers and social scientists-strive "at least to appear
to satisfy an unrealistic norm of rationality"); J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note 16,
at 8; id. at 9 (in Beutel's Experimental Jurisprudence, law should be subject to the
same intellectual demands as social science with regard to isolating social problems,
identifying law's actual effects, and explaining the reasons for changed behavior); C.
WEISS AND J. BUCHVALIS, supra note 6, at 263-65, 268; Orlans, supra note 2 (quoted supra
note 2).
23. See infra notes 130, 156, 164 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN. THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
63-64 (1975); J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 113-15 (1964) (justice only one virtue among many; it
comes into play in only two specific instances, yet it is the epitome of legal morality);
Murphy, Liberalism and Political Society, 26 AM. J. OF JURISPRUDENCE 125, 130-32 (1981)
(Dworkin's notion that rights prevail over policy reflects liberals' atomistic conception
of social life, in which policies are not taken seriously); Stedman, supra note 10 (discussed
supra note 10); Tribe, supra note 10, at 82 (quoted infra note 25). Compare Michelman,
Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, passim
(1978) (efficiency should be a tie-breaker, used when other policy considerations are
satisfied or evenly balanced) with Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law,
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The pride and joy of many lawyers is that they deal with what
judges and (other) politicians actually do, rather than with what these
politicians say or, heaven forbid, with what social scientists say politi-
cians do. This realism often proves refreshing: politicians do not always
put their laws or their money where their mouths are, as the "pro-
family" policies of the Carter and Reagan Administrations"
illustrate- but, unfortunately, lawyers' approaches fail to capture the
flavor of much policy. Many policies are embodied in laws which are
enforced grudgingly, if at all, and which lose out during battles of
the budget. Consider Prohibition. These salient aspects of a legal
effectiveness tend to be studied by social scientists other than
lawyers.26
46 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, passim (1979) (efficiency should be the policy goal unless and until
there is a consensus to the contrary). But see, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUS-
LY 90-99 passim (1977); A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).
Some would argue that we are unable to determine whether an efficient justice
or a just efficiency is better, where these lead to different results, but this argument
makes the best policy into the enemy of a merely better policy: "To justify any policy
recommendation, one must argue that it is, in some sense, 'in the public interest,' that
it is consistent with lawful rights, that it is fair and efficient in the use of resources."
Anderson, supra note 17, at 713 (emphasis supplied). It is precisely because this is
so difficult a task that insights should be gleaned eclectically from law, social sciences,
and, indeed, anywhere else: "To diagnose the human condition is relatively easy
[although some] may dispute the conclusions or inferences drawn from known facts.
. ..It is another thing to prescribe .. .policies that are both desirable and feasible."
A. MILLER. supra note 16, at 155.
25. See infra notes 528-36 and accompanying text.
26. See Hurst, Legal Elements in United States History, in LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 3, 29-36, 60-64 (D. Fleming and B. Bailyn, eds., 1971) (legal records are solid
evidence of what governments do because of the time, money, and, sometimes, courage
required to invoke law; but these records are unrepresentative of what happens to,
e.g., the poor; and the records say little about the appropriateness of policy judgments
or the extent to which they are put into practice); L. LEDERMAN AND M. WINDUS,
FEDERAL FUNDING AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES 4 (1971) (governments act primarily through
legislation, regulations and court decisions, yet allocations of budgetary resources ap-
pear to be the best reflection of goals and priorities); J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra
note 16, at 138-40 (most laws are only partially enforced-government being forced
to settle for less than the law requires-because of the sheer bulk of law, cumber-
some adjustments to new rules, overwork and understaffing, negotiated pleas and con-
sent decrees, etc.); Schick; supra note 6, at 259; infra note 528 and accompanying text.
Lawyers have difficulty dealing with underenforced, underfunded policies, the effects
of which are chiefly symbolic: e.g., "a 'war on poverty' may not have any significant
impact on the poor, but it reassures moral men, the affluent as well as the poor, that
government 'cares' about poverty." T. DYE, supra note 1, at 20. See id. at 97. But a sym-
bolic program sometimes becomes "real" over time, if constituent groups emerge to
take its policies seriously. Laws can also have paradoxical effects, creating incen-
tives to do the opposite of what good policy requires. This happened with regard to
Prohibition, and to the Health Systems Agency Act of 1974 and its policies of decreas-
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A result-oriented, client-centered behavior is nevertheless typical
both of lawyers and those social scientists who apply their knowledge
to policy analysis. Both groups can use their expertise to prompt
significant changes in society, but theirs is a by-and-large conservative
influence. Both groups emphasize restraint, stability and predictability,
in an effort to make sense of the relentless tinkering that seems to
inhere in our politics, in our fondness for do-it-yourself projects, and
in other facets of our national character.27
We are left with precious little more than the cumulative side-
effects from so much tinkering: that is, policy as its own cause. As
Aaron Wildavsky observes:
The more the nation attempted to control public policy, the
less control there seemed to be. [Accompanying the] expand-
ing public sector was the feeling that unintended conse-
quences were overwhelming the ability to cope. . . .The
larger each policy grows in its own sector, the more it in-
sinuates itself into the man-made environment with which
we must contend.
More and more public policy is about coping with the con-
sequences of past policies ... "
The policy process draws strength and autonomy from the rich
inner life of the agencies that administer and seek to perpetuate it.
ing costs and improving the delivery of health care. A. WILDAVSKY. supra note 5, at
302-05.
27. See J. SHKLAR supra note 24, at 106 (expressing the judicial creed, judges
choose among political values, and usually in favor of stability, predictability and the
impersonal administration of rules); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 4 (bureaucracies-
where lawyers and policy analysts figure prominently-are "at once the strongest
stokers and and the most determined dampers of changes"); Beckman, supra note 5,
at 243 (policy analysis tends to encourage "restraint and skepticism"); Tushnet, supra
note 9, at 1387 (tinkering causes difficulties to migrate elsewhere, and it gives policy
a conservative cast because a complex society does not readily submit to rational con-
trol). See also M. FREEMAN. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 8 (1974):
Legal stability is the source of both strength and weakness. It enables
the legal order to adapt itself smoothly and efficiently to varied cir-
cumstances. But there is a danger that it does this by excessive limita-
tion to a narrow range of policies, divorced from the living context in
which the concept arose.
28. A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 4. See C. LINDBLOM, supra note 3, at 4: policies
to curb the CIA are required "largely because of prior decisions to use these agencies
to implement national security policy. From the seedbed of implementation, new policy
problems grow and are plucked for the agenda." See also R. EYESTONE. supra note 6,
at 60-61; supra note 2; infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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For example, national security is nowhere defined in our laws; it usual-
ly means what the CIA chooses to do in the name of national security.'
Tradeoffs among various policies are inevitable: cleaner water winds
up meaning dirtier air or land, among many other things. The cur-
rent popularity of the "free" market as the policy solution ignores
the facts that most markets never were free and are less so today
because of governments' numerous policy interventions, particularly
those that some liberals term corporate welfare policies. Having in-
tervened, we cannot but intervene again lest another Depression or
another Cuba result. But we seldom know where policy intervention
will take us, or why. Interrelated policy, political and socio-economic
changes frequently upset the few priorities Americans manage to set
for themselves through democratic processes."
B. The (II)logic of the False Dichotomy
Lawyers who examine the policy process are entitled to feel a
bit depressed, for policy analysis shows law-jobs to be as difficult as
they are important. How can problems of law and policy be cut down
to size without treating them simplistically or, what amounts to the
same thing, molding them into false dichotomies? Efforts here have
been Herculean and successes few. Institutional arrangements and
special rules of logic have been used to restrict what is considered,
and how. Many budgetary processes, administrative agencies, interest
29. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
30. F. FROHOCK, PUBLIC POLICY 47-48 (1979); A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 164
(the "aspirin" theory of public policy-problems are "headaches" amenable to the "quick
fix" - has many adherents); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 4, at 62-65, 78 (inter alia, activities
of the ICC and CAB offer many e.g.s of the solution becoming the problem; policy
interdependence grows faster than knowledge, and the ability to affect other govern-
mental policies is greater than the ability to affect society); C. WEISS AND M.
BUCUVALAS. supra note 6, at 275 ("It is difficult to discern the origin of the initial [policy]
idea, its nomadic course through bureaucratic warrens, its permutations, perturbations,
and shifts of focus"); Mayo and Jones, supra note 20, at 360-62 (discussing Lindblom's
ideas). See Light, supra note 18, at 70: (citing an article by Rossi and Wright):
A theorist may rely on market forces distorted by public policy induced
incentives and disincentives to achieve desired outcomes. But there are
usually missing links in the theoretical chain. . . . One has only to look
at the horrendous implementation problems associated with the "controlled"
experimental studies on income maintenance and housing allowances to
discover how silly simple economic concepts can look when confronted
with the complexity and subtlety of a social context.
See also R. EYESTONE. supra note 6, at 123-24: a long series of incremental changes in
public housing policies increased their complexity while decreasing their effectiveness.
Congress gave up and turned to "market" solutions by private developers, who took
the profits and left the FHA (and the poor) "holding the bag."
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groups, and legal rules exist almost solely to truncate the range of
viable policy options. Separation of powers and administrative hierar-
chies in our federal system reinforce each decisionmaker's jealous
maintenance of her policy "turf."31 Pointed illustrations are found in
the squabbles within the CIA, and between it and other governmen-
tal organs."
The marvelous system Chief Justice Coke termed "the artificial
reason of the law"33 is used to simplify, and to oversimplify, analyses.
There is a need to avoid distractions where the guidelines for deci-
sion are ambiguous or the relevant information is unavailable. But
creativity is compromised in the process, when the mind's peregrina-
tions are squeezed into particular channels of law and policy. Legal
reasoning, like much of social science reasoning, constantly threatens
to turn into a scholasticism, in which contacts with other fields weaken
and recalcitrant facts and rival value judgments are outlawed."
31. L. FRIEDMAN. supra note 24, at 256; C. LINDBLOM. supra note 3, at 7; D. LLOYD,
supra note 3, at 5; E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 90 (to operate properly, social science
logic must be wholly self-contained); A. MELTSNER, supra note 11, at 123-29 (policy prob-
lems can be cut down to size by omitting a part, assuming away aspects after critical
examination, and isolating technical and political components); DeLong, Book Review,
80 MICH. L. REv. 885, 887 (1982) (policy models often get made within the "closed box"
of an administrative agency). Schick, supra note 6, at 259 (routine budget process a
"funnel through which policy passes"). The classic example of a closed system is
described by Halsbury, C.J., in Janson v. Dreifontein [1902] A.C. 484, 491: "I deny
that any Court can invent a new head of public policy .. " (This may be more of
an exercise in semantics than a practical restraint, however: LORD RADCLIFFE, THE LAW
AND ITS COMPASS 55 (1960)). A more subtle but no less telling example is the closed system
of economics analysis that increasingly influences decisions under the antitrust laws.
To be "reasonably comprehensive," this "synthetic superstructure" and "subjective
infrastructure" must be opened to include "the Buddhists, the Marxists, the new-wave
radicals, the Austrian analytical school, the neoclassical school, the post-Keynesians,
and others." Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw.
U.L. REV. 335, 340-41, (1980-81).
32. See infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text.
33. Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co. Rep. 63 (Coke responding to King James's
demand to interpret laws from the throne). See P. NONET AND P. SELZNICK, LAW AND
SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 62 (1978):
Artificial reason upholds the authority of received law by making it an
indispensible ingredient of decision; in so doing, it displays its special in-
genuity, the art of resolving contradiction, filling "gaps," and providing
for needed legal change. [It] is the rhetoric of legal legitimacy. [It] binds
itself to an expert technique of law-finding. At the same time, it vindicates
the jurists' claim to autonomy."
34. P. DIESING. PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 23 (1971)
(dangers of "scholasticism" in social science, of an attention to smaller and smaller
details within an unchanging theoretical frame); M. FREEMAN, supra note 27 (quoted
Brietzke: Public Policy: Contract, Abortion, and the CIA
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
754 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
Law's artificial reason, like those of ethics and the social sciences,
aims to justify and to improve choices. Having decided how to decide
over the centuries, purveyors of this rather autonomous legal reason
offer the means for evaluating the soundness of arguments and the
acceptability of proofs. As an informal and ad hoc logic, law's artificial
reasoning is open to the differing of reasonable minds. Its seemingly-
modest ambition is to act "as a kind of geography, explaining the direc-
tive force of propositions and their relationship one with the other."3
Policy considerations must be somehow organized before they
will add up, even in our minimally-ordered jurisprudence. How the
organizational patterns are formed remains a mystery in part, but,
supra note 27); Marcus, supra note 3, at 337; A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 8, 387;
Flynn, supra note 30, at 382; Lasswell and McDougal, Jurisprudence in a Policy-Oriented
Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 486, 500 (1966-67) (jurisprudence "stabilizes the way in
which the world is experienced," limiting the tasks of lawyer and jurist). See J.
SHKLAR. supra note 24, at 10: "The distrust of vague generalities, the preference for case-
by-case treatment of all social issues, the structuring of all possible human relations
into the form of claims and counterclaims under rules believed to be 'there'-these
combine to make up legalism as a social outlook."
35. Guest, Logic in the Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 176, 197 (1st
ser., A. Guest, ed. 1961). See J. FARRAR. INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL METHOD 52 (1977)
(quoting Wisdom) (legal reasoning is less like the links of a chain than the legs of
a chair, and involves the weighing of several inconclusive items on each side); Guest,
at 180, 182 (law's less a "dry logic" than an interpretation and semantics which ranges
over all possible forms of argument, "partly deductive and partly inductive, partly
reasoning by analogy and partly the product of intuition, emotion or prejudice"); G.
RYLE. PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 5 (1945) (arguments are effective as weapons only if
logically cogent; "if they are so they reveal connexions, the disclosure of which is
not the less necessary to the discovery of truth for being also handy in the discom-
fiture of opponents"); Vaupel, Muddling Through Analytically, in 1 POL'Y STUD. REV.
AN. 44, 55 (S. Nagel, ed. 1977); P. WHEELWRIGHT, VALID THINKING 311 (1962); Murray, The
Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 833, 834, 837-838, (1982); Rorty,
supra note 22 (quoted supra note 22); Tribe, supra note 10, at 78 (the "central claim"
of policy analysis is to enlarge the roles of logical reasoning, empirical knowledge,
and consensual discourse).
36. Guest, supra note 35, at 196. See M. CARLEY. RATIONAL TECHNIQUES IN
POLICY ANALYSIS 7 (1980); J. Commons, Anglo-American Law and Economics 4-5 ("a con-
tribution to the Festschrift in honor of Friedrich von Wieser, 1926, to be revised"-
mimeograph available in the Yale Law School Library) (cases are a method of experimen-
tal research, needing only a formula to bring them together in the unity of a science);
F. FROHOCK. supra note 30, at 179; J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEMS AND LAWYERS REASONING
236 (1964) ("even in cases of first impression, counsel are likely to fare better with
holdings sub silentio, verbal analogies and syllogistic deductions, than with a straight-
forward argument based on the social facts to be regulated and the policies applicable
thereto"); C. WEISS, AND M. BUCUVALAS, supra note 6, at 269; Murray, supra note 35, at
864; id. at 834-36 (legal realists criticized the use of logic in law, but their analyses
flawed by assumption that logic must be mechanical, deductive, or both); Tribe, supra
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in theory at least, they are constituted by the logical process of
classification and, its mirror-image, division into subclasses. Classifica-
tion is a simplified and reductionist procedure since, in law and politics,
it is difficult to keep two or more things in mind at the same time
and to balance them. 7 A few policy "jugglers" delight in doing this,
but the overall tendency is to a laziness, to the dividing and classify-
ing of phenomena on the basis of one principle at a time. Each step
thus results in a "dichotomy" based on mutual exclusion by a binary
logic; either you have it, a contract for example, or you don't."
note 10, at 82 (quoted supra note 10) See also Note-The Weight of Authority, in BASIC
CONTRACT LAW 361, 362 (4th ed., L. Fuller and M. Eisenberg, eds. 1981): a classificatory
system is essential to legal writing, unless each case is to be discussed at length on
its merits. But "a lawyer must not confuse ... an indexing scheme with a real insight
into the judicial process." I would argue that, regrettably, the "indexing scheme" fre-
quently is the "judicial process."
37. R. POUND, PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRACY
9 (1945) (Economics and Business Foundation Conference Proceedings, available in Yale
Law School Library). See Brody, Glossary of Logical Terms, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSPHY 57, 60 (P. Edwards, ed., 1967) ("classification"); J. FARRAR, supra note 35, at
50 (the "mystery" studied under the theory of knowledge, of how we organize,
discriminate among, and store, recall and communicate patterns); J. SHKLAR, supra note
24, at 10 (quoted supra note 35); Thompson, Philosophical Approaches to Categories,
66 MONIST 336 (1983) ('category' commonly a synonym for 'class' or 'type,' but, since Aristo-
tle, categories have been determined by 'transcendental argument' concerning "the
very conditions that determine a philosophy" rather than by empirical procedures);
Vaupel, supra note 35, at 46 (literal Greek meaning of analysis is to separate the whole
into component parts); Tribe, supra note 10, at 95. See also Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their
Function In The Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 850 (1931) (quoted in Guest,
supra note 35, at 189):
Scientific thought concerns itself with analyzing and classifying the
elements of given fact-situations and determining their relations to one
another for the purpose of acquiring ability to predict the relations between
these elements if recurring in a future situation. This procedure involves
the same basic [judicial] thought processes . . . -the isolation of iden-
tities, their formulation in general propositions, and the applicability of
these propositions to specific situations. Here, however, the resemblance
ends.
38. Brody, supra note 37 ("dichotomy"); R. POUND. supra note 37; P.
WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 35. at 80-82. See Hartshorne, Categories, Transcendentul.s, and
Creative Experiencing, 66 MONIST 319, 323 (1983):
Many concepts are categorically universal besides verity, power, goodness,
beauty. Thus always there is diversity as well as unity, beinq influenced
as well as influencing (effects and causes), novelty as well as repetition
or permanence, chance (Epicurus) or contingency as well as necessity or
law, later as well as earlier, subject as well as object (or experience and
its data), dependence as well as independence, concrete as well as "abstract,
[sicl
A dichotomous classification or division-a "cutting in two"-requires knowledge of
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Unfortunately, lawyers are frequently in a bind because other
social scientists provide lawyers with too few good classification
schemes. Classifications organize and simplify perceptions "by exclu-
sion as well as inclusion, and the social sciences are ill-prepared to
say that certain classes of perceptions could be excluded without
significant loss."39 As my analyses of contract law and policy will
demonstrate," schemes for classification can be, and frequently are
unresponsive to socio-economic or technological changes, the prey of
academic fads, dependent for their effect on vague or ambiguous
categories, or otherwise shoddy. The rage to classify everything in
law and policy as either black or white ignores claims, frequently
legitimate claims, to an individualized treatment based on the
peculiarities of the circumstances.41 Representative Les Aspin voices
the kind of objection frequently heard in many policy areas: our
national security "classification system ...is bizarre and Byzantine
and irrelevant to protecting the real secrets .... The administration
will make public . . .things it wants to declassify and classify those
things that are embarrassing,"4 2 and administration critics are bound
by these judgments. This and other classifications schemes, such as
the "trimesters"43 against which attempts to regulate abortion are
judged, influence behavior by generating expectations. Those whom
only one distinguishing characteristic at each level of a hierarchy. The broader the
scope (denotation) of the characteristic, the less restricted the meaning (innotation),
and vice versa. P. WHEELWRIGHT, at 80-82. Thus, the contract-no contract dichotomy is
above offer-no offer, acceptance-no acceptance, etc., dichotomies in a hierarchy of legal
reasoning.
39. E. MEEHAN. supra note 5, at 42 (terming concepts what I call classifications).
Past "experiences with academic ossification suggests the wisdom of avoiding closure
in such matters as long as possible." Id. See id. at 75; Korner, Thinking, Thought and
Catagories, 66 MONIST 353 (1983) ("Deductive organization and epistemic stratification
constitute constraints on all ... thinking, including thinking in and about catagories.").
40. See infra notes 75-117 and accompanying text.
41. Evan, Introduction, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 1, 8 (W. Evan, ed. 1962); E.
MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 40; C. WEISS AND M. BUCUVALAS. supra note 6, at 17. Robert
Nisbet, asking What to Do When You Don't Live in a Golden Age, 51 AM. SCHOLAR
229 (1982), answers:
First be fruitless and reify. Snuff out the lives of particulars through suf-
focation by structures. . . .Agree with Blake: "I must create a system
or be enslav'd by another Man's".... The rage to reification, for pre-
tending that life and meaning exist in the most boneless of abstractions,
is a special mark of ages. . . such as our own.
42. Aspin, in P. HACKES, et. al. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: LEGAL AND DEMOCRATIC
CONTROLS 21-22 (Am. Enterprise Institute Forum No. 37, 1980).
43. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); infra notes 397-400, 417-19,
504-08, 511-12 and accompanying text.
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a classification favors will naturally demand that it be applied.4 Special
interest groups and individual litigants alike favor this technique.
Where a conventional contract does not exist, for example, the litigant
benefitting from this state of affairs will urge a simple contract/no-
contract dichotomy upon the court.
Consistency is an important policy-making value. All documents
marked "Top Secret" not only should but must be treated alike, as
are all fetuses in their first trimester and, under the traditional
scheme, all no-contracts. The compulsion to an intellectual consistency,
this treating of like cases alike, furthers Equal Protection values and
also serves to move classification schemes to ever-higher levels of
generality. 45 Forced to chose between creating a new classification
scheme and extending an old one, judges almost invariably4" wield
Occam's razor 47 and extend the old classification. (This is in sharp
44. See J. Commons, supra note 35, at 9-10 (Hohfeld's classification of cor-
relatives describes not an ideal but an expectation, the "expected enforcement of the
right of one is the expected enforcement of the duty of the other"); F. FROHOCK, supra
note 30, at 65-66; E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 77. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the "Court split five to four.... No one spoke for a third view,
probably for the understandable (if inadequate) reason that neither of the opposing
set of litigants would have been aided by it." L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT 194 (1975),
quoted in J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22-23 (1980). Ely (id. at 23) sees a "middle
ground between the chaos . . . complainants were inviting and the tautology to which
the Court seems to have ended up lashing itself."
45. J. Commons, supra note 36, at 26; Anderson, supra note 17, at 715 (citing
Barry and Rae); id. at 719 (treating likes alike is a maxim of justice, requiring justifica-
tion as to what counts as likeness or dissimilarity). See J. FARRAR, supra note 35, at
50; id. at 62 ("Law tends toward the general, to reduce human behavior to general
rules and principles and concepts for the purposes of social control"); Hartshorne, supra
note 38, at 327 ("One source of error in the theory of categories is the failure to
distinguish carefully between levels of abstractness.").
46. Once a classification is established (e.g., the trimesters in Roe, supra note
43-see infra notes 397-400, 417-19, 504-08, 511-12 and accompanying text) it tends to
remain in place and to be extended. See, e.g., infra note 55. In law, restricting an
existing classification without strong justification, and therefore excluding arguments
by analogy, is seldom acceptable. Guest, supra note 35, at 192. Compare Plumbing
Shop, Inc. v. Pitts, 67 Wash. 2d 514, 408 P.2d 382 (1965) (conventional application of
traditional contract/no-contract dichotomy) with Hoffman v. Red Owl, 26 Wis. 2d 683,
133 N.W.2d 267 (1965) (weird exception, a new classification-in-the-making applied to
somewhat similar facts). See infra note 107. A major reason why the Burger Court
has been criticized is that it has tacitly rejected many of the classifications and con-
cepts established or fleshed out by the Warren Court. See Howard, The Burger Court,
43 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 16 (1980) (A.E. Dick Howard is far from the most vociferous
critic of the Burger Court).
47. William of Occam's (c. 1290-c. 1349) razor is a maxim: "Entities are not
to be multiplied without necessity." It "is vain to do with more what can be done
with fewer." B. RUSSELL. HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 459, 462-63 (new ed. 1961).
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contrast to practices in the other social sciences, where classifications
proliferate to illustrate the ideas of various theorists.) In law,
generalization proceeds under arguments by analogy48 and by various
shortcuts. Analogy is the most prevalent form of legal argument,
precisely because of the "open texture" of classification categories:
a polite description of their vagueness and ambiguity, characteristics
which tend to foster oversimplification. According to Malcolm Sharp's
critique of classification-by-analogy in contract law, the problem is that:
"Everything in the world is like and unlike everything else ... "'I
A jumble of cases or other authorities which do not support a neat
(deductive) syllogism can nevertheless be made amenable to arguments
by analogy. To further an existing classification, short cuts are fre-
quently used to force a generalization from a line of instances which
really do not admit of generalization. The decisionmaker may tailor
facts to fit the classification (as in the contract example we will
examine"°), or part of the problem may be omitted, isolated as a
48. There "is a natural tendency to short circuit the process of abstraction
and application [in deductive and inductive reasoning] and .. .argue more empirically
from case to case." Guest, supra note 35, at 190. This process is usefully described
by Aristotle (discussed id. at 190-91) in the Analytica Priora: Arguing by "example"
(analogy) is "reasoning from part to part, where both particulars are subordinate to
the same term and one of them is known." For comparisons with social science reasoning
processes, see Blair and Maser, Axiomatic Versus Empirical Models in Policy Studies,
5 POL'Y STUDS. J. 282 (1977); Nisbet, supra note 40 (quoted supra note 40).
Legal argumentation by analogy has its enthusiastic supporters: See. e.g., Mur-
ray, supra note 35, passim; Harlan Stone, The Common Law In The United States, 50
HARV. L. REV. 4, 12, 14-16 (1936) (like judicial decisions, statutes should be points of depar-
ture for reasoning by analogy, in the process of creating a seamless web by adjudica-
tion). But analogy is one of the most commonly-abused ways of thinking. The validity
of the analogy depends on the number of points of resemblance and their significance,
something over which experts frequently disagree. W. FEARNSIDE. ABOUT THINKING 43,
266 (1980); E. LEVI. INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1948); P. WHEELWRIGHT, supra
note 33, at 80; Anderson, supra note 17, at 719 (discussed supra note 46). See Omaha
and Council Bluffs Street Ry Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm. 230 U.S. 324 (1913).
Gross, The Theory of Judicial Reasoning, 66 Ky. L.J. 801, 828 (1977-78) argues that liberal
legal reasoning, especially analogy, "reflects the limitations of Cartesian self-conception"
by being sequential, cumulative, posterior to value choice, and consciously directed.
Id. These seem to be valid criticisms, yet Murray, supra note 33, at 868, finds each
of them "incorrect or misleading." Unfortunately, the alternative to using tenuous
generalizations and analogies is frequently one of decisions based on unsupported
hunches. W. FEARNSIDE, at 270.
49. Sharp, Reflections on Contract 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 216 (1966).
50. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text. See also J. Ely, supra note
41, at 19 (analyzing "liberty" and "property" interests, the Court looks quite silly while
"drawing distinctions it is flattering to call attenuated and engaging in ill-disguised
premature judgments on the merits of the case before it"); id. at 61 (in affirmative
action cases like Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Court
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"political question" immune to legalistic treatment (such as the
accountability of the CIA 1 ), or simply assumed away because it does
not fit neatly into black-and-white categories. Decisionmakers use
presumptions or legal fictions when arguments cannot be fully
demonstrated or when arguments recur so frequently that they can
be plausibly characterized as insignificant background to the matter
under discussion.2
From generalized classifications and the concepts embodied in
them come the theoretical explanations offered by lawyers and by
policy analysts.53 The concepts screen and simplify perceptions, and
are expected to somehow pull together certain facets of our shared
experience and thus to influence our behavior. Justice, rights, and
the public interest are the most generalized, and hence most impor-
tant, of these in law. Although hotly disputed in fact, concepts such
as the legal accountability of the CIA and the limited "right" to abor-
tion are frequently treated as settled in law; to do otherwise would
be to undermine many, hard-won principles embedded in a hierarchy
of classification. Untidy and inconvenient elements in the analysis are
usually pigeonholed rather than pondered, and the basic theory im-
plicit in the classification is seldom re-examined. 4 Lynn Wardle argues
succumbs to the understandable temptation to vary the relevant tradition's level of
abstraction to make it come out right."); id. at 215 n.86 (citing L. TRIBE. American
Constitutional Law, 944-46 (1978)) (inter alia, it "makes all the difference in the world
what level of generality one employs to test the pedigree of an asserted liberty claim."
51. See infra notes 265-305 and accompanying text.
52. J. Commons, supra note 36, at 24; A. MELTSNER, supra note 11, at 123-29;
E. SCHUR, LAW AND SOCIETY 47 (1968) (citing Jerome Frank); P. WHEELWRIGHT. supra note
35, at 319-20; Hartshorne, supra note 38, at 327 (discussed in note 45, supra); Komesar,
In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1981)
(generalization, the systematic ordering of cases, is increasingly difficult because of
the proliferation and the complexity of social issues); Murray, supra note 35, at 847.
See.Vaupel, supra note 35, at 45 (in policy analysis and decision, habit, intuition or
some incomplete analysis frequently used in a process of "muddling through"); A.
WILDAVSKY. supra note 5, at 9 (tendency for the alternative adopted, and evidence sup-
porting it, to become the substance of rationality; "historical evolution, the short cuts,
the blind alleys, the trial and error, . . .the crazy-quilt pattern of politics" are often
ignored); Tribe, supra note 10, at 84-86 (quoted infra note 58).
53. See Abelson, supra note 16, at 316. This is all that "scientific" knowledge
consists of in an Artistotelian logic. Id. See also A. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 60; E.
MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 15-19; supra note 16.
54. Abelson, supra note 16, at 314-15; Baum, Comparing the Implementation
of Legislation and Judicial Policies, in EFFECTIVE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 39, 48 (D.
Mazmanian and P. Sabatier, eds. 1981); E. MEEHAN. supra note 5, at 58-59, 66; Ander-
son, supra note 17, at 716. In conventional legal analysis, the "intellectual problem
is resolved when formal distinctions or equivalencies are succinctly put; the question
of what difference it makes whether one or another formulation is accepted does not
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that this has happened in abortion decisions,55 presumably because
the abortion debate generates much more heat than light."6 Pigeon-
holing also economizes on decisionmakers' time and on other scarce
resources such as creativity and tax money; the attitude is "let's get
it out of the way" and new policy choices take the hindmost, unless
these can be fitted into an existing classification. In such a strange
system, the potential for biased analyses and decisions is enormous.
There is a good deal of true believership at work, in saving the world
through law (or a particular legal doctrine) or through national security
intelligence, if you are a CIA employee. Classifications are composed
less of objective truths than of the kinds of cultural manifestations
that anthropologists study in so-called primitive societies. 7
seem to be a pertinent topic." Lasswell and McDougal, supra note 34, at 500. Arguably,
these "distinctions or equivalencies" can be read as what I term as classifications or
analogies. See E. MEEHAN. supra note 5, at 46 (too many definitions are nominal rather
than real, immune to criticisms by reference to experience or observation); J. SHKLAR,
supra note 24, at 33 (lawyers play a definition game, in which words always refer
to identifiable entities); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 205 (quoting Einstein) (seldom
if ever "is the scientist aware of the eternally problematic character of his concepts");
Komesar, supra note 52, (discussed supra note 52).
55. See L. WARDLE. THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE xv (1980):
[The doctrine] has survived intense professional and public criticism for
more than seven years ... and has expanded in scope to a degree of
unanticipated breadth and complexity. [But is developed] largely without
legal analysis, . . .[and produced] a regressive formalism characterized
by the mechanical (and typically evasive) reliance on stare decisis ...
[This is a] rigidly dogmatic treatment focusing on uniformity of results
rather than consistency of rationale. [A]ttributes of principled analysis,
impartial judgment and intellectually honest opinion writing [are neglected].
A doctrinal "sheltering" has resulted in rules of thumb, which are warped toward
philosophical extremes by a lack of criticism by the lower courts, etc. Id. at 303-07.
56. See infra notes 424-35 and accompanying text.
57. M. FREEMAN, supra note 27, at 125 (judge torn between conformity to com-
munity standards and the wish to respect established laws); D. LLOYD. supra note 3,
at 127 (English and French law implicitly relies on insights of the judge, as a typical
representative of his generation); E. MEEHAN. supra note 5, at 58-59; id. at 157 (the 'state
of the art', the "way in which normative matters are conceptualized and handled in
current practice," a serious handicap to reasoned improvement); E. SCHUR. supra note
52, at 47 (quoting Jerome Frank, judges decide on the basis of a "subjective gestalt");
J. SHKLAR, supra note 24, at 106 (discussed supra note 27); C. WEISS AND M. BUCUVALAS,
supra note 6, at 268. See C. LINDBLOM. supra note 3, at 22 (discussed supra note 16);
Hartshorne, supra note 38, at 326 (quoted infra note 64); Lasswell and McDougal, supra
note 34, at 498; Murray, supra note 34, at 840-42.
A good example of the culture-bound nature of classification is from a Chinese
encyclopedia division of animals into:
(a) Belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs,
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With tongue in cheek, we see decisionmakers apply a farflung Par-
simonious Principle of Conserving Existing Concepts and Classifica-
tions. Facing the prospect of a constant tinkering, that is, of attempts
to deal with a chaos of events and earlier policies, decisionmakers
too often seek refuge in the apparent safety and stability of minor
alterations in past policy. The range of policy options has been trun-
cated for decisionmakers by the logic they have learned to apply, by
the interests asserted by themselves and others, and by the ways
institutions are designed. Regular application of "bright-line" classifica-
tions fosters the "either/or mentality" that conceals the sensible policy
alternatives lurking in the gray areas between. 8 Thinking in
extremes-that no contract exists, that all fetuses ought to have ab-
solute rights to life, that CIA activities are illegal unless they fully
preserve civil liberties-requires less mental energy than exploring
all aspects of a problem. These extremes come about by presuming
that a classification is exclusive and exhaustive, that its contraries
are contradictories. Fixed sets of logical pigeonholes tantalize decision-
makers with simple solutions to complex problems, and deliver false
dichotomies instead.59
For logicians, the false dichotomy is an error termed the black-
(e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classifica-
tion, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair
brush, (1) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from
a long way off look like flies.
M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS xv (1970) (quoting Borges and quoted in Tribe, supra
note 10, at 76). Foucault notes "the exotic charm of [such] another system of thought"
and "the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that." Id.
58. Flynn, Commentary, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 767, 769 (1980). (Flynn is discussing
antitrust laws and policies, but his excellent analyses are arguably applicable to law
and policy generally.) See id. at 781, 792 (existing schemes do not work well in all
decisions over an extended period of time, yet they block the evolution of more sensi-
ble standards); Flynn, supra note 31, at 347 ("bright-line rules are barriers to mean-
ingful thought and are soon obsolete in the face of relentlessly changing reality"); Tribe,
supra note 10, at 95 (describing the integrity of the body-in abortion matters, etc.-
as consisting of neighborhood and community "on-off" values with an evocative and
emotive character); supra notes 28-30, 34, 47 and accompanying text. See also L.
WRIGHT. BETTER REASONING 162 (1982): "Boldly-drawn divisions inevitably ignore many
subtle things .... [Slometimes the damaged subtlety is crucial to the issue; it is just
what cannot be ignored."
Decisionmakers are driven to collapse process into results, and then to col-
lapse results into a "structureless mass." Reducing "complex structures to their separate
parts, and then making key features to those parts comparable by establishing rates
of exchange among them, is in many respects a profoundly limiting and distorting
mode of analysis." Tribe, supra note 10, at 84-86.
59. S. ENGEL, WITH GOOD REASON. 72-73 (1976); R. OLSON, MEANING AND ARGU-
MENT 190 (1969). See A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 59 (quoting Mary Douglas).
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and-white fallacy, the fallacy of bifurcation, a simple dualism, and so
forth."0 Legal analysis has ignored the dangers of the false dichotomy
by and large, but there are a few jurisprudential treatments of
legal "antimonies.""1 False dichotomies are everywhere for the
60. F. DAVIS. ET AL; SOCIETY AND THE LAW 138 (1962) (severe, if not false,
dichotomy between "is" and "ought" in law and the other social sciences); S. ENGEL,
supra note 59, at 72 (fallacy of bifurcation presumes a classification to be exclusive
and exhaustive, when other alternatives exist); Barker, Internal Difficulties of Democracy,
in PRIVATE LIFE AND PUBLIC ORDER (T. Lowi, ed. 1968) (excerpts from Barker's Reflec-
tions on Government (1942)) (analyses based on social class amount to a "simple dualism"
ignoring, e.g., voluntary membership in political parties); R. OLSON, supra note 59, at
190 (black and white fallacy, where contraries adjudged contradictories); G. RUNKLE,
GOOD THINKING 39 (1978) (if listener declines to accept one extreme point, she is forced
to accept the other because of the black and white fallacy). See W. FEARNSIDE, supra
note 48, at 145-46 (disjunctive syllogism, a division of phenomena that leaves nothing
over); K. MACHINA. BASIC APPLIED LOGIC 45-46 (1982) (fallacy of false dilemma, where only
two alternatives considered viable); Parsons, The Ideal Type and Generalized Analytical
Theory, in MAX WEBER S IDEAL TYPE THEORY 56, 71 (R. Rogers, ed. 1969) (the basic
dichotomy in social sciences, the false or theoretically unwarranted antithesis of
rational/irrational); L. WRIGHT, supra note 58, at 160-61 (false dilemma, in which position
seems stronger than it is because of misdescription, oversimplification); infra notes
61-63, 65 and accompanying text. See also W. FEARNSIDE, supra note 48, at 43 (false
analogy, based on figurative resemblances which are not the "essential similarities
within the respect compared"); E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 43 (fallacy of composition,
where properties of one element attributed to the aggregate; and its mirror image,
the division fallacy); R. OLSON, supra note 59, at 184 (fallacy of the neglected aspect,
where argument believed to carry more weight than it does because relevant factors
overlooked); id. at 190 (fallacy of false precision, where argument gains weight by
being described in, e.g., mathematical terms); P. WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 35, at 330
(in the a priori dilemma of formal logic, "the alternates are logical contradictories,
so that one or the other of them not only is but must be the case"); L. WRIGHT, supra
note 5, at 164 (in evaluative characterizations, the "description seems reasonable enough
• ..because it captures our settled assessment of the matter, but since that assess-
ment is precisely what is at issue, an argument simply cannot begin there").
Logical dilemmas, and frequently dilemmas in real life, can be validly used
to infer the consequences of various alternatives, if the premises are examined carefully.
R. ANGELL, REASON AND LOGIC 151-52 (1964) R. Olson, supra note 59 at 191. Important
premises have to be sufficiently independent of the conclusion to count as grounds
for accepting the conclusion. An argument can be a fallacy in some contexts and not
in others, a major reason why informal logic can never be precise. K. MACHINA, at
50-51. The false dichotomy arguably illustrates all three main types of material fallacy:
confusion, presumption, and irrelevance. See P. WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 35, at 311.
It can be rebutted by determining that the alternatives are not exclusive, "escaping
between the horns," or by rejecting one or both of the alternatives, "taking the dilemma
by the horn(s)." R. ANGELL, at 152.
61. See, e.g, W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 28-39 (4th ed., 1960) (inter alia,
"antimonies" of natural law v. subjective will, charismatic v. intellectualized law,
positivism v. idealism, stability v. change, collectivist v. individualist ideals, autocracy
v. democracy, nationalism v. internationalism); Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in THE
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH AND DABIN 43, 107-12 (K. Wilk, trans. 1950) (in-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/2
1984] PUBLIC POLICY
searching.62 Foreign policy and nuclear arms policy contribute more
than their fair share of instructive examples. Many of these revolve
around the hoary dichotomies of "better dead than Red" and "better
Red than dead."63 These kinds of false dichotomies can result from
ter alia, justice v. expediency); Fatouros, The International Law qf the New Interna-
tional Economic Order, 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 93, 105 (1980) ("form and substance, coer-
cion and freedom, efficiency and justice"). See also J. ELY, supra note 44, at vii:
Contemporary constitutional debate is dominated by a false dichotomy.
Either, it seems, we must stick close to the thoughts of those who wrote
our Constitution's critical phrases and outlaw only those practices they
thought they were outlawing, or there is simply no way for courts to
review legislation other than by second-guessing the legislature's value
choices.
The latter approach is associated with abortion: See id. at 2-3; infra notes 375-79, 397-405
and accompanying text. But see also W. FEARNSIDE, supra note 48, at 273 (quoting Aldous
Huxley): "Paracelsus . . . owed his enthusiasm for antimony to a false analogy. Just
as antimony purifies gold .... in the same form and shape it purifies the human body."
Asaro, The Public/Private Distinction in American Liberal Thought: Unger's Critique
and Synthesis, 28 AM. J. JURISP. 118 (1983), argues (id. at 147) that R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS, (1975) exposes a "fallacy" or "false dichotomy" in a "liberal ideology ...
frought with antimonies...." These give rise to "a fundamental bifurcation characteristic
of modern liberal consciousness and institutions- . . between the universal and the
particular, between society and the individual, between the public and the private.
.. " Asaro, at 120, discussing R. UNGER, at 45, passim. Unger and others have applied
these insights to legal analyses: See, e.g., id.; passim; R. UNGER. LAW IN MODERN
SOCIETY (1976); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983);
infra notes 384, 552, 563 and accompanying text.
62. False dichotomies, of the type "John is ... a hero or a coward"/"a friend
or not a friend," are common in many policy areas; the possibility that John is nor-
mal/indifferent is ignored. R. OLSON, supra note 59, at 191. See, e.g., Barker, supra note
60 (discussed supra note 60,); J. SHKLAR, supra note 24, at 118 (the policy of justice may,
"in many ... areas, lead to far worse social consequences than a policy of semijustice,
in which several incompatible goals are allowed to live in compromise"); G. White,
Paper Delivered to Plenary Session, AALS Conference, Cincinnati, January 7, 1983
(majority rule v. minority rights, technological advance v. preservation of humanist
values); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 223 (dichotomy between politics and administra-
tion, developed to legitimate rise of the supposedly neutral civil service, overwhelmed
today by observation that statutory delegations are so vague that administrators plug
in their own choices); White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration 59, VA. L. REV.
279, 296 (1973) (dissolution of common values into "polar alternatives-permissiveness
and regimentation, militancy and fatalism, cynicism and fantasy."); supra notes 23-24,
and accompanying text (efficiency v. justice or rights). See also Wellington, Common
Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards, 83 YALE L. J. 221, 246-47 (1973):
If . . . an institution . . . had the job of finding the society's moral prin-
ciples and determining how they bear in concrete situations, that institu-
tion would be sharply different from one charged with proposing policies.
.. . It would provide an environment conducive to rumination, reflection,
and analysis. "Reason, not Power" would be the motto over its door.
63. "Better pink than extinct" and "Better Finnish than finished" may gain
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dumb slips, but are just as likely to emerge from "deep analyses"
which have concerned many decisionmakers over a number of years.
Categories are frequently vague or ambiguous enough to permit
policy to be pursued to the furthest extreme espoused by a powerful
interest group and reachable by extending an existing classification:
ever-expanding definitions of "national security" by CIA employees,
influence in the future, however. These polarized notions are self-satirizing, yet they
broadly influence public life in general:
The red-or-dead conundrum distracts attention from real choices and is
fit only for undergraduate debating societies. As the Church [of England]
puts it, "Supporters of nuclear deterrence ought not to offer a choice bet-
ween savagely repressive occupations on the one hand, and on the other,
the present armed peace ... as though these were the only possible
alternatives."
Jenkins, Widening the Constituency of Concern, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEK
LY, November 7, 1982, at 5, col. 2. See Gore, The Fork in the Road, NEW REPUBLIC, May
5, 1982, at 5:
Advocates of an across-the-board nuclear freeze and advocates of a massive
nuclear weapons buildup now believe they are engaged in a debate with
no middle ground. Each side sincerely believes that ... [its] course ...
is the best way to prevent nuclear war, and each side accuses the other
of harboring irrational fears that could serve to make nuclear war more
likely.
Here is a good example, from someone who should know better: "The question
of geopolitical balance is simply whether friendly or unfriendly nations will dominate
the key regions of the Middle East, South Africa, and Asia. Habib, American Foreign
Policy Challenges for the 1980s, 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 27, 29 (1980). What if no one
dominates or, like John (see supra note 62) they are indifferent? (Habib, id, does go
on to describe a "workable ... compromise: a little containment, a little detente.")
Implicit in Habib's statement are other false dichotomies: e.g., "this debate is about
whether the policy and world outlook of the Soviet leaders are inspired by a brutal
urge to expand their Communist empire, or by a sense of profound insecurity." Seabury,
George Kennan v. Mr. 'X', NEW REPUBLIC December 16, 1981, at 17. This kind of think-
ing comes from "imagining the world ... divided between all those unreasonable others
. .. and our reasonable, humane selves .. " Id. at 20. E.g., the Russians are told
to read Kennan's new book "to see how their actions, excessive secrecy and attempts
to export an ideology have fed a European-American paranoia .. " Weisner, Book
Review, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, January 2, 1983, at 18, col. 2. (Sauce for the
gander?)
A major reason for their instability is that public opinion and our foreign policy
regularly jump from one horn to the other on a false dichotomy:
No sooner did Americans decide that they mistakenly supported a dic-
tatorial Shah in Iran than the hostage crisis created a new mood of
belligerence. No sooner does this reverse the post-Vietnam attitude of
caution toward participation in foreign conflicts than public concern sees
El Salvador as a possible "new Vietnam." All this happens in less than
four year's time!
Rubin, A Centrist Foreign Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, August 2, 1982, at 34. See Hoff-
man, supra note 7 (quoted supra note 7). Some leaps in logic are so rapid and radical
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for example. The more general and symbolic the concept, due pro-
cess for example, the more useful it is for filling gaps in law and policy,
and for organizing politically-effective interests. A moral right, such
as the fetus's right to life, may be confused, unconsciously or inten-
tionally, with a legal right. The facts may be tailored or evidence sup-
pressed (a common practice by the CIA); part of the problem omitted;
presumptions, legal fictions and farfetched analogies adopted; 4 or
question-begging epithets deployed."
In these ways, a classification can come to have a life of its own
over time. It then gets mistaken for the reality it purports to describe.
When this happens, lawyers and other policy analysts get sucked in-
to a vortex of their own abstractions, where the gray areas of policy
are no longer visible. Harold Laski put it well-in "any contact be-
tween life and logic, it is not logic that is successful.""6 Yet logic seems
to win out in much of the argumentation and schooling in law and
the other social sciences. Rules of the game compel decisionmakers
to be seen to advance consistently toward an ideal rationality, in a
as to raise the suspicion that a dichotomy is being manipulated for some group's ad-
vantage: the regrettable death of two astronauts-in-training justifies massive increases
in expenditures for space; the failure of helicopters in the Iranian desert shows the
need for bigger (and less reliable) ones; the assassination of Sadat somehow inten-
sifies our need to sell AWACs to the Saudis.
64. See F. DAVIS, supra note 54, at 142 (citing Llewellyn); K. Machina, supra note
60, at 39; R. Noll, On the New Deal and Other Deals (Paper Presented to the Ad-
ministrative Law Section of the A.A.L.S., Cincinnati, January 6, 1983); Anderson, supra
note 17, at 714; supra notes 20, 31, 44, 52, 57 and accompanying text. See also Hart-
shorne, supra note 38, at 326:
As Pierce said, determinism is mere talk. It cannot be lived and hence
cannot be genuinely believed. The probabilistic view can and must be lived
by. Probability is not only "the guide of life," it should be seen, and many
physicists now do see it, as the guiding idea in science also.
65. The fallacy of begging the question invites the prejudging of an issue.
Slanted language reaffirms a position and appears to prove it without actually doing
so. Reasoning is circular, in that the conclusion is stated in a premise (perhaps in
a disguised fashion): e.g., miracles are impossible because they violate the laws of nature.
S. ENGEL, supra note 60, at 79-81; K. MACHINA, supra note 60, at 48-49; R. OLSON, supra;
note 59, at 189; G. RUNKLE, supra note 60,-at 55; P. WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 35, at
320-22. See id. at 321 (citing Cardinal Newman's Apologia (1874)): "poisoning the well,"
putting the situation so as to preclude contrary evidence, is a commonly-used tech-
nique of legal argumentation.
66. Guest, supra note 35, at 176 (quoting Laski). See 0. HOLMES, supra note
3, at 1 (dictum Holmes frequently ignored himself) ("The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience"); Flynn, supra note 31, at 352 (if a court uses antitrust
"abstractions as reflecting the 'is' of reality to determine the 'ought' of a dispute sub
judicie, the court is snared in a self-fulfilling, yet irrelevant and self-defeating enter-
prise"; Flynn, supra note 58, at 792-793.
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world seemingly being made ever less rational by chaotic events and
by policy as its own cause.17 Unfortunately, decisionmakers get little
aid or even comfort from social scientists, some of whom ignore the
discomforts of the real world to pursue elegant theories of what
policies out to be. Other social scientists restrict themselves to what
policy actually is, frequently delighting in its irrationality and ignor-
ing the possibilities for its improvement. These need not be mutually
exclusive positions, of course, but the two "mind sets" do give rise
to considerably different foci.68 This is clearly evident when compar-
ing the "Groupthink" practiced by CIA officials with the absolutist
libertarian stance taken by American Civil Liberties Union officials
on national security matters. 9
A severe, if not false, dichotomy between what "is" and what
"ought" to be has bedevilled law and the other social sciences, ever
since David Hume raised it to a first principle. Falling neatly between
the "is" and the "ought," policy is the loser whenever the dichotomy
is applied. What policy "is" should influence policy "oughts" by im-
posing constraints on what "can" realistically be done, and past
"oughts" influence the "is" of policy today-at least to the extent that
policy is its own cause. For example, black people know discrimina-
tion to be cruelly unjust, the unemployed know the economy to be
arbitrarily harsh, and business people usually know when they intend
67. M. SHAPIRO. supra note 22, at 90 (quoted supra note 22); J. SHKLAR, supra
note 24, at 113; id. at 33 (quoted supra note 54). R. UNGER. KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
95 (1975): "The characteristic predicament of the modern lawyer is to argue constant-
ly about policy, as if rational choice were possible, yet to remain faithful to the idea
that values are subjective."
68. Samuels, Book Review, 60 TEX. L. REV. 147, 169 (1981). A rationalist social
science tends to be technocratic, to devise or assume clear and non-conflicting goals,
and to then arrange them in a clear hierarchy which gets pursued by supposedly effi-
cient means. The fact that this ideal rationality is not attainable because of the limits
of time, information and intellect has led others to study the reality of decisionmak-
ing, of "muddling through" on the basis of habit, snap judgments, holistic responses
and incomplete analyses. Policies are then considered as ineluctably subjective and
ideological and, when added up, as displaying neither rhyme nor reason. Matters are
almost always left there, however. F. FROHOCK, supra note 30, at 178; C. LINDBLOM, supra
note 3, passim (the doyen of the "is" of policy school); E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at
90-91; Parsons, supra note 60 at 70-71; id. at 71 (discussed supra note 60); R. UNGER,
LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 10-11 (1976); Vaupel, supra note 35, at 45-46, passim; A. WILDAV-
SKY, supra note 5, at 19, 109, 112, 124; Anderson, supra note 17, at 711; Mayo and Jones,
supra note 20, at 360.
In the law, there are similarly incompatible intellectual-psychological types:
those who fall into despair if their moral convictions are not anchored to a universally
valid moral order, and those who find a state of doubt positively enjoyable. J. SHKLAR,
supra note 24, at 37.
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to contract. This knowledge affects their actions, the thoughts and
actions of others, and, thus, the law and policy of a corrective justice."
My survey of the policy process demonstrates that Lord
Radcliffe's traditional view of public policy, as admitting no evidence
because it bursts "out of the inner certainties" of the law,7" cannot
be sustained. Law's "inner certainties" turn out to be extremely
fragile, and, for that very reason, should be repeatedly analyzed rather
than simply conserved. But Flaubert's la rage de vouloir conclure
usually operates instead; the mania for the all-encompassing solution
(such as the abolition of legal abortions or the CIA's desire to eliminate
Soviet influence worldwide)"2 proves an obstacle to realistic policy
strategies and leisurely analyses. Advocates and decisionmakers squirt
ink like so many cuttlefish. Words are long, the imagery stale, the
idioms exhausted in policy statements of imprecision and, frequently,
insincerity. 3 Much floundering about and gibberish is to be found in
analyses of, for example, abortion and the CIA. 4 Similar tendencies
can also be traced through the ancestral homeland of policy in the
common law: contract.
II. CONTRACT: ESCAPING BETWEEN THE
HORNS OF THE FALSE DICHOTOMY 5
Most of the experience of contract policymaking belongs to the
69. See irifra notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
70. F. DAVIS, et al., supra note 60 at 138 (cited supra note 60); J. ROBINSON,
FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 123 (1970); Flynn, supra note 58, at 783 (law must both guide
and reflect reality); Flynn supra note 31, at 352 (quoted supra note 60); Grey, Property
and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877
(1976). See B. Smart, SOCIOLOGY. PHENOMENOLOGY, AND MARXIAN ANALYSIS 45 (1976)
(quoting Louis Althusser) ("nothing takes so long to resolve as a problem which does
not exist or is badly posed"); Spadaro, supra note 22 (quoted supra note 22); Lasswell
and McDougal, supra note 34, at 500-01 (in a contextually oriented jurisprudence, logical
facility is supplemented by policy-relevant criteria to diminish "the likelihood, that
professional tools of legal thinking will sink into ritual incantations"); Tribe, supra
note 10, at 99 (in many situations, personal and social choice is exercised not to imple-
ment a given value system but to define and sometimes deliberately change values).
71. LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at 38.
72. See infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
73. See G. Orwell, Politics and the English Language, in COLLECTED ESSAYS
353, 355, 364 (1961); Coser, Book Review, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 19 and 26, 1982, 40
(reviewing Albert Hirschman's Shifting Involvements, which criticizes development
economics theories on the basis of Flaubert's idea of la rage); Flynn, supra note 31,
at 342-43. See supra notes 41-42, infra note 151, and accompanying text.
74. See A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 211; infra notes 120, 181-85, 429-32 and
accompanying text.
75. For a somewhat similar analysis, see Unger, supra note 61, at 616-33.
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courts. Willing to labor in this field for several centuries, courts have
fine-honed a rather technocratic approach to setting policy and de-
vised rough ideas about some of the practical consequences of pass-
ing between the horns of the contract/no-contract dichotomy. Most
lawyers would also find an abundant judicial capacity to evaluate the
moral and symbolic qualities of contract policies, a capacity which is
the cause and effect of judges being left relatively free from legislative
or administrative intervention in contract law.
Until early in the twentieth century, there was little concern
over the legitimacy and competence of judicial policymaking in con-
tract. Success was seen to turn not on exerting political muscle but
on a judicial lucidity: a vividness of characterization of the issues and
a useful distribution of emphasis. Attempts at lucidity often strike
different people differently, and, in a pluralistic judicial system, it is
difficult to tell whether a few decisions will amount to a change of
policy."6
A. An Illustration of Circular Reasoning
My example7 of the false dichotomy in contract law takes us
into the wheeler-dealer, Hollywood world of Howard Hughes, who was
alive but an eminence grise-as you might expect. A man named Skir-
ball wanted to produce a movie based on John O'Hara's best seller,
Appointment in Samarra. Skirball bought the film rights to the book
and had the screenplay written. He began negotiations with, among
others, Howard Hughes' underling (Rogell) at R.K.O. Studios. Hughes,
never appearing but pulling strings, expressed interest in the project
if Gregory Peck would star. Peck was under contract to David 0.
Selznick, who was willing to "lend" Peck to R.K.O. But it seemed that
Peck might prove a reluctant chattel. Lengthy negotiations ensued
between Rogell and Skirball, until they reached a point where it was
76. See I. BERLIN, The Concept of Scientific History, in CONCEPTS AND
CATEGORIES 103, 132 (H. Hardy, ed. 1981) (characteristics of effective writings about
"human life," which presumably include some contract decisions); Carter, When Courts
Should Make Policy, in PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 141, 146-47 (J. Gardiner, ed. 1977);
0. HOLMES, supra note 3 (quoted supra note 3); G. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMAN-
SHIP, AND THE SUPREME COURT 89 (1977) (Cardozo and Pound took most of their e.g.s from
private law, where their pragmatic morality was at home); D. LLOYD, supra note 3,
at 5; HURST supra note 26, at 406, 453; Newman, The Renaissance of Good Faith in Con-
tracting in Anglo-American Law, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 553 (1969); Shand, Unblinkering
the Unruly Horse, 30 CAMB. L. J. 144, 144 n.2 (1972); But see also infra notes 426-27, 435-36,
508-13 and accompanying text.
77. Gold Seal Productions v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 134 Cal. App. 2d 843, 286
P.2d 954 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Skirball].
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now or never for these negotiations. Selznick's offer to lend Peck ex-
pired at noon. Rogell and Skirball agreed to pay Skirball $125,000,
plus 20% of profits earned by the film. Skirball asked if the other
terms would be "exactly the same" as in the last picture he made
for R.K.O. and, "if the deal is a deal with or without Peck. Rogell
replied 'Yes.' Then Skirball stuck out his hand and said, 'We have
a deal.' Then Rogell stuck out his hand and said, 'We have a deal.'
Those present 'shook hands all around"'78 and Hughes approved the
deal over the phone.
R.K.O. immediately gave wide publicity to its new film project,
starring Gregory Peck. Skirball and Rogell later stipulated that the
picture budget would not exceed $1,250,000, and two draft contracts
were prepared, but not signed, on the basis of Skirball's last picture
contract and R.K.O.'s standard forms. At this point, Gregory Peck
refused to act in the film; consequently, Hughes backed out, and R.K.O.
backed its way into a lawsuit brought by Skirball. Having tried to
sell the "Samarra" film project to other studios, Skirball found them
unwilling to take Hughes' well-publicized castoff.
Only a lawyer could cabin the issues arising from this dispute
in the question: Is there a contract or not? Yet this is the way the
Skirball court dealt with the dispute, when all but the cognoscenti
would conclude that Skirball and Rogell were in the gray area, exact-
ly half-way between "no-contract" and "contract" as the law
understands them. Rogell and Skirball had agreed on the film's story
line (subject to script changes), one star (subject to his truculence),
the overall budget, and Skirball's compensation. In the nature of
things, a near-infinitude of such contract terms as budget headings,
shooting schedules, T.V. rights to the film, director and casting deci-
sions, could not be "exactly the same" as in Skirball's last picture
for R.K.O. The parties had been negotiating almost daily for three
months and were still not ready to set their "deal" in concrete-sign
a "contract"-when, one month after the handshakes, Hughes backed
out. Missing details notwithstanding, the court held Rogell and Skir-
ball's "deal" to be a contract, and awarded Skirball $250,000."9
78. Skirball, at 134 Cal. App. 2d -, 286 P.2d 959.
79. Id. at 968-72. See, e.g., Int'l Telemeter Corp. v. Teleprompter Corp., 592
F.2d 49 (1979) (enforcement of complex patent litigation settlement where several drafts
were exchanged but defendant's new management refused to sign); Viacom Int'l Inc.
v. Tandem Productions, Inc., 526 F.2d 593, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1975) (oral distribution and
syndication rights agreement for T.V. program, "All in the Family," held enforceable);
Reprosystem v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (negotiation and drafting
process in sale of a business similar to Skirball) (discussed infra notes 82-83, 85, 87,
98, 102, 104); Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 693 (S.D.N.Y.
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The Skirball court's reasoning is of a type familiar to lawyers,
and is essentially circular- question-begging. A deal is a contract"0
if the parties intend it to be; that is, if they intend their arrangements
to have legal consequences."' Intentions are not determined by asking
the parties about them after the fact, given the danger of self-serving
statements, but by the court's drawing of reasonable inferences from
the parties' conduct."2 The basis for judicial inferences are, in turn,
the terms the parties appeared to agree during negotiations. So, the
answer to the question, "Do the terms agreed on by the parties
1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1977) (oral agreement to give opportunity to pur-
chase liquor distributorship, with an approximate profit potential and at a reasonable
price, sufficiently definite to enforce); American Cyanamid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (letter agreement to buy "far flung ... large
and sophisticated business" enforceable despite several significant terms being left
open for subsequent negotiation); Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace Co., 307 F. Supp. 713
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (joint press release announcing "agreement in principle" created im-
plied obligation to negotiate definitive agreement in good faith); Itek Corp. v. Chicago
Aerial Industries, Inc., 248 A.2d 625, (Del. 1968) (agreement, with "letter of intent"
signed, held enforceable after seller accepts better offer in bad faith); Woodard v.
Schwartz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 231, (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (an enforcement of negotiations for
share of business profits "similar" to Skirball) (discussed infra notes 83, 86, 98); Co-
lumbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 87 Cal. App. 2d 620, 197 P.2d 580 (1948) (discussed
infra note 85).
80. "A contract is an agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced
or recognized by law." G. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTACTS 1 (4th ed. 1975) (English
treatise). See J. CALAMARI and J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1 (2d ed. 1977); 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS S 1 (3d ed. 1957); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1979).
This is subject to two qualifications: that intent may be judged objectively (see infra
note 82), and that congeries of standards of behavior-including policies-must be
observed by the parties. G. TREITEL, at 1-2. The chief purpose of contract law is to make
secure the promisee's "reasonable expectations." A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
112 (1 vol. ed. 1952). See A. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND MORAL LAW 10 (1953).
81. The "first essential element in the formation of an informal contract is
mutual assent:" the "expression of agreement" between the parties-the "intention
to be legally bound." J. MURRAY. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 28, 31 (1974). See Skirball, at
134 Ca. App. 2d -, 286 P.2d 966; A. CORBIN, supra note 80, at S 29 (quoted infra
note 86). The problem is that "parties . . . rarely think of legal consequences much
less express them when they manifest their mutual assent .. " J. MURRAY, at 30.
This was certainly true in Skirball, although Skirball did try to make clear his desire
to hold RKO to the "deal," Peck or no Peck.
82. I.e.: "What is looked to ... is not the parties' after-the-fact professed
subjective intent but their objective intent. . . .If the parties' expressions and con-
duct would lead a reasonable man to determine that they intended to reach a binding
agreement, their agreement will be enforced." Reprosystem, supra note 79, at 1275.
All acts, phrases, or other expressions are examined in light of "the attendant cir-
cumstances, the situation of the parties, and the objectives they were striving to obtain."
Id. See A. CORBIN supra note 70, at 5 29; G. TREITEL, supra note 80, at 2. This was done
by the Skirball Court, although it was perhaps too rudimentary to merit discussion.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/2
1984] PUBLIC POLICY
amount to a contract?" is: "That depends on the terms the parties
agreed." Put another way, the completeness of negotiations determines
the parties' intent, which determines whether negotiations were
complete.8
Notwithstanding the traditional view that all terms must be
agreed before a contract is formed,84 the Skirball court took a more
83. City Stores, Co. v. Ammerman, 286 F. Supp. 766, 772 (D.D.C. 1967) (quoted
infra note 85) (case discussed infra notes 85, 102); Skirball, at 134 Cal. App. 2d __.
286 P.2d 966 (quoted in note 84, infra). See, Woodward, supra note 79, at 231 (case
"similar" to Skirball): Defendant makes two separate contentions which are really in-
tertwined, "for in large measure his contention that there was no meeting of the minds
[roughly, no intent to create legal relations] is dependent on the fact that their at-
tempts to agree upon the terms to go into the writing were unproductive." See also
Kleinschmidt Div. of SCM Corp. v. Futuromics Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 972, 973, 395 N.Y.S.2d
151, 363 N.E.2d 701, 702 (1977) (quoted with approval in Reprosystem, supra note 79,
at 1275):
Under the Uniform Commercial Code [2-204(31, if the parties have intended
to contract, and if an appropriate remedy may be fashioned, a contract
for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if terms, even important terms,
are left open. . . .It is no longer true that dispute over material terms
inevitably prevents formation of a binding contract. What is true .. .
is that when a dispute over material terms manifests a lack of intention
to contract, no contract results.
Is this a distinction without a difference, permitting the court to reason in
a circle, in that "formation of a binding contract" is known to require an "intention
to contract?" See supra note 81. In fairness to the court, the Official Comment to 2-204(3)
is scarcely more lucid: "The more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is
that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement, but their actions may be
frequently conclusive on the matter despite the omissions."
As noted in Reprosystem, at 1277, the "objective manifestations ...must be
weighed by the court and the line drawn between competing principles. ... These,
I argue, are the contract/no-contract horns of the dichotomy. The requirement of
definiteness is implicit in a more fundamental requirement, protecting the promisee's
reasonable expectations. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 192 (1982). See supra note 80. A
court is thus likely to tailor its findings on definiteness according to whether or not
it wishes to protect the promisee. See also J. ELY, supra note 44, at 19: "whether it's
a property interest [protected under the Constitution] is a function of whether you're
entitled to do it, which means the Court has to decide whether you're entitled to it
before it can decide whether you get a hearing on the question whether you're entitled
to it."
84. See, e.g,. Ridgeway v. Wharton, 6 Clark's H.L. Cases 238, 305 (1857) (per
Wensleydale, L.J.) ("An agreement to be finally settled must compromise all the terms
which the parties intend to introduce into the agreement.") This view is retained by
a few courts today: see, e.g., Plumbing Shop, supra note 46; E. FARNSWORTH supra note
83, at 202 ("traditional premise."). This may be a less demanding premise than ap-
pearances suggest, since a court has a fair amount of leeway in determining what
becomes a "term" during oral negotiations. Also, Plumbing Shop, e.g., permits the court
to imply some of the terms on the basis of trade usages and business customs.
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modern view which requires that only essential terms must be agreed.'
Whether this has happened is a question of fact answered in the trial
court, whose findings will be affirmed on appeal if "supported by the
evidence"" 6-as they were held to be in Skirball. Thus an appellate
85. Skirball, at Cal. App. 2d __, 286 P.2d 966, quoting Thompson v. Schur-
man, 65 Cal. App. 2d 432, 440, 150 P.2d 509, 513 (1944): "The question as to whether
an oral agreement, including all the essential terms and conditions thereof, which ac-
cording to the mutual understanding of the parties is to be subsequently reduced to
writing shall take effect forthwith as a completed contract depends on the intention
of the parties .. " The Rogell-Skirball negotiation "was in practical effect a complete
statement of the terms of the contract." Skirball at 134 Cal. App. 2d __, 286 P.2d
967. Reprosystem, supra note 79, at 1275, goes further, approving the "essential terms"
test but adding that "in New York and across the country a binding contract can
be formed despite 'material open issues' (quoting Kleinschmidt, supra note 83, quoted
supra note 83). See, e.g., id. at 1277 (quoted supra note 83); id. (quoted infra note 87);
City Stores, supra note 83:
Defendants . . . contend that this contract should be governed by the
rule that where material terms remain to be decided by the parties, there
is no contract. . . However, as the authorities cited by the defendants
clearly reveal, that rule applies only where the parties fail to reach an
enforceable agreement, that is an agreement for a valuable consideration
which is binding on both parties. 1 Williston on Contracts S 103 (Jaeger
3d Ed. 1957).
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 33(2) (1979); text accompanying supra note
83. Ever the pragmatist, J. MURRAY. supra note 81, at 743, makes the point that if the
gaps in the manifestation of assent are too great or too many the court will feel unable
to fill the gaps. He argues that most cases support the presumption (my term-see
supra notes 77-84 and text accompanying) that a contract exists as soon as agreement
is reached (i.e., even before a written memorial is executed) in the absence of evidence
convincing the court to the contrary. A few cases would support a contrary presump-
tion, but this is "unwarranted." Id. at 34-35.
Skirball, at __, 286 P.2d 966, does quote a case, virtually undistinguishable
on its facts, which requires that "all" terms and conditions be orally agreed: Columbia
Pictures, supra note 79. See note 74, supra. The same requirement is stated in Thomp-
son at 440, 150 P.2d 513. It may be that the Skirball court wanted to blur the category
it applied, given the then-state of California precedent and the nature of the Rogell-
Skirball negotiations.
86. SkirbaUl, at __ 286 P.2d 966. See Woodward, supra note 69, at 232 (in
a fact situation "similar" to that in Skirball, "the trial court was fully warranted in
concluding that the execution of a writing was never intended by either party to be
a condition precedent to the coming to life of the agreement."); A. CORBIN, supra note
80, at S 29 (business is done "in a very informal fashion" and a "transaction is com-
plete when the parties mean it to be complete"-"a mere matter of interpretation,"
a "question of fact"); id. at S 30 (we therefore shouldn't worry if decisions conflict,
since questions of law are not involved-and, I would add, existing classifications are
conserved); G. TREITEL, supra note 80, at 41 (similarly ducking thorny problems by term-
ing them questions "of construction in each case; and little purpose would be served
by multiplying examples."). In Skirball, much of the parties' behavior subsequent to
the handshakes, particularly RKO's publicizing of its "Samarra" with Peck as a star,
is "strongly evidential" of an intent to create legal relations. See A. CORBIN, at 5 29.
But other aspects of the parties' behavior points in the other direction. Some courts
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court can, within reason, place its case on either the contract or the
no-contract horn of the dichotomy. The court can reason in a circle;
it can decide which "terms" are to be "essential," a vague notion which
confers a great deal of discretion on the court; and then determine
whether "the evidence", as tailored a bit by trial or appellate judge
perhaps, supports the trial court's "reasonable" inferences. 7
Although this process may be intellectually respectable, it is a
far from satisfying way to escape the effects of a false dichotomy.
As Charles Knapp notes, "the common law's dichotomy of contract/no-
contract does not exhaust the catalog of possible intentions."89 The
orthodox catechism of an abrupt transition from the no-liability, no-
compensation world of the no-contract to the immediate existence of
full contractual duties, entitling the innocent party to full compensa-
tion in the event of breach, is clearly contrary to business realities
and expectations.
Business relations are usually very informal, as in Skirball,
turning on a sense of honor based on experience or friendship, rather
than on a naivete or a line-drawing by some future court. 0 How, then,
describe the standard of appellate review more carefully without, however, significantly
cabining their discretion. E.g., Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc., 451 Pa.
410, -, 305 A.2d 689, 692 (1973): "[Ulnless it appears that he has clearly abused
his discretion or committed an error of law [citing cases] and ... the findings have
the full force of a jury verdict and if supported by sufficient evidence and if affirmed
by the court en banc, [the decision below] will not be disturbed on appeal." Those
courts that require "all terms" to be agreed are more willing to say, as a matter
of law, that a contract does or does not exist.
87. See Reprosyst em, supra note 79, at 1277 (quoted supra note 83); id. ("Im-
plicit here ... is my conclusion that none of the contract terms which remained open
after consensus was reached ...were such, taken separately or together, as to pre-
vent the agreement from taking effect."); supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
Just as a finding of unconscionability can be disguised as a traditional finding of failure
of consideration or lack of mutual assent (J. MURRAY, supra note 81, at 737), so can
facts in the middle ground be pushed into the contract or no-contract category. What
is done may depend on whether the court is willing to take the time and trouble in,
e.g., a routine case. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 193 (discussing U.C.C. 2-204(3)).
This discretion may "permit courts to pay lip service to the sacred dogma of freedom
of contract while performing their basic task of administering justice." J. MURRAY,
at 737. The court did this in Skirball: see infra text following note 107. This subter-
fuge is explained by Atiyah, Judges and Policy, 15 ISRAEL L. REV. 346, 361 (1980) (quoted
in text accompanying infra note 91).
88. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
89. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 678 (1969).
Corbin and Murray adopt four-fold classifications which are less parsimonious (of course)
and carry less explanatory power. See A. CORBIN, supra note 80, at S 30; E. MURRAY,
supra note 80, at 31-33; infra notes 114 and accompanying text.
90. A. CORBIN, supra note 80, at S 29; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 106;
Knapp, supra note 89, at 674-76, 679-80, 689, 726. On grounds of "commercial conve-
Brietzke: Public Policy: Contract, Abortion, and the CIA
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
774 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
did the false dichotomy come to the common law? Patrick Attiyah
offers one explanation:
[T] here was a strong elitist tradition in English law [and,
I would add, in the American contract law based on it] un-
til relatively recent times. Saying one thing, and doing
another, or keeping quiet about powers of mercy or equity,
was an important contribution to the mystique of the law."
B. Freedom of Contract" and its Derogation
By the middle of the nineteenth century, something called
freedom of contract was at the center of the common law's mystique.
As we became "a commercial center with a capitalist ethic," freedom
became the rallying cry and freedom of contract "the ideological
principle,"" the master policy that set the tone for a developing com-
mon law. This policy accords individuals the broadest possible latitude
to arrange their own affairs. It is a canon of judicial non-interference,
a deference to private parties in the public interest. To be as free
as possible, there must be a precise point and time when I choose
to commit myself on my own terms, and a correlative "freedom from"
contract until then. This commitment is thought to be free of risks
other than my own stupidity, which is very much my own problem.
nience," business people often "make agreements binding in principle without being
able at the time precisely to settle all the details." G. TREITEL, supra note 80, at 43.
This is arguably what happened in Skirball. But see also E. FARNSWORTH, at 241 (quoted
infra note 102).
91. ATIYAH, supra note 88. See D. HAY, ALBION's FATAL TREE 55 (D. Hay, P.
Linebaugh, J. Rule, E. Thompson & C. Winslow, eds. 1975) (law's "very inefficiency,
its absurd formalism, was part of its strength as ideology."); Walker v. Keith, 382
S.W.2d 198, 204 (Ky. 1964) (quoted infra note 94); infra note 115 and accompanying text.
92. The classic (but appropriately vague) definition is: [I]f there is one thing
more than another public policy requires, it is that men [N.B.] of full age and compe-
tent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting." Printing and Numerical
Register Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875) (Jessel, M.R.).
93. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 80, at 5. (referring to England, but
comments equally applicable to the U.S.). Contract becomes the principle of order par
excellence, the safeguard of peace and stability, and the only legitimate means to a
social integration which illustrates the natural identity of interests in society. Kessler
& Sharp, Contract as a Principle of Order, in SOCIETY AND THE LEGAL ORDER 155, 157
(R. Schwartz & J. Skolnik, eds. 1970). The philosophical bases of freedom of contract
are those of the open society: the sanctity of promise, individual sovereignty and respon-
sibility secured by a nightwatchman state and judiciary, and an economic efficiency
(supposedly) secured by catering to the needs of trade. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
at 7-11. For modern-day analyses in this vein, see, e.g., F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
AND MORALITY: RULES AND ORDER (1973); B. NOZICK. ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974);
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1977).
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I am not committed unless and until the other party is also committed.
Once this happens, a subsequent breach entitles me to a judicial
remedy which is assumed to be effective. 4
As the Skirball case shows, this dichotomous precision is fre-
quently unattainable in the real world. Yet freedom of contract and the
false dichotomy that makes it effective so captured the judicial im-
agination that there was precious little room for other policies. Ad-
mittedly, judges described these residual policies in the Grand
Manner-"No polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice, ' 5
for example-but the effect of these policies seems very narrow to us.
Aside from freedom of contract, so pervasive as to seem to lose
its status as a policy, judges were deeply suspicious of public policy:
it is "a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you. never
know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law."9
94. Underwood v. Barker, 1 Ch. 300, 305 (1899) (Lindley, M.R.); E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 106-08, 132-33, 335; C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 13
(1981); LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 312, at 61 (freedom of contract as master policy); Sym-
mons, supra note 2, at 194; text accompanying supra note 12. See Cohen, The Basis
of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 572 (1933): "Certainly, some freedom to change one's
mind is necessary for free intercourse between those who lack omniscience. For this
reason we cannot accept Dean Pound's theory that all promises in the course of business
should be enforced." Judicial statements of freedom of contract are frequently cast
in the form of: "Our role is not that of contract maker; we merely give legal effect
to bargained-for contractual relations." Plumbing Shop, supra note 74, at 514, 408 P.2d
383. In Walker, supra note 91, the court refused to undertake the "paternalistic task"
of fixing the rent at which a lease should be renewed: "courts sometimes must assert
their right not to be imposed upon...." Imagine a court feeling "imposed upon,"
when its aid is sought in a dispute! It "is a first principle of liberal political morality
that we be secure in what is ours...." C. FRIED, at 7. This leaves open the central
question of most lawsuits: What is it that is "ours?" A lease extension in Walker?
The policy issue is whether there exists a reasonably certain and sensible answer
to this question.
95. Collins v. Blantern (1767) 2 Wilson 341, 350, (Wilmot, C.J.). Whether this
is because the hand is polluted or the fountains pure, or both, is never made clear.
It does make a difference, when policies come to be applied. Shand, supra note 76,
at 148-52. See Holman v. Johnson (1775) 1 Cowper 341 (Mansfield, L.J.) ("The principle
of public policy is "that no "court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause
of action upon an immoral or an illegal act."); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 331
(a collection of policies based on moral values-against gambling, impairment of families,
etc.-on economic notions-against restraints on trade and sales of property-and on
protection of governmental institutions); D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 147.
96. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824). See
Egerton, supra note 3 (quoted supra note 3). The statement in Richardson by Bur-
roughs, an otherwise unremarkable judge, has been occasionally reinterpreted as a
"challenge" rather than "an invitation to remain pedestrian," in a nation of horse-
lovers (LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at 46). With "a good man in the saddle, the unruly
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Public policy did offer a few additional reasons for pigeonholing a fact
situation as a no-contract, but there were no positive protections for
the "other" party who could not find them in "his" freedom of
contract. 7 Applying this view of policy, we would quickly pigeonhole
the Skirball-Rogell negotiations into the no-contract category because
they constitute a mere "agreement to agree."98 Rogell had not, in other
words, deprived R.K.O. of its freedom from contract.
The false dichotomy of contract did not remain frozen in place,
however; the Skirball court did, after all, find a contract rather than
horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles." Enderby Town F.C. Ltd.
v. The Football Assn. Ltd. (1971) Ch. 591, 606 (Denning, L.J.-who else).
Traditional notions of public policy are conceived narrowly: D. LLOYD, supra
note 3, at 147-48. Public policy is a "reserve power ...used sparingly in England
and France" alike, because of a traditional lawyers' conservatism, the judicial dislike
of being overruled, and the difficulties of ascertaining a clear policy rule in any par-
ticular case. Id. But the French "jurisprudence" has proved readier than the common
law to allow moral factors to override the doctrine of freedom of contract." Id. at
68. This is perhaps because English public policy (other than freedom of contract) was
thought a "hunch," the insightfulness thought typical of the judge's generation and
community (id. at 127) but terribly elitist in fact. See also id. at 28; LORD RADCLIFFE,
at 38. E.g., Ronald Dworkin views policies as "rules manques," as extra-legal stan-
dards applied according to each judge's own lights so as to water down (Dworkin's)
principles. Shand, supra note 77, at 145. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 24; LORD
RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at 52.
97. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 326; LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at
37-38, 52-53; Symmons, supra note 3, at 194-95. A contract is unenforceable on policy
grounds "only ... if its harmful tendency is its probable and not merely its possible
consequence." G. TREITEL, supra note 80, at 286, citing (id. at 286 n.74) Fender v. St.
John Mildmay (1938) A.C. 1, 13: Statements that the contract is "void" or "unenforceable
...only emphasize that no specific legal wrong is involved." There is a "harmful
tendency" in Skirball-Hughes' backing out was rather naughty-but it is difficult
to get too upset about it (unless you're Skirball or a Peck fan) and "no specific legal
wrong is involved." But see also infra note 115 and accompanying text.
98. An "agreement to enter into an agreement upon terms to be afterwards
settled between the parties is a contradiction in terms." Ridgeway, supra note 84.
Until all terms are settled, each party "is at perfect liberty to retire from the bargain."
Id. See Reprosystem, supra note 79, at 1276; Plumbing Shop, supra note 46; Walker.
supra note 91; Woodward, supra note 79, at 232 (quoted supra note 86); J. CALAMARI
& J. PERILLO, supra note 80, at 13; G. TREITEL, supra note 80, at 40-41; supra note 84.
There is an excellent discussion, and collection of cases for and against the "agree-
ment to agree" doctrine in Knapp, supra note 89, at 676, 679-80 n.27, 682, 682 n.34,
683 n.37. More precisely, there is an agreement to agree, under the traditional scheme,
in Skirball because: all terms were not agreed, the negotiations assumed a written
contract would be drafted later, and this far-from-typical contract (outside the movie
industry) involves complex matters and large sums. The bargain would thus be one
usually put into writing, subject to a possible "business custom" of being bound by
handshake. See Mississippi & Dominion S.S. Co. v. Swift, 86 Me. 248, 29 A. 1063, 41
Am. St. Rep. 545 (1894).
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an agreement to agree. Like the economic and political laissez faire
on which it is based, freedom of contract postulates an ideal ration-
ality unattainable in the real world. This became more and more
evident as socio-economic changes resulted in further departures from
the ideal. On the one hand, the kind of complex, delicate and large-
scale negotiations seen in Skirball could not be captured by the courts'
rigid rules of offer and acceptance. On the other hand, freedom of
contract turned out to be meaningless for people unable to capitalize
on economic advantages during negotiations. A few judges realized
that the courts had become prisoners of their own abstractions and
had mistaken "a fashion of economic thinking or social philosophy
for the basic public faith to which they are committed."99
This realization came sooner and more forcefully to the
legislatures that cheerfully began to infringe freedom of contract.
Acting to protect certain groups from the exploitation that was their
"freedom," legislatures came to require that some prices and prac-
tices be somewhat reasonable. Forced to deal with these interven-
tions, more constructively after the Supreme Court's "switch in time"
in 1937, judges often felt themselves relegated to the role of in-
terstitialists. Paradoxically, this subordinate role resulted in a
renaissance of judicial policymaking. The categories of public policy
were no longer thought closed, once legislatures and "realist" judges
cooperated to remove the cap from policy. Courts extended legislative
policies into new areas by analogy, just as they had been extending
common law policies into the areas of tort and property. Policy was
no longer deemed the "hunch" of an elitist judge, but became a more
coherent body of rules manipulable under stare decisis and canons of
statutory interpretation. Manipulation took the form of pragmatic ap-
plications of rooted classifications, as a precondition to changing the
classifications themselves."'
99. LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at 64. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra
note 80, at 6; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 111 (quoting Rudolf Schlesinger); id.
at 332; supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. Among the first to recognize this
was Holmes, J. See, e.g., his dissent from a decision invalidating a statute because,
inter alia, it infringed freedom on contract: Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74
(1905). The fuller use of policies other than freedom of contract, by legislatures and
courts, waited upon the demise of "Lochnerizing" in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937).
100. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 80, at 6; J. Commons, supra note
36, at 5-6; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 330; G. JACOBSOHN, supra note 76, at 129;
Kessler & Sharp, supra note 93, at 156; D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 121 ("Public policy
is a part of the common law like any other topic, such as . . : tort, and is to
be developed by the systematic extension of binding precedents according to the
ordinary common law pattern."); id. at 127 (discussed supra note 96); G. TREITEL, SUpra
1984]
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This precondition to change sometimes seems perpetual; the con-
tract/no-contract dichotomy remains barely afloat in our contract
jurisprudence today, despite its heavy freedom of contract cargo and
its having sprung many leaks such as the Skirball case. Four alter-
native approaches constantly threaten to sink the basic dichotomy
altogether. (There may be more or less than four alternatives, depend-
ing on how you classify-and that is a large part of the problem.)
Each of these alternatives could have been applied in Skirball, with
varying degrees of ingenuity. None were, however.' °
First, many courts have rediscovered the requirement that con-
tract negotiations and performance be in good faith. Were it imposed,
this good faith requirement would have damned Hughes' reneging in
Skirball. Good faith has no necessary connection with contract law
and its nineteenth century assumption of an arms-length bargaining,
for the good faith doctrine is grounded in Roman law and a medieval
note 80, at 3; J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 185 (1966) (applying
policy, a judge sometimes acts as a "paramount censor with power to override 'in-
dividual rights'); Knapp, supra note 89, at 675 (the "rigidity" of the contract/no-contract
dichotomy "is weakened by garden-variety 'legal realism,' which readily admits that
[the decision] ... will in some immeasurable but important respect turn on the 'moral'
or 'ethical' quality of the conduct of the parties . . ."); Shand, supra note 76, at 157
(rigor of policy rules relaxed, not on the basis of policy itself but by using fictions
to avoid applying policies); id. at 165 ("broad and vaporous" policy reduced to predic-
table and obligatory rules); Symmons, supra note 3, at 185-87; id. at 187 (analogy, be-
tween operation of policy in contract and in tort, not always seen as exact by courts).
It was part of traditional dogma to "deny that any court can invent a new head of
public policy." Janson v. Dreifontein [1902] A.C. 484, 491 (Halsbury, C.J.). That "which
is against public morals and public decency should be subject to the condemnation
of courts in all generations. Righteousness is the same today as it was yesterday."
Critchfield v. Bermudez Paving Co., 174 Ill. 466, 482, 51 N.E. 552, 557 (1898). Judges
"are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law that as expounders of . . . public
policy." In re Mirams [1891] 1 Q.B. 594, 595 (Cave, J.). This is because policy is "a
doctrine regarded as rather for the legislature. ... " Hyams v. Stuart-King [1908] 2
K.B. 696, 727. But these conventions are rather ill-defined. The notion of closure of
the heads of public policy turns out to be a semantic persiflage rather than a practical
restraint (LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at 55): "A far more rigid classificatory system
that either French or English law can . . . provide would be imperative before there
can be any prospect of its constituting an effective fetter on judicial discretion." D.
LLOYD, supra, note 3, at 114. As legislatures came regularly to abrogate the tenents of
freedom of contract, courts were encouraged to exercise the discretion that freedom
of contract made them forget.
101. Two of these alternatives (contract implied in law and promissory estoppel)
were adopted by the trial court, along with the finding of an enforceable express con-
tract (Skirball, supra note 77, at __, 286 P.2d 959, 962-63) in a scattergun imposition
of liability on R.K.O. The appellate Court ignored these alternatives holdings, however.
A fifth alternative, fraud, has been omitted from my discussion because it has long
been recognized as a cause of action sounding in tort.
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ecclesiastical desire to sanction departures from tenets of the Chris-
tian faith."' Second, in place of or in addition to implying good faith
obligations, a court may imply a contract or some of its key terms
out of the parties' conduct, their past dealings, relevant business
customs, etc. A fair amount of sleight-of-hand is frequently involved
in this departure from a strict dichotomy, and it would have been
possible to imply a few terms to "fix up" the negotiations in Skirball
or, perhaps, discover a business custom among Hollywood wheeler-
dealers to bind themselves with a handshake."' Even if such a custom
102. The delay in importing good faith requirements into contract law can be
blamed on the "dichotomy" between law (where most contracts cases originate) and
equity (where the good faith doctrine originates). Newman, supra note 76, at 557. This
is a false dichotomy in the U.S. In the few states where law and equity were applied
by separate courts, such courts were fused soon after independence. There is thus
little reason not to merge these separate bodies of rules into a unified contracts
jurisprudence. See J. FARRAR, supra note 35, at 58-60 (quoting Keeton and Sheridan, in
part). It is "some reflection of the business ethics fostered by a system of individual
competition that the parties ...are permitted" by courts of law "to deal at arms
length." It is thought to be "smart business" to buy land that you know to contain
oil for a song. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 241. While the requirement of good
faith encounters "the not unusual reluctance of law to abandon its accustomed ap-
proaches," the "winds of change have at least raised a corner of the moral curtain."
Newman, at 553-54. Courts will punish bad faith where it is clearly present and ap-
proaches non-performance in seriousness. Knapp, supra note 89, at 727. Parties who
withdraw merely because they have found a better deal or (as in Skirball) have a
change of heart are acting in bad faith, while those who withdraw after substantial
fruitless negotiations are not. Id. at 720-21. (There is, of course, a large grey area
between these two poles.) See, e.g., Reprosystem. supra note 79, at 1280 ("under New
York law, every contract carries with it an implied obligation of good faith."); Pepsico,
supra note 79; Itek, supra note 79; City Stores, supra note 83 (specific performance-
negotiating a lease in good faith-ordered where landlord backed out of rather vague
agreement after receiving better offer); Heyer Products, Co. v. United States, 135 Ct.
Cl. 63, 14 F. Supp. 409 (1956) (bidder for government contract has right to have bid
"honestly considered" in good faith); Hoffman, supra note 46 (discussed infra note 107);
Uniform Commercial Code S 1-103 (1952); id. at S 2-103(1)(b) ("reasonable commercial
standards of far dealing in the trade" required-arguably, a rather undemanding stan-
dard); id. at S 2-305, Official Comment 6; Restatement (Second) of Contracts, S 205
(1979); Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE
L.J. 343, 359-60 (1969). See also Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 1401 (1958) (discussing statutory duty in labor contracts). A few cases insist on
a more demanding duty: best efforts (e.g., Stoddard v. Ill. Improvement and Ballast
Co., 275 11. 199, 113 N.E. 913 (1916)) or reasonable efforts (e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917)).
103. The court did not inquire into this possibility, despite the importance of
Hollywood to the California economy, and despite the existence of a Hollywood Reporter
(in addition to a California Reporter). There was a course of dealings between R.K.O.
and Skirball, who had made several pictures for R.K.O., but the court only inquired
into the implications his last picture contract had for the "Samarra" deal. It is clear
that, having found an express contract, the Skirball court saw no need to imply a
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cannot be discovered, a wheeler-dealerism capable of injuring even
the sophisticated Skirball should arguably be curbed. This brings us
to the third alternative, which is avowedly based on policy considera-
tions. Its names, quasi-contract or contract implied in law, belie its
tenuous connections with the contract dichotomy and its historically
separate development from contract law and its policies."' Skirball
would have been unlikely to succeed under quasi-contract since, with
a few exceptions,"'5 courts have denied recovery in the absence of
defendant's unjust enrichment. Defendant R.K.O. gained nothing from
Skirball's loss, a loss which just leaked away. Recovery would never-
theless be possible under the fourth alternative, the court of last resort
and the last resort of courts: promissory estoppel. Traditional notions
here have been engulfed by their "Restatement," a radical law reform
effort with ihe explicit policy rationale of avoiding "injustice.""1 6 Under
contract or its key terms. But see Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Engineering Co., 15
Cal. App. 3d 95, 92 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1971) (business custom that construction subcon-
tractor's oral bid is binding, even though only price term settled and other complex
terms are to be agreed later); Plumbing Shop supra note 46; Berwick and Smith Co.
v. Salem Press, Inc., 331 Mass. 196, 117 N.E. 825 (1954); Uniform Commercial Code:
official Draft SS 2-204, 205, 208 (1952); id. at 2-204, Official Comment ("commercial stan-
dards of ... indefiniteness" tolerated-an Aristotelian insistence on only that degree
of precision which circumstances permit); id. (quoted in note 83, supra); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts S 221-22 (1979); J. MURRAY, supra note 81, at 743 (discussed supra
note 85); Frackman, The Failure to Pay Wages and Termination of Entertainment Con-
tracts in Hollywood, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 333, 335 (1979); Knapp, supra note 89, at 678, 692.
104. See, e.g., Reprosystem, supra note 79, at 1259 (unjust enrichment alleged,
but not really dealt with by court); Bastian v. Gafford, 98 Idaho 324, 563 P.2d 48 (1977)
(contract implied in fact, my second alternative, distinguished from contract implied
in law); In re Crisan Estate, 362 Mich. 569, 107 N.W.2d 907 (1961) (hospital entitled,
on policy grounds, to recover under contract implied in law, even though patient never
regains consciousness and thus never voluntarily assents to bargain).
The trial court in Skirball, supra note 77, at __, 286 P.2d 963, hints at its
willingness to imply a contract in law while noting that Skirball "has suffered unjust
and unconscionable injury," but the appellate court ignores this possibility.
105. See, e.g., Kearns v. Andree, 107 Conn. 181, 139 A. 695 (1928). There, recovery
is based on a reliance rather than a restitution interest, which shades over into my
fourth alternatives: see, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
106. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 90(1) (1979) (revised from the-similar
Restatement (First) of Contracts (1934) (emphasis supplied):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may
be limited as justice requires
(The italicized portion emphasizes that promissory estoppel is the last remedial
resort.) See also Knapp, supra note 89, at 687: "Promissory estoppel is now employed
with increasing frequency .. .to justify the awarding of a remedy ... where a bargain
is under negotiation but no final argument had been reached." On the pre-S 90(1) doc-
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this alternative, Skirball would be seen to have reasonably foregone
his opportunity to contract with other studios in reliance on his "deal"
with R.K.O. The court would then be indifferent to the question of
whether or not a contract existed, so long as R.K.O. is found to have
made a promise. Courts differ as to how definite this promise must
be, but many otherwise strict courts would allow Skirball to recover.
The sum of money recovered would probably be lower than in Skir-
ball's breach of contract action. 10 7
The main purpose of these four alternatives to the dichotomy
is to move certain fact situations from where they really belong in
the traditional scheme of things-the no-contract category or the
dichotomy's uneasy middle ground-and into a realm which resembles
the contract category. While these alternatives all have ancient roots,
they are distinctly modern in breadth of formulation and in frequency
of use. The same can be said of other alternatives which promote
movement in the opposite direction, from contract or the middle
ground and into the no-contract category. These include the doctrines
trine, see, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365, 42 L.R.A. 794, 73 Am.
St. Rep. 491 (1898); Devecman v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 14 A. 464, 9 Am. St. Rep. 422 (1888).
107. In Skirball, supra note 77, at __, 286 P.2d 963, the trial court held: "Defen-
dant is estopped to deny that plaintiff and defendant had a valid oral contract." The
appellate court ignored this plausible holding, presumably because it awarded Skir-
ball some of his expectation damages-a larger sum than that represented by his
reliance damages. See Wheeler, supra note 105 (promissory estoppel a defensive doc-
trine which cannot be used aggressively to recover lost expectations-profits, etc.);
Skirball at ____ 286 P.2d 968-72; Restatement (Second) of Contracts, S 90(1), Reporter's
Note (the last sentence of S 90(1), note 106, supra, was added to suggest that damages
should be determined by the reliance measure). Cf. Wheeler (promise must be intended
to affect legal relations) with Hoffman, infra. But see, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby,
144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958) (limited expectation damages awarded on basis of promissory
estoppel, when rather vague promise made not to terminate car dealership franchise).
Section 90(1) thus represents a kind of middle ground, between full compensation and
no compensation, under the false dichotomy. This is, in part, the basis for the flexible
damages calculation called for in Hoffman, supra note 46. This case "has attracted
the attention of commentators and may ultimately provoke a significant reappraisal
of attitudes toward the bargaining process." E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 192.
In Hoffman, plaintiff received the rather vague promise of a grocery store franchise.
Under defendant's urging, plaintiff went to considerable effort and expense to polish
his managerial skills. Defendant kept insisting that plaintiff raise more and more capital
until plaintiff could nbt afford the franchise. With "admirable candor, the court makes
no attempt to obscure the facts that [agreement] .. .had not been reached" because
defendant's promise was too indefinite to constitute an offer. Knapp, supra note 89,
at 688. Hoffman thus suggests "that one may in some circumstances come under a
duty to bargain in good faith .. " Id. Breach of this duty results in liability, "at
least to the extent of compensating the detrimental reliance of the injured party."
Id. See Henderson, supra note 102, at 357-60. Hoffman thus represents a fusion of my
first and fourth alternative approaches: see supra notes 102, 105-6 and accompanying text.
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of fraud, duress, unconscionability, failure of consideration, and
mistake. Despite the many and sometimes divergent policies under-
lying these alternatives, the net effect of all of this movement to and
fro is a relative doctrinal stability, a conservation of the contract/no-
contract dichotomy in the face of many case outcomes which seem
to contradict it. Judges are understandably reluctant to abandon the
simplicity, generality, certainty, and stability that freedom of contract
appears to bring to the law through the dichotomy. But there is also
a growing willingness to "do right" in particular situations, even if
this means manipulating the dichotomy while purporting to respect
it (as in the Skirball case), or more or less ignoring the dichotomy
and adopting an alternative approach. Judges pass regularly between
the horns of the false dichotomy of contract, acting in ways that defy
description by a coherent set of legal principles. Parties to a dispute
seldom know whether a court will apply, manipulate, or ignore the
dichotomy, since policy is as much its own cause as it is the effect
of resolving a particular dispute. Judges are frequently keen to "use"
a case to fill gaps or manipulate holes in a dichotomy stretched so
thin that new holes immediately open up elsewhere."°8 As things stand,
108. See J. Commons, supra note 36, at 24; J. FARRAR, supra note 35, at 62,
66; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 510; M. FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 8; W. HURST,
LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCON-
SIN, 1836-1915, 290 (1964); North, Reflections on International Intelligence Operations, in
SURVEILLANCE AND ESPIONAGE IN A FREE SOCIETY 178, 196 (R. Blum, ed. 1972) (quoted in
part infra note 170); LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at 51 ("There is indeed a wider
gap than rhetoric can fill between treating as law each judges fancies as to what the
public good requires and maintaining as part of the law some overriding principles
of moral import to which even the assertion of private rights must be subordinated.");
id. at 57, 61-63; G. TREITEL, supra note 80, at 317; supra notes 8, 20, 27, 34, 44, 47 and
accompanying text. This process of applying policy is, for Corbin and Cardozo, the
central problem of judicial creativity. See 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 446-47, 454 (1951);
J. STONE, supra note 100, at 191-92. I argue that this process has failed: some play in
the joints is necessary in any system of rules, but the huge holes in contract law
result in an incoherence and unpredictability. Courts are, however, quite creative in
attempting to paper over these holes. See, e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50
N.J. 528, 554, 236 A.2d 843, 857 (1967) (quoted with approval in Toker v. Westerman,
113 N.J. Super. 452, 456, 274 A.2d 78, 81 (1970) (emphasis supplied): "Although courts
continue to recognize that persons should not be unnecessarily restricted in their freedom
to contract, there is increasing willingness to invalidate unconscionable provisions which
clearly tend to injure the public in some way." There is no continuity in fact, since
there has been an explosion in what are found to be necessary restrictions; the likelihood
that a nineteenth century court would "invalidate unconscionable provisions" approaches
the vanishing point. See also, e.g. J. MURRAY, supra note 81, at 736: "Traditionally, the
essence of contract . . . lies in volition, that free exercise of will by parties who are
on a relatively equal footing .... It is unlikely that a nineteenth century court would
accept the qualification of the last seven words; as Murray remarks (id., quoting Cop-
page v. Kan., 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1914)), such courts upheld freedom of contract while
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there is a real danger of a new false dichotomy emerging, between
what Kessler and Sharp term the "diametrically opposed poles" of
freedom of contract versus an increased judicial and legislative con-
trol over the bargain. °9
John Dawson observes that a "double standard of contract
morality is a clumsy and ineffective way of alleviating hardship or
discouraging sharp bargainers .... The interesting question is whether
we . . . have become prisoners of our own system--or, more accurate-
ly, whether we have become confused by our lack of system..... The
false dichotomy has lost enough of its force to become implausible
as the conceptual center of contract law. This is all but explicitly
recognized in the spate of recent attempts to reformulate contract
law as promise, as tort,... and so forth. The most interesting and useful
of these efforts, Ian Macneil's, t 2 is arguably the most dangerous
because it proposes a fresh dichotomy between "transactional" and
"relational" "poles" of contract behavior. Opposing these efforts is the
Chicago School of law and economics, whose descriptions of contracts
as wealth-maximizing exchanges, evaluated on the basis of the par-
ties' consent, have the effect of breathing fresh life into freedom of
contract and its traditional dichotomy.1
13
simultaneously holding legitimate "those inequalities of fortune" felt to flow inevitably
from the exercise of property rights. Ideas concerning legitimacy and inevitability have
changed radically-see supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text-and judges have
been far from immune to these changes.
109. Kessler and Sharp, supra note 93, at 155.
110. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV.
495, 535-37 (1959) (footnote omitted). See Newman, supra note 76, at 564 (applying Dawson
quote to a dichotomy between what I have analyzed as freedom of contract and the
alternative approach of implying good faith obligations); supra note 102 and accompa-
nying text. See LORD RADCLIFFE. supra note 31, at 62-63:
A really satisfactory jurisprudence has never developed, and probably
never will, partly because ... the courts have come to persuade themselves
that in the name of good order they have some primary duty to uphold
freedom of contract, rather than a duty to work out a theory of contract
as a whole which starts from the necessity of a fundamental decency in
private relations.
Written in 1960 and primarily about English courts, this statement retains vitality
in contemporary America.
111. C. FRIED, supra note 94 (contract as promise); G. GILMORE. THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT (1974) (contract as tort, by and large). See supra note 15 and accompanying
text. But see also LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at 62-63 (quoted supra note 110).
112. I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980).
113. Reports of the "death of contract" proved much exaggerated, once Posner
and his colleagues took hold of it. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 93. Law and economics
helps make a dichotomy out of efficiency and justice: preferring the former, it makes
some of us feel compelled to choose the latter. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Charles Knapp has done yeoman's service in finding a relevant
and respectable passage between the horns of the false dichotomy.
When the parties find themselves in the "half-way house" between
contract and no-contract, Knapp correctly concludes that they feel
'morally' or 'ethically' bound, committed to the deal in what may be
a limited way. In this common situation, enough authority exists for
courts to enforce a "contract to bargain." This prescribes neither an
absolute duty to perform a contract nor an absolute duty to agree
to perform. Rather, it creates a "duty to go forward": to bargain in
good faith for as long as can be reasonably required under the cir-
cumstances. To the objection that Knapp's third category of a con-
tract to bargain would spawn uncertainty comes the decisive response
that this would be nothing compared to present uncertainties in
judicial behavior. 14 A still broader approach would continue to
homologize equitable concepts with the doctrines of contract law, as
in Chancellor Kent's rectifications of a lex imperfecta:
There are many duties that belong to the class of imperfect
obligations, which are binding on conscience but which
human laws do not, and cannot undertake directly to en-
force. But when the aid of a court of equity is sought to
carry into execution such a contract, then the principles of
ethics have a more extensive sway."'
114. Knapp, supra note 89, at 676, 679, 681, 684-85, 720. See id. at 691-92, passim
(dealing with traditional objections based on illusory promises, the absence of intent
or consideration, an agreement to agree, and uncertainty and indefiniteness); id. at
698-719, passim (illustrative cases); id., at 720. But see also. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES
490 (12th ed. 1873) (quoted infra note 115 and text accompanying). The only criticism
I have of Knapp's fine article is that it revives the traditional dichotomy with one,
seemingly unnecessary, sentence: "The additional element of willingness to be bound
must also appear, either from the words of the writing itself or from the surrounding
circumstances . . . ." Knapp, at 720.
115. 2 J. KENT, supra note 114. The "equity power is extraordinary and its use
is limited to cases where legal remedies are inadequate and where the harm threatened
is irreparable." Kallay, Book Review, 20 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 156 (1983). According to Alex-
ander Hamilton, "courts of equity existed to afford relief from 'hard bargains' and
cases of fraud, accident, trust or hardship." Id. at 157 (citing THE FEDERALIST, No. 80).
Some would like to retain this limited and conservative view of equity: "Cut from
these moorings, the equity power cannonades through public and private life with a
tyrannical whimsy that, in some quarter, is spoken of as 'judicial activism."' Kallay,
at 156 (discussing G. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION xv, 3-4, 125-27 (1982)).
On this view, such legal innovations as Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483
(1954) and the Field Code of Civil Procedure can be blamed on a 'sociological equity.'
Kallay, at 159 (discussing G. MCDOWELL. at 88-93, 97-98). With respect, the function of
equity was, and continues to be, to decrease the extremity of result from the applica-
tion of such dichotomous categories as contract v. no-contract and liberty v. equality.
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Knapp's article has proved influential but far from decisive for,
as Felix Cohen observes, "[legal philosophy is not a bad play in which
each actor clears the stage by killing off his predecessors..... Judicial
activism in the refinement of contract policies, and of Knapp's con-
tract to bargain in particular, is certainly no vice."' For example, the
finding of a contract to bargain would have made an excellent conclu-
sion in Skirball because it represents what the parties were doing
in fact until Howard Hughes backed out. Courts have known all along
that a transaction is complete when the parties mean it to be so; yet,
despite centuries of judicial experience, we have no firm ideas about
when and how this happens. Sociologists, psychologists and economists
rarely deign to examine so mundane and practical a matter, but they
should. Business people have learned to expect little from judges and
still less from (other) social scientists. Business deserves better.
III. THE CIA: FINDING THE HORNS OF THE FALSE DICHOTOMY
We all deserve better than the policies applied by and to the
CIA, for reasons which are less clear and which are studied less often
by lawyers than policies concerning contract or abortion. Intelligence
policies must be described in detail so that the horns of the dichotomy
can be found; unlike those concerning contract and abortion, past and
present lines of policy are uncertain and shrouded in secrecy. People
"who are free to talk about [the CIA]. . .are seldom in a position
to know, and those in a position to know are not often free to talk." ' 8
See M. GINSBERG, ON JUSTICE IN SOCIETY 95-101 (1965); Grey, supra note 70; infra notes
269, 345, 524-26 and accompanying text.
116. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L. J. 238, 267 (1950).
117. Judicial restraint, the "impersonal, neutral submission to the rules" (J.
SHKLAR, supra note 24, at 106), is inappropriate where rules and policies are uncertain
and ill-suited to the times-as in contemporary contract law. Restraint sets "up some
kind of 'keep-off notice against those very activities of policy choice-making which
[are] ... inseparable from appellate judicial functions." J. STONE, supra note 100, at
668. It promotes friendly relations with other branches of government-not a very
significant concern in contract. However, restraint, or deference, says little about justice
through law for litigants or about coherent growth in the law. Id., at 668-70. Contract
is an appropriate realm for judicial activism because the court needs no control over
the purse and very little over the sword to enforce its pronouncements. Courts must
sit back and await fact situations appropriate for policy-making, but contract (like abor-
tion and the CIA) is a "hot" area which quickly throws up many such cases. While
compliance with contract policies by those affected by them is far from automatic,
there is little of the open defiance found in the areas of, e.g., school prayers or police
arrest procedures. See Baum, supra note 54, at 46-47, 49. See also infra notes 265-68,
424, 428-35 and accompanying text. It may sometimes be necessary for judges to sweep
"all the chessmen off the board." L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 131 (1952). This is
what Currie, C. J., comes close to doing in Hoffman: see supra note 107.
118. North, supra note 108, at 178. Those few who know and who feel free
1984]
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Relegated to the former category, my analyses are somewhat in-
complete. This certainly makes them no worse than other analyses,
however, and I have tried to reduce the political bias likely in so con-
tentious an area of policy."9 Much of what may seem my liberal bias
is a necessary irreverence for sacred conservative doctrines about in-
telligence, the kind of irreverence I applied to contract doctrines. Just
as the outcome is affected by treating contract policies as instances
of "polluted hands" touching "pure fountains," so it matters whether
an action is adjudged a "mission" by the "intelligence community"
against "terrorists" or another "dirty trick" by the "CIA establish-
ment" against "freedom fighters."''
to talk, whistleblowers, are treated with unremitting harshness under rather farfetched
interpretations of law. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280 (1981) (extraordinarily broad dicta applied to an eggregious fact situa-
tion); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); infra notes 270-76, 288-97
and accompanying text. This may be a misguided, short-sighted policy, to the extent
that the publicizing of past failures can spur reforms which improve performance in
the future. See Thomson, Resigning from the Government and Going Public, in
SURVEILLANCE AND ESPIONAGE IN A FREE SOCEITY 385 (R. Blum ed. 1972) (intense career
and psychological pressures make whistle blowing unlikely). But see also Turner &
Thibault, Intelligence, FOREIGN POLICY, 122, 135 (Fall, 1982) (former CIA officials):
Since Watergate and Vietnam, American society has virtually enshrined
the so-called whistle blowers as heroes. Some of them may have done
great service for their country. But others are simply self-serving in-
dividuals promoting their own special causes. Fortunately .. .very little
information harmful to U. S. intelligence interests has been revealed.
119. In an attempt to delineate a common ground of policy (see infra notes
217-26, 236-59 and accompanying text), I compare perennial criticisms from the Left
(see, e.g., infra notes 135, 209-13 and text accompanying) with the relatively new com-
plaints by the Right (see. e.g., infra notes 109, 122 and text accompanying).
120. Cf F. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE xiv (1980) (Director, ACLU pro-
ject on Political Surveillance) ("Like other dubious enterprises, intelligence has resorted
to a claimed professionalism-and in particular a cosmetic vocabulary-as a badge
of legitimacy.") with supra notes 73-74, 95-96 and text accompanying. While "dirty tricks"
by a "CIA establishment" suggests wrong-doing by a tightly-knit group of Machiavellian
True Believers, "missions" by a "community" suggests the behavior of small town
churchgoers who water their lawns. See F. DONNER, at 464, 466. Both are right and
wrong characterizations of a very complex organization: Many off-duty agents do go
to church and water the lawns of suburban Virginia, for example. But extreme examples
of a bureaucratic afflatus debase the language and corrupt our thinking about distasteful
realities. Aggression involving assassination ("termination with extreme prejudice")
becomes the sanitary sounding "reinforced protection reaction raid." Id. at 465; P.
KOSTINEN, THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 102 (1980). Breaking and entering is "sur-
reptitious entry," "securing a residence" or "highly confidential coverage" (which in-
cludes bugging and wiretapping). Attorney General Levi set up a "special review group"
(committee on bugging and wiretapping) to ensure "the minimum physical intrusion
necessary" (little burglaries). D. WISE, THE AMERICAN POLICE STATE 146 (1976). "Plausi-
ble deniability" involves lying. The "need to know" is really the need not to know,
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Clearly, the CIA is concerned with intelligence. Raw data is col-
lected, interpreted and evaluated to make predictions. These predic-
tions are then presented as "CIA views," which have the organiza-
tional muscle behind them to make a political impact. The way things
are organized,"' covert operations'22 are also part of the CIA's in-
telligence brief. The CIA's role in government illustrates, in an
extreme and exaggerated form, the ways policymakers in all complex
organizations rely on experts for intelligence information and the im-
plementation and evaluation of decisions.'23 The CIA is part of the
executive branch, of course, despite owing some responsibilities to
so as to engage in "plausible deniability." F. DONNER, at 464; Raskin, Democracy Verses
the National Security State, 40 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 189, 206 (1976) (quoting Richard
Barnet). Some "senators said they didn't want to know. One senator said 'If you're
going to have a Central Intelligence Agency, you just have to close your eyes."' Hall,
Taking Care of Company Business, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Nov. 28, 1982, 16,
at 17, col. 5 (former CIA Director Colby, interviewed in a film, On Company Business,
reviewed by the Washington Post).
121. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA is "to correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating to the national security," 50 U.S.C. S 403(d)(3) (1976), and
to "perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence ... as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct." Id., at S 403(d)(5). J. BERMAN AND M.
HALPERIN, THE ABUSES OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 100 (1975). This is the subsection
used to justify covert activities, subject to a few subsequent amendments. See id.
(quoting then-Director of the CIA Colby's 1975 testimony to Senate Appropriations
Committee) (The CIA is "to conduct clandestine operations to collect foreign intelligence,
carry out counter-intelligence responsibilities abroad, and undertake-where directed-
covert foreign political or paramilitary operations."); Hilsman, Intelligence Through the
Eyes of the Policy Maker, in SURVEILLANCE AND ESPIONAGE IN A FREE SOCIETY at 163
(R. Blum, ed. 1972) (Director of State Dept. Intelligence and Assistant Sec'y for East
Asian Affairs, under Kennedy).
Many conservative critics of the CIA's present posture, whose views are usefully
collected in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980's (R. Godson, ed. 1979), favor ex-
pansion of covert operations. See e.g., Miler, Counterintelligence, in id, at 47, 50 (retired
CIA Counterintelligence Chief) (the CIA's primary functions are to protect secrets and
"insure that our institutions are free from foreign penetration and influence"); Tovar,
Covert Action, in id. at 65, 77 (ex-member, CIA Covert Action Staff) (U. S. must
reconstitute the ability to use force, by the CIA rather than the Defense Department,
on grounds of "expertise, institutional membership, and organizational flexibility").
122. See infra notes 164-70 and text accompanying.
123. H. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN
GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY ix, 110 (1967). See E. LEWIS, AMERICAN POLITICS IN A
BUREAUCRATIC AGE, supra note 107, at 158-61, 168-69; (1977); Casey, The Stole of In-
telligence, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, June, 1981, 1, at 1-2 (published by the ABA Standing
C-ee on Law and National Security) (quoted infra note 130); Colby, Intelligence in the
1980's, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, May, 1981, at 3 (Colby is a former CIA Director) ("The pro-
fession and discipline of 'intelligence' faces a major turning point in the 1980's"); H.
WILENSKY, at viii-ix ("intelligence," "the information -questions, insights, hypotheses,
evidence relevant to policy, should ideally be timely, reliable and wide-ranging"); id.
at 66 (quoting President Kennedy, speaking after the Bay of Pigs) ("You always assume
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Congress and, perhaps, to the courts and the public. The CIA can,
in fact, be taken as representative of all of executive branch in-
telligence activities.24 At the center of military and foreign policy (and,
more darkly and at least on occasion, of domestic policies)," the CIA's
that the military and intelligence people have some secret skill not available to or-
dinary mortals."). See also supra notes 18-19 and text accompanying.
124. Florence, Issues in Classifying and Protecting National Defense Informa-
tion, in SURVEILLANCE AND ESPIONAGE IN A FREE SOCEITY 128 (R. Blum, ed. 1972). Denial
of information to the public has become a way of life in public bureaucracies." Id.
See, e.g., F. DO.AER, supra note 120, at xii: "No aspect of our common life has been so
battered by misconduct and betrayal as our commitment to the fullest measure of
political freedom. [There has been a] secret war waged continuously for over fifty years
against all shades of dissenting politics by the domestic intelligence community."
125. The Government's budget typically describes "National Security" as en-
compassing programs "designed to preserve the freedom and territorial integrity of
this nation and its allies." L. LEDERMAN AND M. WINDUS, supra note 16, at 31 (quoting
The Budget in Brief Fy 1969 24 (1968)). Much, but far from all, of the secret CIA budget
is drawn from this Heading. The CIA accounts for only about one-sixth of the intelligence
budget, yet it forms the "nucleus" of the intelligence establishment. Walden, Restruc-
turing the CIA, in SURVEILLANCE AND ESPIONAGE IN A FREE SOCIETY 219 (R. Blum, ed.
1972). The "truth is that every post-World War II president ...has been tempted
to restrict freedom in the name of national security." Halperin, National Security and
Civil Liberties, CIVIL LIBERTIES, May, 1982, at 1, 3 (May, 1982).
For example, the 1975 Report by the Rockefeller Commission found that Presi-
dent Johnson pressed the CIA to find foreign links with the domestic peace move-
ment. D. WISE, supra note 120, at 194. The CIA has viewed the prohibition on domestic
intelligence collection "as a sort of public relations placebo and, on another plane, as
an intelligence problem to be solved by deceptive intelligence." F. DONNER, supra note
120, at 269. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1975, CIA
Director Colby stated that the six domestic divisions of the CIA had 64 offices in
American cities. While the domestic improprieties listed by Colby occupy 45 pages,
he concluded that they were not "massive." D. WISE, supra note 120, at 188, 193. The
CIA has cooperated with the FBI, the IRS, the Secret Service, etc. in order to learn
more about Americans lawful political activities. J. BERMAN AND M. HALPERIN, supra
note 121, at 1.
The National Security Act of 1947 "legitimated secrecy and intelligence as a
necessary form of government" through the CIA and the National Security Council
(NSC). A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 207. Many believe that the CIA frequently dominates
the National Security Council's deliberations. These deliberations result in policy recom-
mendations to the president, and in coordination of the national security policies and
functions of other governmental agencies. J. BERMAN AND M. HALPERIN, supra note 121,
at 168-69 (quoting Report of the Committees on Civil Rights and on International Human
Rights, New York Bar Association). See Casey Calls for Freeing Intelligence Agencies
of FOIA Restrictions, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Oct. 1982, 1, at 2. The "theology" of keep-
ing a distance between intelligence and foreign policy is a "fashionable formalism."
T. HUGHES, THE FATE OF FACTS IAN THE WORLD OF MEN 5 (1976) (Foreign Policy Associa-
tion Headline Ser. No. 233). (Hughes is President, Carnegie Endowment, and former
Director, State Dept. Intelligence). Military and intelligence activities "overlap exten-
sively;" an Iranian hostage rescue may involve either or both types of activity.
Highsmith, Note, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 331 (1982). See H. WILENSKY, supra note 123,
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views are heavily influenced by the many false dichotomies found in
these areas.'26
A false dichotomy which dominates thinking about the CIA can
be discovered once the veils of secrecy and organizational politics are
lifted a bit, as I will argue.'27 The germ of this dichotomy can be found
in the thinking of many CIA officials. Former CIA Director Stansfield
Turner, who starts off by quoting George Washington, illustrates the
line of reasoning followed by many in the Agency:
"The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent
and need not be further urged-all that remains for me to
add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possi-
ble." America's first president perhaps did not anticipate
how difficult it would later become to reconcile the necessity
for secrecy in intelligence activities with the constitutional
provisions for open government. . . .[S]ecrecy can easily
undermine individual rights in the name of protecting them.
Consequently, every American administration has had to
seek a balance between secrecy and openness. '28
at 128; "the head of state who intervenes in Vietnam or Cuba is unlikely to be clear
about goals, costs or performance. Defenses of nations against structural or doctrinal
roots of intelligence failures in the area of foreign policy are, therefore, universally
weak and preconceptions are enduring." See also J. BERMAN AND M. HALPERIN, supra
note 121, at 108 (quoting former CIA Director Colby); Paramilitary operations are the
only alternative "between a diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines."). Some
would hold the CIA to be an integral part of Harold Lasswell's "garrison state" or
of the "military-industrial complex." The latter is a notion developed by President
Eisenhower, in a 1961 speech for television. See P. KOSTINEN, supra note 120, at ix,
8-10; E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at 121-23, 146. The military-industrial complex is no con-
spiracy, but the outcome of many "individual and basically unrelated decisions, which
taken together have the effect of a conspiracy without there ever being one." The
Soviety's military-industrial complex spurs ours, and vice versa. Aspin, Foreward, in
P. KOSTINEN, supra note 120, at vi (member, House Intelligence Subcommittee). This
sounds like the oligopolistic interdependence theory of antitrust liability, and it
presumably has analogous strengths and weaknesses.
126. See, e.g. supra note 63; infra notes 187-92.
127. See infra notes 140-261 and text accompanying.
128. Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 122; Moorehead, Operation and
Reform of the Classification System, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 87, 89, 102-05 (T.
Franck & E Weisband, eds. 1974) (quoting Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.); id. (quoting Potter
Stewart) ("secrecy can be preserved only when credibility is truly preserved."); See
H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 125 ("all democratic societies face the necessity of defend-
ing citizens against abuses of official power"); id. at 130-31 (quoted infra note 196;
Shenefield, Law, Intelligence and National Security, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Sept. 1980,
1 (Associate Attorney General's address to the Aug., 1980 ABA Annual Meeting); Smith,
Attorney General Discusses Intelligence Capabilities, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Feb. 1982,
1; infra note 145.
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President Kennedy, having paid respects to George Washington, spoke
in the same vein:
Clearly, the two principles of an informed public and of con-
fidentiality within the government are irreconcilable in their
purest form, and a balance must be struck. [But the obliga-
tion] to protect certain information . . . has become par-
ticularly acute in recent years as the United States has
assumed a powerful position in world affairs, and as world
peace has come to depend in large part on how that posi-
tion is safeguarded. We are also moving into an era of
delicate negotiations .... 129
The question of who strikes this balance and how is a thorny one,
something which is not always appreciated by intelligence experts.
For example, the National Security Council once asked President
Nixon to strike this balance by amending an executive order.3 ' The
initial response by many lawyers would be that this is a job for the
Supreme Court, particularly in light of the Burger Court's fondness
for balancing that is evident in the area of abortion, but this does
not seem to be the right answer either."'
President Kennedy's words were lifted almost verbatim by Nixon,
while introducing an executive order about document classification, 32
129. Franck and Weisband, Executive Secrecy in Three Democracies, in SECRECY
AND FOREIGN POLICY 3, 5 (T. Franck and E. Weisband, eds. 1974) (quoting Kennedy, with
the order of statements reversed). See H. WILENSK. supra note 123, at 66 (quoted supra
note 123). But see also Hardy, A Tug of War: The War Powers Resolution and the Mean-
ing of "Hostilities." 15 PAC. L. J. 267 (1984) (quoting Letter from Abraham Lincoln to
William Herndon, Feb. 15, 1848) (reprinted in R. BASLER, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 451-52 (1953)):
Kings had always been involving their people in wars, pretending . . .
that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention under-
took to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions; and they resolved
to so frame the Constitution that no one should hold the power of bring-
ing this oppression upon us.
130. Florence, supra note 124, at 128 (qui Ling 1972 NSC staff recommendation
to amend E.O. 10501).
131. See infra notes 420-23 and text accompanying.
132. See Moorehead, supra note 128, at 99, 102-05 (member, House Intelligence
Subcommittee, quoting Nixon's introduction of E.O. 11652, 37 Fed. Reg No. 48, 5209-18,
Mar. 10, 1972). This Order made for less secrecy in government, nominally at least.
But under it, a president could still stay in office for two terms and have another
candidate of his party elected, before damaging information about blunders and
malfeasances is declassified. Moss, The Abuse of Security, in SURVEILLANCE AND Es-
PIONAGE IN A FREE SOCIETY 120, 122 (R. Blum, ed. 1972) (member, House of
Representatives).
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and they could easily have been spoken by Reagan.13 These views
may reflect a present or emerging national consensus,1 34 or there may
be thumbs on the scales when the "balance between secrecy and open-
ness" is struck. In any event, this balance teetered uneasily during
the last decade:
For the American intelligence community, the 1970's
was a decade to forget. One scandal after another basked
in the spotlight of national attention, and by the end of the
decade, the accumulated destruction was considerable.
Ruined careers, curtailed powers, and diminished public con-
fidence lay amid the wreckage.
The 1980's promise great change for the intelligence
community. The political mood of the country, as the [19801
elections evidence, has shifted dramatically. The people no
longer want to hear about corruption and its reform; rather,
it is time, they say, to let the professionals do their job. 3 '
133. See, e.g., Dennet, Comment, 19 Hare. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 404 (1982) (some cites
omitted): One response to criticisms of bills to amend the Freedom of Information Act
is that the basic disclosure policy that guided [its] enactment was mistaken
and should be ignored or discarded. However, the Reagan Administra-
tion and even some of the Act's strongest critics realize that the real
problem is to strike a new balance among the concededly important in-
terests at stake. Thus, the congressional deliberations on amending the
Act are taking place in a framework that accepts the Act's original pur-
pose and focuses on the balancing of competing values.
This seems an evenhanded account of the current state of play and, inter alia, Dennet
cites Deputy Assistant Attorney General Grognan, on the "Solomon-like problem" of
striking this balance. Id. at 404 n. 64.
134. See Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 137. But see Colby, in P.
HACKES, supra note 42, at 11-12 (the late 1940's intelligence consensus has disintegrated);
inJra notes 213 and text accompanying.
135. Medow, The First Amendment and the Secrecy State. 130 U. PA. L. REV.
775 (1982) (an arguably balanced view). As a result of the headline to headline, "scan-
dal to scandal progress of the CIA in the mid-1970's, it became known to the Church
Committee as a "rogue elephant" out of control. Uhlmann, Approaches to the Reform
of the Intelligence Community, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980's 9 (R. God-
son, ed. 1979) (former Assistant Attorney General for Legislation). See T. HUGHES,
supra note 125, at 3. An early 70's thaw in the Cold War "defoliated" the world of
some CIA officials and threatened them with obsolescence. D. WISE, supra note 120,
at 207. It was difficult, in "an era of detente," to identify an 'enemy' which justified
the recreation of intelligence capabilities. Discussion, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE 1980's 44, at 45 (R. Godson, ed. 1979). (Some would object to the notion that
capabilities had to be re-created, and some would add that detente led the CIA to
exacerbate Cold War tensions, with effects observable today.) The outcome was a "sen-
sational" mid-70's revision of "our twenty-five-year consensus as to what intelligence
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This new political mood notwithstanding, there is much disagreement
over the best way to organize the tasks performed by the CIA. It
was initially represented to Congress, in 1947, as an above-board tool
for research and analysis, a place where elderly emigres clip Pravda
articles. Technological change soon made this image irrelevant, and
secret presidential authority was given for covert operations as early
as 1948.136 Many conservatives favor the continued integration of in-
formational and covert activities within the CIA, on efficacy grounds.
A retired Chief of CIA Counterintelligence argues, for example, that
the coordination of tasks and agencies cannot be legislated: "Each case
has to be treated individually." '137 This amounts to Tennyson's
"wilderness of isolated instances" which, like a pluralism of contract
rules and policies, greatly reduces opportunities for a coordinated
supervision and control. Some moderates and liberals see a
schizophrenic CIA, in which a legitimate "interface" between infor-
was all about." Colby, in P. HACKES, supra note 42, at 2. There was a stricter control
of covert operations, an end to glaring illegalities, a modest restructuring, and a more
serious effort at congressional oversight. Hughes, supra note 125, at 3. Conservatives
reacted sharply, picturing the CIA as, e.g., "struggling to gain sustenance from a rot-
ting root system." Miler, supra note 121, at 49. While legislation ensured "that the
United States government cannot violate individual privacy in this country, several
foreign intelligence services do so daily with few objections raised. In effect we are
the enemy." Discussion, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980's, at 45. Some see
a "revolution" in intelligence in the 1980's, but others disagree strongly. See Casey,
supra note 123 (quote supra note 123); id. ("If successfully navigated, the 1980's "will
mark the culmination of the growth of a truly American intelligence system"); Shat-
tuck, Comments, in P. HACKES, supra note 42, at 16 (ACLU representative). Concern "that
intelligence communities might abuse secrecy began to diminish. The county was shaking
itself free of the inhibiting consequences of its debacle in Vietnam .. " Turner and
Thibault, supra note 118, at 123. Prospects "for a balanced judgement are considerably
better than they were three years ago." Id. at 138. See Uhlmann, supra note 135,
at 12. This is a very controversial conclusion politically. The technocratic assessment
is that "intelligence agencies are not so much increasing their budgets as they are
building back to where they were before they got cut during the 1970's. Southerland,
America's Spies, in THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 28, 1982, 1, at 12, col. 1 (inter-
view with CIA director Casey).
136. D. WISE, supra note 120, at 185-86. See supra notes 121, 125. The emergence
of covert operations may mean that, "[uinwittingly, the United States accepted the
communist definition of 'intelligence' and began to ape the adversaries in doctrine
and practice." Ransom, Can the Intelligence Establishment be Controlled in a Democracy,
in SURVEILLANCE AND ESPIONAGE IN A FREE SOCIETY, 205, 206. (R. Blum, ed. 1972)
(Vanderbilt political science professor).
137. Miler, supra note 121, at 63. Miler's discussion concerns the People's Temple
in Guyana. He argues that the CIA felt unable to act because Americans were involved,
and the FBI did not act because a foreign-based religious organization was involved.
Id. With respect, this may be a rationalization of an inattention. These niceties have
not stopped both the FBI and CIA from acting (and sometimes coming into conflict)
where they felt it necessary to do so.
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mational and covert operations exists yet combining these operations
results in a "mutually 'spoiling' arrangement" overall. 1" Others would
go further to abolish or narrowly limit covert operations.' 9 An ex-
amination of informational and covert operations, and of the internal
controls over them, if any, will show that conservatives do not have
the better arguments here. Combined operations frequently result in
a manipulation of the events to be reported and in a reportive
manipulation-attempts to make things come true through wishful
thinking and doing, and by circular reasoning. As Frances Fitzgerald
argues, deception can become self-deception; the liar then becomes
a fool. The vital questions of which intelligence, by and for whom,
frequently go unanswered.'40
A. Information and Secrecy
The centrist position on the CIA is that its primary function of
collecting, processing, analyzing and evaluating information must be
clarified and reasserted. All policy is based on information, and most
of this information comes to the CIA from such commonly-available
sources as newspapers. A skillful espionage operation or electronic
surveillance may be crucial on occasion, but very little important in-
formation is obtained from most of these operations. The information
collectors nevertheless suffered from disclosures of what their covert
operations colleagues had been doing; CIA Director Casey estimates
that fifty percent of personnel and forty percent of funding were lost
during the 1970s. 4 As a result, relatively little information is collected
138. Ranson, supra note 136, at 217. See id. at 206 (quoted supra note 136).
139. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 125, at p.2, col. 3 (quoted infra text
accompanying note 213).
140. See T. HUGHES, supra note 112, at 35; H. WILENSKY, supra note 110, at 23-24,
30; Senate Hearings Continue on Domestic Security Guidelines, INTELLIGENCE REPORT,
Dec. 1982, at 2; supra notes 60-67, 72-74 and text accompanying. Compare infra notes
170-90 and text accompanying, with supra notes 82-87, 101-08 and text accompanying.
Like most of us, intelligence officials maintain images of what is and what ought to
be, and act to decrease the gap between images. North, supra note 108, at 198. Unfor-
tunately, this is frequently done by assuming that the "ought"-including communism
as responsible for all the world's ills -and the "is" are identical. See supra note 70
and text accompanying; infra notes 187-94 and text accompanying.
141: Quoted in Southerland, supra note 135, at p. 12, col. 1. See Hilsman, supra
note 121, at 164-65; T. HUGHES, supra note 125, at 4; Smith, supra note 128, at 2 (ex-
cerpt from speech by Reagan's Attorney General to Los Angeles World Affairs Coun-
cil, Dec. 18, 1981) ("President Reagan inherited an intelligence community that had
been demoralized and debilitated by six years of public disclosures, denunciation, and
... budgetary limitations."); Southerland, at p. 12, col. 1 (quoting unnamed "expert")
(our signal and photo intelligence are among the best, but in human intelligence "we're
lucky if we're among the top 10."); id. (paraphrasing Casey) (because of money and
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about new economic and social trends, or about matters in the Third
World not thought to be manipulated by the Soviets. The rise of
Islamic fundamentalism was nearly missed altogether, for example.
CIA officials admit to a shortage of linguists, areas specialists, and
technical experts.142
Except for last-minute items of critical importance, the CIA does
not disseminate raw (uninterpreted) data. Information is almost always
turned into CIA views. These reflect what many see as a CIA "mind-
manpower cuts, the major analyses known as "national estimates" frequently fail to
cover Third World affairs).
The "real issue now is the quality of intelligence much more than the control
of abuses ...." Aspin, supra note 42, at 32. It is difficult to evaluate the quality of
the CIA's work compared to that of other government agencies, but we have seen
examples of extremely good and extremely bad work from the CIA. Id. This may
be so, but the evidence of past abuses-in areas where information gathering shades
into covert activities-is massive. Attorney General Levi admitted to 8,239 national'
security wiretaps domestically and 2,465 buggings, from 1940 to 1975. Wise, supra
note 120, at 145n (quoting Levi). See J. BERMAN AND M. HALPERIN, supra note 121 (quoted
supra note 121). Herman Schwartz's study of wiretaps made in 1970-71 shows that
they yielded little information and were very expensive, in terms of intelligence
resources used and the extent of invasions of privacy. Harris, Internal Security Practices
of the United States, in SURVEILLANCE AND ESPIONAGE IN A FREE SOCIETY 61, 65 (R. Blum,
ed. 1972).
Ever since passage of the Communication Act of 1934, intelligence agencies and,
usually, the Justice Department interpreted statutes as blank checks which allow
domestic surveillance when national security is invoked. D. WISE, supra note 120, at
97. The position, until recently, was as follows:
Executive Order 12036, under which the CIA conducts surveillance of
Americans, requires the agencies to develop implementing directives and
secure approval for them from the attorney general. [This was done] in
August of 1979. Yet despite the fact that the guidelines are unclassified,
the CIA neither made them public nor even announced they existed. [When]
a formal request was made under the [Freedom of Information Act]
. the agency did not release all of the guidelines ...
FOIA Testimony presented, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Sept. 1981, 1 at 4 (statements by staff
counsel, ACLU, before Senate Select C-ee on Intelligence, July 21, 1981).
142. Pforzheimer, AFIO Holds Annual Convention, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Nov.
1982, at 3 (quoting speech of Adm. Bobby Inman, Deputy Director of the CIA (ret.),
to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, Oct. 2, 1982). But see also Casey,
supra note 110 (CIA Director's speech to U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Apr. 28, 1981):
Over the years Dick Helms and my other predecessors have . ..
developed a great center of scholarship and research, with as many doc-
tors and masters of every kind . .. as any university campus.
They have produced a triumph of technology. ...
In addition . . . .we ask scientists and a wide variety of experts,
scholars and practitioners to serve on advisory panels ...and we con-
tract with think tanks and a wide variety of business corporations to do
specialized research for us.
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set" or "Groupthink" which frequently results in important informa-
tion being overlooked or misinterpreted. 43 In any event, the CIA is
subject to many of the vagaries of policy analysis discussed earlier. 44
Information overloads cannot be dealt with effectively by the CIA,
particularly during the frequent crises when effective communication
is most needed. Most of the CIA's generalizations are forced from
a narrow empiricism, and many of these turn out to be poor predic-
tors of the course of future events. Other generalizations become self-
fulfilling prophecies-with a little help from covert operations col-
leagues. According to Harold Wilensky, these vagaries foster "foolish
ideas about the proper organization and possibilities of intelligence."' 45
143. Aspin, supra note 42, at 33. See Harris, supra note 141, at 71; T. HUGHES,
supra note 125, at 9; infra notes 180-90 and text accompanying. Some would see this
mind-set as stemming from the loyalty-security programs of the 1950s: from "ideological
roots in hyperpatriotism, xenophobia, isolationism, fundamentalism, populism, and the
fear of revolution; and from the "structural roots" of legislators' insecurity of status
and tenure, and from cleavages "between presidents and Congress and between
intellectuals and politicians." See H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 117 (citing study by
Edward Shils). Like the FBI, the CIA has arguably fallen prey to the "collage syndrome,"
the "development of a data base beyond the scope of their mission or functional needs."
F. DONNER, supra note 120, at 270. See H. WILENSKY, at 143: McCarthyism demonstrates
the fallacy of .'all the facts'-the idea that raw or unevaluated facts should be piled
up in the files of intelligence agencies for possible use in some loosely defined emergen-
cy .. ..
144. See supra notes 4, 16, 35-37, 52, 54, 57 and text accompanying. National
security intelligence does have some advantages over other forms of policy analysis,
however: it has a political center (in the organizational muscle of, e.g., the CIA) and
a conceptual center in an anti-communism. Compare supra note 15 and text accompa-
nying with infra notes 173, 178, 183-94 and text accompanying.
145. Harris, supra note 141, at 67 (citing Barton Whaley, Strategem (1969)) ("In-
discriminate data collection makes it harder to identify key warnings and makes it
easier for adversaries to deceive warning systems."); North, supra note 108, at 185;
H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 62, 64; id. at 143; Casey, supra note 123 ("facts can con-
fuse," and the wrong photo "is not worth a thousand words."). See F. DONNER, supra
note 120, at 270 (quoted in note 132, supra); D. WISE, supra note 120, at 159 (Howard
Hunt knew nothing about Watergate wiretaps-his job was to photograph documents,
and after 20 years, Hunt thought of himself as a specialist rather than as a burglar);
supra note 58 and text accompanying; infra text accompanying note 161.
The "ideals of neutral competence and objective sources of knowledge in the
formulation of public policy are probably as significant in modern American political
culture as the ideals of freedom of expression are on representative democracy." E.
LEWIS, supra note 123, at 161. Unfortunately, the CIA and other government agencies
frequently fall short of this mark while making policy into its own cause:
Information is now, as before, a source of power, but it is increasingly
a source of confusion. The proliferation of both technical and political-
ideological information and a chronic condition of information overload
have exacerbated the classic problem of intelligence. An increasing share
of organizational resources goes to the intelligence functions; structural
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Once collected and analyzed, information is kept as secret as
possible; secret from foreign enemies, of course, but also from the
American people and, occasionally, from legitimate decisionmakers who
might do the CIA injury. Americans have a love/hate relationship with
secrecy. Uniquely publicity-conscious, we also idolize recluses like
Garbo and J. Edgar Hoover and try to maintain privacy in everyday
life. Intelligence officials are fond of pointing out that such "other"
professionals as doctors and clergy also maintain a secrecy. Clearly,
the CIA is only one of many governmental agencies which are annoy-
ingly secretive." ' These led Louis Brandeis to argue: "Sunlight is ...
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policemen." '147
The CIA is all in a darkness, however, a state of affairs fostered by
law for the most part. The 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act ex-
empts the CIA from federal laws requiring disclosure of personnel,
names and budgets. By statute the CIA Director must curtail the flow
of information to protect methods and sources. The Espionage Act,
an ineffective statute, impossible to interpret, imposes heavy
punishments on the disclosure of secrets, but it is both ineffective
and impossible to interpret.48 The current trend is toward more
sources of intelligence failures become more prominent; doctrines of
intelligence -ideas about how knowledge should be tapped and staff
services organized- become more fateful.
H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 174. The "tyranny of technique" frequently prevails
within the CIA. Id. at 183. See id. at 128 (quoted supra note 125).
146. H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 127-28; Casey, supra note 125, at 6 ("Why
should national security information be entitled to any less protection" than that granted
to doctors, etc?). See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT S 4.04 (1972) (quoting Chief
Counsel of the Comptroller of the Currency): "banking agencies . .. have long main-
tained systems of secret evidence, secret law, and secret policy." Trial-type hearings
are of limited utility under such circumstances, as practices within the ICC and CAB
demonstrate. Id. In the FTC, litigated cases are but the tip of the iceberg. Informal
decisions have at least as great an impact on the development of law and policy. Too
much "business is conducted in secret, and too much ... time is spent on efforts
to maintain the artificial and unnecessary curtain of secrecy . Id. at S 4.06. (quoting
former FTC Commissioner Elman).
147. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933). See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE 226 (1969): "Openness is a natural enemy of arbitrariness, a natural ally in the
fight against injustice."
148. J. BERMAN AND M. HALPERIN, supra note 121, at 101; Hughes, The Power to
Speak and the Power to Listen, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 13, 16 (T. Franck and
E. Weisband, eds. 1974); supra note 288. The Espionage Statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 793-98
(1976), criminalize the disclosure of certain catagories of information "with the intent
or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United
States or to the advantage of a foreign nation." Id. at S 794. The reporter who un-
covered the 1920's Teapot Dome Scandal could have been prosecuted under this
Section. Moorehead, supra note 128, at 97. Otherwise, the statutes are largely
ineffective-it is difficult to prove the requisite intent against any but classic spies
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/2
19841 PUBLIC POLICY
secrecy: "The Reagan Administration has eliminated the provision of
previous executive orders making the [CIA Director] . . . the intelli-
gence community's spokesman to the media. It has also drastically
curtailed the release of unclassified intelligence reports to the
public."'4 9
The classification of documents under law illustrates most of the
pathologies discussed in this article. What Flaubert terms the rage
to classify5 ' is so potent that hundreds of thousands of minor officials
wield a delegated presidential authority to advertise the importance
of a document (and hence their own, "top secret" importance). A bias
toward secrecy is reinforced by penalties for disclosure and
underclassification which are much heavier than penalties for
overclassification. The latter penalties are rarely exacted, in any event.
In 1974, there were twenty million classified Air Force documents,
99 percent of which could be made public in absolute safety; the State
Department held about 35 million classified documents and the
Archives were responsible for about 436 million classified pages."'
(such as Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who may have been innocent). See Martin, National
Security and the First Amendment, 68 ABA J. 680, 682 (1982). The Statutes pose
"forbidding problems of interpretation," such as that of somehow limiting the breadth
of the language, "connected with the national defense" found in § 793. The legislative
history of the Statutes is "more that usually confused," and they are "hardly adequate
to inform, much less to reconcile sensibly, the competing demands of national security
and public debate. ... Schmidt, The American Espionage Statues and Publications
of Defense Information, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 179, 183-84, 192 (T. Franck and
E. Weisband, eds. 1974). (Columbia Law School Dean). The Justice Department takes
espionage cases seriously, but alleged spies are frequently not prosecuted because in-
telligence agencies refuse to declassify the information needed to secure a conviction.
Glennon, Liaison and the Law: Foreign Intelligence Agencies' Activities in the United
States, 25 HARV. INT. L.J. 1, 33 (1984) (discussing a 1977 Report of the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Secrecy and Disclosure).
149. Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 132. Intelligence officials "can
sanitize most reports ...with minimal deletions and editing." Id. See Southerland,
supra note 135, at 12, col. 2 ("the halt in publication of analytical reports has made
it more difficult for an outsider to judge the quality of CIA reporting."). See also infra
notes 316-22 and text accompanying.
150. See supra text accompanying note 72. See also supra notes 41-42, 44-47
and text accompanying.
151. Moorehead, supra note 128, at 87 (citing William Florence, a retired Air
Force documents classification expert). See Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. S 798 (1976)
(imposing stiff penalties on those who "knowingly and willfully" communicate certain
kinds of classified information to unauthorized persons); Florence, supra note 124, at
128 (quoted supra note 124 and accompanying text); id. at 134 (growing obsession with
document-rather than information-classification); Moorehead, supra note 128, at 109
(overclassification "gradually but surely weakens and eventually destroys the integrity
and effectiveness of the system"); F. ROURKE, SECRECY AND PUBLICITY 63-99, 107 (1961);
H. WILENSEY, supra note 123, at 43 (quoted infra note 169); id. at 139. An Interagency
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These totals must be much larger today, in the midst of the Xerox
Revolution. In 1982 and without feeling the need for a minority report,
a House committee had "no doubt whatever that classification
authority is used to protect information that does not require protec-
tion in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. This has been
a consistent finding of presidents, Congressional committees, commis-
sions and other observers."'52 In a more pragmatic vein, "classifica-
tion controls ... impede and delay the ... distribution of truly damag-
ing information, although one can predict that it will inevitably be
disclosed at some not-too-distant time in some form by some person.""
Classifications are modest hurdles for a foreign "enemy" but, under
them, the American public finds out last, if at all.
Classification Review Committee, headed by Ambassador John Eisenhower, was created
to monitor Nixon's classification scheme: E.O. 11652. Moorehead, supra note 128, at
113. I have been unable to trace any recorded contribution of this Committee. On
August 16, 1982,
the House Government Operations Committee released a report [with no
minority report] highly critical of President Reagan's new executive order
on security classification (E.O. 12356).
[Tihe Reagan administration had made only minimal effort to consult
with congress or the public ...
[Miany provisions in the Reagan executive order . . . parallel provi-
sions of the Carter order. Both prohibit the use of classification to con-
ceal violations of law . . . [inefficiency,] . . . administrative error, or the
use of classification to prevent embarrassment or to restrain competition
or to protect basic scientific research information not clearly related to
the national security.
[The Carter order favored disclosure where there was a "reasonable
doubt" about classification.] The Reagan order conversely says that where
reasonable doubt exits . . . . the information should be safeguarded as
if it were classified pending a determination within 30 days by the original
classification authority. Similarly, if there is a doubt about the appropriate
level of classification, the information shall be safeguarded at the higher
level pending a final determination.
The committee report criticized E.O. 12356 for failing to address the
problems of overclassification, [quoting] a 1979 GAO report and other
reports ...
House Committee Critical of Classification Order, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Sept. 1982, 4,
at 4-5 (emphasis supplied-"the original classification authority" will arguably display
a consistent bias toward classification and overclassification, to augment its power
and prestige, and to conceal blunders).
152. Id. at 5.
153. Martin, supra note 148, at 685. See Moorehead, supra note 128, at 109
(quoted supra note 151). But see, e.g., Tovar, supra note 121, at 79 (exposure through
error or stupidity a recognized intelligence hazard, but cooperation can't be obtained
where danger exists of exposure by government official or former CIA employee).
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The purported justifications for so much secrecy are the frequent
need to act swiftly, the protection of intelligence methods, the pro-
tective cover needed by domestic and foreign informers, and protec-
tion of the information itself. These aims could be achieved at much
lower levels of secrecy. For example, Kenneth Davis argues that where
informers are not secret agents the public interest in security would
benefit from requiring some tale-bearers to appear in the open and
submit to cross examination."M The CIA candidly admits that there
is much "misperception" among informers about the extent of
disclosure in America, a condition which cannot be cured by still more
secrecy. There is, of course, a need for confidential communication
and passionate debate behind closed governmental doors. There are
countervailing needs, however, for public debate and a governmental
accountability to the public. These cannot be balanced adequately
against the need for secrecy because of an inability, institutionalized
under law, to distinguish true secrets from the "false" secrets that
protect the political interests of those in power rather than the public
interest. The latter secrets proliferate under canons of a "plausible
deniability" and the "need to know."'' 5 For example, attempts to in-
terdict North Vietnamese supply routes in Laos started out as a CIA.
caper. Our widened involvement continued to be shrouded in a CIA
secrecy, the White House clinging "to the transparent fiction that
American involvement is limited to noncombatant support to native
forces defending their remote jungle homeland . 5.."6 When "things
154. K. DAVIS, supra note 146, at S 7.15. See Halpern, Clandestine Collection,
in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980's, 35, 39-40 (R. Godson, ed. 1979); Congress
Considers Amendments to Freedom of Information Act, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Aug. 1981,
1, at 12 (testimony by Adm. Inman, then Deputy Director of CIA).
155. Franck and Weisband, supra note 129, at 11; Franck and Weisband,
Disemblement, Secrecy and Executive Privilege in the Foreign Relations of Three
Democracies, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 399, 435-38 (T. Franck and E. Weisband,
eds. 1974); P. WALKER, THE CABINET 27 (rev. ed. 1972); H. WILENSKY, supra note 123,
at 138-39; FOIA Testimony Presented, supra note 141, at 3. See McGehee v. Central
Intelligence Agency, 51 U.S.L.W. 2421 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 4, 1983) (quoted infra note 160).
Two retired CIA officials argue that:
Even with the purest of intentions, there is a danger that these depart-
ments [State and Defense] will release only selective information favoring
their policy objectives. A better answer is for the DCI [CIA Director]
to take the initiative by releasing whatever will be useful to the public.
The director should not let himself be pressured into supporting administra-
tion policy. ...
Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 133. (This leaves discretion in an arguably
inappropriate place, and it is doubtful whether a CIA director could withstand
administration pressures.) But see also infra note 357 and text accompanying.
156. Ashmore, The Policy of Illusion, the Illusion of Policy, CENTER MAGAZINE,
May 1970, 2, at 4.
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go seriously wrong," as they often do, and did in Vietnam, "the surfeit
of villains and paucity of heroes place a profound strain on the entire
system.""1 7 The public blames all experts and politicians equally, since
the divisions and dissensions within the administration have been con-
cealed behind a monolithic secrecy. Many of those at fault can then
exonerate themselves by pleading a lack of information."'
Secrecy spawns other vices, too. It reinforces the specialists'
desire to make expertise the measure of life (rather than making life
the measure of expertise). A rigid compartmentation of knowledge
and functions limits the number of CIA officials who know of a par-
ticular matter to as few as a dozen. Acute coordination difficulties
occur and, for those knowing of an important matter, a significant
power results.159 A major reason for CIA opposition to the Freedom
of Information Act16 ° (FOIA) is that:
A relatively simple FOIA request may require as many of
21 Agency record systems to be searched, a difficult re-
157. Franck and Wiesband, supra note 129, at 9. See T. HUGHES, supra note 125,
at 24 ("Prominent among our many crises over Vietnam was the crisis of its
nonexplainability.")
158. See id.; Franck and Weisband, supra note 154, at 420 (information becomes
a "sacred cow"); supra note 8 and text accompanying. Excusing yourself on grounds
of a lack of information has its corollary: the fewer the restrictions on clandestine
collection the better, since "we would be spared the charge of intelligence failure
whenever something happens in the world that could or could not be predicted."
Halpern, supra note 154, at 40-41.
159. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 52 (quoting Harold Laski); Turner and
Thibault, supra note 118, at 124.
160. 5 U.S.C. SS 552 et. seq. (1966). This was the first amendment to the 1946
Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. §S 700 et seq. (1976), Pub. L. 80-487, July 4,
1966, 80 Stat. 250. It did not change the Act's basic procedures because Congress
was reluctant to tamper with anything so fundamental. J. FREEMAN, supra note 8, at
131.
In 1967, President Johnson set the pattern of executive branch behavior, when
he refused to allow a reporter to see the draft of the remarks he delivered while
signing the FOIA. Franck and Wiesband, supra note 129, at 3-4. Futile attempts, in
1982, to amend the FOIA, so as to make disclosure of intelligence information less
likely, are usefully collected in: Dennett, supra note 133, at 401-05; Law and National
Security, 1982, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Jan. 1983, 1 at 11. The "next battle on secrecy will
focus on the [FOIA] .... [It will extend] beyond national security to the whole ques-
tion of access to government information." Halperin, supra note 125, at 3, col. 2. See
McGehee, supra note 155: "It has often been observed that the central purpose of the
FOIA is to open up the workings of government to public scrutiny. [Aln informed
electorate is vital to the proper operation of a democracy." A more specific goal implicit
in the foregoing is to give citizens access to the information on the basis of which
government agencies make their decisions, thereby equipping the populace to evaluate
and criticize these decisions. Id. See also infra note 285.
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quest over 100. The "need to know" principle, also, means
that CIA employees normally have access only to informa-
tion necessary to perform their assignment. Thus, ...
searching for documents in response to an FOIA request,
people who would otherwise never have access to compart-
mented information necessarily see such documents ... .'
Many imaginative and independent-minded analysts would find it im-
possible to work in such an atmosphere, which appeals more to
cautiously mediocre "raw empiricists, or conventional 'backstoppers."'
162
Paradoxically, excessive secrecy also spawns many of the "leaks"
that have claimed much presidential and media attention in recent
years. Executive control over secrecy permits an administration to
leak and even to declassify information favorable to itself. Retaliatory
leaks, by opponents of the administration or its policies, are the in-
evitable result. Fears that these leaks are only "the tip of the
Ellsberg" lead to scattergun attempts by the administration to "plug"
the leak, efforts which terrorize the bureaucracy to no good effect.
Fortunately, truly damaging secrets (as opposed to those embarrass-
ing to particular politicians) are almost never disclosed during the
political games of the leak. A certain number of leaks seem an in-
evitable reaction to the strains of maintaining a united policy front. 6 '
161. Congress Considers Amendments to Freedom of Information Act, supra note
154, at 12 (excerpts from testimony of Adm. Inman, then-Deputy Director of the CIA,
to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution and the Senate Intelligence
Committee). FOIA protections against intelligence abuses are unnecessary, as congres-
sional oversight provides adequate protections. Id. at 8 (Asst. Attorney General Rose's
testimony). See infra notes 279-87 and text accompanying. But see Colby, in P. HACKES,
supra note 46, at 26: much of the substance, if not the sources, of information can
be disclosed. This would enable the CIA to get badly-needed analytical help from
academics. Id.
162. H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 176-77, 179. See T.HUGHES. supra note 125,
at 59 (quoted infra note 175); H. WILENSKY, at 174, 183 (quoted in supra note 145).
163. See Aspin, supra note 42, at 21-22 (quoted supra text accompanying note
42); Franck and Weisband, supra note 154, at 436-40; de Smith, Official Secrecy and
External Relations in Britain, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 312, 316-18 (T. Franck
and E. Weisband, eds. 1974); id. at 317 (quoting James Callaghan, who later became
Prime Minister) ("briefing is what I do and leaking is what you do."); P. WALKER,
supra note 155, at 29-30. Leaks place government on the horns of a dilemma: none
of the 30 leaks referred to the Justice Department by 1977 were investigated because
the agencies refused to declassify the information that the Department viewed as
necessary for a successful prosecution. Glennon, supra note 148 (discussing 1977 Report
of the Senate Subcomm. on Secrecy and Disclosure). See Turner and Thibault, supra
note 118, at 125: Despite recent steps to make the CIA's "internal procedures more
open, the danger of leaks remained small because intelligence agencies in general are
highly conscious of security. The most significant danger of such steps is rather that
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B. CIA Policies as Their Own Cause
Despite best efforts at secrecy, much information about CIA
covert operations has been made public-particularly through the
efforts of the Church Committee."4 Committees of the Bar Associa-
tion of New York have found particular CIA covert operations to be
"patently unconstitutional"'65 (despite their being non-justiciable,
political questions), and an associate editor of the Washington Post
offers contemporary Nicaragua as a case study in the CIA's
ineffectiveness:
In the best tradition of American involvement in such situa-
tions, . . . the clandestine war in Nicaragua is producing
a result precisely the opposite of what was intended.
American intervention has strengthened the Sandinistas at
home, while giving them excuses to impose increasingly
authoritarian controls on the population and to use Cuban
advisors in large numbers. Nicaraguans who bitterly oppose
the Sandinistas ridicule American policy as clumsy and
counterproductive.
Even the American embassy reckons the Sandinistas
would win a popular election today. 66
they may encourage undue caution . . ." But see also Franck and Weisband, supra
note 129, at 9: "The cost of excessive secrecy is excessive leaking of confidential
information -with its possible threat to national security."
164. Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. 94-755, Bks. IV, Apr. 26, 1976.
165. Quoted in J. BERMAN AND M. HALPERIN, supra note 121, at 70 (Civil Rights
and International Human Rights Committees):
The Bay of Pigs invasion, for example, was a usurpation by the Executive
of Congress' power to raise and support Armies . . . and to 'declare War.'
Similarly unconstitutional was the recruiting and supporting over a period
of years of a large army in Laos without congressional knowledge. Both
the Cuban and Laotian operations might have been justifiable had they
involved the need to act promptly to repel sudden attacks upon the United
States. The planning of both operations, however, took sufficiently long
as to eliminate any reason for not involving Congress.
In still other actions, such as those in Chile, the CIA conducted
activities which apparently breached treaties ratified by the Senate. In
ratifying these treaties, the Senate was exercising its constitutional power
to set the standards which guide the President in the conduct of foreign
policy. The CIA's violation of these treaties contravened the standards
established by the Senate and undermined its constitutional role.
The difficulty with this argument is, of course, that political authorities have been
unwilling and/or unable to declare a covert operation unconstitutional and to make
this declaration stick. See infra notes 227-31 and text accompanying.
166. Kaiser, Yankees are a Sandinista's Best Enemy, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
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Despite this kind of evidence on the law and policy of covert
operations, they seem very popular with the Reagan Administration.
There, conservatives dominate national security policy, and many con-
servatives find covert operations to be viable alternatives to a liberal
advocacy of reforms in a foreign government and its policies. ' It
seems that moderates and liberals are justified in their search for
new curbs on covert operations. Like wars, covert actions rarely solve
anything and should therefore be used only just short of war. In his
Decline and Fall, Gibbon recognized something that the CIA and its
conservative supporters have not: nothing is "more contrary to nature
than the attempt to hold in obedience distant provinces." ' Opera-
WEEKLY, Feb. 6, 1983, at 17, col. 1 (excerpted from the WASHINGTON POST). See id. at col.
4 (quoted infra text accompanying note 252).
167. Rubin, supra note 63, at 36. See Miler, supra note 121, at 50
(counterintelligence may be nativist and isolationist, in the sense that covert opera-
tions serve as alternatives to innovative diplomatic initiatives); Casey Confirmation
Hearing, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Feb. 1981, 4, at 5:
Questioned by Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.) about "covert actions" and secret
operations, [CIA Director] Casey affirmed the views of the Murphy
Commission "generally." The Commission had concluded that prohibition
of covert action could put the nation and its allies at a dangerous dis-
advantage, but that it should be utilized in such areas where it is clearly
essential to vital U.S. interests. Casey, when pressed by Senator Biden
(D-Del.), explained, "There is a point at which rigid accountability, detailed
accountability can impair performance."
Halperin, supra note 125, at p. 3, col. 3, argues that:
The Reagan Administration views covert action as something you do
because it's the most efficient way to proceed. Most efficient often means
avoiding public debate in the United States, avoiding the opposition of
other agencies, like the State Department, which may not be enthusiastic
about the policy, and avoiding Congressional opposition.
The Administration's is a conservative viewpoint, represented here by Barnett,
A Geopolitical Overview, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Apr. 1981, at 5 (Director, National
Strategy Information Center):
[T]he threat to world stability stems not only from Soviet warships
. or from uncontrollable populations. It arises from a working system which
the U.S. has tended to ignore-the Nazis believed in it profoundly and
the KGB believes in it-covert action and political warfare operations.
[We] need ...to revitalize our freshly disabled CIA and ...vigorously
reenter the world of transnational politics.
(The last few words are promising candidates for Euphemism of the Decade.) There
has been a clear shift in congressional opinion toward a larger legitimate scope for
covert activities, which should be subject to a less searching outside scrutiny. Aspin,
supra note 42, at 4-5. See id. at 5-6 (comments by Colby and Robert Bork). Tovar,
supra note 153, at 67 finds that, regrettably, covert action "shows all the earmarks
of a dying "art-form." The CIA's ability to use force must be reconstituted. Then,
it must be used or it will atrophy. Id. at 75, 77. See Miler, supra note 121.
168. Quoted in Rubin, supra note 63, at 36. See Ransom, supra note 136; D.
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tions like the CIA's in Nicaragua allow Americans (and the Soviets)
to be tarred with a broad "Imperialist" brush overseas. This
characterization is plausible enough to have a significant effect. While
one covert action, "considered in isolation, might seem worth the cost
of slightly tarnishing our image abroad, the cumulative effect of
several hundred blots was to blacken it entirely. 16 9
Unless covert actions are curbed at some stage, policy will con-
tinue to be its own cause. Having intervened, the CIA feels that it
cannot but intervene again to destabilize regimes (such as Libya's)
becoming ever more unfriendly because of past CIA interventions,
to stabilize regimes (such as the Shah's in Iran) which have little reason
to exist apart from prior CIA interventions on their behalf, and to
counter the Soviet's interventions that are causes and effects of our
own interventions (such as trading "our" Ethiopia for the "Soviet's"
Somalia).'"
The main reason why the CIA's policy is its own cause is that
this satisfies the CIA's organizational imperatives. Liberals and con-
servatives agree that the CIA suffers from many bureaucratic
pathologies. While no two critics are in exact agreement as to what
these are, social science organization theories offer a somewhat neutral
description of the problem: to a large extent, the CIA's organizational
structure determines its poliey content. A CIA "Groupthink"' 71
operates under an organizational logic designed to truncate, unduly
and prematurely, the range of viable policy options. A narrowly hierar-
chical and rigidly compartmented CIA bureaucracy suppresses or
ignores the individualization of issues and opinions, in an attempt to
WISE, supra note 120, at 409 (covert operations should be banned in peacetime, since it
"has been amply demonstrated by now that the cost of covert operations to our own
system is too high."); Highsmith, supra note 125, at 331-32 (many statutes related to
national security should be reformulated because clarity and enforceability lacking).
Many conservatives agree that clear definitions of the permissible limits of covert
activities are desirable. See Colby, in P. HACKES, supra note 123 at 4 (there should be
a CIA Charter, under which the executive proposes and Congress disposes); Discus-
sion, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS for the 1980s 80 (R. Godson, ed. 1979).
169. Hilsman, supra note 121, at 176.
170. P. BRIETZKE, LAW, DEVEOLPMENT, AND THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION 39-46
(1982). See H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 174 (quoted supra note 145); supra notes 28-30
and text accompanying. North, supra note 108, at 196 argues that, in organizations
like the CIA: "Action at one point in a system ... that attempts to relieve one kind
of distress often produces an unexpected result in some other part of the system."
See also supra note 108 and text accompanying.
171. I.e., errors in decisionmaking based on group conformity in thinking. See
I. JANIS AND L. MANN, DECISIONMAKING (1977); Heller, Not All the Sheep Were on the
Falklands, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, February 6, 1983, at 7, cols. 3-5; infra notes
183-85 and text accompanying.
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attain speed and efficiency. The CIA, like most large organizations,
resists change aggressively, in spite of a constant desire to expand
its activities. This desire is reflected in a more or less united pursuit
of power, which masks the bureaucratic infighting that frequently
distorts informational and covert operations. " 2 One effect of these
organizational pathologies is a CIA that is all but immune to control,
by outsiders or insiders. In America, we try to fetter administrative
discretion with a regularity and an openness wholly alien to the CIA,
under what Kenneth Davis terms "open plans, open policy statements,
open rules, open findings, open reasons, open precedents, and fair in-
formal discretion."' 73
The organizational problems to be solved within the CIA are:
drawing competent and unbiased intelligence analyses from a com-
partmentalized body of knowledge, getting these analyses to the
relevant decisionmakers, and helping to implement their decisions. The
sources of failure are legion, and most relate to common organiza-
tional "patterns of behavior variously described as 'trained incapacity'
(by Veblen), 'occupational psychosis' (by Dewey), and 'professional
deformation' (by Warnotte)." '174 Even if intelligence starts out as
accurate and timely, it almost inevitably becomes distorted and stale
172. See Graham, Analyses and Estimates, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE 1980s 21, 22-28 (R. Godson, ed., 1979) (Lt. Gen., ex-Defense Intelligence Agency Direc-
tor, and co-chair, Peace Through Strength) (peddling hardware and the management
of technical systems, the "CIA spread out and tried to realize a vision of itself as
the paramount influence in American intelligence"); Turner and Thibault, supra note
118, at 134 (CIA resists change because "no change . . . comes easily to a large
bureaucracy where traditions run deep and dialogue is constrained."). See J. FREED-
MAN, supra note 8, at 38. All "governments ... are plagued by the pathologies of hierar-
chy, agency rivalry, and secrecy; all generate an urgent demand for 'all the facts' and
'shortrun estimates.' " H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 128. In most countries, "the in-
stitutionalization of intelligence ... has become so irreversible, the processes themselves
so pervasive, the products so indispensible, the penalties for spurning them so
disagreeable and most of the intelligence officers so durable, that the policy-maker
must suffer intelligence gladly." T. HUGHES, supra note 125, at 22. In the U.S., the growth
in the CIA's size, budget, and power has paralleled that of the rest of the executive
branch for the last forty years. D. WISE, supra note 120, at 404.
173. K. DAVIS, supra note 146, at § 4.02. See id. at S 4.04 (structuring discretion
means regularizing it and requiring that thought be devoted to long-term objectives);
E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at 161 (quoted supra note 145); supra notes 144-63 and text
accompanying. Davis's comments can be used effectively to criticize assertions like
those of Wiseltier, The Great Nuclear Debate, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 10 and 17, 1983,
7, at 12: "The persecutions of CONTELPRO originated in a political style and a per-
sonality disorder that cannot be laid at the Defense Department's door." This is true
in one sense, but the absence of fetters on discretion makes it possible for a "per-
sonality disorder" to have this particular effect.
174. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 39. See P. MCGARVEY, CIA: THE MYTH AND
THE MADNESS 4 (1972); H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 126.
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on its way through the CIA. Excessive secrecy in a rigidly compart-
mented CIA exaggerates the distorting effects that hierarchy, cen-
tralization, and internal and external rivalries have on intelligence in
all organizations. The great number of specialized ranks in a tall and
narrow CIA pyramid could well have been designed to maximize
obstruction and obfuscation. People who see little opportunity for job
promotions or otherwise attaining a broader perspective tend to serve
out their time in provoking the jurisdictional squabbles that keep
everyone in their place. Many CIA subordinates have the opportunity
to screen out information that does not fit their preconceptions or
power needs, and to alter the background against which information
will be presented. Kurds or Cruise missiles look very different to dif-
ferent CIA departments, a situation which causes many "riders" to
be attached to and removed from information on its migratory
journey.' 5
In contr- t with what happens in our best agencies, such as the
SEC, the ab nce of clearly defined CIA goals, of precise and detailed
175. North, supra note 108, at 185-87, 192-94; H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at
ix, 41-42, 57, 175-77; Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 124. See Graham, supra
note 172, at 25 (preoccupation with being close and visible to policy makers spawns
formalistic, or worse, short-term reports); id. (intelligence analysis and bureaucratic
routine or politics are "mortal enemies"); T. HUGHES, supra note 125, at 59 (quoting
Isaiah Berlin) (a paradoxial consequence of increasingly specialized knowledge is a
dependence "upon a collection of ill coordinated experts, each of whom sooner or later
becomes oppressed and irritated by being unable to step out of his box and survey
the relationship of his particular action to the whole."); Uhlmann, suvra note 135, at
19 ("bureaucratic infighting within the CIA has been one of the causes of the decline
of clandestine collection and covert action."); Hughes, supra note 148, at 19; H.
WILENSKY, at 43 (in a hierarchy, "information is a resource that symbolizes status,
enhances authority, and shapes careers," and men on the way up restrict certain in-
formation to please others and preserve comfortable work routines); id. at 58 (acquisi-
tion of unnecessary responsibility-"empire building"-provokes cries of duplication
and inefficiency); Turner and Thibault, at 125; id. at 133 (quoted supra note 155); Con-
gress Considers Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 154; id.
(quoted in text supra note 154); supra note 30 and text accompanying. H. WILENSKY,
at 58, describes "the dilemma of centralization:"
if intelligence is lodged at the top, too few officials . . .with too little
accurate and relevant information are too far out of touch and too over-
loaded to function effectively; on the other hand, if intelligence is scattered
throughout too many subordinate units, too many officials and experts
with too much specialized information may engage in dysfunctional com-
petition, may delay information as they consult with each other, and they
may distort information as they pass it up.
Organizational pathologies are so numerous and interwoven in the CIA that
it tends to obtain all of the disadvantages, and few of the advantages, of both cen-
tralization and decentralization. The remedy is significant organizational change: see
infra notes 362-65 and text accompanying.
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written rules about reaching these goals, and of a routine monitoring
of subordinates' performance mean that CIA officials often flounder
about or go off on frolics of their own. Such controls as exist are
frequently not applied by superiors who have their own axes to grind,
or who are too busy or unable to penetrate the veil of secrecy to
find out what is going on. 7 ' Intelligence programs with imperceptible
beginnings thus gain a momentum of their own that it takes too much
paperwork to stop. For example, the ill-fated "Pueblo" mission resulted
from a young lieutenant's ill-informed decision (with perfunctory
approval from busy superiors) that too little attention was being paid
to North Korea. 7
Ironically, hasty CIA decisions made under pressure are
frequently of better quality than the leisurely ones; participants are
forced to be more creative, and many bureaucratic bottlenecks are
bypassed in the interests of speed and secrecy. Bypassing then
becomes a regular feature of bureaucratic life in the CIA's atmosphere
of constant crisis. The bureaucratic reality of the CIA is thus one
of a complex organizational flow chart with a controlled chaos superim-
posed. Everyone speaks and no one listens, while jurisdictional
rivalries and policy means and ends are brokered in a secret market
where bureaucratic power is the common currency. The CIA would
function no more consistently than many an "underdeveloped" Third
World bureaucracy, were it not for the fact that internecine quarrels
quickly disappear when the question arises of how big and strong the
CIA ought to be. Competitions for resources and for new programs
keep CIA officials busy concealing its inadequacies and ferreting out
the weaknesses of rival organizations. The CIA is often successful
in these competitions because its power stems from so frequently being
the first to have, analyze, and act upon important information. As
a large bureaucracy where traditions run deep and discussions are
constrained, the CIA uses its resources to resist significant changes.
With exceptions during the late 1970s that proved to have little per-
manent impact, the wider government has preferred to face a chaos
of world events with a stable CIA run by officials with long service
records, rather than to engage in organizational experiments.'78
176. See K. DAVIS, supra note 146, at S 4.08; K. DAVIS, supra note 147, at 223;
Raskin, supra note 120, at 189 (national security state "linked to the rise of a
bureaucracy that administered things and people in interchangeable fashion without
concern for ends or assumptions.").
177. P. MCGARVEY, supra note 174, at 100-01. See G. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at
132; Miler, supra note 121, at 63 (discussed supra note 137).
178. See Hilsman, supra note 121, at 172; Hughes, supra note 108, at 19; Miler,
supra note 121, at 63; North, supra note 108, at 196, 199; Uhlmann, supra note 135,
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The Agency is far from all-powerful, of course, and it frequently
tailors intelligence to fit client preconceptions and needs, particularly
in response to presidential pressures. The CIA is frequently able to
push policy in directions favorable to its organizational needs, however.
When this happens, policymakers often feel hemmed in by an in-
telligence that limits the range of options. After the Bay of Pigs, for
example, President Kennedy took particular care that standing orders
and informational and covert operations did not leave him without
decisionmaking alternatives."'
Liberals and moderates offer unflattering portraits"H of the in-
fluence the CIA has on its officials' thinking, through secrecy and the
conformitarian recruitment and indoctrination policies common to many
large organizations. Many conservatives would disagree with some of
these characterizations, but a rough consensus that a Groupthink
operates in the CIA can be discerned. Janis and Mann's Groupthink
notion is a very useful concept because it adroitly explains the recur-
ring failures to warn commanders of a possible attack on Pearl Har-
bor, Truman that Chinese troops were massing during MacArthur's
rush to the Yalu, Kennedy that the Bay of Pigs would be a disaster,
and the British that a Falklands/Malvenas invasion was imminent.'
at 11 (quoted infra note 219); H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 8-12, 46-48, 76, 175-78;
Turner & Thibault, supra note 118, at 124-25, 134.
179. Aspin, supra note 42, at 32-33; G. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 135: Hilsman,
supra note 121, at 173; T. HUGHES, supra note 112, at 21; Hughes, supra note 125, at
18; E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at 207; Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 133 (The
CIA Director "should not let himself be presented into supporting administration policy
or intimidated into withholding information when policy makers do not like his news.");
supra note 31 and text accompanying.
180. See. e.g. F. DONNER, supra note 120 at xiii (the "nativist anti-radicalism"
of the CIA's "passionate tribal constituency"); T. HUGHES, supra note 125, at 17
(intelligence officials "culture-bound, bureaucratically-staked, umbilically connected [and]
... career-limited"); Miler, supra note 121, at 50 (discussed supra note 167); Ransom,
supra note 136, at 206 (intelligence officials' views reflect a new, post World War II
form of manifest destiny, compounded of idealism, balance of power politics, and con-
cern about access to raw materials); H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at ix (for intelligence
officials, anti-intellectualism, a narrow empiricism, and heavy reliance on experience
exist in odd combination with demands for a scientific precision); id. at 117 (citing
Shils' study of 1950s loyalty-security programs) (intelligence secrecy has its "ideological
roots in hyperpatriotism, xenophobia, isolationism, fundamentalism, populism, and the
fear of revolution."); id. at 119 (an ethnocentrism in American intelligence results in
stereotypes of foreigners-occasionally, a major source of intelligence failure); Raskin,
supra note 120, at 189 (the national security state-of which the CIA is an important
part-emerges from war and nuclear technology, from the fear of revolution and change,
and from the economic instability of capitalism).
181. I. JANIS AND L. MANN, supra note 171; Heller, supra note 171. I. JANIS, GROUP.
THINK (2d ed. 1982) has just appeared. See G. PRANGE, AT DAWN WE SLEPT (1981); H.
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Conservatives would add to this list CIA failures accurately to assess
events in Iran and in Egypt prior to the 1973 war with Israel, Soviet
military power and intentions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Africa
today, and the impact of socialism in Chile and Italy.2 In these and
many other policy areas, CIA officials give loyal but irrational sup-
port to pre-determined organizational commitments. A political and
intellectual "permafrost" sets in. This "permafrost" includes:
1. An illusion of invulnerability, shared by most or all
of the members, which creates excessive optimism and en-
courages taking extreme risks;
2. Collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount
warnings which might lead the members to reconsider their
assumptions before they recommit themselves to their past
policy decisions;
3. An unquestioned belief in the group's inherent
morality, inclining the members to ignore the ethical or
moral consequences of their decisions.
4. Stereotyped views of rivals and enemies as too evil
to warrant genuine attempts to negotiate, or as too weak
or stupid to counter whatever risky attempts are made to
defeat their purposes;
5. Direct pressure on any member who expresses
strong arguments against any of the group's stereotypes,
illusions, or commitments, making clear that such dissent
is contrary to what is expected of all loyal members;
6. Self-censorship of deviations from the apparent
group consensus, reflecting each member's inclination to
minimize to himself the importance of his doubts and
counterarguments;
7. A shared illusion of unanimity, partly resulting from
this self-censorship and augmented by the false assumption
that silence implies consent;
8. The emergence of self-appointed "mindguards"-
WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 41-42, 49; Mott, Review, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Apr. 1982,
at 3; Steele, The Prospect of Constant Alert, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Jan. 30,
1983, at p. 1, col. 2-4, at col. 2; supra note 180.
182. See Casey, Opening Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence, January 31, 1981, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Feb. 1981, at 3.
1984]
Brietzke: Public Policy: Contract, Abortion, and the CIA
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
810 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
members who protect the group from. adverse information
that might shatter their shared complacency about the
effectiveness and morality of their decisions."
There is much evidence of these "symptoms" of Janis and Mann's
Groupthink in the writings of others, about the CIA" and about policy
183. Heller, supra note 171, at col. 5 (summary of symptoms of Janis and Mann's
Groupthink). Clearly, all conservatives would not agree with all of these
characterizations.
184. See, e.g., W. COLBY, HONORABLE MEN 213-14 (1978) (some CIA officials took
high-level "expressions of official hostility as a suggestion, consent or even authority
to mount operations aimed at assassinating Castro."); G. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at
31-32; Franck and Weisband, supra note 129, at 8-9; Graham, supra note 172, at 25
(discussed supra note 175); D. HALBERSTRAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 358 (1972)
(The "job is ... to get along with superiors"- an "Air Force intelligence officer will
not . . . say that bombing does not work."); T. HUGHES, supra note 125, at 43 (bland-
ness and extra ambiguities added during intelligence officials' search for unanimity);
Hughes, supra note 125, at 16; D. MARTIN, WILDERNESS OF MIRRORS 226 (1980) (quoted
infra note 237); North, supra note 108, at 186 (ancient custom of executing bearers
of bad news survives in reluctance to convey unpleasant intelligence information or
interpretations with which superiors will disagree); H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at
16, 19, 23 (like all experts, intelligence officials defend established policies and give
us intelligence "Edsels" based on window dressing, slogans such as "Sino-Soviet bloc,"
stereotypes, and simplifications); id. at 54, 175 (men of good will will obfuscate and
exaggerate agreement with rivals on behalf of an "ultimate consensus" which fosters
"intelligence fantasies" and illusions of reliable information); id. at 58 (CIA data collec-
tion too far from the outlet of useful policy, and this encourages agreed-on estimates
concealing strong disagreement); id. (illusion of security and reliable information results
in, e.g, Bay of Pigs); id. at 63 (resentment toward outsiders and exaggerated belief
in practical experience among intelligence officers); id. at 174 (quoted supra note 145).
When intelligence officials go beyond their substantive depths, their interests
become painfully clear. For example, an Air Force general once argued that U-2 flights
are legal if they occur over countries we do not recognize. T. HUGHES, supra note 125,
at 25-26. Soviet intelligence also suffers from a Groupthink, which is a cause and effect
of the CIA's. See, e.g., Interview Given by First Defector from Arbatov's "American
Institute", INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Sept. 1981, 6, at 7 (Galina Orionova) [hereinafter cited
as First Defector]: ". . . ISKAN [Institute] researchers would still try to please their
bosses, never mind their own feelings. Otherwise, they knew their career would be
ruined." See also id. (quoted infra note 191).
Some intelligence officials are aware of these problems within the CIA. E.g.,
Casey, supra note 123, at 2:
We need to resist the bureaucratic urge for consensus.
We don't need analysts spending their time finding a middle ground
or weasel words .... Their time needs to go into evaluating information
[and uncovering] . . . valid and meaningful differences [of interpretation].
. . . The search for consensus cultivates the myth of infalliability. It
implicitly promises a reliability that cannot be delivered.
See Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 131 ("Past mistakes have frequently
resulted from insularity and from an absorbing dedication to getting the job done.");
id. at 133; Medow, supra note 135, at 820 (one "may almost instinctively translate
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analysis generally.185 In contrast with what the fields of contract and
abortion seem to require, there is little need for the certainty of "stare
decisis" applications of "precedents" by the CIA. There is, rather, a
need for individualized analyses of the peculiarities found in particular
foreign and military policy imbroglios. The CIA tends to a simple-
minded "us" and "them" pigeonholing, however, of "freedom fighters"
versus "terrorists," for example. (The policy-as-its-own-cause circle is
then completed by covert CIA operations which encourage "them"
to act more and more like our enemies.) Rather than re-examine
cherished preconceptions, CIA officials usually seek out the apparent
security of what has been done before. For example, a few journalists
and academics produced assessments of our Vietnam policies which
were much more accurate than the CIA's, despite the CIA's superior
access to information. Rather than review its own analyses, the CIA
chose to investigate the journalists and academics instead. The cons-
tant flux of world events is downplayed in the artificial reason by
which the CIA alone evaluates the reliability of its information and
the soundness of its analyses. Most of these evaluations are kept
secret, and the wider government and public are thus unable to deter-
mine whether real or fantasy intelligence is being propagated.'86
New threats are constantly being perceived by the CIA, of
course: terrorism, new tides of nationalism in the Third World, theft
of new technologies, economic aggression, and resource shortages con-
trived, perhaps, by new OPECs. But a close reading of official and
quasi-official pronouncements'87 reveals that, while the existence and
identity of an enemy in these areas may be unclear to others, the
an attack on the CIA Agency into an attack on national security"); supra note 143
and text accompanying.
185. See supra notes 27, 30-31, 34-35, 41, 47, 52, 54, 57-58 and text accompanying.
186. See H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 175-77; supra note 185; supra notes
81-85, 94-101, 108-110, 170, 180-84 and text accompanying.
187. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 167, at 5-7; id. at 5 (quoted supra note 167);
Casey, supra note 123, at 2-3; Casey, supra note 125, at 2, 5; supra notes 58, 63 and
text accompanying. See also H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 119; supra notes 58-60 and
text accompanying. A subtle e.g. is offered by Casey, supra note 125, at 1:
Recently I had our cartographers prepare a map to show the Soviet
presence in its various degrees of influence. They colored in red .. .the
nations under a significant degree of Soviet influence. When the map was
finished, 50 nations were in red. Ten years ago, in a similar map I had
prepared, only half as many of the nations of the world were colored in red.
That "degrees of influence" are "various" is admitted by Casey, but the result looks
like, and is undoubtedly treated like, a pre-World War II map of, e.g., the red-colored
British Empire-a supposed monolith. Presumably, adding our "degrees of influence"
to the map would result in large blocs of blue, and the CIA's color of choice for
remaining countries would be pink.
1984]
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CIA is certain that the enemy is the Soviet Union. The richness of
the natural variety in foreign affairs is lost, and analytical creativity
is compromised, because the CIA as an organization is interested
almost exclusively in Soviet sponsorship and coordination of terrorism,
in Soviet manipulation of aspirations in the Third World, in Soviet
technological theft and economic devilry. This is an illustration of what
Flaubert termed the quest for the all-encompassing solution, to our
military and foreign policy problems, 8' the solution increasingly
rejected by even our most loyal allies.189 The quest reflects "something
nearly evangelical: a profound conviction that communism is . . . [an
"evil Empire"] that takes its guidance, wherever and in whatever form
it may appear, from the rulers in Moscow; and that those rulers,
whoever they may be at any time, are committed to worldwide
ideological conquest." ' Our intelligence policies are thus essentially
reactive to CIA perceptions of Soviet policy;"' our fear of "them" feeds
on their fear of "us," and vice versa, of course, in worldwide cycles
188. See supra note 73 and text accompanying. See also supra note 38 and text
accompanying.
189. A recent Gallup poll in Newsweek found that 43 per cent
[of West Germans] distrusted the United States and the Soviet Union
equally, a higher proportion than in France or Britain.
The same poll found that 57 per cent of West Germans thought that
Western Europe would be safer if it moved toward neutralism in the East-
West conflict (The poll also found surprisingly high totals for the same
view in Britain, 45 per cent, and France, 43 per cent.)
While confidence in the Americans has fallen, fear of the Russians
has gone down. . . . The crises in Afghanistan and Poland reinforced a
perception of Soviet weakness, not of strength.
Steele, Germany and America, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Feb. 13, 1983, 10, col.
1-5, at col. 3. These attitudes, and American public opinions, are easily misunderstood
by American officials. See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 251-53.
190. Geyelin, Not Dreamt of in His Philosophy, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY,
Feb. 6, 1983, 16, col. 3-5, at col. 4 (discussion, excerpted from the WASHINGTON POST,
of President Reagan's "inflexible" worldview). Overwhelmingly, this is also the view
of CIA officials, which is one reason why Reagan wants to strengthen their hand:
See Halperin, supra note 125, at p.3, col. 3 (quoted supra note 167); supra notes 31,
34, 63, 167, 180, 183 and text accompanying.
191. E.g., Tovar, supra note 153, at 69-70. See D. MARTIN, supra note 184, at
xi: "The battle is devious and the outcome ambiguous. Complexity and perplexity
abound. The record is abstruse and, above all, obscure." The CIA's victories are Pyrrhic,
defeats are resounding, and what "the KBG has not done, the CIA has managed to
do to itself." Id. See also First Defector, supra note 184:
Watergate came to us at ISKAN [see supra note 184] as a shock. There
were even suggestions that we had to stop talking of the weaknesses
of American democracy and start talking of its strength.... Afterwords,
... the anti-CIA hysteria ... received a lot of pleasantly surprised atten-
tion. But I do not know of any "programme" to enhance the anti-CIA
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of policy as its own cause. Unwittingly, "the United States accepted
the communist definition of 'intelligence' and began to ape the adver-
saries in doctrine and practice." '92 This is a game we "lose by winning.
For, in time, if we accept the values of the enemy as our own, we
will become the enemy."
'
1
93
C. Exploring the False Dichotomy
The CIA is a prisoner of its false, "us" and "them" dichotomy,
false because the United States is not inherently all-good, the Soviet
Union is not inherently all-bad, and the rest of the world does not
split neatly in two monolithic, warring camps. The CIA itself is neither
all-good nor all-bad, and therein lies another false dichotomy: a secret
and hence unaccountably good CIA, versus the openness and hence
the accountability of the (potentially) bad CIA.'94 Everybody talks about
striking a balance between these policies,'95 but nobody does much
about it in fact, as we have seen. There have been temporary political
coalitions in favor of a particular balance. No balance has been mean-
ingfully institutionalized through law.9 Many conservative and liberal
campaign. The prevailing official view was that "they were exposing and
ruining themselves-let them."
There is, of course, a parallel in arms policy: "The Other side is allowed to raise the
ante, and to dictate the size and style of our forces. It is not on the basis of this
version of deterrence, then, that the arms race may be restrained." Wiesletier, supra
note 173, at 36.
192. Ransom, supra note 136, at 206. See Glennon, supra note 148, at 41
(America's true national security needs are related to "preserving the privacy of the
individual rather than interests of the State" that is only a "mental construct;" these
needs are "quickly forgotten against a backdrop of geo-political games where, on boards
in policymakers' minds, one anthropomorphic state befriends another, betrays another,
or bedevils another."); infra notes 225-26 and text accompanying.
193. D. WISE, supra note 120, at 412. See D. MARTIN, supra note 184, at 226 (quoted
infra note 237).
194. See supra notes 61, 63, 90, 186-91 and text accompanying. See also H.
WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 176-77 (discussing in detail "Doctrines that maximize
[intelligence] distortion and blockage (e.g., misleading dichotomies"):
"Facts" to "fill in gaps" vs. "evaluated facts" ..... "Intelligence" ("informa-
tion gathering") .. vs. "operations" (clandestine operations). "Overt" vs.
'covert" intelligence. The notion that secret sources are superior. The
"right to know" (vs. executive privacy in decision process and account-
ability for effects). Prediction or estimate vs. analysis and orientation.
195. See supra notes 128-29, 132-34 and text accompanying.
196. See supra note 37 and text accompanying; infra notes 222-34 and text
accompanying. The balance is commonly struck by a temporary coalition of the executive
branch and one or more of the following: Congress, the press, and interest groups.
Franck and Weisband, supra note 154, at 404. This coalition is "built upon a common
national team-interest and fear of defeat...." Such a coalition favors "secrecy even
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diagnoses of CIA shortcomings are correct, yet false dichotomies have
hindered the search for creative solutions. From Kenneth Davis'
perspective,
the main part of the problem has been to try to accom-
modate the national security interest and that of the in-
dividual; the weaknesses and failures have not involved
subordination of the interest of the individual to that of the
nation but have involved doing less to protect the individual
interest than can be done without impairing the national
interest.197
The long-term effects of occasional expos6s and governmental and
public debates have been to make the CIA slightly less effective without
making it significantly more accountable. Secrecy remains."' Past CIA
mistakes "raise gnawing questions about intelligence breakdowns, con-
fused or distorted evaluations, misinterpretations .... the ignoring of
valuable information," '199 and counterproductive covert operations. We
may hope that CIA officials have learned from mistakes, taken greater
account of human rights at home and abroad, and implemented internal
at the cost of the public's right to know and participate," subject to the "occasionally
umpiring role of electorates and courts." Id. at 405. H. WILENSKY, supra note 123 at
130-31, argues that-
The dilemmas of intelligence in a democratic society are most evident
in three- areas: the maintenance of democratic control of secret intelligence
agencies and secret police; the effects of patterns of secrecy and publicity
on the development of an enlightened public opinion; and the efficacy of
alternate means for discovering truth in the administration of justice-
adversary and inquisitorial procedures, the testimony of unchecked experts,
and scientific methods. The ideal is to strike a balance in which constraints
on the proliferation of secret police, secret agents, and secret files are
matched by constraints on the spread of punishing publicity and, further,
to devise procedural safeguards that insure the privacy and liberty of
the individual confronting a bureaucratic world.
Clearly, there are no regularized institutions or legal rules under which these dilemmas
can be resolved. See Colby, supra note 123, at 4: "Institutionalization of American
intelligence within the constitutional framework" has "not been completed."
197. K. DAvIs, supra note 146, at S 7.15. See infra note 523 and text accompanying
(similar shortcomings in abortion policies).
198. Florence, supra note 124, at 128 (quoted in text accompanying supra note
124); Ransom, supra note 136, at 205 (intelligence "establishment" wields "power without
accountability or responsibility-in the democratic sense"); Uhlmann, supra note 135,
at 11 (the debate has focused on Church Committee's characterization of CIA as a
"rogue elephant," rather than on solutions); Halperin, supra note 135, at col. 2 (quoted
supra note 160); supra notes 146-63, infra notes 235-39, and text accompanying.
199. North, supra note 108, at 179. See H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 191.
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reforms, but we have no way of knowing whether this is so under the
veil of CIA secrecy. 20 0
The CIA exerts a strongly conservative influence on our foreign
and military policies, and it is thus not surprising that many conser-
vatives are fervent supporters of the CIA. 20 ' For these conservatives
(and for many moderates and some liberals), almost any threat to the
dominant world position America attained after World War II is an
extremely serious crisis. A coalition is usually mustered to take
whatever steps are perceived as necessary to deal with the perceived
crisis. (Courts almost always uphold these kinds of actions after the
fact, even if rights are infringed in the process. ° ) Threats to national
200. F. DONNER, supra note 120, at 453 ("secrecy permits intelligence to function
without accountability or control by the constitutional standards that prohibit inter-
ference with political expression."); Walden, supra note 125, at 234; H. WILENSKY, supra
note 123, at 136 ("Not enough is known about the work of the FBI"-and, I would
add, the CIA-"in record keeping, operations, or intelligence to judge its conformity
to due process").
201. See Franck and Weisband, supra note 154, at 404-05 (discussed supra note
196); A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 207; supra notes 27, 175 and text accompanying. F.
DONNER, supra note 120, at 452-53 argues that:
Intelligence as a means of containing movements for change, as a system
of control, is simply too powerful a weapon in a highly conservative
economic and social order lightly to be abandoned. The continued worldwide
erosion of capitalist economic and social structures has clothed the defense
of the status quo with a new urgency ...
See also D. WISE, supra note 120, at 311 (quoting Thomas Emerson): "At worst it [the
FBI] raises the specter of a police state. [In essence the FBI conceives itself as an
instrument to prevent radical social change. . . . [T]he Bureau's view of its function
leads it beyond data collection and into political warfare." (Some have argued that
the CIA has sometimes had the parallel function of regulating internal affairs under
the foreign affairs prerogative.). But see also infra note 235 and text accompanying.
202. See F. CASTBERG, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE WEST 411-18 (1960); C. MCIL-
WAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN 139-40 (rev. ed. 1947); G. MARSHALL, CON-
STITUTIONAL THEORY 32 (1971) (quoting Sir William Anson); A. Miller, supra note 16, at
97; Brietzke, The "Seamy Underside" of Constitutional Law (forthcoming) (and sources
cited therein); infra notes 264-302 and text accompanying. See also, e.g., United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Government's substantial interest in assuring continued
availability of draft cards outweighs first amendment freedom to burn one of these
cards); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (no first amendment right to
remain silent on conviction for contempt of Congress, for refusing to disclose possible
Communist Party affiliation); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (conviction
upheld for failure to register party allegedly advocating overthrow of government by
force); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (conviction upheld on failure
to obey statutorily-authorized military order excluding Japanese from designated areas);
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (access to civil court only guaranteed to citizens,
and alleged saboteurs could thus be tried militarily on President's order); Helvering
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (ignoring United States v. Butler,297 U.S. 1 (1936), con-
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security may be exaggerated in their perception or depiction, and
politicians' or the CIA's raison de groupe may be advanced as the
reason of state justification for actions taken, but the cumulative effect
of crisis actions has been to aggrandize the military and related
bureaucracies such as the CIA. Attempts to deal with present and
future crises quickly, flexibly and effectively thus result in a massive
but very narrow strengthening of the State. (Compared to those in
European democracies, the American State remains very weak in the
number and scope of welfare and economic guidance functions
performed."') Policymaking and implementation are skewed in par-
ticular directions by the exercise of a narrowly-focused, unchecked
power in military and foreign policy. Many Americans are nevertheless
able to retain the comforting image of living in a liberal democracy." 4
Just as many conservatives want to trade butter for guns, so would
they trade privacy and an accountability of the CIA for more security.
gressional powers unlimited in dealing with old age benefits during economic emergency);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (state mortgage moratorium
law, interfering with contractual rights, upheld because of economic emergency); Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (freedom of speech sacrificed to wartime hysteria);
Halki-i v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (state secrets privilege absolute); United
States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 90 (E. D. Wis. 1979) (prior restraint on
publication, based on a flimsy showing of danger to national security). But see Scales
v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (saving rights through narrow construction of
legislation); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (President's seizure of steel
mills because of strikes during Korean War not justified by emergency); Ex Parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (after-the-fact invalidation of military tribunal proceeding
during Civil War, in area where civilian courts' functioning unimpaired).
203. See, e.g., H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 126 n.30 (quoted infra note 351);
text accompanying infra note 219.
204. See G. BARRACLOUGH, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 220
(1981); J. BERMAN AND M. HALPERIN, supra note 121, at 101-02; C. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 26, 76 (1977); E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at 146 (discuss-
ing Harold Lasswell's "garrison state" theory); id. at 121-23 (discussing Eisenhower's
1961 Farewell Address on the "military-industrial complex"); A. MILLER, supra note
16, at 149-50; G. POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE 136-37 (1978); Ransom,
supra note 136, at 205; Walden, supra note 125, at 233-34; D. WISE, supra note 120,
at 408; Brietzke, supra note 202; Halperin, supra note 125, at p. 3, col. 3 (President
Reagan "talks about patriotism, about rallying around the government, when we're
not even faced with a very serious foreign threat."); Turner and Thibault, supra note
118, at 124; Vogel, Why Businessmen Distrust their State, 8 BR. J. POL. ScI. 45, 53-54
(1978). Historically, the strengthening of the State has moved forward under a na-
tionalistic fervor, political and economic crises, the modernization of warfare, and, in
some countries, the scramble for colonies. Kirchheimer, The Socialist and Bolshevik
Theory of the State, in POLITICS, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 7 (F. Burin and K. Shell,
eds. 1969). The CIA is a facet of a modern police state, in which dispersed powers
are knit together once again and used to establish a dominant policy position. See
B. CHAPMAN, POLICE STATE 78 (1970); infra notes 225-26 and text accompanying.
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Unfortunately, such a trade results in more intelligence rather than
in more security. No tradeoff between accountability and security is
apparent in America, and the fulcrum on which such a balance could
be based has never been discovered."' The futility of such a tradeoff
was recognized by James Madison and by Alexander Hamilton,"° and,
more pragmatically, by President Eisenhower: "Our security is the
total product of our economic, intellectual, moral, and military
strengths."2 7 While a country can never satisfy its craving for an ab-
solute security, it can bankrupt itself morally and economically while
attempting to do so.
208
Some policy analysts have elaborated on Eisenhower's critique
of a "military-industrial complex:" our strong State acting overseas
constitutes a threat to liberal democracy under the weak State at
home.' While this should logically be a liberals' critique, many liberals
(and moderates) have acceded to conservative demands for a strong
CIA; the critique has been left to civil libertarians. (American leftists
have surprisingly little to say about the CIA, perhaps because it offers
pointed illustrations of the bureaucratic stultification and other hor-
rors of the strong State that form the most potent critique of an
205. Harris, supra note 141, at 67.
206. See D. WISE, supra note 120, at 401 (quoting Madison, writing to Jefferson):
It is "a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions
against danger real or pretended from abroad." See also A. MILLER, supra note 16,
at 53 (quoting Alexander Hamilton): "[Elven the ardent love of liberty will, after a
time, give way to the dictates . . .[of] safety from external danger .... To be more
safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free."
207. Quoted in P. KOSTINEN, supra note 120, at 13.
208. Id. at 13-14.
209. See, e.g., F. DONNER, supra note 120, at xii (quoted supra note 124); id. at
452-53 (quoted supra note 201); Halperin, supra note 125, at 1, col. 1: The U.S. makes
judgments
about whether what is going on in a foreign country constitutes such a
gross violation of civil liberties that the U.S. should not provide assistance
which will directly contribute to that violation. Inevitably those judgments
affect perceptions within the United States, particularly . . .about what
is an acceptable violation of civil liberties for the sake of national security.
[President Reagan] says that the lack of functioning newspapers in
El Salvador is not a serious violation of rights because threats to the
country's security justify the closing down of newspapers .... When the
President says that it needs to be made a crime in the United States
to publish the names of intelligence agents, he is making the same argu-
ment, namely that national security threats justify restrictions on freedom
of the press.
See, e.g., Medow, supra note 135, at 826-27: There is intolerable risk in delegating
our civil liberties to such foreign intelligence organizations as the Shah's SAVAK [or
the Korean CIA or South Africa's BOSS].
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American leftism.21 °) The essence of the weak State is the fullest
measure of civil liberties exercised by its citizens and, perhaps, a
proselytizing for liberal democracy overseas." Most lawyers adopt
this stance almost reflexively, on information and belief-until it comes
into conflict with the real and supposed requirements of national
security. When this point comes, as inevitably it does, conservatives
almost uniformly prevail, favored as they are by the "us" and "them"
dichotomy, by the organizational muscle of groups such as the CIA,
and by legal and policy processes generally.212 Critics of the strong
State in national security affairs are thus left in what is perceived
as an extremist, ACLU position, with calls for extensive civil liber-
ties exacted from a fully accountable CIA-which would be weaker
because it is less secret. For example, the ACLU's Morton Halperin
argues that:
The main consequence of pursuing a policy through covert
operations rather than openly is that you make it almost
impossible to have the public debate the First Amendment
demands on issues as grave as war and peace.
The only way to deal with the problem is to simply
prohibit the conduct of covert operations. 1
Covert operations certainly do restrict public debate, but Halperin's
prescription is put too baldly to have much effect in the real world.
If the question is whether we want to retain covert operations, at
least as a policy option, all but the most adamant of civil libertarians
would answer "yes." In other words, covert operations will win out
210. See M. Kelman, Comment, The Past and Present of American Legal Scholar-
ship, AALS Plenary Session, Cincinnati, Jan. 7, 1983. (American Leftism all but ig-
nores the social democratic, Trotskyite, and anarchistic thinking that has sprung up
elsewhere in response to these criticisms).
211. Legal liberalism is "orthodoxy ... premised on the paired assumptions
of the postwar liberal states: majority rule and minority rights; affirmative govern-
ment and autonomy from government interference; the furthering of economic and
technological progress and the preservation of humanist values." G. White, supra note
62. These "paired assumptions" arguably have the effect of false dichotomies, in the
sense that an inability to pass between them has handcuffed liberal policymaking. They
can be profitably analyzed in a dialectical fashion, however: See infra notes 601-08
and text accompanying. A liberal-left critique, of the CIA is, of course, possible, but
not all that common: See Raskin, supra note 120, passsim.
212. See Brietzke, supra note 202; infra notes 556-82 and text accompanying.
See also supra notes 27, 30, 171-73, 178-79 and text accompanying.
213. Halperin, supra note 125, at 2, col. 3. See 119 CONG. REC. 25,079-80 (1973)
(quoted infra note 331). But see also H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 130 (quoted supra
note 196); infra note 235.
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in any struggle with an absolutist First Amendment.21 A compromise
of conflicting policies must be found: the Constitution is neither "a
compact of convenience"215 nor "a suicide pact."2 6
In this and other areas of national security policy, the most that
civil libertarians can hope for is a balance which is far from wholly
protective of civil liberties. Aiming for much more than this, the critics
wind up with much less. They lack the organizational cohesiveness
to pursue unpopular remedies which, for the most part, seek to treat
symptoms, i.e., civil liberties violations, rather than the disease. The
disease is found in such lucunae of governmental accountability as
the CIA." 7 It is unfortunate in at least some respects that the civil
libertarian critique of the CIA is so weak politically and argued so
unrealistically. If we are serious about retaining something like liberal
democracy in America-and the refusal (since President Johnson's
Great Society ended) to take further steps down the road to social
democracy or welfare statism218 indicates that we are serious -military
214. Compare Halperin, supra note 125, at 2, col. 3; id., at 1, col. 1 (quoted
supra note 209), with Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 137: The June 1982 Act
making it a crime to identify covert agents represents a major step in
the right direction. The media reflexively oppose any limits on what can
be written or said; but this represents a parochial and unrealistic view-
point. The new legislation can protect U.S. intelligence officers without
jeopardizing the fundamental freedom of the press.
It is the perceived extremism of the civil libertarians' stance that allows ex-CIA Director
Turner, in an otherwise surprisingly balanced article, to describe a "reflexive," "parochial
and unrealistic" opposition by the media-adjectives used by many to characterize
CIA attitudes. See also K. DAVIS, supra notes 146, at S 7.15 (quoted infra note 222);
supra notes 129, 154-55 and text accompanying.
215. Glennon, supra note 148, at 40.
216. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 371 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (quoted in Glennon,
supra note 148, at 40).
217. See infra notes 235-43 and text accompanying. See also Schwartz, Cycles
of Reform: Existential Commitment Rather than Cynicism, 4 DET. COLL. L REV. 1418,
1420-23 (1983): the ACLU's opposition to Sen Kennedy's Criminal Code Reform Act
of 1978 (S. 1437; H.R. 6869) is a perfectionist obstacle to pragmatic law reform, an
instance of the best being an enemy of the good. The Bill makes hundreds of im-
provements, and most of the "hysterical" ACLU objections are to the Bill's re-enactment
of existing rules. Id. at 1421. Thus the ACLU makes common cause with the Right
to defeat reform. Id. at 1420.
218. "Social democracy" here refers to the constitutional goals of Western states
dedicated to a genuine socio-economic equalization through gradual reforms which retain
as much of liberal democracy as possible. A "welfare state," on the other hand, is
a cradle-to-grave caring for the public, even at the sacrifice of much individual choice.
It describes the projected outcome of the search for stability by communist party-
states, and the constitutional path of those Western states where liberalism was never
firmly rooted or where there is a willingness to trade more of the tenents of liberalism
for more of the advantages of the strong State. Of course, a particular polity may
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and intelligence agencies will have to be curbed. Restrictions are
needed to stop CIA officials from taking advantage "of every loophole,
of every ambiguity in order to broaden the powers of the intelligence
agency."2 9
Absolute curbs are unattainable politically, but there is a need
to direct the flow of power and other resources away from the strong
State and towards the private autonomy in political (and economic)
activity that is struggling to keep its place in American life. Other-
wise, there will always be a thumb on the scale when the needs for
guns and butter come to be balanced. Threats to national security
and the organizational needs of entities such as the CIA will be exag-
gerated to the point where accountability appears impossible. And,
if strong State policies set the tone of public law, the danger is that
the executive branch will treat foreign affairs prerogatives as perma-
nent and more extensive licenses to regulate domestic matters.220
There is precious little accountability of the CIA. I have gone
into much detail about CIA practices to demonstrate that informal
reflect social democracy in some of its programs and welfare statism in others. See
H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 126 n.30 (quoted in note 346, infra); R. WILLIAMS,
KEYWORDS 281 (1976) ("welfare"); THE FONTANA DICTIONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT 579,
672-73 (A. BULLOCK AND 0. STALLYBRASS, eds. 1977) ("social democracy" entry by Leopold
Labedz and "welfare state" entry by Donald Watt); Brietzke, supra note 202; supra
note 6 and text accompanying.
219. Uhlmann, supra note 135, at 11 (quoting Morton Halperin).
220. Franck and Weisband, supra note 154, at 401. See North, supra note 108,
at 205; Walden, supra note 125, at 233-34; H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 130-31
(quoted supra note 196); supra notes 12, 123 and text accompanying.
One danger is that the National Security State will eliminate an historically-
important function of liberalism: the orderly processing of change. Raskin, supra note
120, at 219. The CIA's low-profile, domestic policing responsibilities may create "a
society programmed for fear, and a nation wracked by long-suppressed tensions." F.
DONNER, supra note 120, at 463. Some would argue that it is "not altogether surprising"
that a secret CIA, "spending billions [an estimated $12 billion in 1975] in hidden funds,
and operating outside normal constitutional and political controls, had become a corrupt
force in American society." D. WISE, supra note 120, at 185.
Public debates in these matters are intensely ideological. They are thus open
to cynical manipulation:
Dollars given to the Pentagon are dollars taken away from the poor. [We]
are told to choose between the welfare state and the warfare state. It
is also argued, in a similar vein, that the criterion for military spending
must be economic need, that capital must be transferred from the military
industries to the civilian industries if the decline in American economic
power is to be reversed. . ..
"[Tjhe modern emphasis on the education, health, and welfare of the
common man is in fundamental conflict with foreign policies based on
regarding man elsewhere as a legitimate object of aggression and oppres-
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controls - controls vital to the functioning of other agencies in
America-are sporadically applied, confusing in operation, and open
to abuse." ' With regard to formal controls, conventional notions of
administrative "law," *"process" and "agency" are not applied to the
CIA,222 the "mortal enemy" of the rule of law.223 Unlike the "lawyer's
sion." Of this, certainly, we may be proud; and this philosophical condi-
tion accounts in part for the difficulty faced by recent Administrations
in winning popular support of double standards in their positions on human
rights.
Weiseltier, supra note 173, at 14-15 (source of quote not identified). The terms
of such public debates can be cynically manipulated by the CIA, "the ideal vehicle
for a conspiracy . . . " H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 133 (quoting Allen Dulles). For
example, CIA newsreel footage shows "how changes in power in countries such as
Cuba and Guatamala were ominously portrayed to heighten anticommunist feelings
in the United States." Hall, supra note 120, at 18, col. 3. CIA Director Casey offers
another, clear example (Casey Asks Freedom from FOIA, supra note 125, at 2): "Only
recently have we established . . . the accuracy, the precision and the power of Soviet
weapons, which we are required now to counter with budget-busting appropriations.
. .. If Soviet weapons capability has again been overestimated, as it was during the
Kennedy-era "missile gap", we will have spent money to benefit the strong State rather
than ourselves. The danger is that, unless "the tell-tale signals and clues are being
monitored, the whole nation may find itself caught up in a runaway, less and less
controllable positive feedback situation-an arms race, a monetary crisis, inflation,
depression, crime wave, trade war, revolution or the like." North, supra note 108,
at 199. See id. at 196. We would like to think that organizations like the CIA are
monitoring such "signals" accurately and in good faith, but we cannot be certain that
this is the case under veils of secrecy.
An even more subtle example is offered by Turner and Thibault, supra note
118, at 138: "Congress could minimize the risks of reopening" the longstanding debate
over enacting a charter to regulate the CIA "by establishing in advance that the major
issue to resolve is the degree of intrusion the public must accept." See FOIA Testimony
Presented, supra note 141, at 4 (quoted infra note 261). Presumably, the risks to be
minimized are risks to the CIA, first and foremost. The public "must accept" intru-
sion because of the ways in which debates over the CIA have been cast.
221. See Ransom, supra note 136, at 210-11 (on the CIA)("While a structure
for authority exists, real control has been absent because ... of bureaucratic pluralism
and free-wheeling activity by its various units."); supra note 137 and text accompanying.
Informal controls include, e.g., "plausible deniability" and the "need to know." See supra
note 120 and text accompanying. These are also sources of administrative law, albeit
weak and tenuous sources: See K. DAVIS, supra note 146, at S 4.11. For this reason, I
have devoted a great deal of space to officials' speeches.
222. K. DAVIS, supra note 147, at 220. See id. at 223; K. DAVIS, supra note 146,
at 5 7.15 (discussing national security exception to general rule that a party with a
sufficient interest at stake is entitled to a trial-type hearing on issues of adjudicative
fact): "our legal system is clear that when national security is jeopardized a young
man may be legally compelled to expose himself to enemy fire; if life itself may give
way to the national security interest, then clearly the right to a hearing may." See
also supra note 147 and text accompanying.
223. Raskin, supra note 120, at 199, 202 (citing B. SCHWARTZ, THE POWERS OF
GOVERNMENT 26 (1963)). The rule of law entails: "1) The absence of arbitrary power; 2)
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law" I surveyed in relation to contract, the CIA's regime is at most
a law of social administration; it is almost totally of concern to officials
who translate questions of policy and purpose directly into action. Just
as the police have an almost unlimited discretion to issue tickets now
and secure convictions later, so is the CIA a law unto itself. National
security is nowhere defined in the statutes and executive orders osten-
sibly governing it. What amounts to national security is thus defined
tautologically by the ways officials exercise unchecked power in the
name of national security.2 ' The CIA's legal regime follows a par-
ticular continental model, the police state,22 which "leaves it to the
official to subordinate the interests of some to those of others by iden-
The subjugation of the State and its officers to the ordinary law; and 3) the recogni-
tion of basic principles superior to the State itself." Id. The CIA does not feel, and
is not made to feel, that it must bear these legal costs: see infra notes 231-34, and
text accompanying. See also B. CHAPMAN, supra note 204, at 67: "The Gestapo drew
..unwritten authority from the fact that it worked according to 'special principles
and requirements' as opposed to the civil administration's general and regularly legalized
rules."
224. K. DAVIS, supra note 147, at 154; G. SAWER, LAW IN SOCIETY 64-65, 127-30
(1965); Glennon, supra note 148, at 40 ("Under the best of circumstances it is no easy
task to identify what is necessary to this nation's security and well-being, and to devise
policies based on a balance of diverse, sometimes conflicting, national goals."); id. at
40-41; Raskin, supra note 120, at 193. See B. CHAPMAN, supra note 204, at 83: Police
powers are exercised under an intuitive sense of values-which may not match those
in the wider society. It is, of course, true in all fields that, to "a significant degree,
policy turns out to be what the administrators choose to do, not what an ostensible
policy decision declares." C. LINDBLOM, supra note 2, at 66-67. See K. DAVIS, at 154. But
see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) ("National defense" not an end
in itself but a defense of values and ideals setting this nation apart, such as freedom
of association).
225. For four decades (seven administrations) police and intelligence agencies
have secretly violated laws and the Constitution-in a uniquely American police state.
D. WISE, supra note 120, at 398. Historically, the police power was part of the uncon-
trollable sovereign authority of the State, an "estate" owned by the monarch. The
18th century Prussian Polizeistaat was a product of economic, social and military policy
exercised for the common good. This included not only individual welfare but State
strength too, since State welfare was thought to transcend that of individuals. Political,
legislative and administrative authority is fused in a police state, where the bureaucratic
values of order, form, and discipline are imposed on the public and private lives of
citizens. Interference with private life is unrestricted, so that the general welfare,
public security, and order can be achieved. After 1870, European jurists sought to
tame the Polizeistaat by using, for example, French separation of powers doctrine.
The Weimar Republic's Reichstaat was too weak to prevent the reversion to a
Polizeistaat harnessed to the Nazi ideology. B. CHAPMAN, supra note 204, at 12-15, 17,
31, 34, 41, 44, 54. America and England have been historically willing to tolerate a
greater measure of disorder, rather than risk police state incursions into liberties.
American police powers are imprecise and subject to a changing Supreme Court
jurisprudence. But a narrow police state has been allowed to grow up in foreign and
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tifying the latter with the public interest according to policies of his
own."
2 26
Some would reject this conclusion and argue that particular CIA
activities are unconstitutional or ultra vires, constitute crimes, or
violate treaties or other aspects of international law. 27 These
arguments are not analyzed in detail because they miss a fundamen-
tal point, a point obvious to the CIA. Declarations of CIA illegalities
may assuage the speaker's moral outrage and, perhaps, influence public
opinion a bit. They will not serve to hold the CIA accountable (at
least in the short run), however, unless the declarer has the capacity
to visit such unpleasant consequences on miscreants as the loss of
powers, jobs, budgets or the secrecy of information. Holding the CIA
accountable is, in the words of then-Senator Walter Mondale, "like
nailing jello to the wall.."226 An impasse among factions and govern-
military policy without Court interference. Id. at 50. See supra notes 201-06, and text
accompanying.
There is nothing specifically left wing or right wing about the police state. The
KBG and CIA can imitate each other in attempts to create "little" police states, based
on the notion that they are the only wholly reliable bastions of State interests. B.
CHAPMAN, supra note 204, at 135. See id. at 114.
226. R. POUND supra note 37, at 15. See Emerson, Control of the Intelligence Agen-
cies, 1983 DET. COLL. L. REV. 1205, 1205-06 (1983); supra note 225.
227. Walden supra note 125, at 221, 229, 233-34. The Rockefeller Commission
reported to President Ford that many CIA actions are "plainly unlawful" infringements
of "the rights of Americans." D. WISE, supra note 120, at 184-85. Similar discussions
are usefully collected in J. BERMAN and M. HALPERIN, supra note 121, at 156-73, passim.
Particularly noteworthy are analyses by New York Bar Association Committees (see
id., passim, quoted in part supra note 165) and enumerations of the (mostly 18 U.S.C.)
crimes committed by the CIA:
-conspiracy to infringe upon the civil rights of citizens by violation of
their First, Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. (Section 241)
-warrantless electronic- surveillance. (Section 2511)
-burglaries in violation of state and local laws.
-warrantless searches of homes. (Section 2236)
-opening of the mails and the copying of the contents. (Sections 1702
and 1708)
-obstruction of justice. (Sections 371 and 1503)
-conspiracy to violate federal law. (Section 371)
-destroying or. concealing public records. (Section 2071)
-making false statements. (Section 1001)
In addition, many of the activities of the intelligence agencies,
including the CIA domestic intelligence gathering and the FBI
COINTELPRO, appear to go beyond the charters of the agencies.
J. BERMAN and M. HALPERIN, supra note 121, at.156. See id. at 157-70. The CIA's refusal
to publish an accounting of expenditures would appear to violate the Constitution,
Art. 1, Sec. ix, cl. 7. Id. at 170.
228. D. WIsE, supra note 120, at 214 (quoting Mondale).
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mental branches is guaranteed to result from attempts at account-
ability. The Constitution, "an instrument for all seasons," leaves each
to his own devices on this issue.229 Neither the executive nor Con-
gress can claim the exclusive right to settle boundaries between them,
of course; and, in the quintessentially gray area of foreign affairs, the
Constitution's draftsmen went beyond a separation of powers to hedge
their bets under "an invitation to struggle," among the branches of
government and between government and the governed.23 ° The CIA
is immune de facto to both the checks and balances associated with
a separation of powers and the legal-rational legitimacy described by
Max Weber2 1 -and CIA officials know this. Testifying in closed ses-
sion before the Church Committee, a senior CIA official with a long
service record said: "It's inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm
of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the
government." '232 Few are so overtly defiant in a covert CIA, and this
229. Franck and Weisband, supra note 154, at 428. See supra note 196. The
"popular dimensions" of the American Constitution, those which concern the organiza-
tion of parties and constitutional protections of political activities, "are more largely
conditioned today by factors of culture and technology outside the constitutional frame."
The coalitions that result are "continuously labile and unstable." Gilbert, The Shaping
of Public Policy, 426 Annals 116, 127, 130 (1976). But overall and with regard to the
CIA in particular, "culture," "technology," and "coalitions" are hostile toward an
increased accountability. There are four constitutional standards for CIA practices-
and that's a large part of the problem: 1) maximal authority derived from presidential
powers under the U.S. Const. Art. II, supplemented by congressional authority delegated
under Art. 4; 2) modified authority under more strict congressional delegations,
supplemented by powers implied in U.S. Const. Art. II; 3) authority based on 1) or
2), constrained by judicial review and interpretation of the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th
and 14th Amendments; and 4) discretionary standards from 1)-3), promulgated by a
president to limit encroachments on a free society. Harris, supra note 141, at 72.
230. T. Franck, Constitutional Practices Since Vietnam, Address to Congress,
the President, and Foreign Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., May 10, 1984; Mathias,
Executive Privilege and Congressional Responsibility in Foreign Affairs, in SECRECY AND
FOREIGN POLICY 69, 86 (T. Franck & E. Weisband, eds. 1974) (quoting E. CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT 171 (4th rev. ed. 1957) and Madison's Federalist, No. 49).
231. See Miler, supra note 121, at 63 (quoted and discussed supra note 137
and text accompanying); Medow, supra note 135, at 837 (under case decisions-and,
I would add, other legal regimes-concerning the CIA, the fit between ends and means
is too loose); infra notes 270-71, 304, 565-68 and text accompanying. See also E. LEWIS,
supra note 123, at 161: "The politics/administration dichotomy of Max Weber and
Woodrow Wilson simply does not work. The separation of powers doctrine, so dear
to the heart of American democratic ideology, is also in some difficulty. The
public/private distinction has been dealt a series of blows in the political and scholarly
worlds." American public administration is better at checking discretion than in con-
fining or structuring it. K. DAVIs, supra note 147, at 228. It is thus unfortunate that
checks upon the CIA are virtually nonexistent: "Institutional decisions at their best
draw much strength from built-in systems of checks and balances." Id. at 143.
232. D. WISE, supra note 120, at 208 (quoting Angleton). See id. at 399 (quoting
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statement was retracted in open session. The official did admit openly
to the misleading of presidents, however.233 More representative is
the Church Committee testimony of William Sullivan, who never heard
"anybody raise the question: 'Is this course of action which we have
agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral?' [W]e were just
naturally pragmatists." '234 If so, it takes pragmatists (rather than, e.g.,
civil libertarians) to curb other pragmatists.
A pragmatic accountability of the CIA has not been forthcoming
under law because the policy problem has been badly put, as a false
dichotomy between security and accountability. Most conservatives
do not wish to erode liberal democracy to any extent which is not
required for purposes of national security; it is, after all, liberal
democracy that most conservatives are trying to conserve. Most civil
libertarians do not want a CIA any weaker than necessary to con-
serve the civil liberties that are undoubtedly exposed to foreign
threats too.23 Many conflicts between these rivals' positions are thus
apparent rather than real (the fruits of a false dichotomy), although
significant conflicts undoubtedly exist at the margins. A sensible policy
would strike a balance over these marginal conflicts, after a larger
consensus has been secured. My candidate for a politically-realistic
consensus - a means of passing between the horns of the false
dichotomy of secrecy and accountability- revolves around the policy
precept of a CIA competence: the CIA must do effectively what we
as Americans236 want it to do-and nothing more. This precept takes
advantage of a consensus which already exists: the CIA has frequently
proved itself incompetent, and we should focus on making it much
less so in the future rather than merely excavating past misbehavior. 7
Tom Charles Huston, author of the Huston Plan): "We faced an extraordinary situa-
tion requiring an extraordinary response, and you don't want a constitutional, legal
mandate for that kind of thing. You don't want to institutionalize the excesses required
to meet extraordinary threats." President Nixon ordered the CIA to destroy its
biological weapons in 1970, and a mid-level official refused to destroy part of the stock.
After his retirement, a successor assumed that remaining stocks had official sanction.
G. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 135.
233. D. WISE, supra note 120, at 207, 209.
234. Id. at 403 (quoting Sullivan).
235. See supra notes 201-14 and text accompanying; infra note 520 and text
accompanying.
236. See Aspin, supra note 42, at 37. Put thus, my projected consensus may
sound like a dissensus deferred, to what "Americans" want to do. I will argue that
this is not the case: see infra notes 573-82 and text accompanying.
237. A consensus over CIA incompetence (at least in the past and with a fair
degree of frequency) exists among liberals and conservatives alike. Many of the latter
no longer believe that expressing such attitudes constitutes an attack on national
security itself. For liberal views, see, e.g., Aspin, supra note 42, at 32 ("The real issue
19841
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The CIA is not the monolith it may appear to be." 8 It is not a take-it-
or-leave-it instrument of policy, despite the way some conservatives
put the issue: "Do we want a strong CIA or not?" It is clear, once
the false dichotomy is discarded, that we want a more effective CIA
for some purposes, and no CIA activity at all in other areas. A
narrower CIA effectiveness and the broader protection of civil liber-
ties should both be expanded until they come into conflict with each
other, a point which would take some time to reach under even the
most sensible of policies. Once greater measures of both security and
accountability are attained, the remaining policy conflicts could be
compromised more easily. Of course, this would be most easily achiev-
now is the quality of intelligence much more than the control of abuses"); North, supra
note 108, at 179 (quoted in text accompanying supra note 199); Shattuck, supra note
135, at 7-8. For conservative views, see, e.g., Casey, supra note 182, at 3; Godson,
Introduction, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS for the 1980s 1, 3 (R. Godson, ed. 1979)
(debate has focused on past failures rather than future intelligence needs); id. at 7;
Halpern, supra note 158, at 42; id. at 44 ("the lack of direction or an inadequate con-
cept of priorities .. .may have led [intelligence] collectors in Iran to avoid the time-
consuming effort involved in collecting information on the dissidents."); Miler, supra
note 121, at 49 (discussed supra note 135); Tovar, supra note 121, at 68 (CIA "clandestine
efforts reflect an all too pervasive mediocrity that bodes poorly for the future.");
Uhlmann, supra note 135, at 12; Casey Confirmation Hearing, supra note 167, at 4
(quoting CIA Director) ("it is a time to make American intelligence work better and
become more effective and more competent and make the members of its establish-
ment respected and honored.").
In a radio interview, William F. Buckley maintained that an attempted assassina-
tion of Indonesia's Sukarno had all the earmarks of a CIA operation: everyone was
killed except Sukarno. (Regrettably, I have lost the citation.) If this was intended as
a humorous remark, the humor lies in its plausibility. A U.S. attorney in San Diego
was fired by President Reagan because he investigated a former Mexican official/CIA
informer, for his involvement in a multimillion-dollar California car theft ring. Landau,
CIA, Its Allies Gain Secrecy Victories, VIDETTE-MESSENGER (Valparaiso, In.), April 14,
1982, 4 at cols. 1-2. While the CIA adroitly halts the domestic publication of unclassified
information freely available to our enemies, Britain's Geoffrey Prime has been giving
away many of our real secrets, as a result of incompetence which comes close to defy-
ing description. See infra note 302 and text accompanying. It sometimes seems that
CIA officials act out a Samuel Beckett scripting of a Dostoyevsky novel. See, e.g., a
biography of two long-serving CIA officials, Angleton and Harvey: D. MARTIN, supra
note 189. Manuevering on a "darkling plain" for decades without fear of accountability,
(id. at xii), their careers
were mired in absurdities, not the least of which was that they habitually
violated the democratic freedoms they were sworn to defend. [Albsurdity
became the only logic they knew. Immersed in duplicity and insulated
by secrecy they developed survival mechanisms and behavior patterns
that by any rational standard were bizarre .... The game attracted strange
men and slowly twisted them until something snapped. There were no
winners or losers in this game, only victims. Id. at 226.
238. See supra notes 174-78, and accompanying.
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ed under a consensus-seeking foreign policy, a sharing of credit and
blame by Congress and the President such as developed under the
Monroe and Truman Doctrines."9
How can appropriate criteria of a CIA competence be devised?
Surprisingly, perhaps, Antonio Gramsci offers a good beginning: "The
great states have been great precisely because they were at all times
prepared to enter effectively into favorable international situations,
and these situations were favorable because there was the concrete
possibility of effectively entering them."24' Note that entry must be
effective, based on sound information and judgment, for, as Roger
Hilsman argues:
If a . . .great power uses the techniques of subversion to
bring down foreign governments . . .[others] have a right
and duty to defend themselves ... [by methods which] are
effective and appropriate and for which methods there is no
effective and appropriate alternative.
The trouble has been ... [that, in] the past, the United
States has too often used methods when they were not
effective and appropriate or when there were effective and
appropriate alternatives.'
If we borrow analyses from antitrust law, Hilsman is understood to
recommend that rules of reason be applied to CIA activities, rather
than the "bright line" rules of a per se illegality that would probably
be successfully ignored by the CIA anyway. 242
239. See K. DAVIS, supra note at S 7.15 (quoted in text accompanying supra note
197); K. DAVIS, supra note 147, at 154 ("we surely can and should do far more than we
have to eliminate the absolute discretion that we find to be unnecessary or unjustified.");
Franck, supra note 230; P. WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 35, at 317); H. WILENSKY, supra
note 123, at 130-31 (quoted supra note 196); supra notes 23-24; infra note 522 and text
accompanying. During the Iranian hostage crisis, a Lou Harris poll (discussed in P.
HACKES, ET AL., supra note 42, at 1) showed that 73% of Americans favored stepping
up intelligence activities, and 19% did not. This suggests that the public equates more
activity by a stronger CIA with a better, more effective CIA-which is arguably one
effect of the false dichotomy on public opinion.
240. A. GRAMSCI, The Modern Prince, in THE MODERN PRINCE AND OTHER WRITINGS
135, 173 (L. Marks, transl. 1957).
241. Hilsman, supra note 121, at 175.
242. See United States v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (discussed infra note 294); Medow, supra note 135, at 827 (under a com-
pelling state interest challenge to restraints on publications dealing with the CIA,
the argument should be that another type of restraint is less intrusive, and capable
of satisfying friendly foreign intelligence agencies-rather than a "no prior restraints"
argument); supra notes 58, 219, 232-33 and text accompanying.
1984]
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No overall box score has even been kept on the CIA in this
fashion, with a view toward, for example, maximizing the usefulness
of a stated minimum of covert intervention or maximizing the infor-
mation obtained from a stated minimum of intrusion on privacy. This,
rather than a CIA which sometimes runs amok, would result in more
efficient pursuit of the public interest. 43 These notions can be traced
back at least as far as the hostility to a then-nascent police state
expressed in Rook's Case (1598):... wide powers must be exercised
reasonably, "for discretion is a science or understanding to discern
between falsity and truth, between wrong and right .... and not to
do according to their wills and private affections." This notion sur-
vives in our law (and more fully in French law), even in the face of
broad statutory grants of discretion.24 As we shall see,246 there are
significant but not insurmountable barriers to its application in the
area of national security.
CIA officials suspect that, as censors of behavior, they will never
be loved at home or abroad. They want and need to be respected,
however. In 1971, the CIA Director rather grandly announced: "The
nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are honorable
men devoted to her service." '47 But many Americans were reluctant
to "take it on faith" rather than on disclosure and evaluation, after
the Cold War consensus that legitimated CIA activities came unravel-
ed during an era of detente, Vietnam, and Watergate. 4 According
to Stansfield Turner: "[Tihe intelligence community has to merit public
support by avoiding the mistakes of the past and by providing the
anticipatory and objective reporting that the nation needs." '49 Put
another way by Potter Stewart, "secrecy can be preserved only when
credibility is truly maintained.""0
CIA and other governmental officials frequently misunderstand
the nature and effect of public mistrust and cynicism. Consider some
of their arguments:
243. Harris, supra note 141, at 75; H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 64. See
Harris, at 67 (citing B. WHALEY, STRATEGEM (1969)); supra note 186 and text
accompanying.
244. 5 Co. Rep. 99b. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 608 (1976).
245. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 610-11, citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970) (concerning broad grant to Secretary of Agriculture) and arguing that this
rule may include unjustified use of discretion, as well as its abuse. See N. BROWN AND
J. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1973).
246. See infra notes 268-303 and text accompanying.
247. Quoted in Ransom, supra note 136, at 217 (speech to National Press Club).
248. Colby, supra note 123, at 10. See supra notes 132-33 and text accompanying.
249. Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 136.
250. Quoted in Moorehead, supra note 128, at 108. See Moorehead, at 109.
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[T]he loss of Afghanistan is alleged to be a serious
threat to our interests. Strong support for that position
among the American people is doubtful, however, and pro-
bably few believe that a free and independent Afghanistan
is essential to this country's vital interests. Similarly, it is
doubtful that the American public would support strong
military moves to keep Pakistan free and independent. As
a result of this lack of consensus, our allies a.d adversaries
are at a loss in discerning where our vital interests lie. 51
On the contrary, all but those who are prisoners of the "us" and
"them" dichotomy are able to discern a new, post-Vietnam consensus.
It is no simple isolationism; it seems to combine yearnings for a more
liberal democratic foreign policy with an unwillingness to take officials'
assertions of a "free and independent" Pakistan, El Salvador, and so
forth at face value. Many Americans realize that, trying "to make
policy while ignoring the past, we become allies of a false version
of 'stability' that requires us to support reactionary regimes that no
American would find acceptable in this country.""2 2 It is almost as if
Americans were reading John Stuart Mill: Our desires should not be
imposed on others if we would regard as unjust their desires impos-
ed on us.M (Opinion polls concerning abortion.. suggest that this is
indeed an important strand in the thinking of many Americans about
public affairs.)
Clearly, any administration or agency whose statements and
policy justifications are not consistently believed is in deep trouble
in a democracy, unless it is democracy itself which is in trouble with
its strong State. The rejection of expertise that "was termed the
'credibility gap' in the Johnson Administration's relations with the
public is not peculiar to any one president; it is a growing problem
of modern governments, as foreign policy becomes central to domestic
politics and welfare, and as the blanket of secrecy is spread wide." '255
Many a government faces such a crisis of legitimacy," a crisis for
which the CIA bears part of the blame in the United States.
251. Toon, The Soviet Threat, 17 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 57, 61 (1980) (speech to
ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security, by former Ambassador to
Moscow). See supra notes 187-91, 194 and text accompanying.
252. Kaiser, supra note 166, at col. 4. See id., col. 1 (quoted in text accompanying
supra note 166) for a more pragmatic justification of this position.
253. See W. CONKLIN, IN DEFENSE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 126-29 (1979) (discuss-
ing Mills's principle of "self-regarding conduct").
254. See infra notes 517-18 and text accompanying.
255. H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 154. See supra note 8 and text
accompanying.
256. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, passim; J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1976).
1984]
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All of this may sound like a trite civics lesson. It is no less im-
portant for that or for the fact that, pursuing its short-term policies,
the CIA often seems heedless of its, and government's, longer term
needs for legitimacy. CIA officials are unlikely to volunteer to accept
restraints on power, even those restraints plausibly designed to in-
crease CIA effectiveness, at the cost of supervisions which would fre-
quently annoy these officials. The "us" and "them" dichotomy is so
deeply ingrained that the CIA will almost certainly continue to pro-
ceed regardless, by identifying its organizational and ideological im-
peratives as those of the nation."' Our public interests have always
been defined very abstractly, in ways convenient for manipulation by
the CIA in default of our own resolute judgments." If we want to
control the CIA and other manifestations of the strong State, we must
decide for the first time what our national security interests really
are and what, precisely, the CIA is to do and not do about them.
In particular, we have to decide from time to time exactly who our
"enemies" really are; better yet, we should abandon this rather
See Kristol, On Corporate Capitalism in America, 41 PUB. INTFREST 124, 126-27 (Fall
1975): "[Populism is] the constant fear and suspicion that power and/or authority, whether
in government or out, is being used to frustrate 'the will of the people.' It is a spirit
that intimidates authority and provides the popular energy to curb and resist it." The
major sources of legitimacy involve discursive justification and/or canny manipulation.
To the extent that legitimacy exists, fewer of the other resources used to secure com-
pliance with decisions (infra) need be deployed. In the legitimation process, flows (rather
than stocks) of legitimacy are augmented as well as depleted by the timely implemen-
tation of policies which the public thinks sensible. Government's claim to obedience
then seems self-evident to all but marginal recalcitrants. Many of the resources used
to secure compliance with decisions, such as law, public participation, coercion, charisma,
ideology, and the wise exercise of an unfettered discretion, also serve as sources of
legitimacy. See R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCEITY 200
(1959); S. FINER, COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT 29-30 (1970); L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at
112; J. HABERMAS, at xiv, 7-8; R. JACKSON AND M. STEIN, ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS
206 (1971); G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE 57 (1966).
257. See Harris, supra note 141, at 62 ("organizations tend to equate their mission
with the security of governments, not of the people whom governments represent.");
id. at 65; supra notes 171-93, 251 and text accompanying.
258. The notion that a "nation is a society responding as a unit," F. NORTHRUP,
THE TAMING OF THE NATIONS 3 (1952), has been thoroughly demolished by behavioralists.
No organization or nation possess a status independent of the individuals composing
it; collectivities "exist and behave the way they do only insofar as the people com-
posing them act in certain ways." H. EULAU, THE BEHAVIORAL PERSUASION IN POLITICS
15 (1963). See T. HUGHES, supra note 125, at 20 (quoting Woodrow Wilson, "I lived in
the Government of the United States for many years, and I never saw the Govern-
ment of the United States."); North, supra note 108, at 180, 184. If the public does
not make intelligence policy through elected representatives, groups most interested
in those policies -notably the CIA-will make policies in self-interested ways. See supra
notes 204, 220, 224 and text accompanying.
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primitive classification in favor of affirmative policies designed to win
friends and influence people rather than react simplistically to the
consequences of past American and Soviet policies." 9
CIA resistance could only be overcome by altering the balance
of power within government,260 so as to eliminate the present impasse.
In a liberal democracy, it is we who should tell the CIA which civil
liberties cannot be infringed in which circumstances, rather than, as
in the past, leaving the determination of which infringements
Americans will have to put up with to the CIA. It must be made
painfully clear to the CIA that extensive civil liberties and an informed
public debate are essential to our national security, rather than in-
compatible with it or a luxury we can afford on occasion.26 '
259. Aspin, supra note 42, at 37; Colby, supra note 123, at 10 (CIA morale
and effectiveness requires public debate on what we want the Agency to do); Raskin,
supra note 120, at 193; H. WILENSKY, supr o note 123, at 177. See Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88. (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoted in text
accompanying infra note 575); T. HUGHES, supra note 125, at 4 (the need to reassert
the primacy of collection, processing and evaluation of information); H. WILENSKY,
supra note 123, at vii, 3-4; Medow, supra note 135, at 831 (discussed supra note 231).
260. The internal balance of power can be described "vertically, as between
the canaries of the State Department and the cats of the Department of Defense; or
horizontally, as between the foxes of the intelligence community and les petits princes
of public planning." Franck and Weisband, supra note 129, at 8. The external balance
of power is the familiar constitutional one; while the CIA gives the president the
advantage over Congress or the Court at first glance, the CIA has frequently acted
on its own, immune to presidential control. See infra notes 306-39 and text accompanying.
The effects of the existing balance are frequently misunderstood. See, e.g., Wieseltier,
supra note 173, at 12:
It has been suggested . . . that the internal surveillance insanity that
overcame the Nixon government was a spillover from the mentality of
secrecy that attends all things nuclear. This is rather forced. The persecu-
tions of CONTELPRO originated in a political style and personality
disorder that cannot be laid at the Defense Department's door.
The political culture of the United States cannot be reduced to its military
culture.
The point missed here is that the struggle between "political culture" and "military
culture" is an uneven one when put in these terms; the strong State apparatus in
daily use can be massively misused, albeit rarely, without accountability, and until much
damage is done to liberal democracy.
261. See, Colby, supra note 123, at 10; R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 166 (in
democratic theory, the public interest is best served by discussion, since actions most
effective in prompting governmental response are also those broadening and informing
the debate); Medow, supra note 135, at 823 ("Information concerning public issues is
the lifeblood to democracy; an uninformed citizenry is, by definition, an ineffective
check on both official misconduct and misguided policy."); Turner and Thibault, supra
note 118, at 132 (quoted in text accompanying supra note 149); Congress Considers
Amendments to FOIA, supra note 154, at 5 (statement by a journalist, Steven Dornfield).
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D. Failures in Accountability
Stansfield Turner describes "four types of controls and oversight
[over the CIA]:
* internal controls created and enforced within the intelligence
agencies themselves;
* presidential controls such as executive orders;
* controls that come from Congress in its role as overseer of
intelligence; and
* controls that flow from public scrutiny of intelligence
activities." '262
This sounds impressive, but we have seen, at some length,263 that
meaningful internal controls enforced by the CIA are virtually non-
existent. Likewise, a meaningful public scrutiny of secret CIA matters
on any regular basis is a contradiction in terms." ' Privacy and the
First Amendment rights to know, speak and publish about intelligence
activities are apparently not worth mentioning, as Turner does not
bother to list the courts as CIA overseers.
In contrast to broad and longstanding judicial experience in the
field of contract, courts have very little experience in the national
security field and no distinctive policy goals or appropriate classifica-
tions to apply. 65 Street "demonstrations, apocalyptic rhetoric,
See supra note 220 and text accompanying. But see FOIA Testimony Presented, supra
note 141, at 4 (then-Deputy CIA Director Bobby Inman):
I am convinced that there is an inherent contradiction in the application
of a statute [the Freedom of Information Act] designed to assure openness
in government to agencies whose work is necessarily secret, and that the
adverse consequences of this application have caused intelligence func-
tions to be seriously impaired without significant counterbalancing of public
benefit.
262. Turner and Thibault, supra note 108, at 124. See supra notes 229-30 and
text accompanying.
263. See supra notes 171-78 and text accompanying.
264. See supra notes 145-63, 198 and text accompanying; infra notes 279-88 and
text accompanying.
265. A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 116; Raskin, supra note 120, at 205 (courts han-
dle "precious few" national security cases, and "courts are frightened of the Dual State,
hoping that the problem will go away if no attention is paid to it.")
One important policy role for courts is characteristically American: "Judges have
their own policy goals which they consciously pursue through carefully elaborated
strategies, perhaps resembling those of legislative leaders and executive officials." J.
SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note 16, at 16. This is not the case in the area of national
security, however:
Reference to word formulas like "direct, immediate and irreparable injury"
or "clear and present danger" have proved to be only slightly useful..
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obscenity, libel, and the rest of the usual First Amendment judicial
fare are poor materials from which to fashion permissions and
restraints on publication of national security secrets." '266 In circular
fashion, courts are reluctant to act because they lack a national secur-
ity expertise, and expertise is not forthcoming because of a reluctance
to act. While contract law and policy may be an appropriate realm
for judicial activism-the courts needing no control over the purse
and very little over the sword to be effective-an exaggerated
deference seems the courts' only feasible national security policy. The
imbalance of information and expertise between executive and judicial
branches is felt keenly under what are frequently perceived as crisis
conditions in national security. Judicial lucidity is all but irrelevant
in the face of the CIA's organizational muscle, its control over infor-
mation, the sword, and the purse exercised with scant respect for
law. If Mapp, Miranda and the school prayer decisions are regularly
disobeyed when the judge's back is turned, how can the CIA be kept
to the straight and narrow?26
. . [Tihe calculus of injury to the national security often does not permit
certainty of impact or timing and is at best analogous to a mathematical
projection ...
In fact, the courts have largely ignored the formulas. Deference to
executive branch foreign policy judgments, respect for applicable congres-
sional determinations, and a demanding and critical approach to conclusory
governmental representations are all mixed in the same pot with the para-
mount First Amendment guarantee ...
Martin, supra note 148, at 684. (As to whether courts use a "demanding and critical
approach" in fact, see infra notes 268-305 and text accompanying.) It would be hazardous
to develop judge-made rules where much of litigation would be in camera, First Amend-
ment decisions being particularly dependent on full elaborations of the facts. See A.
MILLER, supra note 16, at 211 ("more gibberish has been written about ... [executive]
privilege based on fewer formal statements of doctrine than almost any other area
of constitutional law."); Note, 74 HARV. L. REV. 976, 984 (1974) (there are "no 'manageable
standards' for evaluating an international peril, and in that sense the question of whether
such a peril justifies surveillance is arguably 'nonjusticable'").
266. Schmidt, supra note 148, at 182. See supra note 265; infra note 271.
267. See Baum, supra note 54, at 46-47, 49, 56-57; Baum, Judicial Impact as
a Form of Policy Implementation, in PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 127, 128 (J. Gardiner,
ed. 1977); Carter, When Courts Should Make Policy, in id. 141, at 144-46; Henig, et al.,
The Policy Impact of Policy Evaluation, in id. 225, at 230; Note, supra note 265, at
983-84; id. at 996 (the secrecy of facts in prior cases makes of each decision a case
of first instance, unless judge was personally involved in prior cases); supra notes
76, 117, 148. In United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 and 486 F.
Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis 1979) (see infra notes 277-78 and text accompanying), "when one
considers what was claimed to be at stake, the prospect of a coin toss by a nonscientist
judge . . . seemed a less than adequate way to resolve this problem." Martin, supra
note 136, at 683. The decision in Jackalone v. Andrus, __ F.2d __ (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(unreported, Slip Op. 79-3140) is animated by a "sense of vulnerability:" demonstra-
tions in front of the White House might be interpreted as officially sanctioned by
Iranians holding hostages, causing them to retaliate against the hostages. Martin, at
683-84.
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It was the weak State in an American liberal democracy that
made judicial review both possible and necessary. There is almost
no room for judicial review of behavior by our growing strong State,
however. One of the ways the Supreme Court legitimates its power
is by linking the exercise of this power to constitutional provisos. This
task is more than usually difficult in the gray area of national security
policy. A paucity of authority and policy are reflected in the dismissal
of suits under case or controversy, standing, ripeness, and political
question doctrines. 6 Courts may have assumed an ombudsman's role
in some areas of public law, but CIA activities plainly exceed the
courts' supervisory powers and remedial ingenuity in ways that even
the behavior of southern school districts does not. Even if courts were
predisposed to intervene in national security, there is frequently no
law to apply;269 given the many lacunae in the CIA's accountability,
268. See G. BARRACLOUGH, supra note 204, at 146; Giraudo, Judicial Review and
Comparative Politics: An Explanation for the Extensiveness of American Judicial Review
Offered From the Perspective of Comparative Government, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.O. 1137,
1138-39, 1159-63 (1979); L. Henkin, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the
Foreign Affairs Power, Address to Congress, the President, and Foreign Affairs Con-
ference, Washington, D.C., May 10, 1984; Murphy, supra note 24, at 129; supra notes
202-04 and text accompanying; infra note 304.
269. Although the Freedom of Information and Administrative Procedure Acts
"are virtually non-applicable to the whole vast foreign policy sector" (Franck and
Weisband, supra note 154, at 435; see supra note 158) the following analogies to a
general administrative law seem appropriate. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
S 28.16 (Supp. 1982) finds that a "pernicious" idea was announced in Standard Oil Co.
of Cal. v. FTC, 596 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1979): "When no law fetters the exercise
of discretion, the courts have no standard by which to measure the lawfulness of agency
action, and consequently, the action is not susceptible of judicial review." This must
be the way courts frequently ponder the absence of meaningful fetters on the CIA;
"[in practice, the determination of whether there is 'law' to apply necessarily turns
on pragmatic considerations as to whether an agency determination is the proper sub-
ject of judicial review." Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031,
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See K. DAVIS, at S 28.16. See also such "subtle, elusive and unclear"
(K. DAVIS, supra note 146, at S 28.05) constructions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(5 U.S.C. S 701) as: Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413
(1971) (dictum). Even if relevant law clearly exists, judges sometimes refuse to apply
it. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (18 U.S.C. SS 2511, 2518, 2519;
50 U.S.C. SS 1801-1811) created a court "to hear applications for and grant orders
approving electronic surveillance .. " Refusing such an application on June 11, 1981,
Judge Hart held: "as a designated judge .... I have no authority to issue such an
order. I am authorized to state that the other designated judges concur in this judg-
ment." INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Jan. 1982, at 7. Decisions are thus left to executive branch
discretion. Id. The "disqualification of judges on issues of military and foreign policy
may be so strongly felt that judges will decline even to pass on constitutional issues."
K. DAVIS, supra note 146, at S 28.05, citing, e.g., United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp.
511, 515 (D. Mass 1968), dismissed on other grounds, 399 U.S. 267 (1970). This cannot
be because of the complexity of a specialist subject matter, since matters are not
as complex as in, e.g., patent infringement or antitrust actions. See K. DAVIS, supra
note 146, at S 28.05. See also infra notes 395, 524-26 and accompanying text.
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courts would have to fashion the doctrines themselves. That they will
be reluctant to do so is suggested by a statement from Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,27 a case establishing an absolute presidential immunity
from civil damage suits:
Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the
development of common law, any historical analysis . . .
merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public
policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court.
This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be
considered implicit in the nature of the President's office
in a system structured to achieve effective government
under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
The only ingenuous aspect of this murky statement by Justice Powell
is his placing of quotation marks around public policy. The Fitzgerald
"separation of powers" seems to be applied heedless of checks and
balances, to strengthen the State because of a most English solicitude
for the executive and its "effective government" desiderata.7 '
Fitzgerald and other recent cases272 represent a greatly increased
willingness to take executive branch claims at face value, when com-
270. 457 U.S. 731, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2701 (1982).
271. 457 U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 2704: Before exercising separation of powers
jurisdiction the Court "must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be
served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive
Branch." The Court will act "to maintain their proper balance" and "to vindicate the
public interest in an ongoing criminal prosecution," but will not intervene in "this
merely private suit for damages .. " Id. See id., passim; id. at 2717 (White, J.,
dissenting); Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 408 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("A doctrine that denies redress for constitu-
tional wrongs should ...be narrowly confined to those contexts where history and
public policy compel its acceptance."); K. DAVIS, supra note 146, at S 7.15 (quoted supra
text accompanying note 197); id. at S 28.05 (quoted supra note 269); A. MILLER, supra
note 16, at 16; id. at 223 (quoted infra text accompanying note 307); de Smith, supra
note 163, at 325 ("English judges have generally manifested a keen sense of obligation
to serve the interests of the State"); Martin, supra note 148, at 682 (the "net result"
of "judicial abstention justified by the separation of powers doctrine" is that secrecy
is "the responsibility either of the executive branch or the Congress" that has failed
to act); id. at 684 (quoted supra note 265); supra note 231 and text accompanying;
infra note 305. In general, if "constitutions or statutes failed to provide standards
or rules, obedience to the constitutional ideal called on judges to fashion the generaliza-
tions themselves." J. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 136 (1977).
This has not happened in the area of national security, however.
272. See infra notes 275-95 and text accompanying. See also Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976), which upholds regulations banning partisan political activity on
a military base. Greer's significant retreat from Flower v. United States, 407 U.S.
197 (1972), is "troubling:" Why should the "Court in a dramatic and scarcely-explained
departure from traditional first amendment analysis . . . defer so obligingly to
generalized and self-claimed military interests as to confer an essentially conclusive
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pared to the Court's approach in the Pentagon Papers Case13 and in
Youngstown Sheet and Tube.274 In Snepp,"5 for example, the Court's
eagerness to rely on CIA Director Turner's "conclusory, self-serving,
... essentially untested" assertions is "nothing short of remarkable.""27
In The Progressive,27 a well-meaning but naive trial judge was
mortified when government's extravagant claims evaporated on a
preliminary testing by the Seventh Circuit.278 His prior restraint on
the publication of a do-it-yourself H-bomb article, an article known
to have been assembled from public library materials, had meanwhile
remained in effect for months.
The CIA has been so successful in winning judicial acceptance
of its justifications that its claims to need a blanket exemption from
the Freedom of Information Act sound hollow; the CIA has "never
lost a suit ... where it was required to disclose classified information
• . . [or] the identity of a CIA source ... "279 Courts have recently
held that disclosure of a fifteen-page CIA document about President
Kennedy's assassination "would be likely to endanger certain national
security interests,"2" that disclosures of past CIA activities at Syracuse
presumption of constitutional validity on the . . . restriction .. " Young and Herbert,
Political Association under the Burger Court, 15 U.C.D.L. REV. 53, 72 (1981).
273. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (claim that publica-
tion would embarrass government and prolong war rejected per curiam, in a near-
prohibition of prior restraints on publication). The central theme of the opinion is a
reluctance to enjoin in an area where Congress had failed to authorize injunctions
of similar publications. L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 1140; Schmidt, supra note 148, at 181.
Recent cases convey "a sense that there is a changing judicial attitude toward the
kind of national security claims . . . put forward and almost summarily rejected in
the Pentagon Papers case." Martin, supra note 148, at 684.
274. Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (presidential
seizure of steel mills to avert strike during Korean War enjoined because congres-
sional authorization obtainable). See also Reynolds, infra note 286.
275. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). See infra notes
293-95 and text accompanying. Government's strategy in Snepp was dictated by the
outcome of New York Times, supra note 273. Medow, supra note 135, at 831.
276. Id. at 828 n.305.
277. Supra Note 267. But see Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963) (prior restraints not permitted).
278. Personal communication from (as the CIA frequently says) a "usually
reliable source." Martin, supra note 148, at 683, is more charitable: "It is difficult to
justify rationally a judicial process . . . [to determine] whether hypothetical foreign
nuclear weapons experts . . . could, through sophisticated scientific analysis, deduce
the secret of the A-bomb's design from a variety of specified sources each of which
allegedly revealed one or more elements of that puzzle." See id. (quoted supra note
267. This may be true but, if so, the process is no more irrational than many other
judicial inquiries.
279. Landau, supra note 237, at col. 5. See FOIA Testimony Presented, supra
note 141, at 4 (quoted supra note 261); supra notes 161, 220; infra note 341 and text
accompanying.
280. Allen v. CIA, 516 F. Supp. 653, 655 (D.D.C. 1981) (held that there is no
need to balance public interest in disclosure against need to protect information).
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University (hardly a secret) would increase the reluctance to cooperate
with the CIA,"8 ' that disclosure of the names of those contracting with
the CIA during the Glomar Explorer project would make future con-
tractors more reluctant, '82 that disclosure of CIA activities in Albania
from 1945 to 1953 (activities wholly known to the Soviets through
Kim Philby) would seriously strain diplomatic relations (with Albania?)
and be likely to provoke retaliation, '83 and that disclosures about the
use of the herbicide Agent Orange in Vietnam would violate the in-
tegrity of the official Air Force history of Operation Ranchhand 4
The only apparent attempt at an evenhanded balancing of CIA claims
is Judge Edwards's in McGehee;28 however, "his" D.C. Circuit has held
the state secrets privilege to be "absolute." '288 Judge Gesell is amazed
281. Daily Orange Corp. v. CIA, 532 F. Supp. 122 (N.D.N.Y., 1982).
282. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
283. Miller v. Casey, __ F. Supp. __ (D.D.C. 1982, Slip Op. 82-1100, Dec.
22, 1982).
284. National Veterans Task Force on Agent Orange v. - F.2d
__ (D.C. Cir. 1982, Slip Op. no. 81-2005, July 23, 1982).
285. McGehee v. CIA, - F.2d - -_ (D.C. Cir. 1983, Slip Op. 82-1096,
Jan. 4, 1983):
[T]he judgment of the CIA is to be accorded considerable respect and
deference. The Freedom of Information Act nevertheless imposes on the
courts the responsibility to insure that agencies ..."make .. .records
promptly available to any person" who requests them, unless a refusal
... is justified by one of the Act's specific, exclusive exemptions. Especially
where, as here, an agency's responses to a request .. .have been tardy
and grudging, courts should be sure they do not abdicate their own duty.
Summary judgment for the CIA was reversed and a "sample procedure" established
(see infra note 363) because the CIA delayed for some 30 months in responding to
a journalist's request for documents concerning the People's Temple massacre in
Jonestown, Guyana, and then limited its search to documents on hand as of the date
of the request. Id. See supra note 160.
286. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F. 2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (adopting Defense Secretary's
assertion that admitting or denying existence of NSA warrantless interceptions of
international communications would reveal important military and state secrets). This
must head the list of court-recognized privileges. A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 54-55.
Congress never acquiesces in claims of absolute executive privilege, however. Mathias,
supra note 230, at 75. See also Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S.
491 (1975) (Senate Internal Security Subcommittee subpoena of organizations bank
records held completely immune under the speech and debate clause, without inquiry
into motives for investigation and despite the First Amendment violation that resulted);
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952) (Air Force investigative report concerning
crash of plane on secret mission cannot be disclosed during Federal Tort Claims Act
suit); id. at 10 (where "reasonable danger" exists that "military matters" will be exposed,
the court should not insist "upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge
alone, in chambers."); Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (the "President has available intelligence sources whose reports
are not and ought not to be published to the world."); Conway v. Rimmer [1968] A.C.
910 (doctrine of absolute Crown privilege jettisoned, but rationale unlikely to be
extended to national defense or security disclosures). But see ACLU v. Brown, 619
F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (7th Cir. 1980) (remand to determine whether Army Regulations
and Field Manual on domestic intelligence practices, 1966-76, should be disclosed-
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"that a rational society tolerates the expense, the waste of resources,
the potential injury to its own security" that Freedom of Ihformation
Act requests entail.287
There is a battery of statutes288 aimed at whistleblowers,289 and
a trilogy of recent cases shows that the Court loveth not the
whistleblower. In Haig v. Agee,29 ° an injunction was sought against
Agee's second book about the CIA and, in the matter reaching the
Supreme Court, his passport was revoked. An egregious fact
situation-the methods used by former CIA employee Agee are
abhorred by almost everyone, including most CIA critics-led the
Court into much overbroad dicta which endanger freedom of speech,
procedural due process, and the right to travel. For example: "Agee's
disclosures, among other things, have the declared purpose of
obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence
personnel. They are clearly not protected by the Constitution."'" The
government's claim to privilege "sufficiently dubious"); Glennon, supra note 148, at
32-33 ("In some instances a court may rule . . . that a legitimate state secret is not
involved, or that the need for information in litigation outweighs requirements of
confidentiality.").
287. Agee v. CIA 517 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (D.D.C. 1981) (upholding CIA refusal
to release 8,175 of 8,699 documents pertaining to Agee himself).
288. See Medow, supra note 135, at 830 n.311:
In addition to 18 U.S.C. S 793(a) ... the basic provision criminalizing speech
(as opposed to pure espionage) is 18 U.S.C. S 793(d) [see supra notes 148-49
and text accompanying]. This law is identical in all material respects to
section 793(e) except that the former applies to defendants "lawfully hav-
ing possession of" the information, e.g. CIA agents, while the latter covers
those having "unauthorized possession." Both sets of individuals are sub-
ject as well to several narrow prohibitions outlawing specific types of
disclosures. See 18 U.S.C. S 794(b) (1976) (troop movements); id. S 797
(photographs of defense installations); id. S 798 (classified communications
systems data); 42 U.S.C. S 2274 (1976) (Atomic Energy Act Restricted Data);
See also Intelligence Identities Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-200, 96 Stat.
122 (1982) (criminalizing the disclosure of an undercover agent's name).
Government employees, moreover, fall within the reach of two other
narrow prohibitions. See 18 U.S.C. S 952 (1976) (diplomatic codes); 42 U.S.C.
S 2277 (1976) (restricted data); cf. 50 U.S.C. S 781-783 (1976) (dealing with
pure espionage activities).
289. On the strong psychological pressures that forestall much whistleblowing
(and that are ignored by courts), see Thomson, supra note 118 (discussed supra note
118). An attempt to internalize whistleblowing within the executive branch has not
been very successful: see Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 129 (quoted infra
note 311).
290. 483 F. Supp. 729; 629 F.2d 80; rev'd 453 U.S. 280 (1981); See Hall, supra
note 120, at p. 17, col. 1; Martin, supra note 148, at 684; Case Note, INTELLIGENCE
REPORT, July, 1981, 1.
291. 453 U.S. at - (Burger, C.J.) (citing Snepp-see infra notes 293-95 and
text accompanying). The Court found that: "To identify CIA personnel in a particular
country, Agee . . . consults sources in local diplomatic circles whom he knows from
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two dissenting Justices objected to a "whirlwind" treatment of Agee's
constitutional claims; they found his speech "undoubtedly protected
by the Constitution" under prior precedents. 92 In Snepp, the
whistleblower's freedom of speech claims were dismissed in a
footnote.293 It was no secret that Snepp was writing Decent Interval
based on information made public by the CIA. Without briefing or
oral argument, the Court gave the CIA more than it said was needed
against an author whose apparent sin was to make the CIA look
ludicrously incompetent. 94 Snepp did breach his CIA contract of
employment. But the Court could have refused to enforce the rele-
vant contract covenant on grounds that public policy favors disclosure
of non-secret matters of great public concern.1 5 But "public policy"
leans strongly against the whistleblower, as in Fitzgerald.' Fitzgerald
was not allowed to recover damages after being fired for disloyalty
to President Nixon: that is, testifying before a congressional commit-
tee about Defense Department cost overruns.297
his prior service in ...Government. He recruits collaborators and trains them in
clandestine methods and techniques designed to expose the 'cover' of CIA employees
and sources." 453 U.S. at 284.
292. Id. at __. See Martin, supra note 148, at 684.
293. 444 U.S. at 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam), "a watershed victory in the
Agency's battle to contain the flow of information to the public." Medow, supra note
135, at 775.
294. See 444 U.S. 524-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Medow, supra note 135, at
775, 775 n.3, 776-77. See also D. WISE, supra note 120, at 197. The CIA's rather lame
arguments were that publication decreased foreign confidence in CIA reliability, and
that Snepp violated his CIA employment contract covenant not to disclose without
prepublication censorship. As an employment restraint, this covenant should logically
have been subjected to a rule of reason treatment, a determination of whether it goes
further than necessary to protect legitimate CIA interests not outweighed by the public
interest in disclosure. 444 U.S. at 518-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) See Medow, at 780;
supra notes 58, 219, 232-33, 242 and text accompanying. Instead, a breach of contract
was decreed by the Court and a constructive trust impressed on the book's proceeds.
444 U.S. at 511, 511 n.6, 515 n.11; Medow, at 781. A constructive trust is an inap-
propriate remedy, since Snepp arguably owed no fiduciary (as opposed to contractual)
duty to the CIA. Snepp, 555 F.2d at 935-37; Medow at 780-81.
Snepp casts doubt on Marchetti and Knopf. Medow at 783-87. See Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (given
citizens' right to compel Freedom of Information Act disclosure, a CIA agent should
be in no worse position; and items deleted by CIA should be suppressed only if classified
and classifiable); U.S. v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 139, 1317 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S.
1063 (1972) (because it exercises prior restraint, the CIA must act "promptly," within
thirty days, on a prepublication clearance).
295. Medow, supra note 135, at 811-12. See 444 U.S. at 521 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); supra note 95 and text accompanying (CIA's arguably a "polluted hand",
at least in this circumstance).
296. See supra note 270-71 and text accompanying; infra note 297.
297. See also the companion case, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 967, 102 S.Ct.
2727 (1982):
Harlow modified the previously accepted method of testing defendants'
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The courts are thus extremely zealous in choking off the main
sources of information that would insure an informed public scrutiny
of the CIA: whistleblowers and Freedom of Information Act
disclosures. It may be that "truce is stranger than friction" '298 between
government and the media, but the media is powerless to exert a
check on government without information and the willingness of those
supplying it.299 Like Rosenberg ° and Oppenheimer3 °1 in an earlier era
(the justice and policy wisdom of which continue to be debated to-
day), the cases surveyed strengthen the national security State without
strengthening national security itself. The minor disclosures curbed
or punished, at a great cost in judicial and prosecutorial resources
and to our civil liberties, are a drop in the bucket compared to the
effects of unbridled CIA incompetence. While these cases were being
argued and decided, Geoffrey Prime was quietly passing "real" secrets
to the Soviets because of a British and CIA bureaucratic incompetence
untouched by administrative laws. 2 Agee apparently continues his
claims that their conduct was shielded by "good faith" or "qualified"
immunity. Prior thereto, defendants whose official conduct was challenged
had to "objectively" and "subjectively" prove that their conduct was,
indeed, in "good faith." Harlow abrogated the "subjective" aspect of the
good faith analysis because the Court felt that the "social costs of such
inquiries were impermissibly high."
Druckenmiller v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 917 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (dictum). Harlow "seems
to us a small court-plaster which cannot staunch the hemorrhage of governmental ef-
forts and resources expended in avoiding or resisting the ever increasing spiteful and
unfounded torrent of Bivens claims." Dale v. Bartels, 552 F. Supp. 1253, 1266 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). There are now 10,000 such claims pending. Williams, Supreme Court
Decisions, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Nov. 1982, 1, at 6. Many of these suits are unsuccessful,
however: see, e.g., Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (Feres doctrine bars
claim, under Federal Tort Claims Act, based on L.S.D. administered without veteran's
knowledge as a part of chemical warfare experiments).
298. Franck and Weisband, supra note 129, at 9 (quoting Maxwell Cohen). But
see also Bullock, The Office for Civil Rights and Implementation of Desegregation Policies
in the Public Schools, 2 POL. STUD. J. 597, 609 (1980): "To speculate, the role of catalyst
may be most available to the media when it can focus on acts of inhumanity and do
so in such a way that most policymakers and most of the public are not threatened."
Otherwise, everybody gets defensive and media coverage may be counterproductive
as a control. Id.
299. See Ignatieff, Secrecy and Democratic Participation in the Formulation and
Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY 53 (T. Franck and
E. Weisband, eds. 1974); supra notes 189, 237, 251 and text accompanying. The freer
flow of information makes for a pluralism in private and public intelligence informa-
tion and evaluation, giving rise to a better-informed public and government. H. WILEN-
SKY, supra note 123, at 127.
300. Rosenburg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
301. See Martin, supra note 148; Raskin, supra note 170, at 214.
302. See Davies, Communications Spy Gaoled for 38 Years, MANCHESTER GUARD-
IAN WEEKLY, Nov. 21, 1982, p. 4, cols. 1-2; Davies, Spy Trail that Led to Adropov, MAN-
CHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Dec. 5, 1982, p. 3, col. 5; Jackson, U.S. Angry at Not Being
Told, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Nov. 21, 1982, p. 4, col. 3; Norton-Taylor, Prime
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efforts through articles published abroad in Soberania Sovereignty."3
Much judicial labor has had little useful effect. If journalists,
academics and other intelligence amateurs can detect real secrets, as
the CIA claims, how much easier is this task for the many skilled
Soviet agents that the CIA claims are in place undetected? Will we
continue to dismantle the trappings of liberal democracy because the
CIA, having frequently proved itself incompetent, claims this is a
necessary response to perceived crises? The most realistic answer is
found in Justice Jackson's evaluation of the strong State, in one of
the Japanese Exclusion Cases:
Of course the existence of a military power resting on force,
so vagrant, so centralized, so necessarily heedless of the
individual, is an inherent threat to liberty. But I would not
lead the people to rely on this Court for a review that seems
to me wholly delusive .... If the people ever let command
of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous
hands, the courts wield no power equal to its restraints.
The chief restraint upon those who command the physical
forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must
be their responsibility to the political judgments of their
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.3"4
The "moral judgments of history" are fragile protectors of rights:
ask a Native American. But courts place great confidence in political
processes in many areas, such as an all but unfettered presidential
supervision of the CIA. 05 Is this confidence warranted? For many
.... in id. at pp. 4-5; Norton-Taylor, The Failures of Vetting, in id. at p. 4, cols. 4-5;
The Prime Case, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1982, p. 9; The Treason of Geoffrey Prime, in
id. at 63-64; Two Lessons from the Prime Affair, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Nov.
21, 1982, p. 12, col. 1, at col. 2 ("The real problem is finding what peculiar combination
of laxity, levity and heedlessness and doziness recruited, monitored and then promoted
Prime."). See also Jones, Letter to the Editor, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Nov.
28, 1982, p. 2, at cols. 3-4:
Why, during the recent trial of Geoffrey Prime, was it necessary for the
court to sit in camera? It appears to have been common ground that all
the information in question had long since been passed to the enemy. From
whom are the "secrets" being kept? I think we (and the Americans) should
be told!
303. 1982: The Year in Review, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Jan. 1983, 1, at 12.
304. Quoted in A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 138. See Martin, supra note 148, at
685: The Progressive, Snepp, and Agee represent "an erosion of the fundamental First
Amendment protections that unfortunately may not be limited to the national securi-
ty area." Id.
305. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. at 2705-06 (nation's protections to be found
in constant scrutiny by press and Congress, and in impeachment); Id. at 2711 (White,
J., dissenting): (the Fitzgerald plurality and concurring opinions "place the President
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liberals and moderates, hopes that the president could and would con-
trol the CIA in the public interest did not survive Vietnam and
Watergate. For President Johnson, the management of the CIA
appeared to be of little concern. President Nixon had some awareness
of the need for CIA economy and efficiency, but his secretive style
probably compounded the difficulty of holding the CIA accountable.
Both Johnson and Nixon corrupted the CIA for partisan purposes,
and applied pressure on the Agency to show military policy successes
and the foreign sponsorship of domestic dissent at home. This pressure
contributed to a civil liberties overkill by the CIA. Earlier, Presidents
Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy complained of an inability to con-
trol the CIA, despite their enormous power over the CIA in theory."
This power consists of the executive power vested in the President,
his foreign affairs powers, and the Commander-in-Chief power. Many
traditionally monarchial privileges have been implied into these
powers, as "a means by which those with knowledge [such as that
supplied by CIA] will remain in control of the levers of power in
government. In sum, the executive is privileged when he can get away
with it politically." 7 The 1947 National Security Act was left
deliberately vague to serve as a flexible instrument of shifts in
presidential policy emphasis." 8 Intelligence officers, past and present,
above the law . . . [in] a reversion to the old notion that the King can do no wrong.");
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., et al., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (Sutherland,
J., dictum) ("In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen"); Bork, in
P. HACKES, et al., supra note 42, at 2 (Bork is now a D.C. Cir. Judge, who dissented in
part in McGehee, supra note 285 and text accompanying) (a balanced intelligence policy
is best formulated under a self-limited presidential discretion); A. MILLER, supra note
16, at 138; supra notes 270-71, 286 and text accompanying. But see, e.g. Mathias, supra
note 230, at 81 (congressional efforts at compulsion- impeachment, budget cutoffs, etc.-
so crude as to be virtually unemployable); infra notes 573-79 and text accompanying.
306. F. DONNER, supra note 120, at 278; Hilsman, supra note 121, at 171-73; Ran-
som, supra note 136, at 208; D. WISE, supra note 120, at 329. See W. COLBY, supra note
184 (quoted supra note 184); G. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 31-32; Shattuck, supra note
135, at 31 (President Johnson repeatedly urged the CIA to investigate antiwar ac-
tivities, and information was collected on the First Amendment-protected activities
of 200,000 Americans during Operation CHAOS); Wieseltier, supra note 173 (quoted
supra note 173); supra notes 178-79 and text accompanying.
307. A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 223. See Hughes, supra note 148, at 13; Mathias,
supra note 230, at 72-73; Glennon, supra note 148 (quoted in note 148, supra); Highsmith,
supra note 125, passim; supra notes 229-30, 271, 286, 304-05 and text accompanying.
Executive privilege is not a constitutional doctrine but a last resort after other evasive
tactics are exhausted. A. MILLER, at 223. It is "a political maneuver, an instrument of
policy .. " Id. A paramilitary CIA operates under the NSA as the president's private
army, the principal staff organ for military and foreign policy. Id. at 139 (going a bit
overboard, in my opinion).
308. J. BERMAN AND M. HALPERIN, supra note 125, at 168-69; Tovar, supra note
153, at 75; supra note 121.
[Vol. 18
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are content to leave matters to the president (as opposed to leaving
them to Congress or the courts) because intelligence is deemed an
inherently presidential function. Further, the psychology of those
attaining the presidency has been one of wanting to make important
decisions personally, sometimes in a less-than-democratic fashion. 0 9
The reality of the president's ability to control the CIA is very
different from the theory. He must, in fact, work very hard to keep
the CIA from running without him. While playing many roles which
detract from each other from time to time, the president's interests
and energies are spread very thin. Supervision of a CIA which never
rests is possible only when particular CIA activities are vital to the
president's political needs or represent logical extensions of some
favored policy. Even then, the president is unlikely to intervene
directly against so powerful an organization, and risk depleting the
authority and prestige that is carefully conserved for the most im-
portant of political battles. Presidents have thus relied increasingly
on national security advisors. As part of a burgeoning population of
presidential special assistants, these advisors lack the consistent ac-
cess to presidential power that is necessary for effectiveness. As
political appointees, they are frequently as unfamiliar with the tricks
of the intelligence trade as is the president." '
The only significant structural reforms of the CIA attempted by
presidents involve the time-honored device of a coordinating commit-
tee: the 52-12 or Special Group under Eisenhower, the 303 Commit-
tee under Kennedy and Johnson, the 40 Committee under Nixon, the
309. Uhlmann, supra note 135, at 16; Highsmith, supra note 125, at 343: See
A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 122 (quoting T. Cronin, who quotes an anonymous aide to
President Kennedy): "Everyone believes in democracy until he gets to the White House
and then you begin to believe in dictatorship, because it's so hard to get things done."
310. See R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 92; id. at 98 (CIA activities may be
important to Congress and the Court, but president may think them a minor issue,
and the CIA frequently disregards all of these institutions); E. LEWIS, supra note 123,
at 169 ("the scarcity of attention and the serial nature of problem or issue considera-
tion . . . tend to favor the 'prolonged attention subsystems' of professionalized
bureaucrats."); C. LINDBLOM, supra note 3, at 66 (Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy com-
plained bitterly that their policies were ignored or only feebly implemented in many
areas); R. LINEBERRY, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 56-57 (1978); McConnell, The Steel Price
Controversy, 1962 in PUBLIC POLICIES AND THEIR POLITICS 127, 138 (R. Ripley, ed. 1966)
("Power is not solely a grant of authority under a constitutional provision"-it "is
also a capacity for action which rests upon intangibles of previous history, public con-
fidence, and prestige."); J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note 16, at 16 (citing Ted Soren-
son); Gilbert, supra note 229, at 143-44; Sullivan, The Role of the Presidency in Shaping
Lower Level Policy-Making Processes 3 POLITY 201 (1970). Assistant Secretary of Defense
Froehlke told a congressional committee in 1970 that: "There wasn't one [inventory]
in the Intelligence Community when I took over .. " Ransom, supra note 136, at
207-08. How could a president control that which had not even been inventoried?
1984]
Brietzke: Public Policy: Contract, Abortion, and the CIA
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
844 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
Interagency Classification Review Committee created by Nixon, a
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in and out of action, the
Intelligence Oversight Board in use since Ford created it, and so forth.
Committee members are frequently distinguished but usually True
Believers in the "mission" of intelligence agencies. About as forceful
as polite alumni visiting committees, these groups have focused on
ameliorating intelligence flops and flaps after the fact rather than
serving in a preventative, watchdog role.3 "
Executive orders have been widely used by the last three
presidents to create new norms of control over the CIA and, under
Reagan, to revert to the old norms. President Ford's Executive Order
of February 1976312 sought to limit CIA incursions into Americans'
civil liberties, require intelligence agencies to issue regulations, and
create clearer job descriptions, lines of authority, and operational
guidelines. Then-Attorney General Levi devoted considerable effort
to seeing that the Executive Order and his own guidelines on elec-
tronic surveillance and FBI intelligence operations were followed. 13
Carter's E.O. 12036 of January 19781" made minor changes in Ford's,
and added that sensitive CIA collection activities had to be authorized
in advance by the National Security Agency. The Attorney General,
who has no operational control over intelligence agencies, was also
required to approve all of their regulations in advance. A modified
311. Moorehead, supra note 128, at 113; Ransom, supra note 136, at 211-13.
See Sullivan, supra note 310. But see also, Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 129:
[Tihe Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) .. . is a three-person panel that
reports directly to the president. Ford and Carter empowered it to review
intelligence activities that "raise questions of legality or propriety."
Anyone, including Agency employees, could use this unique channel to
report known or suspected wrongdoing. Reagan has considerably weakened
the IOB, limiting it to advising the president on matters of legality but
not matters of propriety.
312. E.O. 11905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (1976). See Shenefield, supra note 128, at
5; Smith, supra note 128, at 2; Turner and Thibault, supra note 107, at 123; id. at
129 (quoted supra note 311).
313. Shenefield, supra note 128, at 5. Levi's domestic security guidelines have
been made much less restrictive. See FBI Intelligence Guidelines Now Being Revised,
INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Aug., 1982, p. 1; Senate Hearings Continue on Domestic Security
Guidelines, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Sept. 1982, p. 1 (quoting FBI Director Webster) ("with
the benefit of hindsight, I feel that the balance struck [by Attorney General Levi]
has unduly restricted the flow of vital intelligence to the Secret Service"). (This has
proved a popular argument for decreasing intelligence curbs, after the Reagan assassina-
tion attempt.)
314. 43 FED. REG. 3674 (1978) (replacing E.O. 11905, supra note 312). See Martin,
supra note 148, at 680; supra note 312. Thirty "discrete sets of procedures and guidelines
required approval by the attorney general-and scores of interagency directives and
regulations were created." Smith, supra note 128, at 2.
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version of E.O. 12036 was introduced in the 95th Congress as the "In-
telligence Charter,"3 5 but it failed to pass.
Much or all of this was undone by President Reagan, who
pledged, during the 1980 election campaign, to strike the fetters from
the CIA. The CIA is one of the few government organizations cur-
rently hiring large numbers of people, under increased budgets and
for greatly expanded covert operations.3"' The tone of Reagan's in-
telligence policies is set by the affirmative quality of the preamble
to his E.O. 12333:317 "all reasonable and lawful means must be used
to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence
possible." Under Reagan, "the intelligence agencies are authorized to
conduct specified activities but within certain limitations; this contrasts
with . . . the previous order [12036], which generally prohibited such
activities outside certain limitations and left the authority for non-
prohibited activities to be implied."3 ' Under Reagan's order, the Agen-
cy Director "shall insure implementation of special activities," and
Director Casey has appointed himself head of the "international af-
fairs"-covert operations-division. 9  Physical surveillance of
Americans abroad is now permitted, as are domestic covert opera-
tions not "intended" to influence public opinion. The requirements that
the National Security Council review sensitive intelligence opera-
tions and conduct annual reviews, requirements which forced the
CIA to do its homework, are eliminated.32 Under Reagan's E.O.
315. S. 2525, 95th Cong., __ (197 ). See P. HACKES et al., supra note 42; passim;
Uhlmann, supra note 135, at 11, 13; infra notes 333-35 and text accompanying. (Carter's
Justice Dept. did initiate many national security prosecutions which endangered civil
liberties, however.)
316. See Halperin, supra note 125, at p. 1, col. 1, p. 3, cols. 2-3 (quoted in part
supra notes 125, 160, 167, 209); Jackson, Opportunities Galore with a Booming CIA,
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Feb. 20, 1983, at 8; Southerland, supra note 135, at pp.
1, 12; Turner & Thibault, supra note 118, at 124; id. at 132 (quoted supra text accom-
panying note 149). But see 1982: The Year in Review, supra note 303, at 2 (quoting
Daniel Silver, former CIA general counsel): Under Reagan's executive orders, it "appears
... that more radical changes . .. may have been forestalled by a number of cosmetic
changes and modifications of tone whose significance is less real than apparent. [Their]
most important aspect .. .is the .. .continuity they present ..... ".See id. at 9 (quoted
supra text accompanying note 318).
317. 46 FED. REG. 59941 (1981). Along with E.O. 12334, which continues the In-
telligence Oversight Board (supra note 311), E.O. 12333 replaces E.O. 12036, supra note
314.
318. 1982: The Year in Review, supra note 303, at 9 (quoting Daniel Silver).
See id. at 2 (quoted supra note 316).
319. Jackson, supra note 315, at col. 4 (quoting E.O. 12333 S 1.5(D)).
320. Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 126-28. See id. at 129 (quoted supra
note 311); 1982: The Year in Review, supra note 303, at 9 (quoting Silver): E.O. 12333
"abolished the rigid National Security Council committee structure embodied in the
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12356,"' doubts are now resolved in favor of classification rather than
the declassification of information. President Reagan also pardoned
two ex-FBI agents, convicted of "black bag operations" against the
Weathermen. Reagan argued that: "America was generous to those
who refused to serve . . . in the Vietnam War. We can be no less
generous to two men who acted on high principle to bring an end
to the terrorism that was threatening our Nation.
22
The courts are right: supervision of the CIA (actually the lack
thereof) is a political football. A President's ideological predispositions
and his current relations with Congress, the bureaucracy, and the
public are the prime determinants of policy, rather than the re-
quirements of a sensible, longer-term national security. The President
does have the right and duty to speak on military and foreign policy,
but his message gets distorted or blocked by Congress, interest
groups, the media, and other nations-and his administration frequent-
ly speaks with (and in) many tongues.2 3 The CIA only listens to those
it wishes to hear, and the results32 are frequently anomalous.
Congress has been even less effective than the president when
seeking to compel the CIA to listen. This is but one aspect of a familiar
lament in twentieth century America and the European democracies-
the decline of legislatures as formulators and monitors of law and
previous order and replaced it with a provision permitting the NSC to establish such
committees as may be necessary. The order also abolished the National Foreign
Intelligence Board and the National Intelligence Tasking Center . . . " See also
Southerland, supra note 135, at p. 12, col. 5 (quoting CIA Director Casey):
The criticism of the executive order [E.O. 12333] was much overblown.
It's not true that we wanted the order so that we could spy on Americans.
We wanted it to simplify the work of our operations officers. Before, they
had 130 pages of operational guidance and restrictions to follow and in-
terpret. It's down to 25 percent of what it was.
321. 47 FED. REG. 14874, 15557 (1982). See House Committee Critical of Classifica-
tion Order, supra note 151, at 5; supra notes 149-52 and text accompanying.
322. Pardons for W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller, INTELLIGENCE REPORT,
May 1981, 1 (quoting Reagon). They were fined $5,000. and $3,500 respectively, where
the maximum penalty was 10 years and $10,000. Felt-Miller Conviction, INTELLIGENCE
REPORT, Jan. 1981, 3. See id. at 4:
It now appears that such operations were legal and constitutional if a
particular entry is approved in advance by either the President or the
Attorney General. The defendants did not seek the specific approval of
either ...because such had never been thought necessary in the past
and, at the time they acted, there was nothing to suggest that personal
approval was required.
323. Hughes supra note 148, at 13; A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 66. See Miler,
supra note 121, at 55 (president must eliminate intelligence oversight functions of those
in his administration who contribute to confusion about intelligence needs); supra note
304-05 and text accompanying.
324. See, e.g., supra notes 157-58, 163, 178-79, 224, 234-36.
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policy, a decline paralleling the growth of the strong State. Intelligence
matters show Congress at its worst disadvantage in the face of the
relative unity, decisiveness, speed, and secrecy displayed by the CIA
and by the executive branch generally. Congress can inquire into
disasters after the fact, but cannot deal with uncertain contingencies
prospectively. Until the mid-1970s, a Congress uncertain of its powers
over the CIA delegated these powers to the executive branch under
standards so loose as to amount to confessions of an absolute con-
gressional ignorance.2 Congressional debates on intelligence matters
were ritualized responses to perceived "them" ve 'sus "us" crises. They
were occasionally followed up with minor policy changes negotiated
with the executive branch. By the end of 1972, some 132 bills pro-
viding for congressional oversight of intelligence activities had been
introduced; only two were reported out of committee, to be defeated
roundly.2 An "abdication of influence by the legislators, aggressive
pursuit of influence by the executive, and the heightened pace, com-
plexity, and hazard of international affairs"3 27 added up to a congres-
sional inattention.
By the mid 1970s, however, many in Congress had grown to
mistrust the CIA. The Church Committee's revelations, and a larger
distrust of executive branch expertise and the motives of presidents
embroiled in Vietnam and Watergate led to attempts to curb threats
to civil liberties and to extend newly-rediscovered congressional
prerogatives. In a rejection of the tradition of a perfunctory over-
sight by two or three congressional leaders, Senate and House Select
325. See R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 35 (political supervision is often difficult
"because the aggregate is hidden, its growth is incremental, and no single addition
is greatly controversial in itself."); Mathias, supra note 230, at 71 (discussing
FEDERALIST No. 70); Franck, supra note 230; Gilbert, supra note 229, at 140; supra notes
121, 137, and text accompanying.
Since 1937, courts have almost always sustained the constitutionality of delega-
tions of congressional power. The formal standard is that Congress has legislated as
far as is "reasonably practicable." Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).
But in practice the only criterion for delegation is that the relevant wisdom is not
to be found in Congress. K. DAVIS, supra note 146, at § 2.03, 29; J. FREEDMAN, supra
note 8, at 78-79. Courts have deemed this to be the case in the area of foreign and
military policy-see, e.g., supra note 305-and Congress has been unable or unwilling
to provide the procedural protections of individual rights that are found in most ad-
ministrative laws. See K. DAVIS, at § 2.03, 30.
A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 128, argues that: "The target of interest groups, with
little self-generative power, it [Congress] is the prime example of a nineteenth cen-
tury institution that will not reform itself .... Congress staggers along, full of unre-
quited self-importance and dashed expectations, with some members participating in
the 'sub-governments' of Washington."
326. R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 158; Ransom, supra note 136, at 212; Walden,
supra note 125, at 230.
327. Glennon, supra note 148, at 270.
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Committees on Intelligence were created in 1976 and 1977. The
possibility of a public committee rebuke has had some influence on
the behavior of CIA officials, and Senate confirmation hearings for
CIA directors have served as general policy reviews. 28 In 1981, for
example, nominee Casey assured the Committee that he "could not
now conceive of any circumstances" under which he would not
cooperate with its oversight activities.2 9 (The Committee later found
Casey to be "not unqualified.") There is some doubt whether a
rigorous, consistent oversight is in fact achieved, however. Many of
the committees' members seemingly have a "need not to know" the
ungentlemanly details of intelligence, and the CIA has withheld in-
formation from the committees on occasion. This is known because
some of the information disclosed by the CIA as a consequence of
Freedom of Information Act lawsuits had not been previously given
to Congress.3 °
Congress tried to put some teeth into demands to be informed
about intelligence operations during the 1970s. But it soon became
apparent that, as interpreted by presidents, the War Powers Resolu-
tion of 1973 (WPR)331 has a paramilitary loophole; CIA covert opera-
tions would proceed without prior presidential consultation with Con-
328. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 14,673 (1976); J. FREED-
MAN, supra note 8, at 66; Ransom, supra note 136, at 213; Turner and Thibault, supra
note 118, at 129. See supra notes 8, 18 and text accompanying. There was a strong
feeling in Congress that it could have retarded the Vietnam escalation if the extent
of disagreement among executive branch policy experts had not been kept secret.
Hughes, supra note 125, at 37-38. Senator Church was cautious, fearing that Americans
were not ready to have their idols shattered and that he would be seen to be furthering
presidential ambitions. His Committee nevertheless dug deeper than ever before (D.
WISE, supra note 120, at 203) or since.
329. Casey Confirmation Hearing, supra note 167, at 4.
330. FOIA Testimony Presented, supra note 141, at 3. The CIA was essentially
exempt from the FOIA until 1975, id., which may be amended to create a blanket
exemption in the future. See Aspin, Forward, in P. KOSTINEN, supra note 120 at vii;
Ransom, supra note 136, at 213-14; D. WIsE, supra note 120, at 404 (quoting Sen. Stennis);
id. at 409 (House committee intelligence report costing $500,000 was suppressed, and
leaking of document to Daniel Schorr investigated instead); Hall, supra note 120 (quoted
supra note 120); Raskin, supra note 120, at 206.
331. 50 U.S.C. SS 1541-48 (1976). See Carter, The Constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101 (1984); Hardy, supra note 129; Highsmith, supra
note 112, at 328, 368-69. The WPR's opponents claim that clause 11 of the Constitution
"confers upon Congress only a narrow piece of the war power." Carter, at 101. The
WPR is triggered by "hostilities," actual or imminent, and the Reagan Administration
finds this to mean an exchange of fire by actively engaged American forces. Hardy,
at 269. The constitutionality of terminating U.S. involvement by Congress's failure
to pass a concurrent resolution within 60 days (under § (4(a)(1)) is cast into doubt by
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317, 51 U.S.L.W. 4907 (1983). Chadha
is probably distinguishable, however. Hardy, at 272. Public interest in the WPR has
been rekindled by the recent deployment of Marines in Lebanon, Reagan Administra-
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gress under the WPR. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 19743.2 thus
sought to prohibit the expenditure of funds for covert CIA operations
where the president has not reported "in a timely fashion, a descrip-
tion of the nature and scope of such operation to the [eight] appropriate
committees of Congress." A broad intelligence charter 3 was not
enacted in its entirety, but Title V became law as the 1980 Amend-
ment to the National Security Act of 1947.' Under Title V, only the
Senate and House Select Committees need be consulted, but consulta-
tions must broadly cover the "significant" (not just covert) intelligence
tion policies with regard to Central America (Hardy, at 268), especially the mining
of Nicaragua's harbors-and the invasion of Grenada.
The Iranian hostage rescue attempt would probably not have triggered the WPR
if CIA personnel had been used. Highsmith, at 370-71. Presidents have circumvented
the WPR by using the CIA or by contending that hostilities are not "anticipated"
or that a "humanitarian mission" was undertaken. Id. at 382. See id., at 378. For an
argument that the WPR covers covert operations and certain economic and diplomatic
measures taken by the U.S., see Sen. Eagleton, 119 Cong. Rec. 25,079-80 (1973): "Wars
do not always begin with the dispatch of troops. They begin with more subtle in-
vestments . . . of dollars and advisors and civilian personnel. [Tihe end result is the
same: Americans are exposed to the risk of war. And as they are exposed to the
risk of war, the country then makes a commitment to war." See supra note 213 and
text accompanying. J. BERMAN AND M. HALPERIN, supra note 121, at 102 (quoting Jer-
rold Walden) add that: "At no place in the legislative history of the CIA is it apparent
that Congress intended the Agency to engage in subliminal warfare."
332. 22 U.S.C. § 2422(a) (1976). Hughes-Ryan does not apply where war has
been declared or the War Powers Resolution complied with, Id. at S 2422(b). It serves
to qualify 50 U.S.C. S 403 (1976) (quoted supra note 121). See J. BERMAN AND M.
HALPERIN, supra note 121, at 102-03; Highsmith, supra note 125, at 354-55. The War
Powers Resolution and Hughes-Ryan both "represent a compromise between the theory
of congressional authorization and the practical realities of presidential decision-making
in a . . . fast-moving world." Id. at 378. Uhlmann, supra note 135, at 11-12, argues
that covert CIA help during the Aldo Moro kidnapping was impossible since the legally-
required finding that Italy's Red Brigade is an "international terrorist organization"
could not be made. This argument should be taken with a grain of salt: statutes like
Hughes-Ryan can become handy rationalizations for incompetence by the CIA and others.
333. S. 2284, 96th Congress, 2d Sess. (1980). See Uhlmann, supra note 135 at
13; Highsmith supra note 112, at 355-58; supra notes 314-15 and text accompanying.
There were many intelligence disputes between Congress and President Carter, who
supported the continuation of a Hughes-Ryan type of oversight (supra note 332 and
text accompanying) and opposed S. 2284 because it would give the CIA Charter (much
of which replicated Carter's E.O. 12036-see supra notes 314 and text accompanying)
the force of law. Highsmith supra note 125, at 357, 360. S. 2284 seemingly failed to
pass because of a paradox: a perceived CIA incompetence during the fall of the Shah
and the invasion of Afghanistan was used to justify strengthening the president's hand
in intelligence matters. Id. at 355. Raymond Waldman, testifying before the Senate
Select Committee about S. 2284, argued against "the direct involvement of Congress
in the management of executive agencies. Congress should concern itself with authoriza-
tions, restrictions and procedures. The writing of detailed rules . . . is more appropriate
for an administrative agency for its own operations." Standing Committee, 1980, IN-
TELLIGENCE REPORT, Jan. 1981, 1 at 5.
334. Pub. L. No. 96-450, 94 Stat. 1975 (1980), 50 U.S.C. S 501-05 (1980).
Brietzke: Public Policy: Contract, Abortion, and the CIA
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
850 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
activities of any agency (not just the CIA). Prior notification of the
Committees is also required, for the first time. 35 Secrecy makes it
impossible for Congress to know how effective these consultation pro-
cedures are in practice. Some experts praise the procedures highly,"'
while others3 . complain bitterly about partisanship in oversight and
leaks of "sensitive" information by committee members and their staff.
These complaints are used to justify, tacitly and sometimes not so
tacitly, withholding from Congress some of the vital pieces of the in-
telligence jigsaw puzzle.
335. See Highsmith, supra note 125, at 330-31, 356-58. "Significant" activities,
those which must be reported in advance, are those with "policy implications;" the
"day-to-day implementation" of previously adopted policies is excluded. 50 U.S.C. S
501(a)(1). The Committees' approval is not a condition precedent, however. Id. at S
501(a)(1)(A). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 also seeks to curb CIA
activities, but its key provision has been negated by at least some of its designated
judges: see supra note 269.
336. Turner and Thibault, supra note 108, at 129-31:
[Allthough the committee members ... have a good record of preserving
secrecy, the requirement of disclosing information to Congress inhibits
intelligence officers.
[T~he widespread impression that congressional oversight has hobbled
intelligence can be attributed to the 1980 battle over modifying the Hughes-
Ryan amendment ...
* ..While in the past some subordinates may have sought to hold
back information from the .. .[CIA Director], today they know they may
be called to testify before Congress where they would face the choice
of disclosure or perjury.
Finally, all intelligence officials who testify .. .benefit from the
exchange.
See S. Rep. No. 730, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980): "The executive branch and the
intelligence oversight committees have developed over the last four years a practical
relationship based on comity and mutual understanding without confrontation." Title
V attempts to continue this relationship, in an area where constitutional doctrine
is lacking. Id.; Highsmith, supra note 125, at 363. See also Casey, supra note 123, at
3 (quoted infra note 337)); Colby, supra note 123, at 6: The 1980 Amendment-see supra
notes 334-35 and text accompanying-is a reasonable sharing of information and power
with committees able to keep secrets.
337. See, e.g., Pforzheimer, supra note 142, at 4 (paraphrasing CIA Deputy
Director Inman's October 1982 speech) (emphasis supplied):
[Alt present there are staff leaks from the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee ...; the Admiral said he could furnish names to those empowered to
be informed. He then criticized the House Intelligence Committee staff
report on intelligence community performance in Central America, leaked
a few days before it was officially released. [Ilt had been released on a
straight party-line vote .. .[, which is] so serious a breakdown in bipar-
tisanship that the Admiral .. .resign[ed] his post as a consultant to the
committee.
See also Bork, supra note 42, at 6 (congressional leaks make covert activities impossible);
Godson, supra note 237, at 6 (Hughes-Ryan requirements of presidential approval and
reports to eight congressional committees "effectively ruled out major covert action
as an option."); Landau, supra note 237, at col. 3 (discussing CIA Directors', Turner's
and Casey's, complaints of congressional leaks). But see also, Casey, supra note 123,
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It is nearly impossible for Congress to engage in a longer-term
policy planning, in the field of intelligence and elsewhere, because of
biennial election cycles and an annual budgeting. It is totally impossi-
ble for Congress to exercise budgetary controls over the CIA in any
event. Many details of CIA budgets are kept secret by hiding them
under innocuous headings for other agencies. This practice is probably
unconstitutional in theory, 338 and it eliminates oversight of the CIA
by the appropriations committees that frequently staunch the growth
of other agencies and that are less likely to be impressed by Agency
blandishments. After the Church Committee was disbanded, it became
difficult to maintain a zeal for and a sustained attention to the details
of intelligence oversight. Intelligence committee members receive few
personal gains from their service, neither the national exposure nor
the kind of constituent "casework" that are perceived to improve re-
election chances. A rigorous oversight might, in today's political
climate, expose the overseers to charges of endangering national
security.39 That Congress may be more receptive to Agency blan-
dishments is suggested by the enactment of such statutes as the
Classified Information Procedures ("Greymail") Act of 198031' and the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982.41
at 3: "Today our relations with the two permanent congressional intelligence committees
are excellent. We are responsive to their concerns, as we should be. In turn, their
attitude is one of 'what can we do to help you accomplish your mission?' " (This at-
titude may have changed after the minig of Nicaragua's harbors.)
338. See U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 9, cl. 7: "No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by laws; and a regular statement
and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published
from time to time." See also K. DAvIS, supra note 146, at S 4.08, 108-09; J. FREEDMAN,
supra note 8, at 66-67; Mathias, supra note 230, at 81 (congressional compulsion-
impeachment, budget cutoffs, etc.-is so crude as to be virtually unemployable); supra
notes 18-19, 26, 148, 227-28 and text accompanying.
339. G. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 157. See E. LEWIS, supra note 103, at 169;
Ransom, supra note 136, at 209 (intelligence "overkill" results from congressional
inability to control CIA's budget); id. at 211 (Office of Management and the Budget
controls over the CIA seem ineffective, although it is impossible to be certain of this);
J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note 16, at 20; Carron, supra note 7, at 292-93; id. at 293
("Spontaneity and laissez-faire are still deeply ingrained" in Congress).
340. See 18 U.S.C. Appendix (1980), Pub. L. 96-456, Oct. 15, 1980, 94 Stat. 2025
(Title 18 App.). "Greymail" encompasses attempts to win a civil suit or defend a criminal
suit by threatening to obtain classified information through discovery, or to threaten
to introduce such information into evidence. See Litigating National Security Issues,
INTELLIGENCE REPORT, June 1982, 1. (The statute covers criminal prosecutions only.)
341. 50 U.S.C. S 421-26 (1982), Pub. L. 97-200. Signing the Bill after a three
year battle in both houses, President Reagan said that it would send a "signal to
the world that while we in this democratic nation remain tolerant and flexible, we
also retain our good sense and our resolve to protect our own security and that of
the brave men and women who serve us ...." Act Signed into Law by President, IN-
TELLIGENCE REPORT, July 1982, 1.
For extended arguments for and against the constitutionality of the Act, see
Bork, Professor Bork on Intelligence Identities Protection Act, INTELLIGENCE REPORT,
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E. Future CIA Accountability: A Proposal
While there is a fairly clear line of future development in con-
tract law and policy," ' no such line exists for the CIA. We may be
in for fuller reversions to the untrammelled discretion enjoyed by the
CIA prior to the mid-1970's, but such a trend is unlikely to outlast
present and future disclosures of CIA misdeeds and incompetence.
Despite the apparent cycles of congressional trust and mistrust of
the CIA, Congress is the CIA's most promising overseer in the long
run. Congress is, after all, the locus of American liberal democracy,
the institution whose prerogatives are most at risk from the strong
State and its intelligence activities. If a politically effective pluralism
concerning intelligence policies (a fruitful questioning of diverse sources
of information and a willingness to dissent from official views) is to
be found at a particular time, it will be found in Congress. The falsity
of the "us" and "them" dichotomy, and the futility of trading CIA
accountability for more national security, will not always (perhaps not
usually) be apparent to a majority in Congress. Nevertheless, Con-
gress is the only governmental body capable of achieving a consen-
sus over intelligence which differs significantly from the CIA's views.'
Congress possesses both the strongest motives for curbing the
CIA and the least effective institutional means to this end. Congress
did try to reform itself to sustain a policy competition with the
executive branch during the 1970s, over intelligence policy and many
other matters. New advisory boards were created, 4 but these are
largely irrelevant to a CIA oversight. In any event, it would be futile
for Congress itself to try to create an intelligence expertise in
miniature. A fair amount of decentralization in congressional power
also occurred during the 1970s, a decentralization which gave added
Sept. 1980, 2; House Hearings on Intelligence Identities Protection Act, INTELLIGENCE
REPORT, May 1981, 2, at 3. Halperin, supra note 125, at 3, cols. 1-2 argues that the Act
is "part of a much more disturbing trend," the "development by the government of
the concept of . . . 'dangerous information'...." Government asserts the right to
control such information, whether it "is in the hands of government employees or private
individuals." Id.
342. See supra notes 111-18 and text accompanying.
343. P. KOSTINEN, supra note 120, at 17; H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 127, 162;
Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 137. See C. LINDBLOM, supra note 3, at 21; A.
MILLER, supra note 16, at 129; supra notes 186-93, 202-03, 209-13, 218, 325-41 and text
accompanying. See also Hughes, supra note 125, at 39: "Congress and the intelligence
community have a similar stake in institutionalized skepticism and in assuring that
the products of an expensive and elaborate process are not ignored."
344. E.g., the Office of Technology Assessment, Congressional Research Service,
expanded Government Accounting Office functions (auditing assistance for Congress),
and the Congressional Budget Office and other mechanisms created by the Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 93rd Cong. 2d
Sess. (1974). See Beckman, supra note 6, passim; Thurber, supra note 19, passim.
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authority to those who chair committees and subcommittees. One ef-
fect of this was more autonomy for intelligence oversight by commit-
tees, but decentralization has also meant a fragmentation of congres-
sional power and a weakening of its leadership. This fragmentation
makes Congress an even poorer match for powerful agencies like the
CIA, which present a united policy front to Congress and fall back
on misinformation, endless delays, and claims of executive privilege
when the going gets rough."'
The CIA will not curb itself, the checks exercised by courts are
flimsy and likely to remain so, and, periodically, presidents have a
unity of purpose with the CIA in strengthening the National Security
State. If Congress is to alter this impasse, which leaves the CIA more
or less unaccountable, new means of supervision will have to be in-
stitutionalized. An altering of the balance of power in intelligence
would not create separation of powers problems. CIA functions and
lines of authority stem from the customs and statutes that can be
changed by statute, rather than from constitutional doctrines." My
candidate for an effective new institution would be an intelligence
ombudsman,347 selected by and responsible to Congress. The need for
345. Hughes, supra note 148, at 39; Mathias, supra note 230, at 75, 79; Moss,
supra note 132, at 123. See J. Fox, ARMING AMERICA 136-37 (1974) (five successful
"games" used by the Pentagon to secure congressional funding for endangered pro-
grams); E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at 125-26; Beckman, supra note 6, at 242-43; Carron,
supra note 7, at 292; Davidson, supra note 18, at 300-04, 311, 322; id. at 300 (informa-
tion and power fragmented by "byzantine jurisdictional politics" of congressional com-
mittee/subcommittee system); Frye, supra note 18, at 270-72; Jones, Why Congress Can't
Do Policy Analysis, in 1 POL. STUD. REV. AN. 234, 235 (S. Nagel, ed. 1977); supra notes
19, 333-34 and text accompanying. (The tactics discussed in the text were used against
Congress by some Environmental Protection Agency officials during early 1983.)
Congress functions collectively in some areas and fragmentarily in others, with
varying degrees of success. It "probably cannot devise an energy policy, but it can
take the initiative in environmental regulation; it probably cannot function independently
in global, fiscal or monetary management, but it can write tax legislation in detail."
Gilbert, supra note 229, at 140.
346. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 261; Medow, supra note 135, at 812; supra
notes 229-31, 257, 271, 305, 325 and text accompanying; infra note 347. Harris, supra
note 141, at 72, argues that the Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 4 (the "guarantee clause")
and Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) confer broad intelligence oversight
powers on Congress, but this argument seems rather farfetched.
347. See infra note 351 and text accompanying. There are no legal barriers
to a congressional delegation of power to one agency (the CIA) to be exercised in
accordance with standards and procedures prescribed by a second agency (the
ombudsman), particularly as the latter would be closely linked to Congress in its exer-
cise of power. See National Water Commission Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1962a-2; K. DAVIS,
supra note 146, at S 2.03, 46. An ombudsman could perform many of the functions
performed ineffectively by the Intelligence Oversight Board, performing them for Con-
gress rather than for the president. See Tovar, supra note 121, at 78 (a single con-
gressional "committee, giving the subject full-time attention and working closely with
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such an institution has only become apparent recently. The lawyers'
and political scientists' answer to Juvenal's question, "Quis custodiet
ipso custodes?" (roughly, "Who controls the controllers?"), used to be
rather uniformly optimistic: democratic processes, aided by the press
and the direct democracy of petitions and public meetings, with judicial
remedies in the background." 8 Our courts still think this the full and
effective answer to the CIA's power,"9 but the growth of the strong
State since World War II (some would say since the Depression) has
been cause and effect of these traditional controls becoming much less
effective. This was, for example, the thrust of the Goldwater conser-
vatives' attack on the march of "collectivism" in an American "welfare
state.""0
There is now enough experience on which to base an in-
telligence ombudsman's functions, the experience of a generation
of trial and error that has exhausted the ingenuity of would-be
overseers who tried to adapt traditional devices. The complexities
of modern bureaucracies must be matched by complex controls,
and this has led other countries,"' and states such as Nebraska
Executive leadership, could profit from the mistakes of the past and perform its watch-
dog role effectively."); supra note 311 and text accompanying.
348. G. SAWER, supra note 2, at 1.
349. See supra notes 272-73, 304-05 and text accompanying.
350. G. SAWER, supra note 2, at 1-3. See W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS
2 (1966).
351. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 111-12 (discussing problems faced by the
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission); 1. AL-WAHAB, THE SWEDISH INSTITUTION
OF OMBUDSMAN 13-14 (1979); H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 126:
[Pirocedural safeguards and outside checks ...which involve a search
for information as well as justice [are needed]. Consider the Ombudsman.
... While this institution originated in Sweden, apparently analogous in-
stitutions have been or can be developed in common-law countries that
have inherited the British parliamentary system (United Kingdom, Canada,
New Zealand), in countries with federal forms that separate legislative
and executive powers (the United States, the Philippines), and even in
countries with a well-developed system of administrative courts providing
easy access to judicial review (France, West Germany).
See also id. at 126 n.30:
[In the reluctant welfare state of America, a more aggressive matching
of agency to clientele than that afforded by a greivance commissioner
may be necessary. Doctrines of economic individualism reinforce struc-
tural barriers to the humane administration of health, education, and
welfare services. An unusual accent on minimum government, private prop-
erty, and the free market reinforces our decentralized federalism and our
separation of powers, thereby making it difficult to finance public ser-
vices and making it necessary to channel services obliquely through a
labyrinth of local units, each more reluctant than its neighbor to yield
a fraction of its autonomy.
See supra note 218 and text accompanying. It is precisely "a more aggressive matching"
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and Hawaii,"2 to experiment with ombudsmen. To be successful,
an ombudsman must search out information and identify appropriate
reforms in law and policy, as well as rectify injustice. A skeptical
expertise is needed, of course, as is a strong power base insulated
fairly effectively from both the producers and consumers of the
government service in question. An omsbudsman who needs to
neither create nor use intelligence could attain a neutrality and
objectivity in the evaluation of intelligence operations, while resist-
ing the temptation of a detailed supervision of these operations.
At the most general level, such an ombudsman would prag-
matically promote a CIA responsiveness to the fundamental prin-
ciples of liberal democracy and a distinctly American intelligence
policy. The mere existence of such an ombudsman, who offers an
accountability where other control devices are unavailable, inade-
quate, slow or expensive, would create significant incentives for
the CIA to correct maladministration and to avoid needless civil
liberties violations.1
53
Like a court but unlike Congress, an ombudsman could risk a
of the CIA with its clientele that is needed. This matching can be termed an om-
budsman institution without doing violence to the term. "Procurator" might be a bet-
ter term, were it not for its Kafkaesque connotations. The federalism and separation
of powers problems mentioned by Wilensky deserve serious consideration, but they
are irrelevant to strong State institutions such as the CIA.
352. See A. WYNER, THE NEBRASKA PUBLIC COUNSEL (1976); The Ombudsman in
Hawaii: The Basic Premises, 7 HAW. B.J. 17 (Apr. 1970). The "general idea" of an
ombudsman "is one that we Americans ought to explore." K. DAVIS, supra note 146,
S 4.10, at 115. Careful adaptations of foreign models will be required, however: see
supra note 351.
353. K. DAVIS, supra note 146, S 4.10, at 115; K. DAVIS, supra note 147, at 150;
J. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 261; W. GELLHORN, supra note 350, at 1, 3-4; H. WILENSKY,
supra note 123, at 176. See K. DAVIS, supra note 146, S 4.02, at 92; K. DAVIS, supra note
147, at 150 (ombudsman cannot be a substitute for competent administration); A.
MELTSNER, supra note 11, at 4-6; G. SAWER, supra note 2, at 49 ("A good ombudsman will
reduce the complacency, verging towards arrogance, which is the characteristic vice
of bureaucracies, and he will also remove many of the chips on shoulders which citizens
tend to display in their dealings with government."); H. WILENSKY, supra note 123,
at 130-31 (quoted supra note 196); Franck and Weisband, supra note 154, at 401 (foreign
affairs prerogatives should not become licenses to replace legislation in the regulation
of internal affairs); id. (adequate if not always immediate public information must be
assured); Highsmith, supra note 125, at 378 (compromise required between theory of
congressional authorization and the practical realities of presidential decisionmaking);
Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 130 (danger that Congress will try to manage
rather than oversee CIA activities, a distinction easily blurred in many circumstances);
STANDING COMMITTEE, 1980, supra note 333 (quoted supra note 333); supra notes 140, 259
and text accompanying. See also Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 136: "Since
the Attorney General's office is not a principal user of foreign intelligence, it has an
institutional inclination to tighten controls and to curtail intelligence activity rather
than to let the CIA take risks." This is certainly true in theory, but memories of
a John Mitchell seemingly responsible only to Nixon make Congress a more logical
overseer.
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certain number of politically-unpopular decisions, thereby insulating
Congress from some of the political consequences of a rigorous in-
telligence oversight. Congress excels at accumulating desirable policies,
but finds it difficult to balance and establish priorities among them.
For example, Congress would no doubt approve of an all-powerful CIA
which is fully accountable and protective of civil liberties. But when
the inevitable tradeoffs between these policies come to be made, Con-
gress runs aground. An ombudsman could make these tradeoffs for
Congress, subject always to its disapproval. (S)he would also introduce
an inquisitorial element into the adversarial debates concerning in-
telligence, within Congress and between Congress and the executive
branch. Disputes could be narrowed and tensions reduced by the
ombudsman's careful investigations into the "facts" being debated.
While some see American courts as ombudsmen, dealing with "a
cafeteria of questions"' in some areas, courts are unwilling and unable
to do this in the area of intelligence-as we have seen.' Unlike French
or German administrative courts, or the ombudsmen who work by
their side, American courts lack the intimate relations with parlia-
ment, ministers, and the bureaucracy necessary to a technically in-
formed assessment of administrative activity. American courts can
judge the legality of an administrative activity, but not its propriety.
Activities cannot be supervised by our courts in any detail, and pro-
grams to deter maladministration cannot be developed in any elaborate
way. Our courts examine the symptoms, civil liberties violations, in
a cursory fashion rather than attacking the cause: a CIA unaccoun-
tability which is addressed most inadequately by existing rules, doc-
trines, and remedies. These would be best created anew rather than
merely reformulated. An ombudsman can do this as well as anyone,
borrowing the (admittedly limited) congressional flexibility and con-
trol over the sword and purse that the courts lack.156
354. Goodwin, Comment, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 358, 360 (1980-81). See J. SIGLER AND
B. BEEDE, supra note 16, at 7; Lowi, Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Func-
tions of Government, in PUBLIC POLICIES AND THEIR POLITICS 27, 40 (R. Ripley, ed. 1966);
Baum, supra note 106, at 42-43.
355. See supra notes 265-97, 303 and text accompanying.
356. See F. MARX, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 141-43 (1957) (the impact of French
administrative law on administration there); G. SAWER, supra note 2, at 4-5, 17; id. at
10 (ombudsman as alternative to powerful administrative court, a useful alternative
where problems are too complex to be solved by ingenious adaptations of private law
remedies or prerogative writs); id. at 186 (quoted supra note 2); K. WHEARE, MALAD-
MINISTRATION AND ITS REMEDIES 31, 39-42 (1973); H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 126
(quoted supra note 351.) At one extreme, Anglo-American judicial review of ad-
ministrative action prevents a real review because of a refusal to probe the founda-
tions of facts presented. At the other extreme (all but absent from the national security
area), uninformed judicial preferences are imposed on administration. F. MARX, at 141.
The "resulting string of court decisions has left the administrative process tattered
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An ombudsman could bridge the false dichotomy between CIA
secrecy and accountability with greater ease than could any existing
governmental institution. While courts dislike in camera proceedings,
and Congress and the executive branch are prone to leaks on occa-
sion, an ombudsman could keep investigations secret while giving the
widest publicity to the fruits of investigation-whether these serve
partisan purposes or not. Demonstrably able to keep the "real" secrets,
an ombudsman could legitimately insist on a fuller and deeper in-
vestigation, a subsequent public disclosure of matters not properly
classified, and a reprimanding of the overclassifiers. Disclosure by the
ombudsman would frequently be delayed, however, particularly to
allow secret negotiations and attempts to form policy coalitions to go
forward. The secret sources of information would be deleted and
replaced by the ombudsman's judgment about the reliability of the
information. Ombudsmen are used in several countries, notably in
Britain and New Zealand, to filter secrets in this way. Such a system
would decrease the tendency to partisan leaks and counter-leaks,
expose the divisions and dissensions within the administration (after
attempts at policy coalitions have failed), and encourage officials to
identify and line up behind the "best" policy. 5' An ombudsman could,
in fact, institutionalize the whistleblowers' role along lines attempted
(unsuccessfully) by Ford's and Carter's Intelligence Oversight Board.3 5
Were it better informed about foreign and military policies, the
public would have a significant incentive to take greater interest in
them, and in the CIA activities purporting to further them. The mere
fact that justified complaints by Americans and by foreigners or their
governments would obtain redress from an ombudsman, and that
groundless complaints would stand revealed as such, would greatly
and torn without any suggestion of better alternatives for serving the general interest."
Id.
357. Colby, supra note 123, at 25; Franck and Weisband, supra note 154, at
430; Ignatieff, supra note 299, at 6; A. MELTSNER, supra note 11, at 280. See K. DAVIS,
supra note 146, S 4.06, at 104 (quoted supra note 146); I. AL-WAHAB, supra note 351,
at 52 ("no document is so secret that it may be kept ... from an Ombudsman and
no official has the right or the privilege to refuse answering thc questions of an
Ombudsman or to decline to give him assistance whether during inspections or in-
vestigations."); Martin, supra note 148, at 684; supra note 118 and text accompanying
(ombudsman could be both knowledgeable and free to talk); supra notes 151-58, 162-63,
337 and text accompanying. There have been attempts to create ombudsman-like filters
for secrets: see e.g., Muskie Bill, S. 2965, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Dec. 7, 1971 (7-member
Disclosure Board, appointed by president with Senate's advice and consent); Horton-
Moorehead Bill, H.R. 4960, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 28, 1973 (Freedom of Informa-
tion Commission to downgrade or declassify information); Franck and Weisband, supra
note 154, at 430.
358. See Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 129 (quoted supra note 311);
supra notes 288-97 and text accompanying.
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increase the credibility of a CIA forced to be more careful.359 For
example, Cuba's Castro claims to have evidence of recent CIA
assassination attempts against him. If an ombudsman were to find
Castro's case proved, draconian action could (and should) be taken by
Congress. If his evidence proved insubstantial, Castro would be reveal-
ed to the openminded as on international libeller of the CIA-and
many such libellers would take care in the future not to endanger
their credibility further. If Castro refused to submit his evidence, it
would be heavily discounted by the openminded. Over time, the ef-
fect of an ombudsman believed to pursue investigations actively and
objectively would be to swell the ranks of those who are openminded
about the CIA.
Congressional and media evaluations of the CIA are oriented
toward past failures rather than a future efficacy and efficiency. An
ombudsman's oversight, on the other hand, could be forward looking,
attending to a past misadventure only when it points to unresolved
problems.3 "' At present, the few rules of a "per se" illegality applied
to CIA activities are unenforceable because controversies arising from
violations of these rules are non-justiciable. CIA conduct thus winds
up being legal per se, while an ombudsman could effectively apply
much needed rules of reason36" ' to this conduct. While a fair amount
of discretion is essential to a competent CIA, much less is needed
than presently exists. Some intelligence processes are not readily
cabined by rules, and dealing creatively with the peculiarities of cir-
cumstance requires innovation rather than a mechanical bureaucratic
response. Insisting on a strict bureaucratic legality amounts to settling
for a merely tolerable administration, while ombudsmen try to im-
prove administration by evaluating the motive for and effect of par-
ticular exercises in discretion. Evaluations would not be based on the
CIA's extravagant claims for needed powers, but on criteria devised
(sometimes after the fact) by the ombudsman acting on his expert
judgment. How closely did a particular operation adhere to the most
restrictive means-those least violative of domestic and foreign
rights -available to perform a legitimate task competently? Over time,
a sliding scale of rules would evolve to cover particular circumstances,
rules about what is desired (although not required) or allowed (but
not necessarly desired). These rules, like those of the common law
and of a good faith performance of duties in particular, would remain
rather vague until they coalesce in the face of the clearest violations. 2
359. See supra notes 255-56, 260-61 and text accompanying.
360. See Godson, supra note 237, at 3: supra notes 238-39 and text accompanying.
361. See supra notes 240-44 and text accompanying.
362. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 518-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussed supra note
294); K. DAVIS, supra note 146, S 4.02, at 92; id., S 4.10 at 115; K. DAVIS, supra note 147,
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To make the rules more concrete, sample procedures 313 could be
drafted, and the ombudsman could require the CIA to draft its own
specific guidelines. 4
The purposes of this exercise would be pragmatic: the reward-
ing of CIA competence with recommendations for promotion, etc.; the
keeping of inevitable deviations within reasonable bounds by recom-
mending the suspension or dismissal of the clearest violators; and
recommending changes in intelligence processes in areas where viola-
tions become too numerous. An ombudsman would have to attend to
organizational reforms of the CIA, particularly those breaking down
rigid hierarchies and rituals, coordinating intelligence activities
(without creating artificial divisions of labor or marriages of informa-
tional and covert activities), and forcing superiors to monitor their
subordinates' performance. Congressional committees would
presumably be willing to question closely any official who received
an adverse report from the ombudsman concerning the official's, or
his subordinates', performance. A patient reeducation of CIA officials
would also be in order, away from the "us" and "them" dichotomy
that leads to policy being its own cause, and toward efficiency, a
respect for Americans' and foreigners' rights, and an ability to think
creatively about radical changes in small countries with weak
governments. 65
In sum, I propose many tasks for a powerful ombudsman, who
would need a small staff to deal with the more minor matters. To
control this controller, Swedish-style arrangements should be adopted:
at 215-19; B. GROSS, THE MANAGING OF ORGANIZATIONS 721 (1964); F. MARX, supra note
356, at 142; B. SCHWAREZ, supra note 244, at 611 (the rule in Rook's Case, quoted supra
text accompanying note 244, may extend beyond abuse of discretion to the unjustified
use of discretion); I. AL-WAHAB, supra note 351 at 60, 66; K. WHEARE, supra note 356,
at 153 (the British Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration's 1970 Report criticiz-
ed three decisions simply on the ground that they were wrong); supra notes 102, 186,
188, 199, 204, 218 and text accompanying. But see also the present position, that na-
tional security activities are legal per se: e.g., Greer, supra note 273; Halkin, supra
note 286 and text accompanying; Young and Herbert, supra note 272.
363. In McGehee, supra note 285, Edwards, J., "offered" a "sample procedure"
for processing documents originating in other agencies and demanded from the CIA
under the Freedom of Information Act.
364. See Note, supra note 265, at 1000. The attempt to fashion such guidelines
might itself provoke a re-thinking of policy. Id.
365. See B. GROSS, supra note 362, at 719, 727; J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra
note 16, at 19 (quoting Kenneth Davis); Uhlmann, supra note 135, at 14; I. AL-WAHAB,
supra note 351, at 58 (Swedish ombudsman's prosecutions rare and designed to secure
"discipline"); H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 46-48, 58, 62, 175-78; Secret Operations Can
Go Awry, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 3, 1982, p. 10, col. 1 (quoting Pezzulo, former
U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua); supra notes 23-6, 137-8, 174, 176, 186-87, 194-95, 234,
259 and text accompanying.
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the election by Congress of an ombudsman, nominated by the Senate
Intelligence Committee, to a maximum of two six-year terms. This
ombudsmen could be dismissed at any time by a vote of no confidence
passed by both Houses of Congress. An annual report would be re-
quired of the ombudsman, summarizing actions taken and proposing
law reforms.6
An intelligence ombudsman would obviously get off to a slow
start; the hope is that competent ombudsmen would, over time, build
up the expertise and the prestige necessary to an effectiveness. The
ombudsman's expertise, probity, and neutrality are demanding
qualifications, but people like Edward Levi, Stansfield Turner, and
Vernon Walters867 would meet them nicely. An appeal from the
ombudsman's decision should lie in the courts, which would presumably
welcome a requirement that the ombudsman's remedies be exhausted
where constitutional rights are not at stake. It would certainly do
no harm to transfer Freedom of Information Act requests concerning
national security matters to the ombudsman (whose staff would then
have to be much larger). If the ombudsman ordered disclosure of the
requested information, it could then be introduced in an ordinary
lawsuit. Otherwise, much of the courts' drastically self-limited jurisdic-
tion over national security matters would remain; the ombudsman's
primary objective would be to improve CIA competence, and the vin-
dication of rights (which is, presumably, the courts' central concern)
would be a secondary objective designed to encourage the filing of
meritorious complaints. It nevertheless seems likely that more rights
would be* vindicated more fully by an ombudsman than by courts
applying contemporary doctrines."6 Congress could, for example, set
up a compensation fund administered by the ombudsman and deducted
later from appropriate CIA budget headings.
While some conservatives would agree with at least some of my
policy prescriptions, many would feel that these restraints on the
strong State would also weaken national security. But a "balanced"
intelligence policy requires a liberal-by-design ombudsman, to counter
the CIA's conservative influence on foreign and military policies.3 6 9
366. See 1. AL-WAHAB, supra note 351, at 43-47, 89. In Sweden, parliamentary con-
trols over the ombudsman are exercised in a bipartisan spirit (id. at 43), a tradition
that Congress could usefully adopt.
367. (Levi is a former Attorney General, and Turner and Walters are former
CIA Directors.)
368. See E. GELLHORN, supra note 350, at 438 (ombudsman device amounts to a
government of men and not laws); I. AL-WAHAB, supra note 351, at 71-72, 76; Baum, supra
note 54 at 48-49; Martin, supra note 148, at 685; supra notes 304-06 and text accompa-
nying. See also J. SHKLAR, supra note 24, at 114-15.
369. See supra note 201 and text accompanying.
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To round out this section, we should note an important intelligence
policy reform advocated by conservatives: the need for competitive
analysis of intelligence data to reduce the likelihood of policy
mishaps."' This would not be the classic, Holmesian free market in
ideas, but a somewhat freer flow designed to expand the range of
intelligence policy alternatives. Since individual and bureaucratic
rivalries will exist anyway, why not restructure the CIA to put rivalry
to good use in competitive analysis? Spying on each other would have
to be prohibited, of course, and intelligence perscnnel given "not only
a license to report the truth but also the full confidence that their
licenses will be respected and protected." ' This competition could
be usefully expanded to include advisory committees, semi-autonomous
research institutes, individuals doing research under contract, and even
the mass media. This would increase CIA contacts with other fields
and value judgments, providing breaths of fresh air for intelligence. '2
IV. ABORTION: SPREADING THE HORNS OF THE FALSE DICTOTOMY
The abortion controversy could also do with some fresh air. Abor-
tion will be treated more briefly than was the CIA, since the outlines
of abortion law and policy are all too painfully familiar for most of
us. Readers who have perservered can probably guess what my
arguments will be: the activities of pressure groups7 3 have created
a false, pro-choice versus right to life, dichotomy. This dichotomy
leaves sensible policies lurking in the gray areas between the ever-
spreading horns of an abortion dichotomy. From this standpoint, Roe
370. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 182, at 3; Jackson, supra note 315, at col. 4
(Reagan's stress on 'analytical competition' is "not easily achieved by the lightning
idiocy that computers bring to human studies."); Graham, supra note 172, at 25-27;
1982: The Year in Review, supra note 303, at 9 (quoting Silver) (Reagan's E.O. 12333,
supra notes 317-19 and text accompanying, "contains a strong emphasis on competitive
analysis" to be guaranteed by the CIA Director).
371. North, supra note 108, at 187. See H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 174-75;
Murray, supra note 35, at 856-57; Turner and Thibault, supra note 118, at 126, 128;
supra notes 30-31 and text accompanying.
372. Harris, supra note 141, at 75; E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at 169; H.
WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 162-describes what may be called a congressional model
of intelligence-"the ultimate assurance that experts will be questioned fruitfully lies
in a pattern of political pluralism: a diversity of strong, independent interest groups
representing a significant division of values and engaged in open conflict and competi-
tion." The two "radical contrasts" to this pattern are the FBI and CIA, given their
attempted monopoly over information. Id. at 163. Also, there are distinct limitations
to this process of "pluralism:" see infra notes 580-82 and text accompanying.
373. To minimize controversy, I will call each group what it most frequently
calls itself; each has unflattering names for the other, of course. See Vinovskis, Abor-
tion and the Presidential Election of 1976, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1750, 1750 n.1(1979); infra
notes 424-31 and text accompanying.
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v. Wade374 becomes a good faith attempt at an initial approximation
of sensible, gray-area policies, an early attempt prematurely frozen
into our law by judges who feel compelled to defend it from the par-
ticularly virulent attacks of well-organized groups."' This is not to
say that Roe v. Wade creates anything like elegant constitutional
doctrines,"' but then few of the True Believers on abortion matters
would have been swayed by doctrinal elegance. The Court seems to
have done about as well as can be expected under the circumstances:
activities and policies deemed to be good must "conflict by their very
nature; and . . . there can be no incontestable scheme for harmoniz-
ing them" '377 and no absolutes pleasing to everyone.
Important bundles of rights and interests, concerning women,
fetuses, doctors, special interest groups, various branches and levels
of government, and, perhaps, society itself, emerged in response to
rapid changes in medical technology and in the mores of some groups.
374. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Roe]. See infra notes 381-91, 394,
408, 417 and text accompanying.
375. See L. Wardle, supra note 55, at 303-07; infra notes 496-513 and text
accompanying.
376. See. e.g., A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 114 (1976) ("neither historian, layman nor lawyer will be persuaded that all the
details prescribed in Roe v. Wade are part of either natural law or the Constitution");
Dellapenna, The History of Abortion, 40 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 359, 424 (1979) (abortion
decisions based on inaccurate and inconclusive history and unhelpful moral premises,
with no constitutional text to point to); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973); id. at 947 (Roe "is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because
it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be");
Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name, 1973 SuP CT. REV.. 159; id. at
184 (Roe "symptomatic of the analytical poverty possible in constitutional litigation");
Newman, supra note 76, at 553 (decisions became established legal doctrine only when
decisional advances and social approval in approximate balance).
377. Williams, Introduction, in I. BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES xi, xvi (H.
Hardy, ed. 1981) (stating Berlin's theme in this collection of his writings). (One "good"
may be adjudged better than another, of course.) See, e.g., F. FROHOCK, supra note
30, at 255 ("though most civil and legal authorities recognize the difficulty of settling
a dispute" like abortion "with such a long and conflicting history, most statutory and
legal interpretations must favor one view or another"); Jones, Abortion and the Con-
sideration of Fundamental Irreconcilable Interests, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 565, 612 (1982)
("The abortion issue does involve irreconcilable differences between the rights of a
pregnant woman and the fetus," and pretending "these rights can be reconciled does
not make them so."); ABORTION 12 (L.Sass, ed. 1978) (quoting WALL STREET J. of Jan.
26, 1973) ("on the whole we think the court struck a reasonable balance on an ex-
ceedingly difficult question") [hereinafter cited as Sass]; id. at 7 (quoting CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR of Jan. 29, 1973) (criticised both for going too far and not far enough,
Roe recognized "the sanctity of life, both adult and unborn"); infra note 557 and text
accompanying. But see, e.g., Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the pre-Roe Case
Law, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1725 (1979) (the court shouldn't have decided Roe, given the
politically unsettled and judicially confused state of the law); supra note 376; infra
notes 420-23 and text accompanying.
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These bundles grew into conflict with each other so quickly that the
legal system was caught unprepared to deal with the variety of issues
pressed."' The Court could have awaited a "Missouri Compromise"
over abortion, with little hope that politicians379 would hammer it out
in anything but the long run, or that all of the rights and interests
at stake would be recognized. Rather than tolerate the emerging chaos
of approaches to abortion, a more difficult path was chosen: a minimal
recognition and an inevitably messy balancing of rights and interests,
as these had evolved by 1973 in the eyes of nine Justices.
As in the question of supervising the CIA, 8 ' the Court lacked
experience in, and appropriate classifications for, new abortion
policies-as did other branches and levels of government pondering
mores and medical technologies. In contrast to their CIA decisions,
the Justices rushed in to intervene because they had distinctive policy
goals to pursue regardless of the judgments of their political counter-
parts. The Court presumably underestimated the degree of political
muscle organizations would exert against its decisions, and the detailed
supervision that would be required to defend abortion policy. Such
miscalculations would be fatal in any dealings with the CIA, and
opponents of the Court's abortion policies may yet seize the means,
perhaps the Constitution itself, to overrule and'possibly overturn the
Court, by sapping its legitimacy.
A. Roe v. Wade as the Policy of the Second-Best
An irresistable force met its immovable object in 1973. A
"fundamental" right38' was found, limited by a "compelling state
378. This is not a common situation; see, e.g.,. G. SAWER, supra note 224, at 183:
One might expect that legal response to social stimulus would often be
slow, because the need for change does not quickly become apparent,
because men will put up with inconvenience and even painful tensions
between practice and precepts or all kinds-religious and moral as well
as legal-and because the structure of the legal process, judiciary, and
legislature usually operates to put a brake on legal changes, especially
on changes in lawyer's law.
What happened to abortion, according to Dellapenna, supra note 376, at 421, is
that "[slhifts occurred in the areas of sexual mores, role expectations for women, con-
cern about overpopulation, pressures created by poverty and rising illegitimacy, reac-
tions against the influence of certain religious groups, and the gradual rise of a quali-
ty of life ethic over the traditional 'sanctity of life' ethic."
379. See R. EYESTONE, supra note 19, at 106, 109, 113; Sass, supra note 377, at
28 (quoting CHICAGO DAILY NEWS of Feb. 5, 1976); Vinovskis, The Politics of Abortion in
the House of Representatives in 1976, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1790, 1817-18 (1979). (Politicians
mostly try to duck abortion issues.)
380. See supra notes 265-69, 304-05, 356 and text accompanying.
381. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481,
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interest" '382 nonetheless, and initially-radical changes in policy have re-
mained more or less static ever since. A woman can choose to have
an abortion, during the first trimester of pregnancy, if she is not too
poor or immature and if her choice coincides with the professional
judgment of her doctor. 83 This woman's right is thus exercised joint-
ly with a doctor. It is, of course, subject to the latter's "fiduciary"
duty to find the facts courts use to operate the scheme set up by
Roe. The right is one of privacy and grounded in the fourteenth
amendment,8 ' a right dramatically extended but not clarified by Roe.
Clearly, however, this right is "not unqualified," and the Court has
shown little interest in whether the right can be exercised
effectively.3 1
6
Terming this woman's right fundamental 87 causes much confu-
sion, particularly as the Court has previously preferred to analyse
2491 (1983); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. See Jones, supra note 377, at 600; Parness and Pritchard
To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CINN. L. REV.
257, 259 (1982); Brietzke, Book Review, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 409 (1982).
382. See L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 602, 892-93, 914, 963, 965, 975-76.
383. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-66. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (doc-
tor's judgment to be exercised "in the light of all factors -physical, emotional,
psychological, and the woman's age") [hereinafter cited as Doe]; Jones, supra note 377,
at 579-80. "Her" doctor is also the state's, to the extent doctors' abortion rights are
fettered by the Roe scheme; many abortions are carried out in abortion clinics, however,
where it may be reasonably inferred that professional judgment inclines in favor of
abortion.
384. Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2686 (1980) ("Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment" as the "constitutional underpinning" of Roe); D. O'BRIEN,
PRIVACY, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 187-89 (1979); L. WARDLE, supra note 55, at 84. According
to Asaro, supra note 61, at 135, A. WESTIN, PRIVACY & FREEDOM (1967) is the most
"thoughtful and comprehensive study" among "dogmatic and often crusading works.
.. . Westin finds in privacy the "personal autonomy" necessary to a "sacred
individuality" and the preservation of "ultimate secrets." A. WESTIN, at 33-34; Asaro,
at 135. Privacy is also necessary for "emotional release," for planning and self-evaluation,
for companionship, and for the achievement of group aims. A. WESTIN, at 35-40, 42-51;
Asaro, at 136.
385. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977) (discussing Roe); Jones, supra note
377, at 596.
386. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2491-92; Maher, 432 U.S. at 458-59 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 459 (woman unable to afford abortion loses all "chance to control
the direction of her own life"); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 94 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); F. Frohock,
supra note 30, at 251; Jones, supra note 377 at 577, 584, 600; Parness and Pritchard,
supra note 381, at 259; Annot., 20 A.L.R. 4th 1166 (1983) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980)) ("although the due process clause affords protection against govern-
mental interference with freedom of choice, it does not entitle citizens to such funds
as may be necessary to fully realize the advantages of that freedom.").
387. W. CONKLIN, supra note 253, at 1-3 (fundamental right termed essential, for-
mative, irreducible.) See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106-07 (1908): A fun-
damental right is such "that there would be no due process without it." (Twining winds
up a case about "incorporation," however.)
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rights occupying a "preferred position" or simply "incorporated" into
the fourteenth amendment."' In its fundamental-ness, privacy seems
to have been collapsed into the individual's liberty (really libertarian)
interest of autonomy in the act of choice.3"9 The "only legitimate limit
to the scope of [such] a fundamental right is the existence and exer-
cise of another fundamental right.""39 According to the Roe Court, this
limit must be a State right, suddenly springing up when State in-
terests become "compelling." This is rather awkward: under "classic
liberalism's philosophy of individual liberty," the apparent basis for
privacy rights, "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community against his [or
her] will is to prevent harm to others." '391 As we saw in discussions
of the CIA,392 the State can seldom resist the temptation of self-
aggrandizing claims to represent inchoate "others," and thus of
infringing the individual autonomy that is at the core of liberalism,
unless a court or other independent decisionmaker holds the balance.
For much of "classic liberalism's" history, the State has not prevented
harm coming to blacks, women, etc. in many of their activities.
However, some protections were accorded the health of pregnant
women and the potential represented by the fetus. Fetal protection
seems to have been accomplished under a legal indirection, however;
the state of medical technology and social mores made it unnecessary
to raise and judge fetal interests explicitly, even as the law tried to
see pregnancies carried to term.
Can we now evaluate State claims to represent and protect the
fetus? Evaluations are complicated by the fact that such claims are
rarely explicit, even today. For example, recently proposed constitu-
tional amendments have as their ostensible purpose the truncating
of the Court's jurisdiction over abortion (and certain other) matters,
or the returning of abortion and other policies to the states under
a federal system of comity. 93 Inquiries are also complicated by the
388. L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 552n., 564-601, 813, 819, 924n., 1147n.
389. See D. O'BRIEN, supra note 384, at 190; Sidorsky, Contemporary Reinterpreta-
tions of the Concept of Human Rights, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 88, 93 (D. Sidorsky,
ed. 1979). A "zealous individualism" should, in theory, guarantee the sanctity of the
private sphere in America. Asaro, supra note 61, at 134. Privacy "is a special kind
of independence. . . .The free man is the private man, the one who still keeps some
of his thoughts and judgments entirely to himself. Id. at 137 (quoting Clinton
Rossiter).
390. W. CONKLIN, supra note 253, at 230.
391. B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 154 (1980). See
Wellman, A New Conception of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 48, 56 (E. Kamenka
and A. Tay, eds. 1978) (ethical relations between individuals must be very different
from those with the State, a special organization with a distinctive role in human affairs).
392. See supra notes 154, 167, 177, 183, 201-05, 219, 251 and text accompanying.
393. See Senate Judiciary Committee, Human Rights Federalism Amendment,
19841
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holding, in Roe,394 that fetuses are not "persons" whose rights can be
protected under the fourteenth amendment. This seems the only possi-
ble holding, so long as the jurisprudence of fetal interests and rights
(a lex imperfecta,395 fetuses having no duties correlative to "their"
rights) remains in its undeveloped state. Questions like "Who are per-
sons?" and "Can fetuses be persons outside of the fourteenth amend-
ment?" have gone unanswered, while fetuses occupy an ambiguous
position under tort, criminal, inheritance, and trust laws. 96 Here, in
contrast to its analysis of woman's privacy right, the Roe Court takes
refuge in a lack of authority, authority to base a compelling state
interest on so widely disputed a premise as life beginning at concep-
tion. But all of this apparently changes after the fetus becomes
"viable," potentially capable of surviving outside the womb albeit with
artificial aid. This stage was marked, in 1973, by the beginning of
the third trimester of pregnancy. Then, logic and biology are said to
dictate that, if not alive, the fetus is at least almost alive. This premise
is not as widely disputed as life beginning at conception, and it can
thus form the basis for a compelling State interest (in the "potentiali-
ty" of life) which overrides woman's privacy. 97
The fragility39 of this argument is probably the reason why the
indisputable policy of protecting the pregnant woman's health became
the touchstone for many of the abortion restrictions the Court
S. Rep. No. 465, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 53-60, 62-64 (1982) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep.
No. 4651.
394. 410 U.S. at 157-62.
395. See Institutes of Justinian, I i) S 3 in, e.g., MANUAL OF CIVIL LAW 31-32
(2d ed., P. Cumin, ed. 1865): "Vivere honeste involves many duties, as charity, temperance,
and c., to which Law attaches no obligation. Such mere moral duties are styled im-
perfect, to distinguish them from perfect duties, which raise a legal obligation, and are
enforced by law." "Person" is then defined as "any being capable of having rights
and owing duties." (Id. at III, p. 36) Persons are to be distinguished from "res-things
in which persons had rights." Id. See also supra notes 115, 269, infra notes 524-26,
and text accompanying.
396. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159; Moore, Abortion and Public Policy: What are the Issues?,
17 N.Y.L. FORUM 411, 434 (1971) (Appendix C); Parness and Pritchard, supra note 381,
at 257-58. See Annot., 64 A.L.R. FED. 886 (1983) (Fetus as "person" under 42 U.S.C.S.
S 1983); supra note 269 and text accompanying.
397. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. See id. at 150, 160, 163-65; Morgan, supra note 377,
at 1745-47 ("speculative reading" of Roe, based on Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800
(D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973)); Parness and Pritchard,
supra note 381, at 260; infra notes 410, 417 and text accompanying.
398. I.e., the non-viable fetus may not be a "person" in the whole sense, but
it is certainly not nothing either. Ely, supra note 376, at 931; Morgan, supra note
377, at 1740. The potential for life is no less potential in the first than in the third
trimester. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at __ (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The fetus qua fetus
is always in the process of becoming a person, unless stopped by natural or artificial
means. If corporations are "persons" under the 14th amendment, why not the fetuses
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tolerates. Here, the State's interest is said to become compelling at
approximately the end of the first trimester. Even if compelling, this
State interest is not particularly powerful: health risks from abortion
have decreased markedly in modern times and will presumably con-
tinue to do so, and the Court will test governmental restrictions under
the kind of cost-benefit analysis that policy experts recommend in
other areas. 99 The Court is thus prepared to second-guess a legislature
whose purported concern for maternal health is felt to be a stalking-
horse for a premature concern about the fetus, or a catering to in-
terest group pressures unrelated to maternal health. Such second-
guessing hardly began with Roe, since it accounts for some of the
brightest stars in the Warren Court's (liberal, result-oriented) firma-
ment. As in earlier school desegregation and death penalty cases, for
example, the Roe Court is trying to make policies for what it thinks
a future society can and ought to become.00
This is not the stuff of which "neutral principles" of constitu-
tional law are made, as Justice O'Conner's Akron dissent"1 makes clear.
But a neutral principle (usually a pallid lowest common denominator
acceptable to all sides in the controversy) is not going to result from
any attempt to implement policy, unless the policy is nothing more
than the generating of neutral principles. Such principles would be
that grow into the species homo economicus? It is presumably these counter-arguments
which led Kurt Baier to observe:
That the life of a human being begins at conception appears to be a
necessary truth. . . .But from this it does to follow, though it may be
true, that an individual's right to life begins at conception, for the ques-
tion of when his life begins is essentially a retrospective one.
Baier, When Does the Right to Life Begin?, in NOMOS XXIII: HUMAN RIGHTS 201 (J. Pen-
nock and J. Chapman, eds. 1981). The fetus may have a moral right to life, although
this is hotly debated, but it does not necessarily follow that it has a legal right to
life. See supra note 64 and text accompanying; infra notes 408-16 and text accompanying.
399. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93; Roe 410 U.S. at 149, 162-65. See id. at 162-63;
id. at 164 (restriction must be "reasonably" or "legitimately" related to woman's health);
Dellapenna, supra note 376, at 364; supra note 19, infra notes 417, 459, 500 and text
accompanying; infra text following note 457. An alternate standard is proposed in Akron,
103 S. Ct. at 2492-93: abortion regulation is permitted where justified by important
state health objectives having "no significant impact" on the exercise of women's rights.
Note that fetal interests are omitted from this cost-benefit analysis.
400. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1963) (discovery therein
of the "privacy" right that laid the foundation for Roe). An epitome of the Warren
Court's approach is found in the Chief Justice's reliance, in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (quoted in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 327 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)) on "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society." What these "standards" are and should be is still widely disputed, however:
See infra notes 584-85 and text accompanying. But see also G. SAWER, supra note 224,
at 183 (quoted supra note 388); supra text accompanying note 304.
401. 103 S. Ct. at 2504. See Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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canons of paralysis. They are disobeyed by conservative and liberal
judges (however defined) every day, and usually without controver-
sy, whenever policies with a favored substantive tone or content get
implemented.0 2 The real danger, seen by Justice Goldberg..3 among
others, is that judges will favor policies on personal and private
grounds rather than those of our traditions and "collective conscience."
This, it is frequently alleged,44 is what happened when the Roe Court
reverted to techniques of a substantive due process. Some of these
arguments deserve to be taken seriously,0 ' but most of them (com-
plaints about a "Lochnerizing" or "activist" Court) are little more than
expressions of a strong dislike of the Roe result encoded in doctrinal
analyses of constitutional law. Perceived as such, they become the
academic equivalent of crying wolf when repeated often enough, an
unfortunate tendency if a substantive due process Court is again
rewriting separation of powers doctrines into a judicial supremacy.
This has not happened as a result of Roe, however. Roe may be a
"victory" for the Court over other branches and levels of government,
402. See LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at 3, 6-7 (discussed in part infra text
accompanying note 428); supra notes 116-17, infra notes 404-06, 571-74, 583, and text
accompanying.
403. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1963)(Goldburg, J., concurr-
ing). See Lackland, Toward Creating a Philosophy of Fundamental Human Rights, 6
COL. Hu. RIGHTS L. REV. 473 (1974-75).
404. See e.g., Akron 103 S. Ct. at 2505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (on abortion,
etc., judges are not 'Platonic Guardians' of our social policy, 'wisdom' or 'common sense');
Sass, supra note 377, at 3 (quoting OMAHA WORLD-HERALD of Jan. 28, 1983) (like the
Warren Court, the Roe Court is "falling back on the judge's personal feelings and
sociological considerations in the name of the Constitution.") See also Vermont Yankee
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 547, 557 (1978): courts
should not "run riot," be "Kafkaesque" or engage in "Monday morning quarterback-
ing." But see also, e.g., Bishop, Robed Rivalry, NEW REPUBLIC, June 27, 1981, at 36:
"Every argument for, say, the abortion cases is also an argument for the other cases
and even for the opinion of Chief Justice Roger Taney, . . in Dred Scott v. Sandford."
(Taney and two other Justices invoked substantive due process as one basis for Dred
Scott; whether Bishop's analogy is apt is for the reader to judge: see supra notes 48-49
and text accompanying.)
405. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 376, at 926 (Court simply should not second-guess
legislatures and their statutes); Epstein, supra note 376. Even in the most judicious
of hands, this is a slippery argument. E.g., Justice Black was frequently accused of
using a substantive due process while, at the same time, being one of its staunchest
critics. See e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting from majority's "natural
law due process" theory, a judge's own apraisal of the law's wisdom and necessity);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) (Black, J., concurring but decrying the
Court's "shock the conscience" test as a "nebulous" standard legitimating an "unlimited
power"). But see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (while upholding congres-
sional refusal to pay for abortions for the poor under the Hyde Amendment, held
that fifth amendment due process is not the source of substantive rights and liberties
but, rather, of the right to be free from invidious discrimination).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/2
1984] PUBLIC POLICY
but losses in the Court's legitimacy have been high." 6 Further, the
Court loses or abstains in enough other areas (such as in supervising
the CIA.7) for the separation of powers to continue tottering along,
forever in flux.
Presumably the Court thought it was pointing the way to neutral
principles when it refused to base a decision in Roe on
religio-philosophica... grounds which do not command a consensus.
Since most people want the law to embody their aspirations, convic-
tions and philosophies, and to be something more stable and
fundamental," 9 persons whose views were rejected in Roe got angry.
It nevertheless remains that, with varying degrees of ingenuity and
perhaps disingenuousness, life has been found to begin in: prehistory,
the sperm and egg kept separate, their mingling (conception), the firm
implantation after conception, the embryo taking on a human
406. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); J. Ely, supra
note 44, at 18 ("Familiarity breeds inattention, and we apparently need perodic remind-
ing that 'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms" similar to "green pastel
redness."); L. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 300-02 (1973); J. HURST, supra note
271, at 90; M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 264-66, 288-89
(1967). See also B. SIEGAN, supra note 391, passim (dubious argument that there is too
little substantive due process in our contemporary constitutional law). The Roe Court,
410 U.S. at 117, attempted to rebut in advance the notion that it was Lochnerizing:
We bear in mind .... Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition in his now-vindicated
dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905): "[The Constitu-
tion] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the acci-
dent of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even
shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States."
407. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
408. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159-60; Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 n.3 (D.
Conn. 1975) (interpreting Roe v. Wade, the issue is to be "stripped of the sensitive moral
arguments surrounding the abortion controversy"); Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072,
1083 (D. N.H. 1976) (interpreting Roe v. Wade, "[mioral judgments are not 'reasonable
standards' under the law"); Galebach, A Human Life Statute, HUM. LIFE REV., Winter,
1981, at 5 (judiciary has no suitable evidentiary standard to determine an answer
over abortion); Morgan, supra note 372, at 1745-47 (discussed supra text accompany-
ing note 397). But see also A. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 154 (most policy problems touch
on both values and perceived self-interest and thus "have deep emotional resonance");
infra notes 428, 430-31 and text accompanying.
"Religio-philosophical" is an awkward term chosen for the sake of accuracy. After
a careful review of the literature, I (and many others) am unable to distinguish the
philosophical from the religious arguments-those concerning matters of faith and im-
mune to a rational demonstration or refutation. In abortion matters, religion, emotion,
and deep personal conviction account for much of the argument. It is thus not surpris-
ing that the Court seemed chary of the First Amendment Establishment Clause in
Roe, thereby exposing itself to the charge of implementing, e.g. "secular humanism."
409. LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at 10.
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appearance, movement by the fetus (quickening), a potential for sur-
vival outside the womb (viability), and birth.41 As one index to the
nature of public debate, the Atlanta Constitution terms these findings
"irreconcilable. They are all based on faith-the willing suspension
of disbelief-and have no place in civil law-which must be
pragmatic. 411 When "abortion is separated from religion and morality,"
according to the Louisville Times, "it becomes no different from a
vasectomy, a tubal ligation or a circumcision. It should not be the
policy of government to encourage or discourage abortions any more
than it is to promote the Latin mass or endorse baptism by immer-
sion ... '412 These arguments may prove too much. As the Washington
Post observes, "the public arena may be the best place . . . in a
democracy" to resolve "an issue in which religion and emotion and
deep personal conviction count for more than a literal and arbitrary
reading of the law." '413
It is, of course, true that much of law is and should be based
on morality. But morality is not all of one piece, and its relation to
law is not direct. Law's artificial reason is kept separate from those
of religion and philosophy, where different methods are used to justify
and to improve choices. Law "is social, objective and coercive; morals
are individual, subjective, and voluntary. '1 4 When morality becomes
law, its advocates benefit from having successfully invoked a govern-
ment's near-monopoly of the legitimate means of coercion. Such
benefits are indeed guaranteed by the law of our liberal democracy,
but only up to the point where this morality comes into conflict with
other rights and morals which have similarly obtained a legal recogni-
tion. If it were otherwise, if the morality of one group or law were
allowed to override all others, a philosophical absolutism would become
a political authoritarianism under law. The morality of our law is
pragmatic, most theories of natural law having fallen on hard times.
Social values have become more secular and relativistic, in part
410. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-65 (1976)
(statute defining "viability" as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the
unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial
life-supportive systems" does not circumvent or violate Roe limitations on state regula-
tions); Emerson, The Power of Congress to Change Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme
Court, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 129, 131 (1982); Margolis and Neary, Pressure Politics Revisited:
The Anti-Abortion Campaign, 8 POL. STUD. J. 698, 700 (1980); Moore, supra note 396, at
424 (Appendix C).
411. Sass, supra note 377, at 189, quoting ATLANTA CONSTITUTION of June 6,
1972, on differences of opinion on abortion.
412. Id. at 194, quoting LOUISVILLE TIMES of Aug. 14, 1978.
413. Id. at 91, quoting WASHINGTON POST of June 24, 1977. See Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). But see also infra notes 418, 430-31,
575-80 and text accompanying.
414. J. SHKLAR, supra note 24, at 44. See supra note 35 and text accompanying.
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because of the proliferation of divergent religious and philosophical
values. Change, which will eventually debunk any fixed ideal of perfec-
tion, has become the driving force of society and of law."' The Roe
Court thus seems justified in resisting rival religio-philosophical blan-
dishments. The beliefs that life begins at conception or at birth can
be, and are, the foundation of comprehensive moral schemes. Under
a pragmatic morality, these beliefs are not violated by Roe; each group
keeps religio-philosophical beliefs to itself and does not restrict
freedom by imposing its beliefs on others.
41
415. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 (quoted in note 406, supra); G. JACOBSOHN, supra note
76, passim (discussing the influence of John Dewey and William James on American
law and the Court); Pennock, Rights, Natural Rights, Human Rights, in NOMOS xxIlI:
HUMAN RIGHTS, 1, 3 (J. Pennock and J. Chapman, eds. 1981); Hartshorne, supra note 38,
at 326 (quoted supra note 64); Sidorsky supra note 389, at 96-97; supra notes 235, 411
and text accompanying; infra note 423 and text accompanying. See Lackland, supra
note 403, 398, at 487: Perhaps we should be grateful to the Roe court for not burden-
ing us with a philosophical theory. Such "theories are, after all, much like religions;
each is most comfortable with our own view and resents others needlessly imposing
theirs on us." Id. See also Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power, 27 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 261 (1973): According to Robert Lee Hale, notions of a "voluntary" freedom-
choosing among freely-chosen alternatives-are nearly irrelevant; "volitional" freedom,
choice constrained by the choices of others, is the relevant concern. Philosophical
arguments:
descend from on high but stop some twenty feet above the ground. It
is the peculiar task of law to complete this structure of ideals and values
• . . so that it is seated firmly and concretely and shelters real human
beings against the storms of passion and conflict .... The lofty philosophical
edifice does not determine what the last twenty feet are ...
Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REv. 35,
57 (1981). G. LENSKI, supra note 256, at 30 adds that:
Pragmatic morality is the basis of all popular moral codes, and is based
on the recognition that men need each other, and therefore condemns
many kinds of harmful actions, especially those which threaten to under-
mine the social order. Ideal morality, by contrast, has never been accepted
as the basis of any popular moral code, since it not only condemns harm-
ful actions but requires that men love others as they love themselves
and without regard to possible rewards.
Roe does not require everyone to love the fetus as much as themselves. Some kinds
of actions harmful to the fetus are prohibited or restricted, and other actions are
sheltered "against the storms of passion and conflict" raised by others. Roe also does
not complete a "structure of ideals and values . . . so that it is seated firmly .. "
On the other hand, a statute does not violate the Establishment Clause merely because
it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.' Harris
v. MacRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980), quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442
(1961).
416. See Knowles, Public Policy on Abortion, SOCIETY, July, 1974, at 15, 16 ("A
pluralistic society need not encourage or discourage abortions but would seek to make
sure that those who need and want abortions can get them and that all abortions
will be performed as early as possible."); Sass, supra note 377, at 9 (quoting NEW YORK
TIMES of Jan. 24, 1973).
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Having avoided this trap, the Court immediately fell into another
by relying so heavily on medical practice and opinion. Presumably,
the Court was trying to lower the temperature of debate over abortion
and, once again, trying to generate neutral principles, by applying
a supposedly value-free science. The Court's hope seemed to be that
abortion would go the way of contraception, that safe, cheap and ef-
fective methods would lessen the need of, and the desire for, legal
restrictions. Unlike controversies such as the one surrounding school
prayer, the need for abortion and, perhaps, the beginning of life could
seemingly be treated as empirical questions. These could then be
answered by a medical profession which had shown little interest in
religio-philosophical questions. But it turns out that there are seldom
any purely medical reasons for an abortion, and none at all for life's
beginnings or its value. Doctors are nevertheless given much discre-
tion in the detailed implementation of Roe, and the state of their art
in 1973 is reflected in the Court's trimesters. As much for convenience
as for anything else, doctors frequently identified viability (in 1973,
the beginning of the third trimester) as the beginning of life. The
Court made the third trimester into the hallmark for state protection
of the "potentiality" in fetal life. Under then-extant technologies,
woman's health was at a significantly higher risk from second-trimester
abortions than from those in the first trimester. This difference is
reflected by the state's interest in woman's health becoming compelling
during the second Roe trimester.417
417. J. ELY, supra note 44, at 53 (disputes about cruelty to animals and abortion
"are over the appropriate breadth of the moral universe and not over any factual
claim."); F. FROHOCK, supra note 30, at 255; L. WARDLE, supra note 55, at 84; Carter, supra
note .267, at 152; Dellapenna, supra note 376, at 417; Jones, supra note 377, at 593
(citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979) (reiterating "that, up to the point
where a compelling state interest justifies intervention, the abortion decision is in-
herently and primarily a medical decision and that a physician must be given ade-
quate discretion")); Knowles, supra note 411; Margolis and Moore, supra note 410, at
700. The Roe Court, 410 U.S. at 116, expressed its hopes in the following way:
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by tonstitutional measurement,
free of emotion and predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and because
we do, we have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis
upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about
man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries.
See id. at 163 ("present medical knowledge" criterion, discussed in Akron, 103 S. Ct.
at 2496); id. at 130-47 (a sociomedical history of abortion, the accuracy of which con-
tinues to be hotly debated); S. Rep. No. 465, supra note 393, at 3; Sass, supra note
377, at 9 (quoting MILWAUKEE J. of Jan. 24, 1973) (in Roe, Court "skillfully steered away"
from religio-philosophical entanglements by basing guidelines on "established medical
facts."); supra notes 13, 16, 31, 383-84, 397-99, 408 and text accompanying.
It can be argued that much of medical practice amounts to rules of thumb, rather
than rules of reason. Even so, the Court adopted a definition of viability about which
physicians disagree. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160, 163; Buckley, Note: Current Technology
Affecting Supreme Court Abortion Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1221, 1222,
[Vol. 18
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Medical technologies continue to improve, however, and the Roe
trimesters now appear to be caught in a technology crunch: the abor-
tion patients' "window of vulnerability" gets smaller and smaller as
safe abortions are performed later and later, while the fetal "window
of opportunity" gets larger and larger as fetuses survive earlier and
earlier.1 8 Can anything good be said for an unwieldy Roe? Yes, if we
leave medical technology alone -as the Court should. So much judicial
movement back and forth-oscillations within and between a "fun-
damental" but "not unqualified" right and subjecting a "compelling"
state interest to "strict scrutiny," for example-has precisely the same
purpose as the to and fro of contract law: attempting to recognize
and balance conflicting rights and interests, while retaining a measure
of such cardinal legal values as certainty, stability and generality, if
not simplicity."9 While trimesters are not encrusted with the centuries
of precedent that bolster the contract/no-contact dichotomy, the Court
behaves as if they are. With so much balancing going on, the Court
seems to have gotten rather lazy about devising and reviewing abor-
tion classifications.
The Court could have chosen not to get involved in abortion in
the first place, but not to decide is to decide to uphold policies of
(1982). Conceding that it was in no position to determine when life begins (410 U.S.
at 159), the Court nevertheless determines when "meaningful life" begins. Id. at 163;
Buckley, at 1227. While Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64, made much of Roe's "flexibility" over
when viability occurs, the next major case, Colautti, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), arguably
returned to a rigid definition. Buckley, at 1232.
418. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2496; id. at 2507 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Buckley,
supra note 417, at 1232, 1238-42, 1245-57; supra note 30 and text accompanying. Ad-
vances in the treatment of prematurely-born fetuses (neonatology) and in gestation
outside the womb or in a "surrogate mother" (ectogenesis) raise the following legal
issues:
(i) the effects on the viability time scale set forth in Roe, Danforth and
Colautti caused by increasingly early capability of fetal survival; (ii) the
issue of whether abortion implies a right to terminate a fetus or merely
a right to terminate a pregnancy; and (iii) the problem of a physician's
duty with respect to a fetus which technically meets the case law defini-
tion of viability, but is nevertheless abortable. The conflicts arising from
inadequate law involve (i) the physician's dilemma with respect to his
patient; (ii) the Commonwealth v. Edelin type dilemma or the problem
of the physician's duty with respect to fetuses aborted alive.
Buckley, at 1238. The fetus is no longer a mere organ of the mother, particularly as
an artificial womb may soon be developed to accomplish gestation in its entirety. Id.
at 1241-42. The compelling State interest could possibly be protected by limiting abor-
tion to an ectogenetic method; the aborted fetus could then reach maturity in a surrogate
mother or in an in vitro device. Id. at 1239, 1246. Buckley concludes that it would
have been wiser for the Roe Court to have defined viability as the potential for life
outside the mother's womb without artificial aid. Id. at 1257. Such a definition gives
rise to other problems, of course.
419. See supra note 109 and text accompanying.
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the status quo where the Court clearly has the power to change them.
The status quo was rather unsavory: many abortions were performed,
even though illegal, and they were riskier and more expensive for
women because abortionists ran risks similar to those faced by drug
pushers and porno merchants. To continue to tolerate this would have
been an abdication of judicial responsibility once a fundamental right
was seen to be at stake. Fundamental rights cannot depend on what
a legislature of the moment chooses to think of them, and these rights
render a judicial deference inappropriate. To intervene, then, the Court
had either to strike a balance among such rights as it could identify
or to work out exhaustively the jurisprudence of privacy, of "persons"
(or quasi-persons) and their beginnings, and of how, precisely, the State
can come to represent and itself balance these competing rights. Even
then, the interests involved would remain unreconciled if the terms
of policy debate and analysis are not similarly changed. Such changes
in jurisprudence and policy perceptions would have been preferable
but are too far-reaching to be accomplished in any single case of our
case-by-case constitutional law. (Brown v. Board of Education42 was,
after all, to be implemented with "all deliberate speed.") Nine justices
of finite wisdom, which changes from time to time, had to respond
to complex pressures by using linguistic tools of limited precision and
specificity.42 While the judicial "techology" they used, balancing, finds
few admirers,422 it can nevertheless be approved under an economics-
420. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
421. See W. CONKLIN, supra note 253, at 67-81; M. FREEMAN, supra note 27, at
52; F. FROHOCK, supra note 30, at 255-56 (although "most civil and legal authorities
recognize the difficulty of settling a dispute [abortion] with such a long and conflicting
history, most statutes and legal interpretations must favor one view or another.");
Danet, Language in the Legal Process 14 L. AND Soc. REV. 445 (1980); Knowles, supra
note 416, at 15 ("Dr. Christopher Tietze has estimated that in the first two years
of a liberalized abortion law in New York City, legal abortions to residents replaced
some 100,000 previously illegal abortions."); Margolis and Moore, supra note 410, at
712; Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1981); supra notes 10,
37, 58-59, 217 and text accompanying; infra notes 422-23 and text accompanying. A
particularly revealing exchange took place during the oral arguments in Akron (103
S. Ct. 2481 (1983)), 51 U.S.L.W. 3433, 3435 (1982):
[Solicitor General Lee:] Under Roe . . . there must be a balancing
of the woman's interest and the state's interest. Balancing is synonymous
with policy determination. Legislatures do that better.
Justice Blackmun: Are you asking that Roe v. Wade be overruled?
Lee: No I am not.
Justice Blackmun: It seems to me that you are asking that or you
are asking that we overrule Marbury v. Madison.
422. See W. CONKLIN, supra note 253, at 236-57; B. SIEGAN, supra note 391, at
126, 219, 221, 305, 311; Christie, Book Review, 70 MICH. L. REV. 947, 960-63 (1981); Com-
ment, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 713, 726-45 (1980). In fourteenth amendment cases, the
Court has traditionally balanced competing interests; see Fried, Two Concepts of In-
terests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755
(1963).
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style theory of the second-best 43 for abortion policy. More elegant,
abstract and/or absolutist constitutional theories would have been
unworkable.
B. Roe's Unwanted Progeny
For a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1982, the
"subsequent development of the abortional right . . . in Roe v. Wade
[an "all-or-nothing legalization of abortion-on-demand" has largely been
one of expansion of the right to its fullest possible limits through the
gradual elimination of virtually all possible impediments to its
exercise."" ' The other, polar view is of a backsliding since Roe: "Today
for the poor and the young, the right is virtually meaningless and
for those who are not poor and young the right is greatly restricted." '25
These statements typify the consensus de minimus that Roe's pro-
geny are disagreeable, while illustrating the tendency to distort in
opposite directions the contemporary realities of abortion policy. Roe
has certainly grown more complex, wily and formalistic, acquiring a
life of its own in response to the many pitfalls laid against it. 2' But
423. I.e., public policy need not approximate the ideal results attainable under
a favored theory, where theoretical assumptions do not accurately describe the real
world. The best e.g. of a theory of the second-best is the economics concept of workable
competition. See J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 13-15, 464-67 (2d ed. 1968); J. KOCH,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRICES 53, 314, 322, 347 (1974); R. MILLER, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMIcS 445-46 (1978); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 22-25 (1970); Schwartz, supra note 217 (discussed supra note 217). See also
Sidorsky, supra note 389, at 97 (on Bentham's notion that inalienable rights are in-
evitably alienated) (emphasis supplied): "Accordingly, for utilitarians and pragmatists,
freedom in any society depends upon the ways in which the rights of different parties
in conflict are respected, weighed, and balanced, and upon the processes by which
the consent of different persons and groups are negotiated .. " Roe can be faulted
on the latter ground, if consent over abortion is open to genuine negotiations. But
see also infra notes 521-28 and text accompanying.
424. S. Rep. No. 465, supra note 393, at 5, 10. See id. at 19 (subsequent cases
"essentially" a "reaffirmation and extension" of the Roe right and "protection of it
from virtually all possible competing interests, private or public."); Rice, The Dred
Scott Case of the Twentieth Century, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (1973) (Roe "a practical
license for elective abortion at any stage, right up to the last minute before normal
delivery."); infra note 431.
425. Jones, supra note 377, at 612. See Copelan, Reproductive and Sexual Freedom
in the 1980's, 2 ANTIOCH L. REV. 47 (1982); infra note 431.
426. See S. Rep. No. 465, supra note 393, at 47: "The court's reading of this
radical policy into the Constitution has prompted an equally radical reaction and frozen
our legal system into a position which allows for none of the negotiation and accom-
modation characteristic of a democratic system of government."); L. WARDLE, supra
note 55, at xv; supra notes 66-69, infra notes 434-35, and text accompanying. See also
Justice Dept.'s argument in Akron (103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983)), 51 U.S.L.W. 3389 (1982):
Roe left many questions unanswered, and subsequent cases forced the Court to fill
in more detail, "resulting in a set of rules that has become increasingly intricate and
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Roe policies have remained more or less on a dead-center because,
I will argue, the Court feels that stonewalling (or, if you prefer, a
strict stare decisis) is the safest defense of its power and policy against
those laying the traps. The Court has emulated both the pragmatism
and the true believership of Roe's opponents. This is another exam-
ple of policy as its own cause. '27 The story of how and why the pit-
falls came to be laid in abortion policy makes an interesting case study
of policy politics in its most extreme form.
Like school prayer and busing decisions, Roe has created a great
deal of divisiveness. Fortunately for our legal system, such divisiveness
is rare. Americans have by and large taken their law easily in the
twentieth century, out of a tolerance, inertia, and apathy. But Roe
touches a nerve rubbed raw by altruism, perceived self-interest, and,
for some, frustration in the sexual, family, religious, and career
activities through which we try to express ourselves. A wrenching
and polarizing case sent partisans from both sides into the streets,
convinced of their right and rectitude. They have fought hard, each
side feeling that it can win or lose everything at the turn of a case
or statute. The battle has given rise to more dubious euphemisms
and extremist tactics than any other controversy since at least Viet-
nam, and a "responsible" political leadership has been more than usual-
ly absent.428
A careful examination of writings about abortion proves out the
conclusion that the "intellectual underpinnings ... are, to put it mildly,
precarious. [I]nconsistency is likely to play dumb and hypocrisy to
speak out with extra vehemence. There has been a lot of what can
only be called disingenuous pretending about, for example, what a
fetus is." 4n The gibberish common to other policy discussions4u reaches
substantially more complicated." Continuing down this path will take "the court fur-
ther away from what courts do best and more into the realm of what legislatures
do best." Id.
427. See supra notes 8, 28-30, 66-67, 108, 164-93 and text accompanying.
428. S. Rep. No. 465, supra note 393, at 2; R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 113-14;
A. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 154-55; F. FROHOCK, supra note 30, at 251; A. MELTSNER, supra
note 11, at 281; LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note 31, at 3, 6, 24; id. at 7 (austere vigor with
which earlier societies maintained their purpose has been abandoned); G. SAWER, supra
note 224, at 183 (quoted supra note 378); Sass, supra note 377, at 28 (quoting CHICAGO
DAILY NEWS of Feb. 5, 1976) ("On this issue ... there may be no 'moderate' position");
id. at 120 (quoting PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER of June 16, 1978, which quotes Rep. William
Clay, Dem. of Mo.) ("It's the holy wars all over again," and the "heathen must be
conquered or converted."); id. at 187; id. at 190 (quoting WASHINGTON STAR of Mar.
21, 1978); Barkun, Law and Social Revolution, 6 L. AND SOC. REV. 113, 116-17 (1971);
Knowles, supra note 411, at 15; Roberts, Power Balance in Favor of Abortion, NEW
YORK TIMES, Sept. 20, 1982, at 12, col. 3.
429. Sass, supra note 377, at 16 (quoting WASHINGTON STAR of July 10, 1976).
430. See supra notes 73-74, 120, 183-85 and text accompanying.
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new heights over abortion. Arguments largely consist of emotive
words used inaccurately, logical fallacies, false or imperfect'analogies,
tasteless oversimplifications, cynical manipulations of narrow values
so that they override and restructure other values into a life center-
ing on abortion issues, and/or reflexive attacks on rival arguments
(any which fail fully to fit cherished preconceptions). 41 Social scien-
tists have had very little to say ex officio on abortion matters that
interests decision makers, pressure groups, or the public. Social scien-
tists are not scientific or otherwise rigorous enough to deal persuasive-
ly with values brought into conflict over abortion. Little wonder, then,
431. See Barker, supra note 60, at 103; S. ENGEL, supra note 59, at 79, 81, 87-89;
Williams, supra note 377, at xvi; Dellapenna, supra note 376, at 359 n.6 (citing Aubert,
Competition and Dissensus, 7 J. CONFLICT RESOLU. 26 (1963) and Gusfield, Moral Passage,
12 Soc. PROB. 175 (1967)); Lackland, supra note 403, at 487; Tribe, supra note 10, at 95-96;
supra notes 58-67, 72-74, 128-34, 138-40, 183-94, and text accompanying.
It is all too easy to easy to "parade the horribles" in this area, but the citing
of a few examples seems appropriate. Granting
a man the power to force someone to carry and care for his child . . .
would raise the specter of the legally enforced physical and psychological
domination of one group in society by another. A woman . . . is entitled
to believe that more than a play on words has come to link her forced
labor with the concept of involuntary servitude.
Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 40 (1973). This equating of
childbearing with slavery was extended by others after the abortion funding decisions
(see infra notes 488-89 and text accompanying); impoverished women serve as baby
farms for the rich-but-childless who want to adopt. More generally, "Isluppresion of
the people to live independent lives is not among the legitimate powers of govern-
ment." Steinem, The Ultimate Invasion of Privacy, Ms., Feb. 1981, at 43. The change
in power relations inherent in the right to abortion disturbs a male identity reacting
to the feminist struggle and a greater equality in sexual relations. L. GORDON, WOMAN'S
BODY 415 (1976); Hayles, Abortion, 5 SIGNS 307, 322 (1979). Pregnancy is not 'natural' or
necessary, but is ideologically imposed as a result of masculine control over the "public
sphere." Copelan, supra note 425, at 48, 51. Roe is partof a broader struggle for freedom,
"in particular for lesbians and gay men, poor women and women of color." Id. at 51.
Opponents of this view see in it the patterns found "in the treatment of those
convicted of crimes, in the waging of war, and in the purveying of sex and crime
and drugs and violence." Sass, supra note 377, at 189 (quoting ST. Louis REV. of May
21, 1972, on the "birth control mentality."). Abortion "rights groups . . . have used
the public trough to encourage cavalier behavior among women." Id. at 92 (quoting
ARIZONA REPUBLIC of June 27, 1977). Wives will now have abortions in "fits of domestic
pique" (id. at 17, quoting ARIZONA REPUBLIC of July 9, 1976), and "parents can't be
parents." Id. at 17 (quoting MEMPHIS COMMERICAL APPEAL of July 3, 1976). The "unborn
child is just as human as grandma," and there is 'no question' but that abortion will
lead to the killing of old people and defective children."' Id. at 195 (quoting MAN-
CHESTER UNION LEADER of Apr. 6, 1977, which quotes Dr. Willke, Right to Life Society
Vice President). Interestingly, each side regularly portrays its opposite number as some
species of fascist, which seems a good reason for allowing neither side to dominate
a supposedly-pluralistic policy. The parties have invested abortion with an emotional
and ideological freight heavier than any single legal policy can bear. See supra notes
19, 66, 424-25, infra notes 535-38, and text accompanying.
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that the Court pays scant attention to their voluminous literature on
abortion.
As fragile and overdrawn as abortion policy arguments may seem
to the uncommitted bulk of the population, they have proved to have
considerable organizing power432 for small minorities. Without the
bureaucratization of, for example, the CIA, right to life and pro-choice
groups have each managed to create a Groupthink cut loose from rival
facts and value judgments. Uniform and complex yet flexible responses
to the vicissitudes of policy battles follow along, despite the absence
of a readily identifiable leadership in either camp. Each group will
automatically push a favorable policy judgment to extremes regardless
of rationality. Any rent which appears in the thinly-stretched policy
fabric of abortion is ruthlessly manipulated for advantage. The world
is seen as one of "us" versus "them," and actions by "us" cause "them"
to act more and more like our enemies; as in Soviet-American
struggles, a policy politics becomes its own cause. Even under the
best of circumstances, there is no free competition in a law and policy
characterized as elitist by many American political scientists and as
oligopolistic by some economists. However, an even more restricted
"duopoly" over abortion gives rise to a perfect indeterminacy, given
the rivals' inability to agree on a direction for policy. ' " Having first
found succor in the Court under Roe, pro-choice groups continue to
go there and to portray themselves as the kind of civil rights/civil
liberties organizations that the Court should want to help. Pending
new appointments to the Court, right-to-life groups have all but given
up on it. They seek legislative and executive help by portraying
themselves as holders of the high moral ground and as single-issue
constituencies capable of determining election results.
The success of right-to-life groups, measured in terms of the
number and range of pitfalls laid for the Court, has been impressive.
Space limitations permit only brief discussions of some pitfalls, most
of which have been avoided by the Court in what has become a policy
432. See supra notes 64-65 and text accompanying.
433. See, e.g. Sass, supra note 377, at 103 (quoting Burlington, Vt. FREE PRESS
of June 27, 1977) (While the few "have drawn up their battle lines, the majority of
Americans stand on the middle ground watching the swirling controversy."); Barkun,
supra note 428, at 126; Uslander and Weber, Public Support for Pro-Choice Abortion
Policies in the Nation and States, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1772, 1786-88 (1979); supra notes 18-19,
31, 34, 59, 65, 176, 184-86, 192 and text accompanying. The basis for a uniform but
loosely-organized response is suggested by Ms. Laswick of the (Pennsylvania) People
Concerned for the Unborn Child (quoted by Margolis and Neary, supra note 410, at
707): "As individuals we all have our personal opinions about welfare and conception,
but as an organization we must not spread ourselves too thin. First we must be suc-
cessful in banning abortions."
[Vol. 18
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standoff. 3 ' A complete list of attempted abortion restrictions taking
effect before the fetus becomes viable would look something like this:
prescribing standards for abortion facilities and methods, relieving
from liability those individuals and institutions refusing to perform
abortions, banning abortion clinics through zoning measures, requir-
ing all abortions to be reported to an administrative agency, requir-
ing that abortions be performed by a licensed physician (perhaps with
a second physician attending to the fetus), imposing criminal liability
on doctors performing abortions under certain circumstances, requir-
ing that women be informed of the consequences of and alternatives
to abortion, requiring a waiting period between consultation and abor-
tion, requiring a husband's consent to abortion or parental notifica-
tion or consent for the unmarried minor patient, restricting the use
of public funds for abortion, and prohibiting abortion advertising or
the advertising of and access to contraceptives. After viability of the
fetus, abortions other than those saving the woman's life or health
have been prohibited, consultations with other doctors have been re-
quired, and aborted children born alive have been made into public
wards. Some of the whackier legislative attempts concerning abor-
tion have failed to become law. 35
The Court's techniques for defending abortion policies are quite
similar to those used to defend antitrust policies,436 in another area
434. S. Rep. No. 465, supra note 393, at 4; Johnson and Bond, Coercive and
Noncoercive Abortion Deterrence Policies, 2 L. & POLICY Q. 106, 121 (1980). As Justice
Powell wryly observes, legislative responses to Roe have required the limits on state
authority to be spelled out on several occasions. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2487. The nature
of this process is frequently misunderstood. See, e.g., Johnson and Bond, at 112: "state
governments are seeking to deter behaviour that the Supreme Court has in effect
legitimated by restricting state authority to prohibit it." (The mere fact that certain
exercises in state authority are made illegitmate does not render legitimate the
behaviour addressed by that authority.)
435. See, e.g., Sass, supra note 377, at 129 (quoting NEWSDAY of Mar. 10, 1978):
only after protracted debate did the Oklahoma House turn down an
antiabortion amendment that would have required any man intending to
have intercourse with a woman to get her written consent in advance
[to obviate an abortion on the ground of rape]. He would also have had
to tell her that she might become pregnant as a result, and that childbirth
could cause serious health problems.
436. Compare United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978);
Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. Container Corp.
of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Northern
Pacific Ry., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150
(1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (quoted infra
note 547); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard
Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-60 (1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe
and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); with infra notes
438-41, 453-67, 503-04 and text accompanying.
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of the law full of messy strikings of balance. There are few, if any,437
situations in which a statute regulating abortion -touching on woman's
fundamental right-is constitutional per se. The basis or starting point
for the Court's analysis is thus a rule of reason: a restraint on abor-
tion is constitutional if its purposes and effects are reasonably related
to a legitimate state objective." More precisely, the restraint on abor-
tion must be merely ancillary to such an objective and necessary to
its protection; restraint cannot be its own objective or found to be
ancillary to an objective impermissible under Roe. Additionally, a
restraint must go no further than necessary to secure a legitimate
437. One exception may be the requirement that abortions be performed by
licensed physicians. See Connecticut v. Merrillo, 423 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1975) (per curiam,
citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163, 165); Jones, supra note 377, at 581-82. Other restrictions
are broadly tolerated but subjected to minimal supervision nonetheless. E.g., record-
keeping requirements have been found to be reasonably related to protection of the
woman's life or health, but confidentiality must be carefully safeguarded. See Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976); Jones, supra
note 377, at 584.
438. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 n.54: "Neither in Texas nor in other States are
all abortions prohibited. Despite broad proscriptions, an exception always exists." An
injunction against enforcement of an abortion consent statute will thus be vacated
where the injunction is so broadly drawn as to include valid informed consent provisos.
Guste v. Jackson, 429 U.S. 399 (1977). See what might be called the blue pencil test
in Menillo, 423 U.S. at 9-10. The requirement that abortions be performed in a facility
accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals is invalid because
it is not "reasonably related" to permissible objectives. Doe v. Boulton, 410 U.S. 179,
194-95 (1973) (companion case to Roe) [hereinafter cited as Doe]. But a criminal statute
prohibiting second-trimester abortions conducted outside of licensed "hospitals"
(interpreted by Powell, J., to include clinics) is "not an unreasonable" means of pro-
tecting the compelling state interest in women's health. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103
S. Ct. 2532, 2540 (1983). Recordkeeping on abortion is "reasonably related" to protec-
tion of women's health or life. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81. The requirement of a pathological
examination of "aspirated" tissue (including the fetus but excluding tonsils, adenoids,
hernial sacs and prepuces) is reasonably related to medical practices and a compelling
state interest in women's health. Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft,
103 S. Ct. 2517, 2522-24 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Ashcroftl]. As state action to encourage
childbirth is "rationally" related to the legitimate State objective of protecting the
potentiality of life, the State need not structure legislation to encourage or facilitate
abortion. Parental notification (as distinct from consent) requirements, and certain broad
restrictions on the public funding of abortions, are thus valid. H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 413 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Matheson]; Harris v. MacRae, 448 U.S. 297,
324-26 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
478-79 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 (1977). Thus, one court found a require-
ment that insurers offer a lower-priced health policy containing only limited coverage
for abortion services to be "rationally related" to State policies favoring childbirth.
American College of Obstetricians v. Thornburgh, 51 U.S.L.W. 2374, 2375 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (citing Maher). See infra note 439.
A closely related criterion is the one under which the Court should determine
whether a restriction "unduly burdens" the woman's right. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at
2509-12 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Beal, 432 U.S. at 446; Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Bellotti I]; infra notes 507-08 and text accompanying.
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state objective.439 Abortion statutes must be rather narrowly drawn,
under canons of construction similar to those applied in criminal law
and first amendment analyses: vagueness, ambiguity, the requirement
of scienter in a criminal statute, and, perhaps, overbreadth and the
"chilling effect" a statute may have on the exercise of doctors' discre-
tion and women's rights. 40 The process of statutory interpretation
439. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2497 (State regulation need not correspond perfectly
in all cases to asserted State interest, but the lines drawn must be reasonable and
must not impose heavy and unnecessary burdens on access to abortion); Matheson,
450 U.S. at 413 (Utah statute, as applied to minors, "plainly serves important state
interests, is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests, and does not violate any
guarantees of the constitution.") See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States 221 U.S. 1, 58-60 (1911); United
States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898); affd 175 U.S. 211
(1899); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 173, 175, 187, 194 (1977); supra note 438. The Court
attempts roughly to gauge the purpose and effect of abortion statutes in: Ashcroft,
103 S. Ct. at 2517, 2522-24 (discussed supra note 438); Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2500 (much
of information provided under informed consent ordinance-life begins at conception,
speculations concerning fetal charactertistics, and a "parade of horribles" about abor-
tion complications-has as its purpose "not to inform the woman's consent but rather
to persuade her to withhold it altogether."); id. at 2493 (prohibition on increasing the
cost of, and decreasing access to, abortion, in the absence of correspondingly impor-
tant health benefits-a prohibition based on Danforth, 428 U.S. at 77-78)); Beal, 432
U.S. at 448 (remand to determine whether a certificate of medical necessity executed
by two other physicians-a means of obtaining public funding of an abortion-interferes
with attending physicians's medical judgment); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 70, 74 (attempts
to delegate to spouse or parent a veto on abortion are invalid because the State itself
lacks this veto power); id. at 83 (purpose and effect of whole statute is to inhibit women
from seeking abortions during first twelve weeks of pregnancy).
440. See Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2540-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (majority's
interpretation of statute too charitable an attempt to cure its vagueness); Ashcroft,
103 S. Ct. at 2504 (requirement of "humane and sanitary" disposal of aborted fetus
too vague a basis for imposing criminal liability); Matheson, 450 U.S. at 406 (overbreadth
arguments not reached because minor lacked standing, having failed to allege that
she was mature or emancipated); id. at 413 (discussed supra note 439); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 643-44, 646-48 (1979) (as construed by Mass. Supreme Court, statute too
broadly requires parental consent for competent and mature minors) [hereinafter cited
as Bellotti II]; Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-94, 394-97, 399 (1979) (statute
similar to that in Danforth, infra, which imposes on doctor a standard of fetal care
if there is "sufficient reason to believe that fetus may be viable"-capable of living
"outside the mother's albeit with artificial aid"-is void for vagueness, ambiguous as
to whose opinion must be consulted, and defective because it lacks a scienter require-
ment); id. at 400-01 ("greater precision" required before a physician can be subjected
to criminal liability); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65, 67, 82-83 (criminal statute requiring that
same duty of care be applied to aborted fetus and to fetus intended to be born alive
is invalid, for failure to limit its applicability to post-viability abortions); Doe, 410 U.S.
at 192-93 (criminal statute upheld against vagueness challenge, since requirement that
physician find abortion "necessary" gives sufficient latitude to consider all factors
relating to woman's health); Planned Parenthood of Central and Northern Arizona v.
Arizona, 52 U.S.L.W. 2267, 2268 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussed supra note 490 and text
accompanying); City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 50 U.S.L.W. 2748 (Mo. Ct. App., 1982)
(defense, to criminal trespass prosecution for blocking access to abortion clinic, based
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under an abortion rule of reason is best illustrated by a line of cases..
dealing with attempts to require parental consent (as distinct from
parental notification) for minors' abortions. In this and other areas,
the Court seeks to defend its Roe policies against new restraints, of
a number and scope limited only by the imagination of legislative
drafters and pressure groups.
on statute justifying conduct preventing "imminent public or private injury," is rejected;
"no sensible construction would permit the statutory terminology to include legally
protected human activity ...which causes no injury in the legal sense."); R. ELY,
supra note 44, at 105 (in first amendment jurisprudence, "overbreadth," "less restric-
tive alternative," and doctrine that "administrative convenience" is an invalid justifica-
tion all amount "to much the same thing."); L. TRIBE, supra note 50 at 712, 718-19; Jones,
supra note 377, at 582-83, 594; supra note 439. But see infra note 446 and text
accompanying.
441. In a succession of cases, e.g., Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74, the Court has fleshed
out the requirements for parental consent statutes. States may reasonably require
the approval of some third person before a minor receives an abortion. The minor
is thus more restricted in the exercise of an abortion right than is an adult woman.
Jones, supra note 377 at 586. The matter was dealt with exhaustively in Bellotti H,
443 U.S. 622. A statute cannot give parents an absolute and possibly arbitrary veto.
A minor must have an opportunity to go to a court (or something like it), without
consulting her parents first, and to show either that she is well-informed and mature
or that abortion will be in her best interests. Id. at 643-50. The abortion right is to
be "exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the
sovereign or other third parties. ... Id. at 655, quoted in Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at
2531 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and disputing Court's validation of parental con-
sent statute).
The consent-by-court process must create opportunities for case-by-case evalua-
tions. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2497-99, but how this can be best achieved is still open
to dispute. See Ashcrofl, 103 S. Ct. at 2530-31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). The
requirement of parental notification (as opposed to consent) does not violate the rights
of immature and dependent minors (Matheson, 450 U.S. at 406-07), even though the
"chilling effect" on minors' exercise of rights may be as great as from a parental con-
sent statute. See, L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 1077-79, 1079 n.9; infra note 477 and text
accompanying.
Further, no means exists for the detailed supervision of judges who are to grant
consent in appropriate circumstances. For example, Randall Hekman, a Juvenile Court
Judge in Grand Rapids, Michigan, refused permission for a thirteen-year-old's abor-
tion, and refused to assign the case to another judge. Hekman defended his actions
as follows:
[D]o we want our judges always to behave like mindless bureaucrats .. ?
[Can judges] escape moral culpability either by obeying the law and saying
that they were "just following orders" or by disqualifying themselves so
that other judges without their scruples can issue the unjust decrees?...
Ten short years ago, a judge in Michigan would be guilty of a felony
crime if he ...ordered that a pregnant girl obtain an abortion. [The
Supreme Court, ignoring the "sentiment of the majority," changed this,
but] we juvenile court judges, whose statutory responsibility is the pro-
tection of children from abuse, must perform the "hatchet job" of assigning
unborn children to a cruel and merciless death. ...
2 (1) Status Call, Fall, 1982, at 7-8 (Milwaukee, Catholic League for Religious and Civil
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Some of these restraints have succeeded, however. One explana-
tion of these successes is offered by Justice Brandeis, in another and
much earlier context: "To stay experimentation in things social and
economic [and, I would add, moral] is a grave responsibility. It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may serve as a laboratory; and try novel . . . experiments
without risk to the rest of the country. '42 The fundamental nature
of woman's abortion right has not prompted the Court to "stay ex-
perimentation" altogether. Experiments are, rather, constrained; the
State must maximize its interests more creatively because in-
terferences with woman's privacy and autonomy must be minimized
under a rule of reason. Such a federalism in policymaking, over abor-
tion and other matters, has always resulted in a sharing of functions
rather than their compartmentation. Like other policy issues, abor-
tion seeks its own level of government from time to time. A chaos
of localized approaches created pressures for minimum standards at
the national level. Promulgated by the Court in Roe, these standards
prompted new local efforts which attempt to clarify, circumvent, or
alter these standards. Where successful, these new efforts are often
adopted by other states and localities, as the Court continues to keep
the inevitable policy divergences within reasonable bounds.443 During
this process, states are not prevented from establishing protections
of the right to abortion which exceed federal minima.444 Since the
merits of a policy experiment do not turn on the level of government
Rights) (quoting Hekman's letter to the GRAND RAPIDS PRESS). While our society rightly
cherishes the principle that each is treated as an individual rather than a statistic,
tailoring all determinations to the individual case encourages arbitrary actions such
as Hekman's. See L. Tribe, supra note 50, at 1078. See also Jaffree v. Board of Comm'rs.
of Mobile County, 51 U.S.L.W. 2426 (D. Ct. S.D. Ala. 1983) (quickly vacated by the
Supreme Court): Justice Black was wrong in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947);
public school prayer is constitutional because the first amendment Establishment Clause
does not apply to the states.
442. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
443. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 325-26; Doe 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting);
R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 128; A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 143; Gilbert, supra
note 229, at 121-22. Indeed, one reason why woman's right is declared fundamental
(see supra notes 287-90 and text accompanying) may be to eliminate any excuse for
applying the presumption of constitutionality. See United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
444. E.g., the denial of public funding for abortion has been held to violate
state constitutions in: Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d
352 (1981) (under privacy and equal protection provisos broader than those in the U.S.
Constitution; Harris, 448 U.S. 297 thus distinguishable); Moe v. Sec'y. of Admin. and
Finance, 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass., 1981) (on privacy and due process grounds, health
care for pregnant women must be publicly funded with a genuine indifference); Right
to Choose, etc. v. Byrne, 169 N.J. Super. 543 (1979) (proposed guidelines violate pro-
hibitions of unreasonable and discriminatory restrictions, because the State's interest
in the potentality of fetal life does not become compelling until the third trimester).
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commissioning it, the Court does not evaluate an experiment different-
ly because it originates in Akron, St. Louis, the Connecticut Welfare
Department, or Congress, rather than in a state legislature.445 The
Court will, however, defer in a limited way to a state's interpretation
of its own statute.446
Roe gave rise to a procedural innovation, a presumption: in-
terferences with woman's abortion right are unconstitutional." A state
must thus try to rebut this presumption by proving the reasonableness
of its restraint on abortion. The standard of proof required to rebut
the Roe presumption remains unclear,448 perhaps intentionally so, but
speculation or religio-philosophical argumentation taken alone will not
suffice. The procedural function of the trimester system created by
445. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (an evaluation of a city ordinance, which then
becomes the basis for evaluating state statutes, etc); Harris, 448 U.S. at 312, 314-15
(Maher, 432 U.S. 464, infra, answers due process arguments raised in opposition to
'Hyde Amendment passed by Congress; see infra notes 479-86 and text accompanying);
Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. at 2644 (1980) (Harris, supra, validates Illinois's statutory
denial of public funds for non-theraputic abortions); Poelker, 432 U.S. 519 (Maher, in-
fra, validates refusal by St. Louis to provide publicly financed hospital services for
non-theraputic abortions); Maher, 432 U.S. 464 (Conn. Welfare Dept. regulation receives
the same treatment as the Pa. statute in Beal, 432 U.S. 438). But see Am. Academy
of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 51 U.S.L.W. 2628 (D.D.C. 1983): Health and Human Services
regulations concerning treatment of handicapped newborns in federally-funded hospitals
are arbitrary, capricious, and promulgated in violation of Administrative Procedure
Act requirements). But see also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40 (1982); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
446. See, e.g. Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2532; Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517; Bellotti
1, 428 U.S. 132. But see Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 643-44, 646-48. It is difficult for the
Court to come up with its own saving construction, however: see Simopoulos, 103 S.
Ct. at 2540-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting); L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 717.
447. See L. WARDLE, supra note 33; supra notes 387-90 and text accompanying.
448. See Scheinberg v. Smith, 51 U.S.L.W. 2316 (S.D. Fla. 1983) ("preponderance
of the evidence"). See also Simpoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2532, 2540 (ordinary criminal burden
of proof applies to prosecution of physician, and burden of going forward on defense
of necessity rests on defendant); Scheinberg (on the kinds of empirical evidence which
establishes risk of harm or death from abortion); supra note 432. But see also Thornburgh,
51 U.S.L.W. 2375: The parties having stipulated that the effects of a statute on health
insurance costs could not be precisely identified, the court found "no evidence" prov-
ing that the statutory requirement of a cheaper policy excluding non-theraputic abor-
tions was arbitrary, unrelated to real costs, etc. This result was reached even though
it "departs from" another Pennsylvania statute "mandating actuarial soundness." Id.
The standards of proof used in Scheinberg and Thornburgh seem rather
undemanding, as recognitions of woman's fundamental right. I would argue that a more
elevated, "clear and convincing" standard should be used where the individual's in-
terest at stake is more precious than a property right, more substantial than a mere
loss of money. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parental rights termina-
tion); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-33 (1979) (involuntary commitment to men-
tal institution). This argument is rather shaky, however: Santosky and Addington are
procedural due process cases, and the Court may be reluctant to apply them in the
"substantive" area of abortion.
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Roe is to help spell out what it is that a State must prove: the
reasonableness of protecting the pregnant woman's health by a restric-
tion taking effect during the second and third trimesters of pregnancy,
or of protecting the potentiality of the fetus by a restriction on third-
trimester abortions.4 9 This scheme offered no basis for rebutting the
presumption in aid of abortion restrictions, no matter how reasonable,
taking effect during the first trimester. Another burden of proof was
thus created by the Court in 1976 or 1977. 41° This burden is still
evolving; the most recent formulation is Justice Powell's, in Akron:" '
The Court's caveats do
not mean that a State never may enact a regulation touching
on the woman's abortion right during the first weeks of
pregnancy. Certain regulations that have no significant im-
pact on the woman's exercise of her right may be permissi-
ble where justified by important state health objectives
.... But even those minor regulations . . . may not inter-
fere with physician-patient consultation or with the woman's
choice ...
This newer burden of proof should be interpreted as a prophylactic
rule of reason, carefully qualified but nevertheless available to rebut
449. See Ashcrofl, 103 S. Ct. at 2521-22 (under Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65, com-
pelling State interest in a viable fetus validates Mo. statute requiring the presence
of a second physician after viability to protect fetal interests); id. at 2529 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting in part) (emergency may make second doctor unavailable, and method
of choice in post-viability, third-trimester, abortions-the one which best preserves
woman's life and health-entails no chance of fetal survival); Colautti, 439 U.S. at 387
(a higher degree of interference in the physician's exercise of medical judgment is
permitted after the fetus reaches viability); Beal, 432 U.S. at 446 (discussed infra note
450); Friendship Medical Center v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1153 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975) (regulation of abortion clinic during first
trimester can be no more expansive than regulations of other medical procedures of
like risk and complexity) [hereinafter cited as Friendship]; L. WARDLE, supra note 55,
at 41, 43.
More generally, the State's interest in the pregnant women's health, which
becomes compelling in the second and third trimesters, does to validate the requirements
that an abortion be performed in a full-service hospital, that other doctors approve
the abortion, or that a safer abortion method which is not widely available be used.
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75-79; Doe, 410 U.S. at 194-200; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; L. TRIBE,
supra, note 50, at 925.
450. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93 (quoted infra in text accompanying note
443, and giving as an e.g., Danforth, 428 U.S. at 77-78 (1976)); Beal, 432 U.S. at 438,
446 (1977) (State's interest in childbirth "significant" throughout pregnancy but
insufficiently compelling to justify unduly burdensome restrictions on abortion right
until third trimester); Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, and finding "the
Court's sweeping invalidation of any restrictions on abortion during the first trimester
impossible to justify.")
451. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93 (emphasis supplied).
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the presumption of unconstitutionality regardless of classifications by
the trimester.45 While the State's burden of proof is eased under these
criteria, the Court can still predetermine the outcome of attempts to
rebut the presumption by adjusting the strictness of scrutiny, the rigor
with which canons of construction are applied, and the degree of will-
ingness to second-guess the legislature.
The subsequent history of Roe, until 1977 at least, has been one
of a growing rigidity. The rule of reason has been hedged about by
a code of judge-made rules as detailed, and as discouraging of alter-
native analysis, as any legislative code. Rather than reform or abolish
trimester classifications, the Court has reinforced them by repeated-
ly pigeonholding untidy or inconvenient factors in one trimester or
another, or, more recently, in all three trimesters. Trimesters grow
richer in implication because they offer apparent security against an
unfriendly tinkering with abortion policies. The Court has also grown
accustomed to hypothesizing the same kinds of purposes and effects
for similar statutes enacted by different states. Hearing incomplete
and often misleading information and analysis, introduced by the par-
ties to attack or defend abortion restrictions which have been
repeatedly found wanting, the Court sees no need for complicated and
prolonged inquiries into reasonableness.453 Judicial effort (and creativi-
ty) is thus conserved at the expense of only a slight arbitrariness,
and, as Akron"' suggests, the Court's patience is wearing thin over
abortion. The Roe presumption of unconstitutionality has never been
declared conclusive. But it has become difficult to imagine how, in
certain areas, ' the presumption can be rebutted or a statute can be
drafted to survive an especially strict scrutiny.
In these areas, where State policy clearly interferes with woman's
right or policy experimentation has given way to close variations on
impermissible themes, abortion rules of reason are beginning to harden
into rules of an unconstitutionality per se. These rules find parallels
in the field of antitrust.4  State motives and achievements would have
to be of a Doric simplicity and purity of line to survive a very strict
scrutiny, and this is rarely the case. For example, all statutes which
452. See Beal, 432 U.S. at 438, 446 (discussed supra note 450); supra notes 387-90,
infra notes 503-04, and text accompanying.
453. See Freund, Storms Over the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1474, 1480 (1983);
supra notes 37-59, 418 and text accompanying. See also United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v.
Northern Pacific Ry., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927)
(quoted infra note 547); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 439, at 187, 193-97.
454. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
455. See infra notes 457-65 and text accompanying.
456. See cases cited supra note 453.
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regulate the advertising of abortions, and the advertising of and access
to contraceptives, have been struck down on First Amendment
grounds when they reach the courts.41 7 It is of course possible for
states to regulate false and misleading advertising in these areas by
exercising conventional police powers rather than compelling state in-
terests concerning abortion. However, any such regulation is extremely
suspect as trenching on a fundamental right, and it certainly could
not serve to implement right-to-life desiderata. Attempts by states
to name the kinds of "hospitals" where abortions must be performed
are almost invariably4 58 struck down. The Court has characterized the
effect, and probably the purpose, of such restrictions as increasing
the costs of, and decreasing access to, abortion. Such an effect or pur-
pose is invalid per se, although the state is free in theory to raise
the "defense" of correspondingly important health benefits flowing
to the woman as a result of the restriction."9 Such benefits can,
however, be obtained under ordinary exercises of the police power."'
Once again, such police power regulations are the suspect hedges on
a fundamental right that are unlikely to further right-to-life aims.
During the time before the fetus becomes viable, the State must
take great care not to intrude upon the physician's and the woman's
exercise of discretion over abortion. This policy is reflected in the
per se exceptions built into Akron's prophylactic rule of reason"1 and
governing restraints on the "physician-patient consultation" and
"woman's choice." A 24-hour waiting period between consultation and
457. See Carey v. Population Services Int., 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977) (access to
contraceptives guaranteed by the Constitution as essential to right to choose and use
them, and State interest limited to protecting user's health and controlling quality
of contraceptives); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertising of abortion fully
protected, its commercial character notwithstanding, under first amendment); id. at
822 (State cannot, through its police powers, supervise internal affairs of another State
by banning information about an activity, abortion, lawful in that State); L. WARDLE,
supra note 55, at 286.
458. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2487, 2490 (requirement that all second-trimester
abortions be performed in full service, acute care hospitals stricken on cost and access
grounds, grounds which would hamper most regulatory efforts over abortion); Doe, 410
U.S. at 194-95 (discussed supra note 438); Friendship, 505 F.2d 997. But see also
Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2532 (Powell, J., interpreting "licensed hospitals" to include
abortion clinics and upholding statute under rule of reason); id. at 2540-41 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (majority's interpretation too charitable, and court should remand for
interpretation by the Va. Supreme Court).
459. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93; supra note 399 and text accompanying.
But see also Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2522-24 (discussed supra note 438).
460. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2493.
461. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93 (discussed supra text following note 451);
id. at 2491 (physician's role one of assisting in woman's decisionmaking and implement-
ing it if she chooses abortion); Colautti, 439 U.S. at 387, 399-401 (discussed infra note
463). But see also. Doe. 410 U.S. at 192-93.
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abortion has been struck down as "inflexible," '462 and it is difficult to
imagine how a flexible statute could be drafted here to advance any
of the State interests under discussion. Restraints on the method of
abortion used by the doctor have also been stricken.46 Impositions
of a standard of fetal care on the physician, and requirements that
the abortion be approved by other, "independent" physicians, have
been invalidated where the abortion occurs prior to viability 64The
requirement that a husband consent to his wife's abortion was held
unconstitutional per se in Danforth:.. the regulation endangers marital
stability where the child is not the husband's, it denies Equal Protec-
tion to unwed fathers, and it gives the husband veto power over his
wife's fundamental right of autonomy and choice. In any event, the
State cannot delegate to husbands a power which the State itself can-
not validly exercise under Roe. This holding offers a broad basis for
declaring other delegations of State power over abortion (and much
else) unconstitutional per se, but the Court has not returned to this
theme since Danforth in 1976.
From 1973 to 1976, a great deal of balancing under an abortion
rule of reason led to an imbalance, through the emerging rules of un-
constitutionality per se that had the effect of favoring the aims of
pro-choice groups. That this was not the Court's steadfast purpose
is shown by its subsequent recognition of the legitimacy of State in-
terests which had earlier been ignored or glossed over in abortion
cases: preferring childbirth to abortion, and safeguarding the family
unit and parental authority. 6 Throwing into the hopper these new
interests which (like almost all State interests concerning abortion)
are congruent with right-to-life aims, the Court struck new balances
which operate to favor right-to-life groups. Another corrective was
462. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2503.
463. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2493; Colautti, 439 U.S. at 387 (criminal statute
mandating abortion method giving fetus best chance for survival, so long as another
method not "necessary" for woman's life or health, an unconstitutional infringement
of physician's discretion in a medical decision made prior to viability); id. at 399-401
("necessary" having been interpreted to mean "indispensible", statute doesn't state
that woman's health and life always takes precedence over fetus's; and, anyway, "greater
precision" required before a physician can be subjected to criminal liability); Danforth,
428 U.S. at 77-78; id. at 76, 79 (statutory prohibition of abortion by saline amniocentesis
after twelfth week held unconstitutional, the Court finding a great danger in banning
a technology and thus substituting its judgment for the legislature's finding that tech-
nique "deleterious to maternal health"); supra notes 383, 417 and text accompanying.
464. See Ashcrofl, 103 S. Ct. at 2521-22, 2529 (discussed supra note 449); Col-
autti, 439 U.S. at 390-94 (discussed supra note 440); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 82-83 (discussed
supra note 440); Doe, 410 U.S. at 199 (requirement that all abortions be concurred
in by two other, independent physicians stricken).
465. 428 U.S. at 69-71, 74.
466. See infra notes 468-86 and text accompanying.
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thus applied in 1983, in an attempt to move abortion policy back to
a dead-center." 7
C. Mothers Young and Poor
Abortion is more complex than most parent-child-State issues,
involving as it does a near-adult's assertion of an individual's privacy
against both the State and her parents. In Danforth4"s and Matheson,469
the Court struggled to place her right among certain older, privacy
and privacy-related, liberties. These reinforce the autonomy of the
family and the authority and religio-philosophical values of its domi-
nant members.47 ° Family autonomy is a canon of State non-interference,
however; the State must go no further than to provide incidental sup-
ports for parental authority. Where these efforts concern abortion they
have been evaluated by the Court under a less strict scrutiny47 since
Danforth in 1976. There,'7 2 the Court found the State to have a
"somewhat broader authority to regulate" minors' abortions. Unlike
that of an adult, the privacy right of a competent, mature minor gets
balanced against an additional State interest: safeguarding the family
unit and parental authority.
The balance weights even more heavily against the privacy of
immature, dependent minor women. This was clarified in 1981 by
Matheson:4" their rights are not violated by the "mere requirement"
of parental notice (as opposed to parental consent) prior to an abor-
tion. The State's interests that win out here, interests in minors'
rights, "family integrity and protecting adolescents," are collapsed into
467. Akron, 103 S. Ct. 2476 (1983). See infra notes 495-504 and text accompanying.
468. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
469. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981).
470. See, e.g. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Buchanan, at 554; infra note 471.
471. See L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 986, 1079 n.9, 1080-81. There is a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter" without compelling justification.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). This realm is limited, however, Id.
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172, 172 n.10, 178, 178 n.14 (1976); no privacy
interest was violated when Congress acted under the 13th amendment to outlaw
segregated private schools. Schools appeal to public constituencies, and parents are
still free to inculcate whatever values and standards they deem appropriate. Id.
472. 428 U.S. at 74-75. See also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 634-9 (1979): the State's
parens patriae interests are those of protecting children unable to protect themselves,
of insuring that they develop into productive adults.
473. 450 U.S. 398 (1981). The trial judge ruled that the statute did not apply
to emancipated minors, and that it would be unconstitutional if it were so applied.
This issue was not appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 406. The Court also declined
to reach the issue of overbreadth: the minor failed to allege that she was emancipated,
and she thus lacked standing to raise overbreadth. Id.
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the traditional parents' right 'to authority in their own household to
direct the rearing of their children.'474 The Matheson plurality refused
to decide if and when an alternative to parental notification is re-
quired, but concurring Justices Stewart and Powell would have re-
quired such an alternative." The plurality went on to admit that
parental notification deters some minors from seeking an abortion,
and tried to ratonalize this on rather flimsy grounds.47 The deterrent
or chilling effect of parental notification appears to be substantial.477
Clearly, the requirement of parental notification goes impermissibly
further than necessary under a rule of reason analysis based on Roe's
compelling State interest in wonen's health; notification is, however,
merely ancillary to a rediscovered State interest in giving parents
of the unemancipated opportunities to exercise authority over
abortion. 78
A 1977 trilogy of decisions479 about the public funding of abor-
tion provided other bases for the holding in Matheson: legislation need
474. Id. at 406, 410 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968))
(plurality opinion). This parents' right (rather than duty) includes providing medical
information to their daughter's doctor, and giving "mature advice and emotional sup-
port" to the daughter making a grave decision under emotional stress. Matheson, 450
U.S. at 410-11.
475. Id. at 420. Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented and would hold
the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 425-54. Matheson does, however, reiterate the holding,
in Belloti 11, 443 U.S. 622, 625 (1979) (plurality opinion), that a blanket, unreviewable
parental consent is unconstitutional.
476. See Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413.
477. Nine states have parental consent laws and eleven states have abortion
notification laws. Planned Parenthood found Minnesota's requirement that a parent
or judge be notified to have decreased abortions by one-third. Isaacson, Holding Firm
on Abortion, NEWSWEEK, Euro. ed., June 26, 1983, 28.
478. But see also, Jones, supra note 377, at 591:
Familial privacy is entitled to great protection against state interference.
Nevertheless, the state is, through the notice requirement, in fact inter-
fering with familial privacy. [Tihe state does not foster familial integrity
by forcing the parties to confront each other over an issue which at least
one member of the family does not want to share with the . . . [others].
This echoes Justice Marshall's dissent in Matheson, 450 U.S. at 443. Additionally,
there is no reasonable relation between notice and the minors' health and welfare.
Jones, at 590.
479. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977)(no federally-imposed obligation on states-
Pennsylvania here-to fund abortions not certified by doctors as "medically necessary"
under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid), 42 U.S.C. S 1396 et seq. (1970
ed. and Supp. V); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (Connecticut Welfare Dept. regula-
tion mandating funding for childbirth, but not for non-theraputic abortion, similar to
statute in Beal, is no denial of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (refusal, by St. Louis, to provide publicly-financed
hospital services for non-theraputic abortions is governed by Maher). See Harris v.
MacRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (annual refusal since 1976, under Hyde Amendment, by
Congress to fund Medicaid abortions not involving rape, incest or saving the woman's
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not be structured to encourage or facilitate abortion, 480 and a state
may thus pursue its "significant" interest in promoting childbirth. It
remains true that, as under Roe,48' the State interest in fetuses does
not become "compelling" until approximately the third trimester. But
no such compelling interest need be shown for a state's policy choice
of favoring childbirth48' by, for example, making it more financially
attractive than abortion.48' It has also become "not unreasonable" for
the State to require a showing of medical necessity for an abortion
performed at public expense.484 Such a showing imposes no restric-
tion on a woman's right which is not already there, and her "not
unqualified" right implies no limits on states' value judgments con-
cerning the allocation of public funds.48" ' State funding for childbirth
but not for most abortions is said to violate neither Equal Protection
nor the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
48 6
It is difficult to explain this seemingly new tack in the Court's
thinking as anything other than a limited recognition of the legitimacy
of political demands for protecting the fetus before its third trimester.
The legal logic of a Roe trimesterism is circumvented in the public
funding cases, where childbirth rather than woman's health becomes
the touchstone of compelling State interest and where certificates of
life is governed by Maher); Thornburgh, 51 U.S.L.W. 2374, 2375 (citing Maher, statute
requiring "insurers to offer a lower-priced policy containing only limited coverage for
abortion services is rationally related to the state policy favoring childbirth."); Hyde
Amendment for 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109; 93 Stat. 926; H.J. Res. 610 (F.Y. 1981);
Bauman Amendment, H.J. Res. 610 (F.Y. 1981) (permits states to choose to eliminate
Medicaid abortions where public funds remain available); supra notes 442-46 and text
accompanying. But see also Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2493.
480. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413.
481. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 194-95. In Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74, the Court
denied that the public funding cases signalled a retreat from Roe. There is a relevant
distinction between direct state interference with constitutionally-protected activity
and state encouragement of alternatives: See id. at 475. But see also infra notes 487-90
and text accompanying.
482. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413; Harris, 448 U.S. at 324-26; Poelker, 432 U.S.
at 521; Maher, 432 U.S. at 578-79; Beal, 432 U.S. at 445.
483. Harris, 448 U.S. at 324-25.
484. Maher, 432 U.S. at 478, 480. But there was a remand to determine if such
certification interferes with the doctor-patient relation. Id. at 478.
485. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474, 477. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17: woman's free
choice does not entail a constitutional entitlement to financial resources for taking
advantage of the full range of constitutionally-protected choices.
486. Harris, 448 U.S. at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442
(1961)) (the Establishment Clause is not violated when a policy choice having a clearly
defined secular purpose 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some
or all religions.'); Poelker, 432 U.S. 519; Maher, 432 U.S. at 471 (financial need has never
been held a suspect class for Equal Protection purposes). See id. at 469-71; Frieman
v. Walsh, 481 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Mo. 1979). A different result may obtain under inter-
pretations of state constitutions, however: see supra note 444.
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medical necessity can be interposed between doctor and patient.48 '
Where the Court validates the State purpose of promoting childbirth,
its effects on women and their rights recede into the background of
analysis. In what may seem a departure from the abortion rule of
reason, the Court displays little or no concern with whether restric-
tions on abortion funding go further than necessary to promote
childbirth. This issue is not reached because the Court does not see
the abortion right as affected by funding decisions. Abortions could,
for example, be funded at the same time as childbirth is made relative-
ly more attractive, but this forms no part of the Court's policy agenda.
If contemporary studies are to be believed, the deterrent effect of
denying public funds for abortion is substantial. Due to an inability
to pay, the abstract right to an abortion is not exercised effectively
about 35% of the time." Not surprisingly, currently productive women
exercise their autonomy more freely than the economically unproduc-
tive. Those who wish to become productive and autonomous in the
future may be unable to do so because of an unwanted pregnancy. 8
This seems inconsistent with the Court's clear holding in other types
of cases "that government may not restrict the exercise of constitu-
tionally protected rights, even when that restriction takes the form
of withholding a benefit, rather than applying a penalty, for that
exercise."4" The neutrality of Court-sanctioned policies is more doubtful
here than over other abortion issues; conferring the benefit of fun-
ding for childbirth but not for most abortions minimizes neither public
487. See Jones, supra note 377, at 602, 604; supra notes 383, 399, 484 and text
accompanying.
488. See S. Rep. No. 465, supra note 383, at 38 (citing and discussing studies).
The inhibiting effect appears similar to that associated with parental notification
statutes: see supra note 477. As an abortion costs $850-900 in a hospital and $350-400
in a clinic, Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2495, several different conclusions can be drawn from
the studies: They are unreliable, they indicate the extreme poverty of some women
who become pregnant, and they show that right-to-lifers are correct in asserting that
some abortion decisions are "frivolous." Some abortions may reflect "marginal" deci-
sions, affected by increasing the costs and holding the benefits of abortions constant,
but what should the State's role be where Roe assumes autonomous women are exer-
cising rational choice?
489. This is the main subject of Justice Marshall's impassioned dissent to the
public funding cases: see Beal, 432 U.S. at 458-59. He concludes that, for a poor woman,
"[aill chance to control the direction of her own life will have been lost." Id. at 459.
490. Planned Parenthood of Central and Northern Arizona v. Arizona, 52
U.S.L. W. 2267, 2268 (9th Cir. 1983). While the theory is that government need not
fund the exercise of fundamental rights, such funding is required in, e.g., Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Central
and Northern, 52 U.S.L.W. at 2268, Judge Choy glosses over such inconsistencies on
the basis of the distinction drawn in Maher (discussed supra note 481), but later exposes
the inconsistencies indirectly. See Central and Northern, 52 U.S.L.W. at 2268 (emphasis
supplied):
Clearly, Arizona may not unreasonably interfere with the right of Planned
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expenditure (some of the children will become public charges) nor in-
stitutional and religio-philosophical entanglement.491
The public funding decisions are strong evidence that the abor-
tion right is so firmly anchored in an individualistic liberty interest
that there is no need or desire to hold this interest in dynamic ten-
sion with our other significant constitutional value: equality. This liber-
tarianism winds up a rejection of one paternalism, of public payment
for abortion, for another paternalism of promotirg childbirth. It is
hard to see how the Court could have it any other way. Most issues
in abortion policy are feasible realms for judicial activism because
effective policymaking requires little judicial control over the sword
and none over the purse. But effectively mandating a public funding
for abortion would require a degree of control over the public purse
which the courts lack. While the Equal Protection of those seeking
abortion could be attained by striking down public funds for
childbirth,492 this evenhandedness benefitting none would be an ab-
surd policy for the Court to pursue. A paucity of power and policy
are the probable reasons why, when compared to other types of abor-
tion cases, the Court is much more willing to defer to legislative
judgments in the public funding cases.493 The Court also seems to agree
with these legislative judgments. Abortion funding is treated as a
species of "welfare," which has long been a pungent issue for the Court
as well as for the electorate. The notion of welfare "as something
for nothing" was easily manipulated in the course of the abortion
debate into an image of female free riders unwilling to take the in-
dividual responsibility that the abortion right assumes. The funding
Parenthood to engage in abortion or abortion-related speech activities,
but the state need not support, monetarily or otherwise, those activities.
Arizona's main concern was to ensure that state funds not be used
in a manner contrary to state policy and not to deter the organization
from engaging in constitutionally protected activities.
However, it is not clear that the statute was drawn as narrowly as
possible to permit the state to control use of its funds while infringing
minimally on the exercise of constitutional rights.
The Court's public funding opinions have put lower court judges in a difficult position.
and Judge Choy seems to have done as well a possible by adopting the to and fro
that is typical of policy dilemmas.
491. L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 933 n.77. See Beal, 432 U.S. at 448 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting): Pregnancy is a condition requiring medical services; abortion and childbirth
are alternative means for dealing with it. If a woman and her doctor choose abortion,
it becomes medically necessary and must be funded under Medicaid. Id. See also supra
notes 401, 408-16 and text accompanying.
492. But see also Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17: women retain the same freedom
as if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs.
493. Compare Harris, 448 U.S. at 325-26, which seems to echo Justice White's
dissent in Doe, 410 U.S. 179, at 222, with supra note 399 and text accompanying.
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of childbirth also creates free riders, yet the Court's reaction to
statutes denying public funds for abortion is similar to President
Carter's: "the world is unfair" and we lack the authority to change it.4"
The 1983 Akron trilogy"5 serves to wall off the Court's decisions
concerning public funding and minors' abortion rights from the
mainstream of abortion doctrine.4" Trimesters,497 requiring the State
to meet its burden of proving a compelling interest,49 and the policy
foci of safeguarding woman's health and the doctor-patient relation499
are all reinstated by this trilogy in more or less the form they took
ten years earlier in Roe. The kind of cost-benefit analysis called for
in the 1976 Danforth decision, and ignored in the public funding and
minors' abortion rights cases, is made a basis for condemning the
statute in Akron."0 Suggestions, made in the minors' rights and public
funding cases,"° that a state need not "fine-tune" its abortion statutes
are set off against the canon of avoiding statutory vagueness. 2 Justice
Powell elaborates on this theme in Akron:
It is true that a state abortion regulation is not unconstitu-
tional simply because it does not correspond perfectly in
all cases to the asserted state interest. But the lines drawn
... must be reasonable, and ... [must not impose] a heavy,
and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively
494. Anderson, supra note 17, at 718 (quoting President Carter). President Carter
also stated (Sass, supra note 377, at 139, quoting the PORTLAND OREGON J. of July 18,
1977): "There are many things in life that wealthy people can afford and poor people
can't. I don't think the federal government should make these things equal when there
is a moral issue involved." See F. FROHOCK, supra note 30, at 193-94; Sass, supra note
377, at 101 (quoting the SAN JOSE NEWS of June 22, 1977) ("like the Supreme Court-
many persons see a sharp distinction between recognizing a woman's right to seek
an abortion and the public's obligation to pay for her exercise of that right."); A.
WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 302; infra note 520 and text accompanying.
495. Akron, 103 S. Ct. 2481; Ashcrofl, 103 S. Ct. 2517; Simopoulos 103 S. Ct. 2532.
496. See Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2525-26 (citing Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2497-99).
497. See Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2536-40; Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2519-20; Akron,
103 S. Ct. at 2494-95; supra notes 397, 447-53 and text accompanying.
498. See Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2520-22; Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492, 2494-95; id.
at 2503 ("legitimate" state interest); supra notes 382, 391-92 399-400 and text
accompanying.
499. See Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2536-40; Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2523-24; id.
at 2527, 2529-30 (Blackmun, J., and three others, dissenting in part); Akron 103 S. Ct.
at 2492-93; supra notes 384, 389, 394 and text accompanying.
500. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2493 (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 77-78). The basis
for cost-benefit analyses of denials of public funds for abortions can be found in supra
notes 399, 459, 488-89, 491 and text accompanying.
501. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413; Harris, 448 U.S. at 325; Maher, 432 U.S. at
473-74. Dissenting in Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2512, Justice O'Connor would apply this
criterion to the mainstream of abortion policy.
502. Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. 2540, 2541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/2
1984] PUBLIC POLICY
inexpensive, and otherwise accessible and safe abortion
procedure." 3
This, along with the Justice's prophylactic Akron standard
(discussed earlier)," ' is an attempt to restate a rule of reason which
was battered during the minors' rights and public funding cases-
and by critics of abortion policymaking by the trimesters.
D. Changing the Terms of the Abortion Debate
Justice O'Connor has become the foremost critic of this vein in
constitutional doctrine. Dissenting from the Akron trilogy, she laments
the striking down of a number of procedural restrictions on abortion. 
5
These strikes amount to a reinvigoration of the approach that leaves
some abortion restrictions unconstitutional per se."6 Justice O'Connor
would replace all of this with a simple rule of reason which ignores
the trimesters, makes State interests compelling throughout preg-
nancy, and is thus more deferential to State claims that do not "unduly
burden" woman's right.5 7 This is clearly a minority view at present.
Roe would have to be gutted to reach Justice O'Connor's result, and
this is unlikely; "especially compelling reasons" for treating Roe to
a strict stare decisis were recently advanced by the Akron majority.58
503. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2497.
504. Id. at 2492-93 (discussed supra notes 451-52 and text accompanying).
505. See Suprenw Court Review and Constitutional Symposium, 52 U.S.L. W. 2228,
2233 (1983) (Lawrence Tribe)-
[In the Akron trilogy,] the Court struck down, 6-3, requirements that: (1)
forced second trimester abortions out of clinics; (2) authorized the "hassling"
of women who seek abortions by, e.g., requiring physicians to describe
in detail the abortion process, its effects on the fetus, etc.; (3) required
women to return within 24 hours following the decision to have an abor-
tion to reconfirm that decision; and (4) provided vague requirements for
the disposal of fetal remains.
506. See Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2521-22, 2529; Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2487, 2490-93,
2503; supra notes 456-65, 505 and text accompanying. But see also Simopoulos, 103 S.
Ct. at 2532; Ashcrofl, 103 S. Ct. at 2522-24.
507. See Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2540 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part); Akron,
103 S. Ct. at 2509-12 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2505, 2510, 2515, (citing Bellotti
I, 428 U.S. at 147 and Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485). See also supra note 453 and text
accompanying.
508. 103 S. Ct. at 2487 n.1. The "doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never
entirely persuasive bn a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect
in a society governed by the rule of law." Id. at 2487. This is especially so for Roe,
a 7-2 decision which "was considered with special care" after argument, reargument,
and extensive briefing. Id. at 2487 n.1. Yet Justice O'Connor "rejects the basic premise
of Roe and its progeny" and only "stops short of arguing flatly that Roe should be
overruled." Id. (emphasis supplied). All of this flies in the face of the fact that, for
the Court, stare decisis does not even have the status of a customary norm; each Justice
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The policy politics of this, the Court's astonishing fidelity to Roe over
time, was described earlier as a stonewalling: new policy is made chief-
ly to defend old policy, lest hard-won principles and classifications be
undermined by abortion pressure groups. 9 Piece by piece, abortion
presumptions, rules of reason, excursions into per se analysis, etc.,
have been assembled into efforts to hold the initial, Roe balance of
interests wherever possible.
While it fails to please connoisseurs of a doctrinal architecture,
the stone wall of abortion grows ever more rigid as one hole after
another gets plugged." ' Brainstorming new solutions becomes more
difficult at a time when established patterns of doctrine and pressure
group politics are growing larger and larger. Trimesters have, for
example, become far too rigid to adjust to technological change5"' or
to Justice O'Connor's well-taken criticisms: no matter what Roe says,
the State has an interest in making first-trimester abortions as safe
as possible, and potential fetal life is no less potential in the first
and second trimesters than in the third. 2 Under a strict stare decisis,
decides policy consistency for himself/herself. G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
33-34 (rev. ed. 1974). What O'Connor, J., does (Akron at 2508) is to quote from Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944): "Although we must be mindful of the 'desirability
of continuity ... when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained
to follow precedent."' See L. WARDLE, supra note 55, at xv (stare decisis in abortion cases
gives rise to "a regressive formalism" which is "mechanical (and typically evasive)");
id. at 303; Isaacson, supra note 477 (in the Akron trilogy, "filled with forceful phrases
that seemed as much addressed to the controversy in the country as in the courts,
a clear majority of the Justices roundly reaffirmed the landmark 1973 [Roe) decision
as the law of the land.")
509. Supra notes 427, 433-35 and text accompanying. See supra notes 9, 28-29,
54, 57-59, 66, 73, 108, 219, 235 and text accompanying.
510. Hearings Scheduled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3387, 3389 (1982) (quoting from Justice
Department arguments in the Akron trilogy): In the years since Roe, "the Court has
been asked to fill in more detail, 'resulting in a set of rules that has become increas-
ingly intricate ... ' Unless this is clarified, and more deference is accorded legislative
judgments, the Court will be taken "further away from what courts do best and more
into the realm of what legislatures do best. [T~he adversaries will be back again and
again.... [Tlhat is an unfair and improper burden to impose upon any Constitution."
Id. L. Wardle, supra note 55, at xv; id. at 311 (quoted infra note 513); id. at 310-11:
To one devoted to teaching that legal analysis is of overriding importance
in the judicial system, the record of the federal court abortion cases is
an awkward deviation .... The abortion doctrine has sprawled and evolved
in an unprincipled, unpredictable and sorely dogmatic manner.
Wardle must realize that there are many such "awkward" deviations, deviations which
cast doubt on the relevance of the kind of "legal analysis" claiming her devotion.
511. See supra note 418 and text accompanying.
512. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2509 ("inherent fallacies" in Roe). See Buchanan, supra
note 470, at 557: fetal life is always present, prior to viability as well as after, as
a moral issue which appears to influence the Court subtly. But see also Jones, supra
note 327, at 613: "The interest of the woman is also in the potentiality of life."
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the Court has imposed its authority in ways discouraging to the feed-
back and the new information from lower courts and uncommitted
outsiders that frequently lead to doctrinal innovations in other areas.
The jurisprudence of privacy and of persons (or quasi-persons), the
particular province of courts, cannot develop spontaneously, and the
Court seems incapable of developing it further while locked into the
current analytical scheme.-" 3 The costs of a policy standoff over abor-
tion are immense, measured in terms of the time devoted to this issue
by judges, legislators, bureaucrats, pressure groups, and the media.
Their time is a scarce resource which would have been better spent
on investigating solutions for other policy problems. There are other
costs, too, but they are more difficult to measure. The Court has lost
at least some of its legitimacy, a scarce and valuable resource, because
of an inability to win political acceptance of abortion decisions over
time. Congress and state legislatures may have lost legitimacy as well,
and the abortion debate has certainly contributed to the growth of
single-issue constituencies which have, temporarily perhaps, changed
the rules of electoral and logrolling games."4
There are thus many things wrong with abortion policies; they
are only the best we could have expected under the circumstances."'
Can these second-best policies be improved by changing the terms
513. E. DE BONO, LATERAL THINKING (1977); L. WARDLE, supra note 55, at 303-07;
Note, supra note 267, at 983. See L. WARDLE, at 311: "While the doctrine of abortion
privacy may not be beyond repair .... it stands no hope of being repaired until the
federal judiciary summons the self-discipline necessary to neutrally apply the doctrine
. . . as a doctrine of law, not merely as a crystallized, controversial social policy."
See also supra notes 5, 8 and text accompanying.
514. See, e.g., R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 111; Sass, supra note 377, at 28
(quoting CHICAGO DAILY NEWS of Feb. 5, 1976) ("for abortion to become the decisive issue
in the election would turn voting into a travesty."); id. at 116 (quoting Louisville
COURIER JOURNAL of Feb. 10, 1977) (during Hyde Amendment procedings, "religious lob-
byists played a role that many Americans might regard as dangerously close to domina-
tion of governmental decisions by a particular religious group."); id. at 119 (quoting
DETROIT FREE PRESS of Feb. 15, 1978) ("The politics of abortion . . . now threatens to
paralyze Congress and chip away at other constitutional guarantees, as well as restrict
the rights of women."); D. WISE, supra note 120, at 406 (abortion "wasted" more than
one month of the Senate's time before and during September 1982); Moore, supra note
396, at 411; Isaacson, supra note 477, at 29; Roberts, supra note 428, at cols. 3-5; id.
at col. 4 (quoting Senate aide) ("It's hard to say to our constituents, we let interest
rates go up while we debated abortion."); id. ("Even so, [and n]o matter what the polls
showed, many lawmakers believed that opponents of abortion would cast votes and
give money based on that issue alone."); Vinovskis, supra note 373 at 1767-68; Vinovskis,
supra note 379, at 1817-18; supra notes 256, 325 and text accompanying. Attempts
to describe the causes and effects of the Supreme Court's legitimacy have been
inconclusive and otherwise unsatisfactory. See the studies collected in: AMERICAN COURT
SYSTEMS (S. Goldman and A. Sarat, eds. 1978); THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(T. Becker, ed. 1969).
515. See supra notes 419-23 and text accompanying.
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of the debate, in much the same way as I propose doing for the CIA?516
The time may be ripe for a new consensus de minimus over abortion
policy, if the temperature of debate can be lowered somehow. While
the relevant statistics are hardly free from doubt, 66% to 81% of
Americans apparently see abortion as a personal matter to be left
to the woman and her doctor, 5' as an unfit subject for legislative in-
tervention. At the very least, it can be said that only small minorities
would either permit or ban all abortions. The wider public is confused
and confusingly in between, having grown weary of the abortion wars.
Yet the public seems prepared to follow the Supreme Court so far
as to preserve the liberal democratic tenets of, for example, John
Stuart Mill. 18 This amounts to a rejection of the paternalistic or strong
State that would tell "us" what to do519 about abortion. Public sup-
port for the Court's public funding decisions suggests that all aspects
of abortion should be strictly off-limits for the State. 2 ' After ten years,
the less extremist members of pro-choice and right-to-life groups must
be coming to realize that all of their desiderata cannot be achieved.
One legal loophole after another has been closed, and lobbying and
psychodrama- "consciousness-raising" demonstrations, occupations of
abortion clinics, etc.-have failed.
516. See supra notes 235-39 and text accompanying.
517. As S. Rep. No. 465, supra note 393 at 48 observes, polls concerning abor-
tion "have not always given reliable or consistent information because of differences
in sampling, in the phraseology of questions, and in the respondents' level of knowledge
of the issues. Such problems are, of course, are common in public opinion polls taken
on any complex issue." Id. See Moore, supra note 396, at 419 (quoting Rep. R.D. Lamm).
This may be one reason why social science data about abortion are held in such low
regard. Be that as it may, 74% of those polled in 1981 approved of abortion in all
or most circumstances. WASHINGTON POST, June 8, 1981, at Al, cols. 1-3. The same percent-
age of those asked in a 1977 CBS-New York Times poll, favored leaving the abortion
decision entirely to the woman and her doctor. Sass, supra note 377, at 220 (69%
of Catholics and 76% of Protestants). 81% agreed this result in a 1976 Knight-Ridder
Newspapers survey, and 66% in a 1976 nationwide survey. Impact 80, 1 ABORTION
L. REP. 5 2.1 (May 1980) (National Abortion Rights Action League). See Arney and
Trescher, Trends in Attitudes Toward Abortion, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 117 (My-June 1976);
Jones supra note 377, at 608-09. Surveys cited in S. Rep. No. 465, at 49-50, 49 n.,
50-52, and in Vinvoskis, supra note 373, at 1753-54, tell a different story: 11-22% of
the population are "hard-core" opponents of abortion, and 23-27% would never pro-
hibit abortion. The majority in the middle agreed that abortions should be permitted,
but only under certain circumstances.
518. Supra notes 252-53 and text accompanying. See L. WARDLE, supra note
55, at 107 (a "protective" abortion right, "a shield against application of the awesome,
coercive, penal powers of government"); supra notes 209-11, 213, 218 and text
accompanying.
519. See supra notes 202-06, 212, 220, 225-26 and text accompanying.
520. In one poll, 40% of those questioned favored federal funding for abortion
while 54% opposed it. WASHINGTON POST, supra note 517, at A4, col. 1. See supra notes
492-94 and text accompanying.
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Pro-choice groups are not pro-abortion, except to the extent that
the unavailability of abortion restricts choice. Likewise, most right-
to-life groups and their members are not anti-choice, except where
the choice is to abort.52' Belaboring the obvious, the broadest basis
for consensus would have us working toward fewer abortions and more
autonomy and choice simultaneously. 22 Those refusing to move to this
position and away from their absolutist, demonstrably-unworkable
extremes could logically-and fairly-be accused of preferring prin-
ciples to fetuses. Unfortunately, this position cannot be reached under
present laws and policies. The "not unqualified" right to abortion
misses the salient policy issue by treating one symptom rather than
the cause: man's and woman's inability to manage sex and other
aspects of intimate relations sensibly. A host of traditional social ills
and side effects of rapid social change are part of the abortion policy
problem: forced marriages, unwanted children, domestic violence, the
health risks of numerous pregnancies in rapid succession, delinquen-
cy. Neither the right-to-life nor the pro-choice principle deal more than
superficially with the many scientific, moral, socio-economic, and emo-
tional issues arising. Under past responses to judicial policy, less is
done than is necessary to protect woman's right without doing as much
as possible to safeguard fetal rights.523
A principle of equity524 could be used to reduce the extremity
of result from focusing on either women's or fetal rights. To rectify
the lex imperfecta of these rights, rights tied to each other in biology
if not under present laws and ideologies, a correlative duty should
be imposed on the exercise of a right that serves to terminate the
fetus.52 5 As in my analysis of policy problems concerning the CIA,'26
521. See supra notes 201-14, 235 and text accompanying.
522. See Knowles, supra note 416, at 18; supra note 239 and text accompanying.
523. See L. FRANKE, THE AMBIVALENCE OF ABORTION (1978); Sass, supra note 377,
at 7 (quoting WASHINGTON EVENING STAR of Jan. 27, 1973); Gordon, The Predicament, NEW
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, July 20, 1978, at pp. 37-39; Margolis and Neary, supra note 410,
at 703, 712; Moore, supra note 396, at 431; supra notes 197, 217 and text accompany-
ing. See also Margolis and Neary, at 713 (quoting Blockner): if the anti-abortion move-
ment does not begin to address the impact of social problems and values on abortion,
it will go the way of the Anti-Saloon League. The League ignored "the fact that planned
social change can succeed only when it rests upon a consensus of values, no matter
how pluralistic the society .. "Id.
524. See Sass, supra note 377, at 98 (quoting MILWAUKEE J. of July 29, 1977);
supra note 115, infra note 546, and text accompanying.
525. See supra notes 115, 269, 395, infra notes 546, and text accompanying.
One basis for this duty, where rights conflict, is the "indispensible nexus" between
a right and "the moral-political norm of self-respect." See W. CONKLIN, supra note 253,
at 2, 5, extrapolating from the ideas of Thurgood Marshall, and from San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
526. See supra notes 236-45 and text accompanying.
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the task is one of holding "persons" who are decisionmakers account-
able under this duty, while reinforcing their legitimate scope of discre-
tion and choice. Like the right, this correlative duty should extend
to women, their doctors, and, less directly, to all of us: demonstrating
respect for life, both adult and unborn, as an end rather than a means
to some other policy goal. The abortion debate has twisted the sym-
bol "life" into either a mere physical existence or participation in a
free-wheeling, middle-class dream." ' Life means both these things
simultaneously in America, plus, for some, the effects of poverty,
racism, and the desperate search for someone to love.
On close examination, there turns out to be very little respect
for life in America. The sprawling media vulgate of a commercialized
"lifestyle" and many of our public policies reflect this sorry fact. For
example, even those legislators ostensibly dedicated to a right to life
are reluctant to put their money where their mouths are, into such
viable alternatives to abortion as sex education and contraceptives,
adoption information and support, and better medical care, nutrition,
tax benefits, and educational and occupational assistance for mothers
who wish to keep their children. 528 Forced to choose, most of these
legislators prefer policies associated with a traditional morality, a fiscal
responsibility, and keeping the Welfare State at bay (while, perhaps,
increasing military budgets and tax breaks for corporations).
Legislators may thus deserve the rebuffs regularly administered by
the Court; any society capable of desegregating southern schools and
putting a man on the moon can, if it wishes, markedly decrease the
number of abortions performed. If this is indeed the main legislative
policy goal, setting it alongside a judicial policy that will not budge-
guaranteeing a moderate degree of access to abortion facilities -would
require moderate public expenditures and a careful policy planning
and coordination. In this way, new options could emerge from policy
experimentation and competitions between legislatures and courts.
527. See supra note 395 and text accompanying.
528. See K. MOORE AND M. BURT, TEENAGE CHILDBEARING AND WELFARE: POLICY
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL ACTIVITY, PREGNANCY, AND PUBLIC DEPENDENCY (1981) (reviewed
in THE WILSON QUARTERLY, Spring 1982, pp. 45-46); Johnson and Bond, supra note 434,
at 122; Sass, supra note 377, at 151 (quoting CHICAGO TRIBUNE of Dec. 1, 1977, which
quotes chairman of an HEW panel) (the current alternatives to abortion are "suicide,
motherhood, and some would add, madness."); supra note 26 and text accompanying.
See also Auletta, Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 7, 1983, p. 32, at p. 34:
Preaching chastity may make out-of-wedlock births less socially acceptable,
but it won't prevent a teenage girl from having a baby in order to escape
an unhappy home or to have someone to love. The Reagan Administra-
tion's policies have cruelly cut the benefits and training and job oppor-
tunities of some "truly needy" Americans. On the other hand, Reagan's
efforts to drive the working poor off welfare . . . has [sic] been more suc-
cessful than is generally conceded.
(Vol. 18
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Coercive legislative restrictions on abortion have proved un-
constitutional, conferred a protective economic tariff on those who sell
abortions in the manner of pornography and illicit drugs, and created
more misery than necessary without reducing abortions as much as
possible. In our democracy, it is choice-expanding "carrots" rather than
such "sticks" that are likely to prove both constitutional and more
effective in reducing the numbers of abortions.29 Carrots can more
efficiently and effectively influence the longer-term parameters of
women's own cost-benefit analyses concerning sex and childbirth, so
as to reduce the number of abortions that prove necessary. For
example, effective childbirth subsidies would do no harm, and they
may do much good by, among other things, making tangible our
respect for life, if abortion is a meaningful alternative. This may seem
a paradox but, so long as nothing is done to curb medical and child-
rearing costs and the feminizing of poverty, the right of autonomy
and choice that must be part of a fully-elaborated respect for life will
be illusory for increasing numbers of women. Doing something con-
structive about these problems would yield many social benefits, in
addition to refuting Barney Frank's taunt that the right to life begins
at conception and ends at birth.50
529. See M. FREEMAN, supra note 27, at 52; Sass, supra note 377, at 141, 146
(quoting ROANOKE TIMES AND WORLD-NEWS of July 8, 1977, MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE of June
6, 1977, and BOSTON GLOBE of July 12, 1977); id. at 153 (quoting BOSTON GLOBE of May
6, 1978) (over time, increasing "spending dramatically to provide the full array of ser-
vice . . . may well prove the most 'economic' as well as the most socially beneficial
approach" to abortion problems); Johnson and Bond, supra note 434, at 108-10, 122-25;
id. at 125 ("most Americans would probably be shocked by a proposal to pay people
to have children."); Knowles, supra note 416, at 16.
530. I regret having lost the source of the Frank quote. See Sass, supra note
377, at 98 (quoting MILWAUKEE J. of June 29, 1977); id. at 140 (quoting ROANOKE TIMES
AND WORLD-NEWS of July 8, 1977) (adoption subsidies carry a "risk of the kind attributed
to Fagin in Dickens' Oliver Twist"); id. at 153 (quoted supra note 514); Moore, supra
note 396, at 431 ("Under restrictive laws, poor women suffer most, as reflected in
their disproportionate mortality and underrepresentation in the few hospital abortions
performed under restrictive laws.") See also Sass, at 146 (quoting MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE
of June 16, 1977): "Would the government be using financial penalties and incentives
to make poor women serve as baby factories for the childless affluent? Some poor
women are likely to think so-and with some justification."
The feminization of poverty is described by Sen. Moynihan, One-Third of a Nation,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 9, 1982, p. 18, at 21:
The welfare population today is associated ...with abandoned female-
headed families, or those that never had a father at home in the first
place, and these have in turn become the most salient aspect of poverty
in America. In 1980, white female-headed families had a median income
of $11,908, compared to $23,501 for white husband-wife families. Black
female-headed families had a median income of $7,425, compared to $18,593
for black husband-wife families.
The impact of race on poverty may help to explain why: "Abortion and out-of-wedlock
births are more common among black teens; marriage and adoption are chosen more
Brietzke: Public Policy: Contract, Abortion, and the CIA
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
Difficult issues concerning childbirth subsidies need be reached
only as a last resort. An ounce of prevention being worth a pound
of cure, many studies have shown that the best chance for reducing
the number of abortions lies in expanding the availability of sex educa-
tion and contraceptives.131 While it might seem that such programs
violate the privacy-related rights of parental authority in much the
same way as abortion does, the courts have not so held. The State's
interest in childbirth is one of seeing pregnancies carried to term,
an interest which does not extend so far as to insure that the pregnan-
cies occur in the first place. Promoting health and welfare by stem-
ming the tide of teenage pregnancy is an additional and important
interest to balance against the State interest in bolstering parental
authority. Familial privacy is thus left with fewer of the incidental
State supports that would enable dominant family members to op-
pose contraception effectively. 2 Unfortunately, there are barriers to
frequently by whites. Eighty-three percent of black and 29 percent of white teenage
mothers in 1978 were unmarried." K. MOORE AND M. BURT supra note 528 (reviewed
in THE WILSON QUARTERLY, supra note 528, at 46).
531. See Sass, supra note 377, at 146 (quoting BOSTON GLOBE of July 12, 1977);
Knowles, supra note 416, at 17 (the "widest possible dissemination" of family planning
information and services is "a major, positive, immediate step to minimize the need
for abortion .... for both moral and economic reasons."); Moore, supra note 396, at
436, 429.
Family planning expenditures per capita have the statistically most significant
impact on decreasing the number of abortions, followed by tax benefits for having
children and state day-care programs and adoption efforts, with coercive policies run-
ning far behind. Johnson and Bond, supra note 434, at 122-24. K. MOORE AND M. BURT,
supra note 528 (reviewed in THE WILSON QUARTERLY, supra note 528, at 46) summarize
several studies concerning contraception:
In 1979, 63 percent of "never-using" teen girls became pregnant, com-
pared to 14 percent of "always-users" and 30 percent of "irregular users."
Awareness of contraceptives is nearly universal. Even so, a quarter of
sexually experienced teenagers have never used any method of birth con-
trol. The reasons: ignorance, embarrassment, cost, and medical, moral, and
social objections.
Two-thirds of the teenagers surveyed in 1976 sought sex education in high school.
In another poll of college students, a majority felt that they had too little sex educa-
tion. Sass, supra note 377, at 164 (quoting MIAMI HERALD of Feb. 5, 1977). The "value
of sex education can be seen in a Lake County School District program for pregnant
girls. Prior to it, 95 percent of these girls became pregnant a second time before turning
18, but since the classes started only 6 percent have repeated." Id. at 153 (quoting
Orlando, Fla. SENTINEL STAR of June 21, 1978).
532. Compare Carey v. Population Services International, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977);
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 412-13; L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 1087; Buchanan, supra note
470, at 608, 610; Jones, supra note 377, at 588, 591; supra note 457 and text accompa-
nying, with supra notes 466-94 and text accompanying. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 448-49 (1972) the Court remarked that it would reflect a strange scheme
of values, "be plainly unreasonable," and only serve as a marginally-effective deter-
rent, for the law to prescribe "pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punish-
ment for fornication." For Justice Stevens (concurring in Carey, at 2032), the denial
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 [1984], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss4/2
1984] PUBLIC POLICY
sex education. The public generally supports sex education in schools,'
and Congress and some state legislatures appropriate small sums for
this purpose. But a local control over education frequently leads to
ignoring sex education altogether or reducing it to anatomy lessons
calculated to offend as few parents as possible. Ideally, sex education
would be treated as part of a civic education, as descriptions of the
things responsible citizens do to demonstrate society's respect for life.
Local communities are, of course, free to give such education a moral
content that does not infringe the First Amendment. The reticence
of many school districts here offers abundant scope for initiatives from
private, voluntary organizations. That these are poorly funded is an
illustration of, once again, our public and private lack of respect for life.
Minimizing the need for abortion, through sex education, con-
traception, childbirth subsidies, and ameliorating the effects of poverty
and discrimination, is the best way forward to reducing abortions
under the pragmatic morality described earlier.' Searching for policies
that would work, by expanding the range of choice and minimizing
religio-philosophical entanglements, the Court made a good beginning
in Roe but got bogged down in its own classifications. There is and
can be no substantive constitutional doctrine governing intimate rela-
tions, and our attitudes on this subject change rapidly while retain-
ing a contradictory character. We now seem to want it both ways, 3 '
asserting demands for self-fulfillment and commercialized sexual titilla-
of contraceptives to unmarried teenagers would be like forbidding the use of safety
helmets to dramatize state disapproval of motorcycles: an utterly perverse means of
control and propaganda. In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470-74 (1980)
(plurality opinion by Rehnquist, J.), a gender-neutral "statutory rape" law-applicable
to women as well as men-was seen to frustrate the State's interest in effective en-
forcement and its "strong" interest in preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancies.
533. See e.g., Sass, supra note 377, at 154 (quoting Rochester, N.Y. DEMOCRAT
CHRONICLE of July 1, 1978): a recent Gallup poll shows that 77% of Americans favor sex
education in schools, and 69% would include information about contraceptives.
534. See Sass, supra note 377, at 159 (quoting TULSA WORLD of June 11, 1977);
supra notes 415-16 and text accompanying.
535. See Sass, supra note 377, at 98 (quoting MILWAUKEE J. of June 29, 1977);
id. at 160 (quoting Houston Post of June 5, 1977); id. at 140 (quoting Lincoln NEB.
J. of Oct. 12, 1977) (prolonged discussion of sex-made HEW Secretary Califano "quite
uncomfortable"); id. at 166 (quoting DETROIT NEWS of March 26, 1977) ("We are not so
far from the Victoria era .... but we may not be so far, either, from a neo-Victorianism
when the current moral laxity has run its course"); Harrison, Book Review, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 1982, p. 27. Harrison (id. at 30) expects that
we will continue to muddle along with two contradictory ideas ... nicely
expressed by Paul Robinson, who, in his Modernization of Sex has written:
As moderns, we remain permanently divided between a Romantic past,
whose repressions we would gladly rid ourselves of, and a deromanticized
future, whose emotional emptiness we fear even while we anticipate its
greater freedom.
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tion while, at the same time, recognizing these demands to be fre-
quently tawdry, doomed to frustration, and inconsistent with the Vic-
torian, Puritanical heritage that is itself deeply contradictory. Our mud-
dle bears down most cruelly on the many teenagers who are becom-
ing sexually active earlier, to face a more protracted struggle of love,
desire, and acquiring the financial and social means sensibly to give
effect to these emotions. Many who would help the muddled, and who
pursue right-to-life aims at the same time, confuse sexual enlighten-
ment with permissiveness, hoping that the denial of information and
"easy" alternatives will deter sexual activity. Numerous studies show
these policy prescriptions to be wrongheaded: the availability of con-
traceptives has little effect on teenage sexual activity, abortion is a
traumatic rather that an easy alternative for nearly all women, and
an expanded access to abortion would not make us an aborting rather
than a contracepting nation. 6
The policy prescriptions outlined in the last few paragraphs are
widely deemed effective, yet they have failed significantly to influence
the course of abortion policy. Their implementation has been blocked
by the pro-choice and/or pro-life groups that, like pressure groups con-
cerned with national security matters, 37 will not voluntarily abandon
536. See L. FRANKE, supra note 523; K. MOORE AND M. BURT, supra note 528
(reviewed in THE WILSON QUARTERLY, supra note 528, at 46, id. at 45-46 ("Among un-
married 19-year-olds in 1979, 65 percent of white females (about one and one-half times
the 1971 rate), 89 percent of black females, 77 percent of white males, and 80 percent
of black males had had sexual intercourse."); Sass, supra note 377, at 140 (quoting
Wilmington, Del. NEWS J. of July 16, 1977) id. at 153 (quoting the Orlando, Fla. SENTINEL
STAR of June 2, 1978) ("the anti-sex-education alarmists have scared just about everyone
else from the arena and something must be done to stem the tide."); id. at 156 (quoting
WASHINGTON POST of Dec. 11, 1976) (of industrialized countries, only New Zealand, East
Germany, and Bulgaria have higher rates of teenage fertility than ours-with the
implication that American teenagers are sexually active); id. at 161-62 (quoting Portland
OREGON J. of June 26, 1978, and CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE of July 24, 1977, which discuss
research by Sylvia Hacker); id. at 167 (quoting Charlotte, N.C. OBSERVER of June 20,
1977, which discusses several studies); Gordon, supra note 523; Margolis and Neary,
supra note 410, at 712; id. at 714 (quoted infra note 538); Moore, supra note 396, at
425. See also Knowles, supra note 416, at 18:
Thi fear has sometimes been expressed that easier access to abortion
will make women careless . . . and that we may become an aborting rather
than a contracepting nation-something like the countries of Eastern
Europe. Nothing in the experience of contracepting nations, such as
England and Scandinavia, which have liberal abortion laws, would add
credence to this concern. In our own country, as in New York and Hawaii,
there has been no apparent relaxation in contraceptive vigilence. ...
But see also S. Rep. No. 465, supra note 393, at 43: '.[A]bortion weakens the marital
structure' by denying procreative responsibility and creating fundamental conflicts
between spouses with different value systems. Abortion can also isolate adolescents
from their parents by encouraging resort to a 'quick and easy' solution which evades
problems instead of resolving them through family consultation."
537. See supra notes 257, 345 and text accompanying.
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their more extremist policies. Abortion has been invested with world-
views as expansive as those fueling the "Better dead than Red" ver-
sus "Better Red than dead" dichotomy: striking off all socio-economic
fetters on women and severing totally the link between sex and pro-
creation, versus the evils of pre-marital sex and departing from idealiz-
ed traditional family roles. Reality cannot break through when a single
policy problem is burdened with more symbolism and ideology than
it can bear."' Policy collapses under the weight, and the bases for
a consensus over coping with reality either leak away or get ap-
propriated for partisan purposes by one or both of the abortion policy
rivals.
If abortion policy is to move forward, old classifications will have
to be abandoned, the excess baggage of symbolism and ideology
discarded, and more flexible rules of reason adopted to guide behavor
by stipulating what is desired but not required and allowed but not
desired." 9 Real (substantive) choice should be expanded and legal (for-
mal) choice constrained, in a compromise enhancing the value of choice
and life alike. This would not require the repression of abortion ex-
tremists; it assumes that creative policymakers can develop the
political courage to ignore extremists while acting as entrepreneurs
(statesmen) for a new policy consensus. Extremists should be moved
gently but firmly to the margins of the policy arena, where their con-
cerns would be balanced as fairly as possible under an overall con-
sensus. The number of abortions that prove necessary could then be
markedly reduced by decreasing the costs of, and increasing the
benefits from, preferred alternatives: abstinence, contraception, and
having and caring for the child.' To remedy the lex imperfecta discuss-
ed earlier," the right to control one's body should have as a correlative
duty the choice of one of these preferred alternatives to abortion.
Privacy requires that there be no prior restraint on this choice, but
538. See F. FROHOCK, supra note 30, at 251; Jones, supra note 377, at 573 (and
sources cited therein); Knowles, supra note 416, at 15; supra notes 62-63 and text
accompanying. See also Margolis and Neary, supra note 410, at 714:
Many who supported the [Anti-Saloon] League hoped that closing the
saloons not only would curb alcoholism but also would reduce problems
of poverty, crime, infidelity, and even . . . industrial absenteeism. In the
absence of widespread acceptance of the moral values of prohibition,
however, the main effects of Prohibition were corruption of public officials
and widespread defiance of the law.
Similarly . . .[m]any feel that closing the abortion clinics not only
will stop . . . the killing of innocents, but also will reinforce their concep-
tion of Judaic-Christian "family life" values of obedience to parents, chastity
before marriage, and fidelity afterwards.
539. See supra notes 362-64, 438-39 and text accompanying.
540. See Johnson & Bond, supra note 434, at 114-15; supra notes 235-37, 239
and text accompanying.
541. See supra notes 115, 269, 395, 524-26 and text accompanying.
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the reasons for choosing abortion could be the subject of an after-the-
fact evaluation. If a genuinely free choice is found to result in an abor-
tion, a sanction demonstrating society's respect for life could be im-
posed for breaches of the correlative duty. This sanction would fall
on women who elect abortions "voluntarily," without rape, incest, un-
forseeable dangers to health, or mental incapacity, and despite full
access to an expanded range of choice: to sex education, contracep-
tion, and the means for childrearing. Under an ideal morality, this
sanction would also fall on men in pari materia. Pragmatically, the
difficulties of identifying the man and the possibility of false iden-
tifications would mean that the the duty follows the right in falling
primarily on the woman. The burden would be less than at present,
however, because of an expanded range of meaningful choice.
How could sanctions on abortion be defined and imposed? Com-
munity service orders could be designed to compensate a society which
has lost valued fetuses."2 A range of choice in community service could
be allowed the woman, in line with her interests and experience. In
particular, the woman could choose to work with children but would
not be required to do so. A full due process would be required before
such a sanction could be imposed, a judicial determination that the
pregnancy was fully voluntary for this particular woman. Due pro-
cess is expensive, but any attempt to integrate women's and fetal
rights-to make the most of two, interrelated and partly-contradictory
sets of rights-is bound to prove expensive. The notion of a community
service order imposed after an abortion may seem repugnant to us,
as a modern-day version of Hester Prynne's Scarlet Letter: "A" for
Abortion rather than Adultery. If so, we may be reflecting the con-
cern for women's privacy and feelings that the Court sought to imple-
ment in Roe v. Wade. If cost, moral considerations, and competing
policies continue to block a more comprehensive approach to abortion
policy, such as the one I outline, this is perhaps the final proof that
the Roe scheme is the best we deserve and can expect.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
We permit vague, unimaginative, unsupported, and unsupportable
public policies to set an unsavory tone for society and the legal system.
We allow wooly-minded decisionmakers to duck the relevant issues
542. See Johnson and Bond, supra note 434 at at 114: "No state ... requires
a woman who has an abortion to work in a child care service, to be a foster parent,
or to stay away from her job for a period equal to that which she would have missed
had the pregnancy been taken to full term." These are the kinds of measures which
would decrease the benefits from abortion (id.) but which are too extreme to attract
a public consensus as appropriate sanctions. Sanctions would have to be designed careful-
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while they treat symptoms rather than disease. 43 Poorly understood
policies then become their own cause in the frequently sterile policy
politics that provokes a public distrust.
In sum, my suggestions for reform are simple but not, I hope,
simplistic; they revolve around what is basically an Aristotelian
argument.5 " A sensible policy process - for contracts, abortion, the
CIA, and other policy problems-would have us seek out and imple-
ment one after another of Aristotle's mean between extremes. If this
does not happen, extremes will continue to plague us as false
dichotomies of apparent policy alternatives: contract versus no-
contract, the CIA's effectiveness versus its accountability, women's
right of autonomy and choice versus the right to life. The exercise
of discretion by a decisionmaker, whether a person in business, a
national security bureaucrat, or a pregnant woman, has its Aristotelian
mean in law: between doing injustice (to a consumer, "terrorist," fetus)
and suffering injustice yourself, between having more than your share
and having less.- 5 CIA bureaucrats do not display an Aristotelian vir-
tue, given as they are to the vice of excess-just as civil libertarians
are given to the vice of deficiency-in defining and protecting national
security interests. Their claims, like those of right-to-life and pro-choice
groups, should be evaluated by independent decision-makers who have
the political and the intellectual power to resist self-interested
blandishments.
My analyses of Skirball, the national security cases, and Roe v.
Wade suggest that an Aristotelian mean cannot be fixed with
mathematical precision by operating a juridical slot machine. Aristo-
tle's mean is found, rather, through the flexible application of such
gray-area principles as equity,5" rules of reason," ' and the duty to
ly, to deter those abortions which can be deterred without prompting a laxity in en-
forcement or recourse to illegal abortions.
543. See R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 158 (policy decisions frequently consist
of "almost ritualized debate ... followed by negotiated incremental changes"); supra
notes 19, 24-26, 170, 217, 356, 522 and text accompanying.
544. See infra note 545.
545. My analyses are based on ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk.2, Chs.
6-7, 9 (pp. 40-50 in the M. Oswald translation (1962). See D. ALLAN, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF ARISTOTLE 132, 136 (1970); M. HAMBURGER, MORALS AND LAW: THE GROWTH OF ARISTO-
TLE'S LEGAL THEORY 152 (new ed. 1971); W. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY 202 (2d
ed. 1980) (quoting Gauthier-Jolif); Kelsen, Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice, in ARISTO-
TLE'S ETHICS 102, 116, 135 (J. Walsh and H. Shapiro, eds. 1967); J. RANDALL, JR. ARISTO-
TLE 268 (1968). See also F. FROHOCK, supra note 30, at 259: "Though the Aristotelian fu-
sion of ethics and politics is a long way off (some would say thankfully), the ideas
of justice and morality are vital instruments to comprehend public affairs."
546. See Tribe, supra note 10, at 102; notes 115, 269, 395, 524-26, and text
accompanying.
547. See United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (the
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pursue interests in good faith. 48 These principles are designed to
reduce the extremity of result from black and white applications of,
for example, liberty or equality, private or public interests, and dogma
or skepticism.549 In Aristotle's example about "giving and taking
money, the mean is generosity, the excess and deficiency are
extravagance and stinginess."'  The problem is, as Aristotle adds, that
generosity looks like extravagance to the stingy,551 as in recent policies
concerning welfare for the poor. Unable to decide what we want as
a society, our generosity is designed to cost as little as possible. We
attempt to have it both ways.
In the absence of a compelling alternative, we try to live as we
wish and escape the consequences of our decisions by throwing the
burden on others. We seek personal automony while preserving
fetuses. We seek complete freedom of action while binding others con-
tractually. We demand a broad civil liberties at home but demand
as well the decisive effectiveness in foreign policy thought to result
from a strong State acting abroad. Analyses based on Aristotle's mean
meaning of reasonableness "necessarily varies in the different fields of the law, because
it is used as a convenient summary of the dominant considerations which control in
the application of legal doctrines."); Medow, supra note 135, at 827 (discussed supra
note 242); supra notes 243-46, 361-65, 438-46, 451-52, 469-94, 503, 539 and text
accompanying.
548. See supra note 102 and text accompanying.
549. See Berlin, The Purpose of Philosophy, in CONCEPTS AND CATAGORIES 1, 2-3
(H. Hardy, ed. 1981) (at least one intermediate "basket" is to be found between false
dichotomy classifications of empiricism and formalism); E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at
161 ("The public/private distinction has been dealt a series of blows in the political
and scholarly world"-as in infra notes 559, 563); id. (quoted infra note 556); J.
SHELAR, supra note 24, at 118 (the policy of justice may, "in many ... areas, lead to far
worse social consequences than a policy of semi-justice, in which several incompatible
goals are allowed to live in compromise"); Spadaro, supra note 22, at 12; K. WHEARE,
supra note 356, at 20 (administration must satisfy citizens of its reasonable regard
for a balance between private and public interests); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at
19, 109, 210; Anderson, supra note 17, at 719 ("In liberal argument, equality locates
the burden of proof in making cases about justice, as freedom does in relation to the
problem of authority."); supra notes 23-24 and text accompanying. Gray-area principles
can be used to cut through much ideological argumentation:
The power and intensity of their [early Americans'] belief in liberty was
balanced by the sheer variety of interpretations of the term. . . .They
believed in something called equality .. .with almost as much intensity.
But .. . there was a great diffusion of definitions, some of them con-
tradictory. When it came to balancing the value of liberty against the
value of equality, there was still more confusion. What came out of it
all was a kind of fuzzy American ideology.
Weisberger, An Interview with James MacGregor Burns, AM. HERITAGE, Dec., 1981, 106,
at 107 (quoting Burns).
550. ARISTOTLE, supra note 545, at Bk. 2, ch. 7, p. 45.
551. Id. at Bk. 2, ch. 9, p. 48. See infra notes 598-99 and text accompanying.
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demonstrate that we can't have it both ways, can't simultaneously
attain incompatible extremes such as liberty and equality. Further,
our attempts to do so can paralyze policy in what becomes a ritualized
avoidance of tough policy questions and of the messy tradeoffs that
answering them involves. We frequently seem unable to translate our
limited understanding of and sympathy for others into action. Our
limited freedom of choice is then not translated into a correlatively
limited duty to exercise it responsibly in the public interest. Under
a lex imperfecta, we also fail (over abortion and the CIA but not con-
tracts) to delegate effective authority to decisionmakers to determine
which rights are whose in what circumstances." 2
I chose to analyze contract polices because they point up a pro-
cess, far from perfect, for dealing with relevant questions and messy
tradeoffs. Courts can, on occasion at least, move in the correct
Aristotelian direction of, for example, Charles Knapp's "contract to
552. See J. ELY, supra note 44, at 153 (prejudice distorts reality and keeps a na-
tion of minorities from perceiving the overlapping interests that bind a majority together
on an issue); Sass, supra note 377, at 98 (quoting MILWUAKEE J. of June 29, 1977); A.
WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 116 (quoting Jung) ("If a man is capable of leading a respon-
sible life himself, then he is also conscious of his duties to the community."); id. at
403 ("To rule oneself ... is not only to affirm but also to subdue the self, because
reciprocity as well as autonomy is required for self-government."); Anderson, supra
note 17, at 718 (emphasis supplied) ("It is easy enough to demonstrate that there is
no definition of the public interest to which all reasonable persons would necessarily
repair [, but it] . . .is equally easy to show that any rational policy evaluation must
give reasons for regarding a policy proposal as, in some sense, in the public interest.")'
Asaro, supra note 61, at 121-22 (discussing R. UNGER, supra note 67, at 27, 45, 61) (the
dichotomy between what is private-the realm of desire-and what is public-the realm
of reason-is false from the perspective of the psychology of an integrated personali-
ty); Asaro, at 123 (quoting R. UNGER, at 215-16) ("contrary to the liberal myth of in-
dividualism, we live in danger of succumbing to conformity; to the extent that we
eschew common bonds and beliefs, we lack the means to express the individuality
we so jealusly guard."); Asaro, at 126, 128 (discussed infra note 563); Jones, supra
note 377 at 605-07; supra notes 24, 54, 64-65, 259-60, 269 and text accompanying.
According to Tribe, supra note 10 at 99:
[Tihe whole point of personal or social choice ... is not to implement
a given set of values in the light of perceived facts, but rather to define,
and sometimes deliberately to reshape, the values-and hence the
identity-of the individual or community.. .The decision-maker, in short,
often chooses not merely how to achieve ends, but what they are and
who he is to become.
But see also Lord Radcliffe, supra note 31, at 24:
Understanding and sympathy reach further [today] ... and are more widely
diffused. In all these ways society is much stronger. But whether it is
at the same time stronger in the general process of aspirations and beliefs
which are capable of elevating the purposes which animate it and so of
sustaining its members in the darker hours .. .is rather a different ques-
tion to which there are no ready answers.
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bargain.""s This is largely because contract is an "easy" field of public
policy compared to abortion and the CIA. Contracts give rise to more
clearly-defined problems which do not change rapidly. The authority
of decisionmakers is clearly recognized by other branches and levels
of governments, so that this "lawyer's law" provokes little public
disagreement. Neither the organizational, procedural, and personnel
problems that make it difficult to hold the CIA accountable nor the
kinds of religio-philosophical dilemmas associated with abortion play
a significant role in contract.
Contract policy problems are almost entirely conceptual, and
many of these are coming to be solved after centuries of experimen-
tation. Pigeonholing is a barely-workable method for dealing with cer-
tain recurring fact patterns in contract. Outmoded categories can
sometimes be made to correspond with essences. Judges can occa-
sionally untie their predecessors' verbal knots with a sense of the
future direction for policy. This seems less likely in matters of abor-
tion and the CIA, where new policy is more frequently made to de-
fend old policies. Ever since freedom of contract lost its place at center-
stage, contract policies have been burdened with little of the sym-
bolic and ideological baggage that makes matters of abortion and CIA
policy so contentious. Unlike attitudes toward abortion, contracts
seldom express the deepest of feelings; they are means to some other
end. Contractual ethics are nearly always situational; the same per-
son may seek enforcement in some circumstances and non-enforcement
in others. Judges can thus pursue their second-best policies, plus some
idiosyncratic judgments, in a purposive, pragmatic fashion which pro-
vokes little controversy.5
As applied today, the contract/no-contract dichotomy does not
appear consistently to favor one group over another. There is no
reason to organize the kinds of pressure groups operating with regard
to abortion and the CIA. Contractual interests are restricted to im-
posing the consequences of one party's desires on the other party
to a particular contract and lawsuit, and, perhaps, to contracting
around disagreeable precedents. The thinly-stretched fabric of policy
does not get manipulated as ruthlessly as in matters of abortion and
the CIA. With the consumer protection movement in abeyance, there
are few calls for legislative or executive intervention. Contract is not
much of a political issue.
Judges retain a broad discretion within a distinctive contracts
553. See supra notes 75, 88, 114 and text accompanying.
554. See T. HUGHES, supra note 125, at 24; D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 3; J. SHKLAR,
supra note 24, at 33; supra notes 20, 31, 36, 40, 67, 73, 76, 109, 116, 186, 342, 356,
380, 427, 509, 538 and text accompanying.
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decisionmaking role seen to cause no separation of powers problems.
Their discretion is exercised as an essential part of conventional
dispute resolution in a weak, "nightwatchman" State. This discretion
appears narrowly constrained by the facts of the case, and by the
need for logical applications of pre-existing rules and categories. An
institutional capacity to formulate and implement policy effectively
makes contract a feasible realm for a rather decentralized policy
activism. The adversary system seems to generate all (or nearly all)
of the information necessary to a policy decision. There is some of
the gibberish but little of the secrecy and "disinformation" attending
decisions by and about the CIA. Secrecy and disinformation are dealt
with fairly effectively under contract (and tort) doctrines of burdens
of proof, misrepresentation, the modern parol evidence rule, etc. Little
importance is attached to policy planning for contract law or, indeed,
to a consistency among decisions or among jurisdictions in the same
type of decision. Specialized theory can be used to more or less resolve
the specialized problems of contract ad hoc. It is not necessary to
generalize theories of political philiosophy, like those called for in deci-
sionmaking involving abortion or the CIA. It is this philosophizing
which causes us to flounder."'5
A. Weak State, Strong State
It comes as no surprise that overtly political processes generate
many of the problems of, and some of the solutions to, our more dif-
ficult issues in public policy. As we have seen, decisionmaking in the
areas of abortion and the CIA give rise to conceptual false dichotomies
much like those found in contract law. Abortion and the CIA also
pose another false dichotomy general enough to plague many policy
areas: pluralism versus absolutism (true believership in an all-
encompassing policy solution). Described structurally, the dichotomy
is between a libertarian, weak State and a paternalistic, strong State.
The dichotomy can also be described conceptually: an eighteenth-
century constitutionalism, with all the checks and balances of a separa-
tion of powers, versus the Germanic legal-rational legitimacy, organized
in a hierarchy of disciplined, concentrated powers, proposed by Max
Weber and Hans Kelsen.
The Weber/Kelsen model is very attractive to those who try to
implement the fragmented policies of fragmented institutions operating
555. See D. LLOYD, supra note 3, at 2; Hurst, supra note 6, at 406 (in the 1950s,
at least, "professionals found no basic concern over the legitimacy or competency of
the common-law style of policymaking."); Reiter, Good Faith in Contract, 17 VAL. U.L.
REV. 705, 728-29 (1983); supra notes 41, 64, 83, 87, 117, 125, 265-68, 305 and text accom-
panying. But see also M. Kelman, supra note 210: "The failures of legal scholarship
are really no different in kind than the failures of our political imagination. ... "
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under short time horizons. Such policy technocrats will never dominate
the overall process, however. Many a policy issue is cast in a form
which requires that two questions be answered: how do we solve it,
and will the solution interfere with our liberties? The blind eye of
our inattention may be turned to particular areas of policy for long
periods, up to about 1970 for abortion and the CIA alike, and
technocrats such as doctors performing abortions and national security
bureaucrats would retain a substantial discretion under most
foreseeable policy schemes. Yet we stand firm in wanting no Platonic
Guardians, those who would hold the polity together by defining the
public interest for "us" free of interference. We find "them," these
"neutral" experts who are outsiders under our constitutionalism and
ideal of popular sovereignty, to be frequently incompetent. They are
captured by their charges and caught maximizing budgets, power and
personal security rather than the-public interest. What we try for
is an Aristotelian process, with a distinctly American accent, instead.
Individualized policy choices are tinged with a populism reacting to
the expertise displayed in policies about energy, Vietnam, the Great
Society, and the like."' What we do expect from our bureaucrats is
the effective implementation of our ill-defined, dichotomous, contradic-
tory policies.
These unrealistic expectations are in large part the fruits of our
inability to come to terms with the limits of an irrevocably "mixed"
556. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (courts are not
our Platonic Guardians, and they encounter disapproval when they act as such over
abortion); J. ELY, supra note 41, at 117 (quoting Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice,
81 YALE L.J. 575, 585 (1972)) ("An argument for letting the experts decide when the peo-
ple's representatives are uncertain or cannot reach agreement is an argument for pater-
nalism and against democracy."); R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 31; T. Franck, supra
note 230 (we believe foreign policy too important to be left to anything other than
a populist politics); J. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 48 (our resentment of experts echoes
Hofstader's ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE and our experiences with Vietnam,
the "expert's war"); F. FROHOCK, supra note 30, at 179; E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at 161
("the politics/administration dichotomy of Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson simply
does not work" and the "separation of powers doctrine, so dear to the heart of American
democratic ideology, is also in some difficulty."); id. (quoted supra note 549); C. LIND-
BLOM, supra note 3, at 11 (on our recent cynicism, a distrust of, e.g., a public utility's
analysis of the need for nuclear power, and our anti-rationalism, a feeling that much
is missed in statistics and bloodless catagories); F. MARX, supra note 356, at 55; A.
WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 109 (elitist policy model of an intellectually-guided society
versus a non-elitist policy model echoing Mills's On Liberty- "every one well knows
himself to be fallible"); G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 163 (1981) (our's
an Aristotelian blend of mild regimes, a medium mediorum, a compound Republic);
id. at 209 (conflicts between parties, Federalists v. Jeffersonians, Jacksonians v.
Republicans, Lincolnians v. Whigs, New Deal Democrats v. business Republicans, etc.,
were attempts to achieve "a mean of means, a blend of previously tempered and
moderate types."); Carron, supra note 7 at 293; Frye, supra note 18, at 226-27; de
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economy and polity. Under so uneven a mix, "all good things do not
cohere and . . .many good things (such as political pluralism) have
perverse effects (such as the unceasing battle of parties and pressure
groups)."55 ' A tragic flaw can be detected in what Barry Karl describes
as our Uneasy State: the evident need for consistent, effective national
policies overlaying and sometimes overwhelming our commitment to
autonomous individuals as the foundation of democracy.558 The incon-
sistency of result obtaining in the private and the public spheres that
coexist in our Uneasy State is demonstrated by the false dichotomies
I have analyzed. Liberal democracy is alive in such policies as freedom
of contract, an insistence that the CIA respect civil liberties at home
(and perhaps abroad), and woman's privacy and freedom to choose an
abortion-so long as the State doesn't have to pay for it. The pater-
nalistic or strong State can be found in judicial and legislative interven-
tions in the parties' bargains, in the CIA defining national security
requirements for us, and in some groups purporting to decide choice
and right to life issues for others. In many such areas, we flit bet-
ween weak and strong State policy extremes because we cannot reach
an Aristotelian mean appropriate to our mixed polity.5 9
This unease resulting from confusions of power and policy is in-
evitably echoed in our political philosophies. Liberal democracy would
Long, supra note 31, at 886-87; Kristol, supra note 256 (quoted supra note 256); Thurber,
supra note 19, at 416-17; supra notes 18-19, 57, 67, 73, 145, 150, 188, 255-56, 404.
557. Hoffman, Raymond Aron (1905-1983), N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 8, 1983, 6,
at 8. See supra note 377 and text accompanying.
558. B. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE (1983). See Raskin, supra note 120, at 205,
passim (analyses of our Dual State).
559. See P. ATIYAH, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 86 (1983) (in a mixed economy and
pluralistic society with a succession of governments, many laws will serve conflicting
goals and values); Lowi, Introduction, in PRIVATE LIFE AND PUBLIC ORDER vii (T. Lowi,
ed. 1968) (book title represents two ways of looking at the same thing, society pro-
viding and surviving-activities in which the inseparable private and public spheres
will always be at odds); D. O'BRIEN, supra note 34, at 231 (American way of life includes
the "right to be let alone," individualism, and the rule of law); A. WILDAVSKY, supra
note 5, at 109; Asaro, supra note 61, at 127, 138 (mainstream American political thought,
from Madison to Nozick, has stressed the primacy of the private sphere and of protec-
ting it from intrusion; this renders impossible the on-going decisionmaking and par-
ticipation that Unger would introduce into the workplace); Wieseltier, supra note 173,
at 8 ("The struggle between democracy and totalitarianism"- or, I would add,
paternalism-"did not end in 1945, because it is a struggle between different answers
to some of the most fundamental questions of human life".- questions reflected in nuclear
arms and abortion policies); supra notes 29, 202-04, 209-13, 218-20, 253, 302, 325 and
text accompanying; infra note 563. See also G. SAWER, supra note 2, at 21-22: "The real
difficulty is that the United Kingdom, and Australia, have improvised a Welfare State
which cannot work without vesting large powers in government, but have been unable
to admit and face the consequences. We have all, Micawber-like, been waiting for
something to turn up" (id.) or, I would add, been seeking to visit the "consequences"
on others.
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have all of us registering relative preferences to remain in force for
the time being; strong State officials seek to bind the future under
overarching universals, and to then convince dissidents that this is
for the good of all. The means to these ends oscillate back and forth
between an expedient opportunism and such elaborate idealisms"" as
the law and economics of the Chicago School and the constitutional
jurisprudence of Herbert Weschler and Alexander Bickel .5 " These
oscillations are illustrated by the tactics of pressure groups over abor-
tion and the CIA, and by decisionmakers' responses to these tactics.
Despite the distinctive contributions of an American pragmatism to
philosophy, particularly in the application of a situational yet purposive
morality to public affairs, little is found to lie between an American
Machiavellism (or positivism) and its Confucian (or Idealist) opposite:
Americans are great at general, pious formulations. We're
also great at practicalities: "How do we do this tomorrow?"
But the linkage between the two is often weak, so that when
people are in power, there is no strategy-there are no
norms by which to set up a hierarchy among certain kinds
of freedom. 5
2
It is precisely the weakness, and the absence, of these philosophical,
institutional, and legal links that is responsible for the false
560. See C. LINDBLOM, supra note 3, at 66; E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 21-24;
Lackland, supra note 403, at 487 (quoted supra note 415); Schwartz, supra note 217
(quoted supra note 217).
561. See e.g., Berlin, supra note 549 (discussed supra note 549); A BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); R. POSNER, supra note 93; Posner supra note 24;
Weschler, supra note 401. See also G. JACOBSOHN, supra note 76, at 164-68.
562. Weisberger, supra note 549, at 107 (quoting James MacGregor Burns). See
G. JACOBSOHN, supra note 76, at 169 (the need to develop the means for reconciling
principle and expediency in a principled fashion, through, e.g., the "passive virtues"
of judical deference); G. LENSKI, supra note 256, at 30 (discussed supra note 415); Ran-
som, supra note 136, at 206; F. MARX, supra note 356, at 55; J. SHKLAR, supra note 24,
at 15 (fear of the arbitrary and the expedient gives legalism its political uses); J.
STONE, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 14 (1966) (Australian jurist's assertion that to move
in the correct direction is to follow John Dewey's pragmatism and instrumentalism,
Veblen's institutionalism, Holmes's realism, Charles Beard's economic determinism, and
perceptions of history as a means for understanding the present and guiding the future);
Lackland, supra note 398, at 487 (discussed supra note 415); supra notes 28, 41, 73,
100, 234, 427, 534, 27, 38, 63, 90, 226, 421, 519 and text accompanying; infra note 599
and text accompanying.
According to A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 57 (quoting Charles Hersh), reform-
minded liberals see troubled individuals and blame this on the environment; con-
servatives see a troubled environment and blame this on individuals. Liberals despair
because too little has been accomplished, and conservatives despair because too much
has been attempted. Id. at 87. Their despair frequently causes conservatives to adopt
liberal strategies, and vice versa. Id. at 57. Policy implementation is confused:
The pragmatic liberal, acting within a "consensus" he seeks both to foster
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dichotomies of policy, the inability to reach an Aristotelian mean by
tinkering.
Weak and nonexistent policy linkages mean that governmental
structures frequently do not correspond with their contemporary policy
functions. Important functions thus spawn incoherent new structures,
such as the CIA and the Office of Economic Opportunity created to
coordinate Great Society programs. Being incoherent, these structures
necessarily spawn incoherent policies.
My analyses of abortion show how little more than a standoff
can result from policies made in several different ways, for different
purposes and effects, by the various branches and levels of govern-
ment. This is a recurring consequence of our having repudiated the
British style of cabinet government in Parliament; intricate and ardu-
ous lawmaking processes were designed to keep the American State
weak. Constitutional separations and diffusions of power were invita-
tions to compete in what we might now call the jealous maintenance
of one's "turf' in policy formulation. Checks and balances are used
to frustrate the formation of some of the policy links that would em-
power rival policymakers to coordinate activities. This eighteenth-
century system encourages a weak-State inertia over policy, and ab-
dications of responsibility for it. Where these tendencies become suf-
ficiently formalized and permanent, uncertainties of policy and power
in the face of a perceived crisis lead one or more branches of govern-
ment to delegate their powers in the form of a blank check. This is
how narrow, strong State exceptions get carved out of liberal
democratic processes." 3 The CIA, for example, came to power under
and to manipulate, frees himself from political values, only to find that
he has bound himself to react pragmatically to events as they occur, able
to judge only their urgency and not their importance.
Fairlie, A Radical and a Patriot, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 28, 1983, 25, at 28. We have
a phrase describing this kind of policymaking: "crisis management." Id.
563. See G. WILLS, supra note 556, at xvi (pluralists, led by Harold Laski, see
ours as the least possible government, a fail-safe that will abort any organized political
program); Asaro, supra note 61, at 126, 128 (discussing THE FEDERALIST No. 49 and
ideas of Unger) (public constraints on private actions are seen as necessary evils, under
the separation of the public and the private institutionalized by the Federalist political
system); id. at 127, 138 (discussed supra note 559); Brietzke, supra note 202; supra
notes 26, 31, 141, 158, 167, 174, 218, 229-31, 514, 537, infra note 581, and text
accompanying. Each policy technique "can be studied through the filters of congres-
sional politics, electoral politics, group politics, bureaucratic politics, judicial politics,
and the politics of federalism." Ripley, Introduction, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THEIR
POLITICS vii, xiv (R. Ripley, ed. 1966). These "filters" are responsible for differences in
the rigor of enforcement, in the degree of continuing involvement by interest groups,
in partisan debate, in the likelihood of exemptions and loopholes, and in the degree
to which original purposes can be subverted. Id. at xv. R. EYESTONE, supra note 6,
at 123-24, offers the case study of public housing, where a long series of incremental
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the judicial deference of the political question doctrine and a congres-
sional deference to executive branch claims about national security
needs for the Cold War."4
These kinds of institutional pressures toward strong State
exceptions are reinforced by politically-influential demands for the
national security, economic growth, and corporate and individual
welfare programs that cannot be delivered under the privatism and
proceduralism of our eighteenth-century Constitution. These programs
always seem urgent, and there is always the danger that they cannot
be immunized from vetoes by dissident groups or governmental agen-
cies. Immunity is thus sought under the European-style laws of social
administration that operate with regard to the CIA."5
Beginning with Carotene Products566 in 1938, the Supreme Court
sought to homologize these laws with the older law of liberal
democracy. The "fit" of these two bodies of law has not improved
much over time, as is illustrated by recent court decisions over
national security and, less clearly, by some abortion decisions.- 7 There
changes decreased policy effectiveness while increasing its complexity. Congress more
or less gave up and deferred to the housing bureaucracy. These bureaucrats tried
to make use of the private developers active in the housing field. These speculators
made a few repairs to get FHA mortgages; when mortgage payments were not made
and the houses fell apart, the FHA was left holding them. Id.
R. UNGER, supra note 67, at 175-76 (quoted in Asaro, supra note 61, at 125) explains
the emergence of strong State exceptions as the outcome of attempts by the "welfare-
corporate" State to displace the liberal social order:
Private institutions assume more and more of the responsibilities previously
committed to government, or, without undertaking its responsibilities, they
begin to resemble its organization and to imitate its power . . . [in a]
universalization of bureaucracy .... At the same time, a wealth of public
bodies come into being that are only perilously connected with one another
and that are as close, in interest, outlook, or ... organization, to "private"
institutions as they are to the traditional agencies of government.
Similarly, H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 60-61 (1959) argues that, under modern
capitalism, the public realm has been made to serve the private realm. Everyday af-
fairs of peoples and communities come to cared for by "a kind of 'collective housekeep-
ing'; the collective of families economically organized into the facsimile of one super-
human family is what we call 'society,' and its political form of organization is called
'nation."' Id. at 28. But see also Asaro, at 144-45, passim (distinguishing Arendt's from
Unger's approaches).
564. See supra notes 265-315, 325-26 and text accompanying.
565. Supra notes 223-26 and text accompanying. See G. SAWER, supra note 2,
at 21-22 (quoted supra note 559). See supra notes 148, 227-33 and text accompanying.
566. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Carolene aban-
doned Lochner v..N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in a nearly complete judicial abdication
to legislative socio-economic judgments which do not fall within specific constitutional
prohibitions; political processes can be relied upon for the repeal of undesirable
legislation.
567. See supra notes 151, 223-25, 275-97, 479-91, 559, 563 and text accompanying.
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is little in our jurisprudence and governmental structures to guarantee
the integrity of the laws of social administration cut loose from liberal
democratic processes. Rarely, in other words, do these laws attain
the ideals described by Kelsen and Weber, ideals sought by many
policy theorists.
Under the theorists' model, policy moves logically down a cen-
tral hierarchy and toward the increasingly specific and concrete ap-
plications of rules held consistent with each other. In contrast to their
desires, the American reality is one of numerous discrete hierarchies,
each with many gaps and weak points. As in CIA and abortion
policymaking, the requirements of constitutions, statutes, regulations,
and court decisions are frequently ignored, consciously or uncon-
sciously. Key rules in a policymaking hierarchy are often missing, part
of the lex imperfecta of rights without duties, or too unclear to
establish what is an adequately authorized act. Administration in-
evitably acquires an intensely political character, through the exer-
cise of discretion and choice without a meaningful accountability or
the feedback channels that cause problems encountered downstream
in policy processes to spur reforms upstream.68 The CIA illustrates
all of these tendencies. It pursues its own or the president's personal
interests, and no amount of executive branch coordinating commit-
tees or guidelines seems to change this. 69 Neither a separation nor
a concentration of powers seems a plausible description of the discon-
tinuous, unintegrated concentrations that serve as our policy process.'
See also supra notes 265-68, 468-78 and text accompanying.
Americans found in law the prime means for increasing collective capacities
while, at the same time, protecting prized individual wills against public encroach-
ment. J. HURST, supra note 271, at 44. The introduction of laws of a social administra-
tion, beginning in the 1930s, disrupted this ideal relation, which has yet to be firmly
restored. Discussing the contractual terms the CIA imposed on Snepp (see supra notes
293-95 and text accompanying), Medow, supra note 135, at 811, concludes that the CIA
could impose only those conditions that its bargaining power justified and
that current political mores tolerated. [But] neither the Constitution nor
any other legal doctrine would play any role in the checking process. The
distribution of benefits would be deemed the dispersal of "privileges",
a process over which the state possessed plenary legal power.
568. These themes are developed in greater detail in Brietzkc, Administrative
Law and Developnent: The American 'Model' Evaluated, 26 How. L.J. 645, 654-57,661-68
(1983). See e.g., E. LEwis, supra note 123, at 161 (quoted supra note 231); C. LINDBLOM,
supra note 3, 66-67 (quoted supra note 224); supra notes 68, 231 and text accompanying.
569. See supra notes 306-24 and text accompanying. In domestic policy, the
president must work very hard to keep government from running without him. R.
LINEBERRY, supra note 310, at 56-57; J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note 16, at 16, (citing
Ted Sorenson).
570. See E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at 172; id. ("Balance wheel notions of
federalism and separation of powers are less applicable today than ever before."); P.
NONET AND P. SELZNICK, supra note 33, at 103 (quoted infra note 581).
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B. Clearing the Policy Streams
Our Uneasy State has an unevenly mixed legal system, the
reform of which requires more than a bit of tinkering here and there.
A patient clearing of the policy streams is in order to improve the
workings of both the liberal democratic and the strong State aspects
of government. The competition inevitable in politics can be turned
to good use by reducing the restraints on competition over policy.
Freer "markets" in policy information and ideas, and in the
entrepreneurship (statesmanship) necessary to form a consensus
around the best ideas, can be attained without creating a standoff
by opening up the public and private channels of communication. 7'
A great deal of conceptual underbrush must be cleared away, as I
have tried to do... in three, fairly narrow areas. Policymaking must
be reworked into closer approximations of the liberal democratic pro-
cesses presupposed by the Constitution but rarely attained in
practice--the Baker v. Carr57' writ large among levels and branches
571. See, Tribe, supra note 10, at 104 (no reason to assume that the Invisible
Hand will leave all important values accounted for, in a multitude of tunnel-visioned
analyses for a multitude of clients); supra notes 338-39 and text accompanying. See
also J. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 58 (quoting J. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS,
1926): 'One disquieting symptom is the frequency with which, when a new reform is
suggested, ways are sought to 'keep it out of politics.' Politics is the democratic way
of governing; it is becoming necessary, then, to keep government itself out of politics."
My approach shares some common elements with John Hart Ely's "representation-
reinforcing theory of judical review." J. ELY, supra note 44, at 181. E.g., constitutional
adjudication should take on an antitrust rather than a regulatory orientation. Id. at
101 (citing Alfred Kahn). But with policy as my focus, my reform proposals go further
(are more "activist") to involve all branches and levels of government. Compare id.
at 73-179 with infra notes 572-612 and text accompanying. It is certainly true that
"unblocking stoppage in the democratic process is what judicial review ought
preeminently to be about .. " J. ELY, at 117. Ely's goal is also a major purpose of
mine: extension of a meaningful franchise (a dominant constitutional theme since the
14th amendment was enacted) to achieve "a political process open to all on an equal
basis and a consequent enforcement of the representative's duty of equal concern and
respect to minorities alike." Id. at 99; see infra notes 584-85 and text accompanying.
Under such a scheme, "everyone's interests will be actually or virtually represented
at the point of substantive decision, and ... the processes of individual application
will not be manipulated to reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination that is
impermissible in theory." J. ELY, at 101. See id. at 153 (quoted supra note 552).
572. See, e.g. supra notes 28, 34, 54, 57-59, 67, 64, 73, 75, 88, 186-90 and text
accompanying.
573. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Equal Protection violated by a state legislative dis-
tricting which caused the votes of more populous districts to be "debased" relative
to votes in less populous districts). In deciding the case, the Court announced guidelines
useful to other reform-minded branches and levels of government. These concern the
limits on effective intervention posed by constitutions and an institutional incompetence,
the ability efficiently to pursue policy through a division of labor among the branches
and levels of government, the existence of manageable legal standards, the need for
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of government that I will describe. Decisions about the best means
to implement freshly-conceived, democratically-chosen policies would
guide the reform of governmental institutions from time to time,
within the broad parameters of the constitutional document rather
than the narrower constraints imposed by conventional techniques of
governance. It would then become clear that many conflicts between
weak State and strong State are more apparent than real. Their better
fit and a broader public consensus over policy would have the effect
of moving many conflicts to the margin, where they can be adjusted
more easily. 7
In a republican democracy, policymaking is a determination of
what, precisely, our interests really are, who implements these in-
terests, and which means promise a creative implementation under
constraints imposed by the pursuit of our other interests. It becomes
much more difficult to hide a policy incompetence when means, ends,
and the fit between them are defined in public. Justice Brennan puts
it thus:
[T]he First Amendment . . . has a structural role to play
in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government.... Implicit in this structural role is not only
"the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" . . . but the antecedent
assumption that valuable public debate-as well as other
civic behavior-must be informed. The structural model
links the First Amendment to that process of communica-
tion necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails
solicitude not only for communication itself, but for the in-
dispensable conditions of meaningful communication."'
But there is little "communication" that is not at cross-purposes con-
cerning the policy extremes of contract, the CIA, abortion, and many
other policy areas. There has been little effort "to do what Publius
uniform and consistent policies in the area under discussion, and the striking of a
balance between the "unusual need" to question a political decision and the need to
respect other branches of government. See id. at 217; G. WILLS, supra note 556, at
175; infra note 575 and text accompanying. This is a rather "unstable" formulation
from the doctrinal standpoint-see L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 71-72 n.1 and sources cited
therein-but this is another way of saying that it is flexible enough to meet changing
circumstances and needs.
574. See Lowi, supra note 559, at vii (ideal relation between public and private
spheres in America always shifting); Gilbert, supra note 229, at 127; supra notes 167,
175, 229, 235, 521-27 and text accompanying.
575. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
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said must be done: consult "the genius of the people" about placing
"the common above the private good." '576
Public attention will vary from policy to policy, but consultation
is always necessary because those steps bringing about the most
effective government action are also those which broaden and inform
the debates through which consensus is discovered. It does not do
to rejoice, along with some political scientists, when apathy keeps away
from policy those who are thought least capable of making wise
choices. A public without responsibilities cannot be expected to behave
responsibly, particularly when the passion for unaccountable power
through a governmental secrecy discourages public attention and
responsibility. A badly-informed public sends inconsistent messages
to the politicians and bureaucrats who, in any event, tend toward in-
ertia, vacillation, or attempts to satisfy pressure group desiderata.
Different kinds of policies get made in areas of informed public in-
volvement, primarily because public knowledge differs from that of
the experts' over, for example, nuclear power and arms control."" Such
rejections of a policymaking competence, the "credibility gap" I
examined in relation to the CIA,57 come about as citizens balance
rationally the sometimes irrationally-perceived gains and losses flow-
ing from contacts with government as a whole, and from experiences
with particular programs. Government is frequently found seriously
wanting, and unless "society finds a blend of leadership styles, new
policies and institutional reforms that build public confidence, one can
expect to see increasing erosion of the support on which effective
democratic government ultimately rests."579
Informed public evaluations of public policy are the most
difficult- accurate information the hardest to obtain-in the many
576. G. WILLS, supra note 556, at 216. (Publius is probably James Madison, in
THE FEDERALIST). See id. at 225 (discussing Madison's Federalist No. 10) (in a republic,
as opposed to a democracy, the public view is refined and enlarged; it is not sacrified
to temporary or partial considerations); supra notes 6-7, 197, 236-39, 243, 259 and text
accompanying. See also Anderson, supra note 17, at 717, 719 (quoted infra note 613);
id. (citing Franz Neuman): "The logic of public policymaking requires that the burden
of proof rests always with the state. . . . It is hard to imagine how the presumption
can be reversed [while retaining'] . . . any meaningful sense of political discourse." Id.
577. See A. CARNESALE, et al., LIVING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 10, 200 (1983); G.
EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 162; R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 166-67; A. WILDASKY,
supra note 5, at 116 (quoted supra note 552); id. at 275-76; H. WILENSKY, supra note
123, at 130-33 (quoted in part supra note 196); Kristol, supra note 256 (quoted supra
note 256); Medow, supra note 135, at 823 (quoted supra note 261); supra note 357,
359, 413, 559, 563, infra note 582, and text accompanying.
578. See supra notes 255-56 and text accompanying. See also supra notes 6-8,
18-19 and text accompanying.
579. P. KOSTINEN, supra note 120, at 19n (quoting Alan Westin's analysis of a 1978
Lou Harris poll).
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areas where a broad, Aristotelian balancing of interests seems
necessary. My analyses of abortion and CIA policies emphasize a major
reason for this: the manipulation of information and influence that
pressure groups, seeking to tilt the policy balance, practice on deci-
sionmakers and the public. Whether a tilt, toward the CIA for exam-
ple, or a standoff, in abortion policy for example, is the result, the
tendency is to foreclose the kind of policy alternatives that could com-
mand a consensus if they are, in fact, allowed to compete."s A recent
study by Magaziner and Reich concludes that
it will be difficult for the U.S. to achieve the sort of con-
sensus upon which industrial policy must rest. Such a con-
sensus is necessary to ensure that the sacrifices . . . are
willingly endured . . . [and] that no group is forced to bear
a disproportionate share of the burden .... But consensus-
forming institutions ... have deteriorated over the last two
decades. Political parties, civic organizations, religious
organizations, charities, and other broad groups have been
replaced . . . by special interest organizations that seek
narrow legislative goals ...
[Cloalitions are fleeting. Attention spans are short.
Issues rise and fall with a rapidity and specificity that
render comprehensive policymaking all but impossible.
[I]ssues must be at or near a point of crisis, and already
distilled into relatively clear choices, before a large enough
coaliton can be mustered to get action.5 1
Despite the firm repudiation that was one reason for the Civil
War, John C. Calhoun's notion of governance through concurrent
majorities-the "vice of faction" James Madison tried to circumvent-
continues to reappear in various guises. Groups try to monopolize a
narrow policy in order to exercise a veto in particular areas regardless
of any broader consensus. A careful handicapping of the interest group
horse race would force a group's influence to more closely approx-
imate its real stake in the public interest. A few mistakes and many
580. See Polsby, Policy Analysis and Congress, 18 PUBLIC POLICY 61, 70 (1969);
supra notes 31, 34, 54-57, 66, 73, 197, 217, 304, 427, 433-35 and text accompanying.
581. I. MAGAZINER AND R. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS 377-78 (1982). See
P. NOENT AND R. SELZNICK, supra note 33, at 103:
There is the spectre of a multitude of narrow-ended, self-regulating
institutions, working at cross-purposes and bound to special interests; of
a system impervious to direction and leadership, incapable of setting
priorities; of a fragmented and impotent polity in which the very idea
of public interest is emptied of meaning.
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complaints would result from decisions taken by independent handi-
cappers under due process standards. But this would be preferable
to what currently obtains: each group defines its own stake under
conditions of a political market failure. The broad consensus groups
mentioned by Magaziner and Reich would have to be revitalized.
Overrepresented interest groups should be reined in. Their con-
tributions to political candidates and other not-so-subtle corruptions
should be strictly regulated, and their "iron triangles" broken down.
Otherwise, these coalitions of a pressure group with its captive ad-
ministrative agency and coopted legislators will continue to coordinate
power in extra-constitutional ways which injure the public interest.
Achieving a balance may, in some areas, mean stimulating the
organization of groups otherwise underrepresented in politics and the
economy, groups whose members otherwise tend to become victims
rather than clients of policy programs. Policies should be designed
as less susceptible to group veto through a reliance on the kinds of
carrots (rather than the sticks whose force can usually be deflected)
I described in relation to abortion. Procedural rules should consistently
strike a balance between the need to avoid delay and inflexibility,
and the need to insure the consideration of all relevant factors and
a representation of the underrepresented. Explicit procedures are
needed across that board, to keep decisionmakers, driven by pressure
groups, from collapsing process into results and results into a policy
jumble. 2
582. See J. ELY, supra note 44, at 135 (even in an "open process," some will obtain
advantages at the expense of others -which makes "a travesty of the equality princi-
ple" despite the existence of one person, one vote); id. at 153; id. at 99, 101, 117, 181
(quoted supra note 571); A. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 121 ("democratization" in the manage-
ment of health care); F. FROHOCK, supra note 30, at 65-66; W. GELLHORN, supra note 350,
at 421; E. LEwis, supra note 123, at 109-10; C. LINDBLOM, supra note 2, at 94-96 (the per-
mitting of veto powers reflects a concern for liberty rather than popular control over
policy, but this has a high and rising price in an era of collective rather than distribu-
tional problems); A. MELONE, supra note 10, at 16-17 (quoting Harmon Zeigler, who cites
studies by David Reisman and associates); P. NONET AND P. SELZNICK, supra note 33,
at 103 (quoted supra note 581); Ripley, supra note 563 (discussed supra note 563); J.
SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note 16, at 13 (Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1973 at-
tempts to avoid the dominance of congressional committees by an agency, but its re-
quirement of public access is evaded; many influential events occur by 'phone or per-
sonal contact); Stedman, supra note 10, at 150-51; G. WILLS, supra note 556, at 101 (con-
flicting interests will mobilize themselves, without waiting to be sorted out in constitu-
tional functions, under such systems as Calhoun's "concurrent majorities" or Robert
Dahl's "polyarchy"); id. at 190 (quoting David Hume) (the check of honor on behavior
is largely removed when people act in a group); id. at 193 (quoting Hume) ("Factions
subvert government, render law impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men
... who ought to give mutual assistance and protection .... '); Beer, Federalism, Nationalism,
and Democracy in America, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 9, 17-18 (1978); Beer, supra note 5, at 25
(Daniel Webster was the main opponent of John C. Calhoun's challenge to nationalism -
"the very idea of an American people, as constituting a single community, is a mere chimera.");
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C. Securing a Policy Competence
The kind of attention Felix Frankfurter asked us to pay to (policy)
procedures is certainly necessary, but it is not sufficient to the making
id., passim; Bullock, supra note 298, passim; Hurst, supra note 6, at 440-41; Majone, supra
note 3, at 62 (typically, we know the policy chosen but not the decision rules; if these exist,
they are frequently ambiguous or rationalized after the fact.); Tribe, supra note 10, at
84-86; supra notes 64, 229, 415, 427, 433-35, 537 and text accompanying.
Any economic policy that failed to attract attempts at a veto by the National
Association of Manufacturers, the AFL-CIO, the National Farm Organization and/or
the NAACP would have to be pretty weird or have its true purpose hidden. The hiding
of purpose sometimes succeeds in Congress, and was a technique frequently used by
President Johnson. G. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 38; R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 35.
Political Action Committees (PACs) have achieved an undue influence by cer-
tain interest groups and, perhaps, corruption. The availability of campaign money is
closely related to the ability to defeat incumbents. PACs donated 19% of such funds
in 1980, chiefly to Republican non-incumbents. Organized under the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. SS 431-456 (1976 and Supp. V 1981), PACs were initially
allowed to contribute no more than $1,000 to a candidate in each election (id. at S
441a). This spending limit was invalidated in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), with
the result that PAC's proliferated to upset the balance between local constituent
representation and national responsibilities in Congress. Wary of unlimited political
expenditures by unaccountable groups, Congress has discussed legal reforms. Reform
efforts are limited by Buckley, however. Adamany, Political Action Committees and
Democratic Politics, 1983 DETROIT COLL. OF L. REV. 1013, 1015-20, 1023, 1026 (1983); Ferris
and Ballard, Independent Political Action Groups: New Life for the Fairness Doctrine,
36 VANDERBILT L. REV. 929, 930-31 (1983). See id. passim. The Court clearly needs to re-
think Buckley, and may do so after the 1984 elections; the rule should be that "institu-
tional PACs .. . are not citizens for purposes of the franchise and related activities."
Adamany, at 1027-28.
In constitutional terms, pressure group politics suggest either that The Federalist
No. 10 was wrong, making No. 51 necessary, or that No. 10 was right, making No.
51 superfluous and destructive of what No. 10 accomplished. See G. WILLS, at xvii
(quoting James MacGregor Burns). An inability to think through reforms can in no
small measure be blamed on our political scientists' dominant ideology, their deadlock
formulation of an interest group pluralism. Contra this ideology, the Invisible Hand
does not advance the public interest as if my magic. Due to serious political market
failures, the power to make public policy cannot safely be parcelled out to private
groups. A little here, a little there for overrepresented groups never solves anything,
and it is the antithesis of a rational ordering of priorities. See T. DYE, supra note 1,
at 23 ("ideological myopia" of commitment to the elements of pluralism, which are
important to the theory rather than to policy); J. ELY, supra note 44, at 135, 242 n.4
(discussing the powerful attack on pluralism found in P. BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF
DEMOCRATIC ELITISM 83-92 (1962), W. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST (1975),
T. Lowi, THE POLITICS OF DISORDER (1971), and E. SCHATTSSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN
PEOPLE (1960)); T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALSIM xiii, 71 (1969) (quoted in Auerbach, supra
note 8, at 1336); A. MILLER, supra note 16, at 129; Stedman, supra note 10, at 151-52;
A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 254; id. 275-76 (pluralism an irrefutable and therefore
empty theory, so broad as to include any group-e.g., Soviet dissidents-from any
society); G. WILLS, at 204; deLong, supra note 31, at 887 (quoting Richard Stewart) (our
public administration undermined by "the corrosive seduction of welfare economics
and pluralist political analysis"); Moore, supra note 396, at 431 (quoted supra note 530);
Tribe, at 104 (discussed supra note 571).
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of important decisions in sufficient quantity and with sufficient quali-
ty. A more activist setting of individual and organizational powers
according to the limits of their competent exercise is also required.
Indeed, evaluation of a demonstrated level of competence in policy
formulation and implementation usefully sets the limits on activism
in three different ways. First, competence offers a means of attend-
ing to the integrity and credibility of government which can be easily
understood by decisionmakers and the public alike. Second, competence
judgments take advantage of the division of labor inherent in our
separation of p6 wers (the sharing rather than compartmentation of
functions that has marked our constitutional history) by requiring each
institution to do what it can do best. Third, competence judgments
offer incentives to line up behind the best policies and to compete,
in the healthy way of seeking to increase your competence so as to
have more opportunities for power-through-activism. Those who prac-
tice the policy vices described earlier would lose their power over
policy, which that would then fall to a more competent individual or
organization. These vices include inability to gather relevant infor-
mation and interpret it free of a Groupthink, relentless tinkering to
no good effect, mindless pigeonholing, and making new policy merely
to defend the old. It is surprising that this competence theme has
played so small a role in legal analyses of policy processes.583
For the CIA, a demonstrable incompetence has been allowed to
serve as the justification for increased powers, there being no institu-
tion competent in holding the CIA accountable. This illustrates, in
extreme fashion, a familiar state of affairs throughout government.
The lessons offered by abortion policy are subtler and more in-
teresting. Judicial competence over abortion policy is modest: much
higher than over national security questions but much lower than over
contract policies. State legislatures would appear to be more compe-
tent organs of abortion policy, unless Tribe is correct:
[W]hen the question before a legislature is whether it should
permanently and completely relinquish its role in an area
583. See G. WILLS, s-upra note 556, at 175; Howard, supra note 46, at 11 (Burger
Court sensitive to Frankfurter's concern about limits of judges' competence, especially
when second-guessing the legislature); White, supra note 62, at 296-97; supra notes
27, 30-31, 125, 140, 146-47, 155, 236-45, 357, 361-64, 443, 509, 523-42 and text accompanying.
Competence judgements make it possible to answer such old chestnuts as: Does the
slow pace of school desegregation illustrate a defect in the policy process or a sensitivity
to democratic public opinion?; Did Hiroshima and the Cuban missle crisis reflect
sandalous policy flaws or a admirable decisiveness?; and Did policy processes work
well over Watergate, or was the result determined by a series of accidents? See C.
LINDBLOM, supra note 2, at 5-6.
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that has for a time been part of its jurisdiction... the answer
comes from a source that cannot act disinterestedly ....
Even if . . . religious involvement [the challenged
legislation having been "shaped in the cauldron of heated
religious controversy"] should be regarded as irrelevant on
the ultimate merits of the constitutional dispute, one can-
not realistically treat it as immaterial to an assessment of
how accurately the political process would reflect, and how
sensitively it would accomodate, the range and intensity of
views and values implicated in the abortion question."' 5
On this view, the Court went activist and took policy away from
legislatures adjudged incompetent over abortion. What followed was
a second-best abortion policy, the result of the Court's seeming in-
ability to clear the policy streams, Baker v. Carr-fashion, so that
legislatures could then "accurately" and "sensitively" incorporate "the
range and intensity" of abortion views.
Such competence judgments are, in turn, subject to competitive
judgments of their competence-the pitfalls laid for the Court over
abortion, the subsequent dangers to its capacity to act effectively,
and the numerous media and academic discussions of whether the
peculiarly judicial notions of privacy and "personhood" make for better
policies. These judgments are more politically potent, and more useful
in evaluating the right to perform a policy task in competition with
others, than diffuse complaints about a judicial activism. Much ink
has been spent on this twentieth century term of art, but it still
amounts to little more than the dislike of particular policies and the
crochet pattern of legalisms surrounding this dislike. Analyses of an
activism are usually applied to courts, but all policymaking institu-
tions go through cycles of activism and quietism. These are really
cycles of optimism and pessimism based on shifting expectations about
competence in dealing with the variety of problems that always seem
to press. Congress tried to reform itself because of crises of com-
petence over Vietnam and the events surrounding Watergate, but an
overall twentieth-century decline in legislative responsibility and
responsiveness in shaping policy is still evident. As analyses of CIA
584. Tribe, supra note 431, at 30-31. See supra notes 236-37, 304, 377, 380, 418-23,
427, 513-15 and text accompanying.
585. L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 929-30. See J. ELY, supra note 44, at 99 (quoted
supra note 571); Sass, supra note 377, at 116, 119 (quoted supra note 514); Buckley,
supra note 417, at 1260: "The Court, at least institutionally, can deal objectively with
these [abortion] matters. Congress cannot. [Ilt is too influenced by pressure groups.
.But see also supra text accompanying note 413.
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policies demonstrate, tighter delegations of congressional authority
are needed if further tilts in the balance of power among the branches
of government are to be avoided. There will otherwise be a tilting
away from the liberal democracy that is the raison d'etre of Congress,
along with paying attention to policy alternatives and the fit between
means and ends. Congress needs more efficient procedures which are
less cyclical (less tied to annual budgets and biennial elections) and
which place less of an emphasis on the quick fix. 8
The incompetence of Congress over a policy planning is almost
total, but the same can be said about other governmental agencies.
This is a particulariy prominent failing in our policy processes.
Analyses of the CIA show how a lack of planning results in ad hoc
responses to situations which have gotten out of control, despite the
fact that many of these situations are of the agency's making. In a
democracy, planning involves an anticipation of demands rather than
their suppression, and expanding the realm of meaningful choice to
meet these demands along the lines I suggested for abortion policy.
Being free to choose (a phrase arguably trivialized by the Friedmans)
is the essence of our policy. Denial of that freedom is a denial of
responsibility in a laissez-faire world where everything simply happens.
Consistently applied, all but the worst policies will yield better results
than the constant tinkering that usually involves dismantling
predecessors' policies as a precondition to implementing your own,
"better" policies. 7
586. See Baum, supra note 54, at 47-49; J. ELY, supra note 44, at 104 (quoting
Alexander Bickel) (the challenge for the Court is to act out Judge Hand's 'sense of
common venture', without lowering "the quality of the other departments' performance
by denuding them of the dignity and burden of their own responsibility."); R.
EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 30, 97; C. LINDBLOM, supra note 3, at 66; F. RODELL, NINE MEN
271 (1955) (quoting Walton Hamilton's characterization of Frankfurter); G. SCHUBERT,
supra note 508, at 212 ("when a majority of the Court is activist, dissenters will argue
... the virtues of judicial restraint, just as a majority will preach restraint to activist
dissenters."); J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note 16, at 18-19 (quoting Kenneth Davis);
J. STONE, supra note 36, at 668, (judicial restraint notions "set up some kind of 'keep
off notice against those very activities of policy choice-making which [are] . . .
inserparable from appellate judicial functions."); G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC
LIFE 189, 351 (1982); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 110; H. WILENSEY, supra note 123,
at 162 (quoted supra note 372); Beckman, supra note 6, at 237-38; Carron, supra note
7, at 292-96; Davidson, supra note 18, at 307-08; Frye, supra note 18, at 276; Jones,
supra note 345, at 226-27, 235; Polsby, supra note 580, at 61, 68, 72; Schick, supra
note 6, at 259-60; Thurber, supra note 19, at 405-06, 416-17; supra notes 117, 267, 325-41,
343-45, 380, 406-07 and text accompanying.
587. See M. AND R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1981); F. FROHOCK, supra note
30, at 279; E. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL 191-93 (1974); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note
5, at 125, 128; Brietzke, supra note 568, passim; Carron, supra note 7, at 292-93; Schwartz,
supra note 21.7 (discussed supra note 217); supra notes 168, 181, 186, 192-93, 338-41,
516-42 and text accompanying.
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There is a strong need for planning agencies in the executive
branch, particularly for industrial policies, and a need to take advan-
tage of the president's extra-legal "jawboning" powers to coordinate
programs. Jawboning may ultimately prove the only way to bring the
bureaucracy under control. From this perspective, Nixon v.
Fitzgerald8 is wrongly decided because it fails to condemn a presiden-
tial jawboning exercised for reasons antithetical to a policy planning
and coordination. With a policy planning at the core of the effort,
it becomes possible 9 to design administrative law rules so as to align
bureaucrats' interest with the public interest, and to thus improve
the "fit" between liberal democratic laws and those of social ad-
ministration. A poor fit could well become a ground for judicial con-
demnation of particular rules. Judges would have to develop the ad-
ministrative expertise of their European colleagues, and the D.C. Cir-
cuit may be in the process of so doing."M
Such a judicial "activism" in clearing the policy streams, foster-
ing competence through coherence, would be no vice. Otherwise, policy
will remain its own cause under "the law of unintended conse-
quences. . . : a past set of problems is perceived; factions interpret
the effectiveness of each solution according to their own self-interest;
and few pay much attention to the cumulative effects of all of the
changes." ' Like the English but unlike the French, "Americans seem
content to abide a fair degree of contradiction and of ad hoc evolu-
tion in their law."'5 92 We may believe this, and the incoherent policies
resulting, to be the price paid for living with a federated separation
of powers. But it need not be so, and courts are the logical agencies
for applying competence judgments here. While they lack the liberal
democratic advantages of Congress, courts are capable of a more
588. Supra notes 270-73 and text accompanying.
589. See Brietzke, supra note 568, at 674-93.
590. See supra note 568 and text accompanying. See also, e.g., Farmers Union
Cent. Exch. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 52 U.S.L.W. 2549 (D.C. Cir., No.
82-2412, 1984); Assn. of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir.,
1979), cert. denied. 447 U.S. 921 (1980). Prior to the proceeding in Advertisers, Chair-
man Pertschuk had sent letters and given, speeches to the effect that childrens'
advertising was indeed unfair under the FTC Act. Holding that he did not have to
be disqualified, the court argued that quasi-judicial proceedings could not be grafted
onto an agency's essentially legislative mandate; policymaking 'administrators cannot
act like neutral adjudicators because they must shape political support and the agen-
cy's agenda. Disqualification should be had only on a "clear and convincing showing"
of "an unalterably closed mind." Id. at 1170. But see also supra note 356 and text
accompanying.
591. Reforming the Reforms, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1982, 8 (apilying this
"law" to reforms in Democratic Party Convention procedures).
592. Howard, supra note 46, at 28. See B. MOORE, JR., REFLECTIONS ON THE
CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY xii (1972) (quoted infra text accompanying notes 616-17).
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penetrating scrutiny. A finer judicial focus and more precise pro-
cedures emphasize the rights that frequently get lost in the shuffle
elsewhere in government, and that provide a measure of representa-
tion to the underrepresented. Analyses of abortion and CIA policies
illustrate most of the difficulties involved in attaining these ideals.
A paucity of both policy and power over the CIA led me to recom-
mend an ombudsman responsible to Congress.93
Ombudsmen would prove extremely adept at filling the policy
lacunae in government, a needed bolster for congressional power in
areas where accountability cannot be secured in any other way. The
exceedingly pragmatic ombudsman institution can simultaneously vin-
dicate rights without fostering new veto groups, curb maladministra-
tion, force superiors to monitor subordinates, break down rigidities
while coordinating policies, and plan future reforms.
Two other institutions with potentially significant policy roles
but lacking a formal status in the process should be attended to:
political parties and the media. The traditional party functions of elec-
toral accountability for an aggregate of policy options, of organizing
government and opposition to it, and of mobilizing public opinion, have
all been substantially eroded in recent years. The media can play a
catalytic role in policy evaluation and reform, and, of cotirse, in
informing the public generally.594 It is therefore unfortunate that the
whistleblower trilogy and the FOIA cases 9 5 deprive the media of some
of the most valuable sources of policy information which do not
endanger national security.
Institutional reforms are most urgently needed in state and local
government. Federalism only comes alive when a lower-level agency
kicks, and the New Federalisms of Nixon, Reagan, and the Burger
Court have clearly failed to realign policy functions in a more finan-
593. See R. DAHRENDORF, THE NEW LIBERTY 87 (1975); J. ELY, supra note 44, at
104 (quoted mupra note 586); A. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 158-59; F. MARX, supra note
356, at 55; E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 20; B. MOORE, JR., supra note 592, at 27; P. NONET
AND P. SELZNICK, supra note 33, at 103; G. SCHUBERT, supra note 508, at x-xi, 6; A. WILDAV-
SKY, supra note 5, at 7, 124-25; Baum, supra note 54, at 48-49 (quoting Donald Horowitz);
supra notes 343-68 and text accompanying.
594. See A. MELTSNER, supra note 11, at 281; J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note
16, at 7; Bullock, supra note 218, passim; Gilbert, supra note 229, at 127; Stedman,
supra note 10, at 163-64 (declining importance of parties matched by increased impor-
tance of party politics, a factionalism based on the personality politics that is an
inadequate substitute for policy formulation); id. at 167 (quoting Lowi) (unlike Euro-
pean parties, America's have a negligible effect on policy; they largely exist to keep
leadership and constitutional structure separate from the settlement of issues); supra
notes 118, 229, 234, 357, 365, 371, 442 and text accompanying; infra note 611 and text
accompanying.
595. Supra notes 118, 270-303 and text accompanying.
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cially and administratively rational way. Centralization is inevitable
whenever a firm policy must be thoroughly implemented. This is true
of national security programs, of abortion (as I would argue), and of
the corporate welfare policies enacted under the Interstate Commerce
Clause. There seems little reason for treating individuals' welfare pro-
grams differently. 9 George Stigler has long proposed assigning a
policy task to the lowest level of government capable of doing a com-
petent job. This seems a useful precept, although here, as elsewhere,
the competence theme would have to be elaborated carefully. The
means of doing this for CIA and abortion policies were outlined
earlier.59 '
D. The Dialectics of Law and Policy
Once the streams are cleared and policies are pursued more com-
petently, the bases for concealing or spreading the horns of the false
dichotomies of policy will begin to disappear. A series of Aristotelian
means can then be reached by an almost dialectical process: on the
rebound, first from one policy extreme and then another, in ways
which moderate the policy swings over time. Picking up on the exam-
ple from Aristotle discussed earlier,598 Great Society failures, which
were largely the result of a policy incompetence, led to a consensus
over doing less for the poor. But skepticism over Great Society dogmas
too quickly gave rise to the new dogmas that are now inducing a new
skepticism, as a substitute for clear thinking once again. Policy has
gone too far, in a governmental stinginess to the poor which ran to
the benefit of corporate and military welfare programs.
These programs are beginning to look like an extravagance-
even to the extravagant. Fewer guns and more butter thus seem to
be in the offing, in reaction to a policy incompetence and the greed
of pressure groups. There will be more guns and less butter than
under the Great Society (Vietnam aside), however. Such policy syn-
theses are sneered at by True Believers, including those accustomed
to an austere analytical elegance. But this is the politics of policy;
a process now messier than need be (and needlessly cruel to the poor),
it would remain rather messy under even the best of circumstances.
We can aspire to little more than to find "a mean of means, a blend
596. See E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 137; A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 142;
Gilbert, supra note 229, at 148.
597. See supra notes 236-45, 361-64, 523-42 and text accompanying; infra note
598 and text accompanying.
598. Supra text accompanying notes 550-51. See North, supra note 108, at 199
(quoted supra note 220); Weiseltier, supra note 173, at 14-15 (quoted supra note 220).
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of previously tempered and moderate types."' No law, policy, institu-
tion or individual can be all good or all bad, and decisionmakers must
therefore try to advance the good and suppress the bad over time.
This involves, for example, doing more to protect woman's
right/national security while, at the same time, advancing fetal
rights/the accountability of our national security agencies. The pro-
cess is a pragmatic one in which, as Holmes, Pound, and Cardozo
taught us, truth is made rather than found, "continually redefining
itself as it unravels. '60 0
The dialectics of law and policy reward careful study. A dialec-
tical tension among policies, rules, and institutions is responsible for
much of the interest law holds as an academic subject, and for the
vitality law needs to deal with policy problems. Things are always
changing, and from "the seedbed of implementation new policy prob-
lems grow and are plucked for the agenda.""1 We move forward
because, consciously or unconsciously, we each maintain images of what
is and what ought to be, and act to decrease the gap between these
images. Whether the "is" gets aligned with the "ought" depends upon
599. G. WILLS, supra note 556, at 209. A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 125 (without
a balance between skepticism and dogma, policy amounts to force without foresight
or mind without mater); G. WILLS, at 209 (discussed supra note 556); Conyers, Social
Reform and Law Reform, 4 DET. COLL. L. REV. 1121 (1983); Mahaffey, Privatization vs.
the Constitutional Commitment to the Promotion of the General Welfare, 4 DET. COLL.
L. REV. 1339 (1983); Weiseltier, supra note 173, at 14-15 (quoted supra note 220); supra
note 562 and text accompanying. In 1980, the "vote may have been more of a Carter
disaster than a Reagan triumph. Liberalism was indisputably a failure, in the 1960s
at least, but the evidence that Americans have repudiated its fundamental assump-
tions about the nation's purposes remains unclear and insufficient." Yardley, Review,
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Feb. 12, 1984, 17 (excerpted from the WASHINGTON POST).
600. G. JACOBSOHN, supra note 76, at 46. See Berlin, supra note 76, at 124-25 (rules
for segregating rational or purposive from irrational factors can only be "distillations
of a generalized sagacity-of practical judgment founded on observation, intelligence,
imagination, on empirical insight . . .something that resembles a skill or gift more
than it does factual knowledge but is not identical with either"); supra notes 41, 73,
148, 188, 194-98, 521-23 and text accompanying. Advancing the good and suppressing
the bad is, of course, one of the major canons of statutory interpretation: See Heydon's
Case (1584), 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637.
601. C. LINDBLOM, supra note 3, at 4. See Fatouros, supra note 61; W. Goldsmith,
Separation of Powers and the Intent of the Founding Fathers, Address to Congress,
the President, and Foreign Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., May 10, 1984; infra
note 605. See also Hartshorne, supra note 36, at 320:
Being a mathematician, used . . . to careful reasoning about continuity,
and living . . . in an age in which discontinuity had been introduced into
physics, Whitehead arrived at the old insight of Hinayana Buddhism:
becoming is not continuous change in a single actuality, but a series of
unitary actualities each of which is somehow produced or created out of
its predecessors.
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what governments "can" do, on a policy leadership widely regarded
as legitimate and competent.0 2
Several Europeans, closer to a Hegelian/Marxist tradition of
dialectical analysis, have conducted studies that can be translated quite
easily into useful analyses of American law and policy. Ralf Dahren-
dorf, for example, spells out policy implications of the "dialectics of
stability and change, integration and conflict, function and motive force,
consensus and coercion. 60 3 The late Raymond Aron spent his life
developing
a philosophy emphasizing tensions and disparities; between
intentions and results; between absolute commitments and
dubious courses of action; . . .between prospective choices
(made in uncertainty) and retrospective interpretations
(which lean toward determinism); ... between the diversity
of culture, values, and interpretations and the "Idea of
Reason" - the dream of a single universal destiny and
destination [pace Flaubert]; between politics as modest refor-
mism and politics as salvation. . . ;[and] between the moral
imperative of peace and the realities of the "state of war"
among nations.0 '
This is the stuff of policy issues carefully posed in light of cir-
cumstances in our mixed society and Uneasy State.
If Dahrendorf's or Aron's frames of reference sound peculiar or
even radical, this may be because the dialectics of American law and
policy have never been described in any thoroughgoing way. But im-
portant components of such an analysis can be found in the many legal
"antimonies" discussed earlier.6 10 If the streams are clear, the
602. North, supra note 108, at 198. See P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 228-29 (1972) ("Whatever else the court does, it must still reconcile the
legal 'ought' with the social 'is' through a dialectical process of interpretations ham-
mered out for specific fact situations."); Spadaro, supra note 22, at 12; Anderson, supra
note 17, at 717; supra notes 68-70 and text accompanying; infra notes 609-14 and text
accompanying.
603. R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 256, at 163. See id., passim. See also J. HABER-
MAS, supra note 256, passim; J. HURST, supra note 271, at 245 (history of antitrust policy
reveals consensus and conflict in all their variety).
604. Hoffman, supra note 557, at 6 (describing Aron's philosophy). See E.
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 14-16 (1966) (quoted infra note
612); supra notes 41, 73, 150, 188 and text accompanying.
605. See, e.g., supra note 61. Many of these antimonies receive additional discus-
sion elsewhere: see, e.g., supra note 24 and text accompanying (efficiency v. rights-a
theme essayed extensively in relation to, e.g., contracts law); supra notes 404-05, 582
and text accompanying (procedure v. substance); supra note 562 and text accompanying
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dichotomies of a policy can become thesis and antithesis -amenable
to a synthesis reached by a zig-zag path and soon to change again.
Legal processes exist to conserve more than they change, yet social
changes constantly upset the few priorities we set for ourselves under
law and the other criteria we use to evaluate policies. Policy usually
gets made incrementally, through the partisan mutual adjustment that
seeks to avoid direct confrontation between values in conflict. Actions
calculated to relieve distress at one point create it at another point.
Rooted classifications get manipulated, and policy grows more com-
plex, less efficient, and less effective. Classifications and their con-
cepts overlap to create contradictions. In the compromises that follow,
the constellation of different classifications and concepts is redefined.
Freedom of contract has, for example, been redefined de facto, even
as it remains the basis for the traditional contract/no-contract
dichotomy. An ever-widening judicial search for fairness and justice
in the particular case goes on within this dichotomy and has spilled
over into other concepts which are expanding to overlap. 6 ' For ex-
(idealism v. positivism); supra note 592 and text accompanying (contradictory nature
of American law in general).
Much of the analysis of law and policy about abortion and the CIA concerns
the extent to which apparent majorities (the streams remaining uncleared) can over-
ride minority rights, and the extent to which these rights can be used as effective
stumbling blocks to the rapid formulation and implementation of policy. See also J.
MERQUIOR, ROUSSEAU AND WEBER 1, 6 (1980) ("the problem of legitimacy," tensions
between Rousseau's power theory of legitimacy and Weber's belief theory of
legitimacy-Glaube; A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at 125 (discussed supra note 599); id.
at 210 ("The tension between skepticism and dogma is built into the rival needs for
organizational change and organizational stability"); Brietzke, supra note 202 (the dialec-
tic between effectiveness and validity in constitutional law, somewhat analogous to
Merquior's analyses and to my analyses of the CIA); Samuels, The Economy as a System
of Power: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 286, 350
(1973) (Hale's analyses of the compound of freedom and necessity that flows from ine-
qualities in the exercise of conflicting liberties); White, supra note 62, at 296 (quoted
supra note 62).
606. See J. ELY, supra note 44, at 88 (the few attempts by the Constitution's
framers to freeze substantive values were repealled, either officially or by interpretive
pretense); R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 25 (citing Charles Lindblom); id. at 123-24
(discussed supra note 30); G. JACOBSOHN, supra note 76, passim (major defect in American
pragmatism is a failure to offer unchanging criteria for the evaluation of changing
laws and policies); E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at 195-97; North, supra note 108, at 196
(quoted supra note 170); G. SAWER, supra note 224, at 183 (quoted supra note 378);
Goodrich, The Antimonies of Legal Theory, 3 L. STUD. 1, 2 (1983); Knowles, supra note
416, at 18 ("A wise public policy" for abortion "would seek to avoid direct confronta-
tions between the two values in tension in ... communities-the beliefs of the institu-
tions versus the constitutional rights of the consumer to the services she needs and
wants."); Tribe, supra note 10, at 69 (in contrast to the rules of ethics, policy choices
seen as marginal tradeoffs or exchanges among desired outcomes); supra notes 27,
92-117, 239, 522 and text accompanying. See also Hartshorne, supra note 39, at 320
(quoted supra note 581).
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ample: "Traditionally nontraditional, promissory estoppel has steadi-
ly expanded from its modest beginnings. . . . [It] is now employed
with increasing frequency in what are essentially commercial, 'bargain-
ing' situations . . . [even] where a bargain was under negotiation but
no final agreement had been reached."6"7
The effects of promissory estoppel on contract law may, indeed,
come to resemble those described in Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scien-
tific Revolutions:
When a sufficient number of contradictions accumulate
within a paradigm of knowledge [the contract/no-contract
dichotomy], the paradigm is abandoned in favor of a new
one [promissory estoppel]. Although there may be resistance
to this transformation ... the power of scientific anomalies
is by and large inexorable in persuading or converting the
next generation of scientists [first-year law students(?)] to
a novel paradigm. "Crisis simultaneously loosens the
stereotypes and provides the data necessary for a fundamen-
tal paradigm shift", to which is added: "Scientific revolu-
tions are inaugurated by a growing sense . . . that the ex-
isting paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the
exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm
itself had previously led the way."6
Law is not science, of course. Kuhn's theory does not explain the drift
in CIA policy, where there is no paradigm and where anomalies and
crises are numerous yet kept hidden by and large. If the policy
streams were cleared, however, the power of CIA anomalies would
almost certainly prove "inexorable" and lead to the creation of a
paradigm.
Kuhn's approach offers an explanation of Roe v. Wade as a "scien-
tific" revolution that failed. The Court and many others saw a number
607. Knapp, supra note 89, at 687. See supra notes 106-07 and text accompanying.
608. Goodrich, supra note 606, at 1-2, discussing T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1973), and quoting id. at 89, 92. Goodrich concludes, at 2, that
Kuhn's theory is not applicable to legal antimonies. With respect, I disagree. Many
changes in logical or metaphysical principles
come about as the result of philosophical reflection based on the discovery
of hitherto hidden inconsistencies, on the fear of future inconsistencies
or on various kinds of intellectual discomfort. . . .Reflection and argu-
ment may appeal to particular philosophical methods, such as the method
of doubt, the transcendental, the phenomenological[,j the "linguistic," the
"scientific" method, all of which claim (wrongly, I think) that one, and
only one metaphysical system, is valid.
Korner, supra note 39, at 355.
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of serious anomalies, almost a crisis in the pre-Roe abortion law and
policy. But resistance to the truly novel Roe paradigm ensued, as did
a near-total judicial incompetence at "converting the next generation"
to it. The Roe, trimesterian paradigm is intellectually unsatisfying and
incapable of accounting for further social and technological change.
Unable either to develop further or to fall of its own weight, the Roe
paradigm was manipulated to cover, however thinly, situations that
appeared to contradict it. Failures in abortion policy leadership led
to a policy complexity, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness.
E. Policy Leadership
The dialectics of American law and policy are moved, not by a
blind, Hegelian determinism but by particular policymakers trying to
cope with particular issues. Abortion and CIA policies failed to move
much during the last decade because of an absence of policy en-
trepreneurship, a compelling vision of the public interest pursued in
a competent enough way to forge a consensus over the heads of would-
be veto groups. In advance of vision and competence comes the ability
to think clearly (a casting aside of false dichotomies, for example),
the "first step towards political regeneration""6 9 which is always in
short supply. Translating clear thought into vision and then into action
requires an understanding of history and people, courage, and the
humane commitment that evokes affection and faith. It is sometimes
more important to be rhetorically right than statistically correct, right
rhetoric being very different from empty rhetoric. Admittedly, some
policy leaders have lacked these qualities, possessed by both
Roosevelts and by Earl Warren. J. Edgar Hoover and Admiral
Rickover, for example, successfully brokered their expertise to ad-
vance narrow goals that left the policy streams as fouled as before.
Their influence remained deep but narrow and by the back staircase,
because of our distrust of Platonic guardianship coming from the
strong State. In a democracy and with partial exceptions for the
Supreme Court, a broad policy leadership must be won by democratic
means from a public too clever (or so the hope of the Republic goes)
for the demagogue. 10
609. Orwell, supra note 73, at 353. See.Berlin, supra note 76, at 124-25 (quoted
supra note 600); G. JACOBSOHN, supra note 76, at 15; Weisburger, supra note 549, at 107
(quoting Burns) ("the great leaders of history have been intellectual leaders-though
they were other things at the same time."); supra note 428 and text accompanying.
610. See J. ALSOP, FDR: 1882-1945 (1982) (the adroitness, confidence, tenacity,
guts, optimism, and gallant front of the ever-pragmatic and anti-ideological Roosevelt);
R. EYESTONE, supra note 6, at 30 ("Knowledge is the only essential ... that cannot be
replaced by public leadership, but even here some kind of response can occasionally
proceed on the basis of ignorance, good intentions, and the blithe assumption that
the job can be done one way or another"); Lewis, A Man Born to Act, Not to Muse,
in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 151, 152 (L. Levy, ed. 1972) (Warren's
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This kind of leadership seems to have gotten harder rather than
easier to find. The president is the most logical of policy leaders; in-
deed, the Constitution assumes it so. But presidents are seldom
masters of their own souls these days, or at least they are not widely
seen to be in control. Political mercenaries take control while
packaging candidates and officials so as to offend as few as possible
and to appeal to as many pressure groups as possible. Voters are left
to grope in the dark by media treating electoral and other politics
like a sporting event, and leaders are left chasing rather than mak-
ing a consensus. A calculatedly bland personality is a poor substitute
for policy, which may be one reason for Reagan's success as a can-
didate. One of the few qualities all genuine leaders share is that, by
really standing for some things and against others, they inspire in-
tense dislike among some groups. As Hamilton recognized long ago,
leadership is much more than achieving a balance among groups,
where the views of one group are deemed as good as another's. The
temptation to duck a tough decision and go for maximum hype and
minimal results from the media is understandable, but it can be avoid-
ed. Creative reforms are urgently needed: it makes little sense to
return to the smoke-filled rooms ("peer evaluation"). In the meantime,
some in Congress are able entrepreneurs of particular policies and,
in default of leadership from elsewhere, there are always the experts
coordinating policy in bureaucratic interstices and the Supreme Court.
But a growing dissensus on the Burger Court, and its mastery of the
fine line that distinguishes Warren Court precedents without creating
new ones, do not inspire much confidence."'
"statesmanship" -"a sense of history, an understanding of people, force, courage.");
E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at 168; G. WHITE, supra note 586, at 326 (Warren "became the
Personification of his Court"; he "seemed to be the last major American public ser-
vant" who believed that the future would be better than the past, that public morali-
ty and private morality were the' same, and that-. . . justice will eventually prevail"
in America); Beer, supra note 4 (inter alia, discussing the leadership qualities of
Hamilton, Webster; Lincoln, T.R., and F.D.R.; id. at 29 (quoted supra note 4); Clark,
America Needs Heroes to Pull the Country Together, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., June,
1982, 68 (heroes, persons "with sufficient leadership qualities," needed to strive against
"fragmentation and pluralism" and to help small groups by serving as volunteers);
Douglas, The Mind of Perry Miller, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 3, 1982, 26, at 30 (Miller's
credo that "invigoration" comes "from contending against society for the welfare of
society."); Kennedy, Review, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 1983, 34, 36 (Thomas Dewey
as the "Model of Mugwumpery", America's greatest administrator at a time when
"the public hungered for redder meat"); id. (quoting Dorothy Thompson) (Dewey lack-
ed the "imponderables by which great leadership weathers storms, compounded of
sympathy with human feelings, humor, compassion, friendship, loyalty-qualities which
evoke affection and faith, which, is different from confidence."); Moynihan, supra note
530, at 18; Weisburger, supra note 549, at 106 (quoting Burns's description of the
American "sunburst of leadership," 1787-1860); supra notes 404, 556, 576-79 and text
accompanying.
611. See D. CHAGALL, THE NEW KINGMAKERS (1981); R. EYESTONE, supra note 6,
at 38; J. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 60 (quoting Joseph B. Eastman) (effective
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Partial, makeshift solutions seldom work because an overarching
leadership is needed to establish a consensus over policy and to coor-
dinate attempts at its implementation. There must be a prudent media-
tion among demands for stability and for change, demands voiced by
individuals and governmental and private organizations. We all resist
changes perceived as threatening, and the key to successful media-
tion is to determine who or what is resisting which change, and why.
Much resistance will turn out to be a rational response to poor policies,
poorly implemented. These must be fixed before consensus can be
secured, as in abortion. Other resistance, such as to the desegrega-
tion of southern schools, will prove irrational and amenable, perhaps,
to the influence of brilliant policies brilliantly justified, and to the
symbolism of law. If resistance persists, compliance will have to be
secured through a coercion used as creatively as possible to foster
consensus.
6 12
administrators are "masters of their own souls, and known to be such".); J. GREEN-
FIELD, THE REAL CAMPAIGN: HOW THE MEDIA MISSED THE STORY OF THE 1980 CAMPAIGN
(1982); McConnell, supra note 310 (quoted supra note 307); Steadman, supra note 10,
at 164; Anderson, supra note 17, at 717 (quoted supra note 576); id. at 719 (quoted
infra note 613); Beer, supra note 4, at 24; Bundy, The Quick-Trigger Mentality, MAN-
CHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Apr. 10, 1983, p. 17, col. 3, at col. 3-4; Fairlie, supra note
545, at 28 (quoting Randolph Borne) ("unless you start with the vividest kind of poetic
vision, your instrumentalism is likely to land you with the younger intelligentsia" engag-
ed in administering, World War I); Greenfield, The Myth of the Media's Political Power,
CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS, June/July 1981, 18; Matthews, Citizen Reagan, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 24, 1983, 43; Sherrill, Review, N.Y. TIMES BK. REV., Dec. 27, 1981, 3; supra
notes 306, 311, and text accompanying. See also Ashmore, supra note 156, at 2 (quoting
Peter Lisagor, 1970): Presidential statements are "rich lodes of insight and uncertain-
ty, truisms and ambiguities, recognition and discovery. They say a little something
to everybody and they drive up the wall the rational analyst who would search for
the succinct passage that explains the Presidents's purpose and direction." This is
not very different from some criticisms of the Burger Court. See, e.g., Howard's analysis,
supra note 46, at 16, of that Court as "master of the fine line": It usually "prefers
to limit or distinguish a precedent, including even those Warren Court decisions found
somewhat distasteful. Often the Burger Court will leave the precedent as it is but
refuse to carry its inherent logic to the next step." Id.
612. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 11 (in America, most people conform to
law and policy "because of prior conditioning (in a non-Pavlovian sense) and force of
habit."); id. at 111-12 (quoting Robert Merton) ("The very existence of the law operates
to create a climate of opinion conducive to compliance"); E. HAWLEY, supra note 604
(FDR's economics "confused" but, politically, he did a "fairly respectable job of satis-
fying conflicting demands); G. JACOBSOHN, supra note 76, at 17, 47; W. LEUCHTENBURG,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963) (details of FDR's democratic respon-
siveness to traumatic socio-economic crises); Muir, Under What Circumstances Can Law
Bring About Attitude Change, in LAW AND CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 48 (J. and M.
Grossman, eds. 1971) (school prayer decisions); P. NONET AND P. SELZNICK, supra note
33, at 113 ("Responsive law presupposes a society that has the political capacity to
face its priorities, make the necessary commitments."); LORD RADCLIFFE, supra note
31, at 24 (quoted supra note 552); Zinn, Introduction, in NEW DEAL THOUGHT xv, xviii
(H. Zinn, ed. 1966) (Thrumond Arnold's pragmatism, in THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT
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We must decide what to do about the private transactions, the
bureaucratic power, and the dilemmas of human existence examined
in this article. The purposes of government can be elevated by
anchoring such decisions to concepts having a powerful legal sym-
bolism: achieving rights, justice, the public interest or, as Lasswell
and McDougal put it, dignity in a free and abundant society where
people are usually treated as ends rather than means."1 3 To work ef-
and THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM, the theoretical equivalent of FDR's opportunistic vir-
tuosity in practical politics); Brietzke, supra note 568, at 682-84; Roche and Gordon,
Can Morality be Legislated?, in LAW AND CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 245 (an overly-
optimistic study of desegregation); Barkun, supra note 428, at 126 ("Indoctrination,
symbol-manipulation, and the provision of material rewards instill and maintain sup-
portive legal attitudes, yet they do so only within limits."); Brietzke, supra note 568,
at 655-57; Tribe supra note 10, at 99 (quoted supra note 552).
613. Trop v. Dulles (quoted supra note 400); supra notes 172, 378 and text
accompanying. A. ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 39-41 (a humanist psychology sees the "need
for secure survival. . . ,affection (or love), recognition (or dignity), and self-
actualization"-in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. alike); King, Letter from Birmingham Jail,
THE NORTON READER 470 (5th short. ed., A. Eastman, et al, eds 1980) (reprinted from Why
We Can't Wait (1963)); H. LASWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF THE POLICY SCIENCES 42-43 (1971)
(the Universal Delaration of Human Rights outlines some of the implications of dignity);
J. SHKLAR, supra note 24, at 92-93 (McDougal's dignity concept a goal for all to strive
for, and thus a standard for evaluating laws and institutions); A. MILLER, supra note
16, at 150 (need to remedy failings of pluralism, such as "structural" unemployment,
problems of the leisure society, and the disappearance of the concept of the dignity
of man); Lasswell and McDougal, supra note 34, at 501; Schick, supra note 6, at 261.
See Cardozo, supra note 2 (quoted supra note 2); F. FROHOCK, supra note 30, at 203
(what we do with welfare policies depends on what we want as a society); id at 209
(freedom and security are excellent candidates for a mass public interest, yet they
frequently conflict); E. HAWLEY, supra note 604, at 14 ("The dilemma of the New Deal
... lay in the political necessity of ... creating organizations and controls that could
check deflationary forces and provide a measure of order and security while at the
same time preserving democratic values, providing the necessary incentives, and making
the proper concessions to competitive symbols."); Horowitz, Economic Equality as a
Social Goal, in 5 POL. STUD. REV. AN. 256, 261 (I. Horowitz, ed. 1981) (quoting Herbert
Gans) (what is needed is more concern for the quality of life and more power to con-
trol one's destiny); G. JACOBSOHN, supra note 76, at 19 (public interest discernible through
careful analysis and the application of constitutional principles to the social realities
reflected in the signs of the times); B. MOORE, JR., supra note 592, at 3 (the questions
that arouse human passions have to do with the forms of authority and justice, the
ways in which people are treated as means and as ends); J. ROBINSON, supra note 70,
at 120 (social engineering differs from space engineering in that the objective is not
given, but is precisely what must be determined); G. SAWER, supra note 224, at 15 ("con-
stitutional law depends on some theory of relations between government and govern-
ed, family law on some theory of domestic relations, even so abstract a legal concept
as property derives much of its content . .. from . . . social values"); A. WILDAVSKY,
supra note 5, at 87, 90 (the social welfare revolution we're waiting for is already here,
because of a consensus over doing more for peace and less for war); id. at 215, 277
(chief obstacles to effective policy evaluations are an absence of clearly defined ends
and a tendency to treat people as means rather than ends); Zinn, supra note 612 (quoted
supra note 612); Dellapenna, supra note 376, at 423 (danger, through abortion, etc.
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fectively, this process needs persuasive justifications of policies as con-
tributing to these goals. The justifications must later be borne out
in fact. After years of relatively parochial interpretations, these goals
must be clarified. In particular, it must be made clear, and palatable,
that governments' creative pursuit of the public interest cannot be
sustained by our low tax levels."' We can't have it both ways here,
a fact that Western European electorates have accepted.
Much progress has been made in certain substantive policies over
the last thirty years. But our statecraft- nationbuilding and, increas-
ingly, a national reconstruction-has lagged behind. Our poor perfor-
mance can largely be attributed to the remediable faults of a lack
of presidential, congressional, and judicial time, interest, and
understanding of the tools and tasks at hand. Attention to policy con-
tent has been at the expense of clearing policy streams and forging
new coordinating links, by channelling politically-and
constitutionally -inevitable competitions in directions useful for policy.
Good policy can and should focus on all of these aims simultaneously,
to create from better policies those which are better still, by a dialec-
tical process and setting aside empty objections to an activism and
empty theories of an interest group pluralism. Only in this way can
we reduce a chaos of inappropriate policies, without signing over our
democratic policy rights to the strong State experts who would be
our Platonic Guardians. Levels of a policy chaos having been reduced
overall, areas where a chaos remains will call attention to themselves
as anomalies fit for a policy dialectic. Where policy is no longer its
own cause, chaos will serve as a signal to reduce chaos. A policy mean
of means will be discovered more easily because a dialectic operating
within a coherent process will moderate the swings between policy
extremes. If we have achieved a democratic control over policy means
policies, of becoming "inured to seeing ourselves purely as means."); Fairlie, supra
note 562 (quoted supra note 562); Gutman, Academic Determinism, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
295, 319 (1981) (quoting Coward) (Contracts and Torts should be taught together as
Obligations, under "the principle of reasonably decent conduct expected in. civilized
society."); Symmons, supra note 2, at 190 (public policy is the general equivalent of
public interest); supra notes 54, 65, 525 and text accompanying. See also Anderson,
supra note 17, at 719: "In liberal argument, equality locates the burden of proof in
making cases about justice, as freedom does in relation to the problem of ' authority.
All individuals are to be regarded as in the same position with regard to policy unless
good reasons can be given for treating them differently."
614. See G. EDWARDS, supra note 6, at 162; Parsons, supra note 60, at 70 (canons
of rationality are oriented toward clear and unambiguous goals or internally consis-
tent values, and toward means adapted to a goal according to best available knowledge);
H. WILENSKY, supra note 123, at 126 n.30 (quoted supra note 351); Anderson, supra note
17, at 718 (quoted supra note 552).
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and ends through Congress, experts can do no harm and may do much
good while implementing policies under canons of competence. A
democratic policy leadership is vital to effective implementation.
Achieving a policy coordination requires that a consensus be created
among citizens and within government, and that matters then be
regularized under law. Such a consensus does not develop spontaneous-
ly, and even Roosevelt's rather charismatic leadership was not wholly
sufficient to the task of coordinating policy across interest groups and
the many gaps and weak points within and among agencies. 1 5
At great length, I have attempted a synthesis of the "rather
varied intellectual precipitate" '6 of law and policy. Such a synthesis
is all the more necessary in "an age of unavoidable specialization and
scarcely less avoidable rancor." '17 All we can do, and that indeed is
considerable, is to make "medium-term thinking relevant for short-
term action"6 ' by improving "in every possible way the factual and
theoretical bases for unavoidable decisions." '619 Policy decisions are
unavoidable in the sense that not to decide is to decide in favor of
the status quo. A denial of responsibility by simply letting things
happen is no longer an option under our mixed economy and Uneasy
State. The "price of improvement is dedication to purpose, precision
in usage, acceptance of stringent rules of evidence and methods of
argument, and changes in the machinery used to make policy, monitor
615. See G. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 3, 157; E. LEWIS, supra note 123, at 123
(quoting Eisenhower) ("It is the task of statemanship to mold, to balance and to in-
tegrate 'the military-industrial complex' and other forces ...within the principles
of our democratic system"); F. RODELL, supra note 586, at 18-19; H. WILENSKY, supra
note 123, at 50 (rather than insulate himself from squabbles, Roosevelt fostered com-
petition within public channels of information and balanced them against private,
unorthodox sources); J. SIGLER AND B. BEEDE, supra note 16, at 16; Beer, supra note 5,
at 29 (quoted supra note 5); id. (allocating functions among governmental branches
a job for practical men, but "the imagery of the national idea can prepare" their "minds
. . . to recognize in the facts of our time the call for renewed effort to consolidate
the union."); Burns and Beschloss, The Forgotten FDR, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 7, 1982,
19, at 22; Fairlie, The Voice of Hope, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 27, 1982, 16, at 18 (It took
Roosevelt's supreme confidence and skill "to'let loose so many oddballs at so many
desks to do so many things, and still manage to weave them into that tapestry" of
agencies old and new); Goodman, Review, N.Y. TIMES BK. REv., June 30, 1982, 10
(Roosevelt's "gifted tinker's knack for taking institutional arrangements apart and
putting them back together in 'rational' ways."); Light, supra note 18, at 74; supra
notes 159, 310-11 and text accompanying.
616. B. MOORE, JR. supra note 592, at xii.
617. Id.
618. R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 593, at 87.
619. B. MOORE, JR., supra note 592, at 27. See E. MEEHAN, supra note 5, at x, on
the need to improve the quality of intellectual consumerism, and to demonstrate the
desirability of linking inquiry to purpose, knowledge to action. Of course, law has a
significant role to play in this process.
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consquences, and adjust performance to improve results.""6 ' The
centenary of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's birth having just passed,
the notion of a New Deal in laws and policies relevant to the 1980s,
of a new logic of public life that dispenses with many of the old false
dichotomies, sounds appealing.
620. Id. at 180. See G. EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 165 (public policy will always
be with us, and ignoring or simply excoriating it will not improve it); J. STONE, supra
note 562, at 14 (engaging in analyses like those described in the text, social scientists
"have nothing to lose but their deductive chains."); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 5, at
22-23 (A self-conscious society has no choice but to think, and we owe it to ourselves
to learn from failures and to make our dilemmas more expressive of our moral selves).
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